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No 153.*

GREAT-BRITAIN's Commercial Interest

EXPLAINED and IMPROVED:

In a SERIES of
DISSERTATIONS
ON THE

Most Important BRANCHES of her
TRADE and LANDED INTEREST.

WITH
An ESSAY, shewing the great Advantages which
would certainly accrue to ENGLAND, from
an Union with IRELAND.

Also a clear VIEW of the
State of our PLANTATIONS in AMERICA,
Their CONSTITUTION, TRADE, and REVENUES,

WITH
A certain METHOD to encrease their COMMERCE
and STRENGTH.

By MALACHY POSTLETHWAYT, Esq;

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THE SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N :

Printed for W. OWEN, at Homer's Head near Temple-Bar.

M DCC LIX.

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Mutual Interests of her
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VOL. II.
The Second Edition.

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Printed for W. Owen, at Horner's Head, near Temple-Bar.
MDCCLX.



TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE

THE
MARQUIS OF GRANBY,

**Major-General of His Majesty's Forces,
and one of the Knights of the Shire
for the County of CAMBRIDGE.**

MY LORD,

Tis the duty of every true friend to his country to exert himself to the utmost, according to his talents, in the public service, in such perilous times as the present are. Though my ta-
A 2 lents

lents are cut out only for writing for the interest and honour of the nation, they may not be less necessary and useful to the state than the abilities of those who are formed to serve it in any other capacity.

YOUR Lordship, as well as His Grace your father, having honoured me with your patronage of my Dictionary of Commerce, and the following political Dissertations, corroborating and extending many parts of what is therein urged, they have a sort of claim to Your Lordship's countenance and protection: nor could I, consistent with that high regard and veneration that I have professed for your noble family, have addressed those discourses to others.

THERE are other motives too, My Lord, for requesting Your Lordship to accept of this fresh testimony of my regard. Your Lordship, like the noble duke your father, is esteemed and beloved by all parties; and as this treatise tends to promote an happy
union

union amongst any ministry that shall be appointed. Your patronizing of this work will convince the administration that Your Lordship is a friend to that union, concord, and harmony that are so necessary at present to the prosperity and glory of the nation.

This work, My Lord, may be considered as a kind of *political chart*, whereby the rulers of the kingdom may steer clear of those rocks and shoals whereon their predecessors have unhappily struck.

I will not presume to tell Your Lordship that the chart is complete. If it shall be found pretty correct, as far as I have extended it, I may be excited to make further efforts to render the same as perfect as I am able; and I assure Your Lordship that I have great materials for the purpose; some of which I have had the honour to shew you; and Your Lordship knows that I do not want application, and I hope my health will permit me to spend the remainder of my life for the interest of my country.

BUT

BUT there are many things, which the course of my studies has led me to, that are by no means proper to be made public, they giving the enemy advantage over us; for that, Your Lordship well knows, which will do great public service, may be converted to do no less public injury. These things I reserve, as being fit only to be laid before the administration in manuscript; and I hope Your Lordship will act in concert with His Grace your father, that my good intentions may produce the desired effect. I am, with the highest veneration,

23 JY 63

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's

Most humble and

Obedient servant,

MALACHY POSTLETHWAYT.

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TO THE

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POLITICAL
DISSERTATIONS
ON THE

British trade, and commerce, and other
interesting subjects, &c.

DISSERTATION XX.

The system of policy pursued by France, from the year 1701, to the present time, in relation to her AMERICAN AFFAIRS; whereby it will appear by what steady measures that nation has become so powerful in that part of the world; being an abridgment of their statutes, with respect to those colonies; extracted from their royal ordonnances, edicts, and arrets; with suitable observations thereon, interesting to these kingdoms.

HAVING, in our preceding dissertations, delineated with all brevity the formidable views of France in America, it will be necessary to point out the gradual steps whereby those mighty things are proposed to be accomplished

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plished by the French court; for when all these things are *connectedly* laid properly before us, with their whole conjunctive force, we shall be the better capable of defeating those destructive designs, wherewith this nation is at present threatened.

THAT we may have the requisite evidence before us, whereby a right judgment may be made of the matter, it will be proper to take a retrospect of the state of the French islands and other colonies before 1701; and we can depend on no accounts thereof more authentic than those given by the French board of trade themselves, in their memorial to the royal council; which is as follows, viz.

“ WHEN once, says the board, this commerce shall be well established [meaning that of the sugar islands] and our colonies shall be sufficiently stocked, it will not be difficult for us to imitate the English of Jamaica in the traffic they have with the Spaniards. We may, by the way of St. Domingo, trade in negroes: by favour of that trade, we might vend great quantities of our goods and manufactures to the Spaniards of the neighbouring islands, and on the coast of the continent, and might get of them a great deal of gold and silver in exchange*. The grand occur-

* In consequence hereof, before the peace of Utrecht, the French had the *Asiento* for supplying the Spanish West-Indies with negroes; which proved the means of introducing immense

occurrence of the union of France and Spain gives us hopes of an open commerce, and

immense quantities of the French manufactures into Spanish America. But when they had greatly enriched themselves thereby, and so overdone this trade as to render it good for nothing to any successor, they very wisely transferred the *Assiento*, by the treaty of Utrecht, to our English South-Sea company; and what the company and the nation got by it, as it was modelled and conducted, is too well known to need explanation. But here it may be needful to prevent a mistake in the reader, lest he should apprehend, that our obtaining a proper *Assiento* from Spain; and that conducted as it ought to be, must necessarily prove a disadvantageous contract. On the contrary, it might easily be shewn to be quite otherwise, as well to the crown of Spain as Great Britain, and might prove the cement of great friendship between those two kingdoms. And before the late peace of Aix la Chapelle was concluded, and the affair of the South-Sea company were settled, I was desired by a certain person of distinction to state the nature of such a new *Assiento*, in order to lay before a certain great man; which I did, and the consequence thereof will appear in my memoirs of the transactions of that certain great man.

To such a degree did the French trade in the South-Seas, by virtue of their *Assiento*, that they were enabled, by a computation made from the several registers in Spain, and remittances otherwise made (according to authentic intelligence now lying before me) to import into the French dominions TWO HUNDRED AND FOUR MILLIONS OF PIECES OF EIGHT; which reduced the Spanish West Indies to such a degree of misery, as obliged the viceroy of Peru to present a memorial to his Catholic Majesty, representing the grievances under which the trade laboured, by the French being permitted and encouraged in the carrying on such a destructive trade in the South-Seas; which had, according to the words of the Spanish memorial, occasioned—The whole trade to be at a stand—The treasure of the kingdom to disperse different ways—All commercial negotiations to be embarrassed—The merchants to be ruined—The subjects to be miserable—The quinto's (or king's duties of one-fifth) to be decreased—The duties in general to be misapplied—The public revenue in general dissipated—The traders in general to become beggars—And the French reaping all the benefit.

an easy correspondence, which may enable us *to undertake any thing*. We have a great many ships which lie useless in our ports, and are rotting for want of employment. The intendants of the maritime provinces can attest this truth: it is grievous to the king's subjects to see their shipping perish thus, while they might make good use of them, had they the liberty which they desire.

THEN follow the measures prescribed by this board, in order to establish the sugar-trade of France, and divers other things essentially necessary to their general commerce.

“IT is necessary to represent, continue the board, that the duties which were settled by the arrets of the 20th of June, 1698, on the white sugars imported from the islands, at 15 livres, over and above the 3 per cent. duty to the domaine of the west, are too high, and prejudicial to the commerce of France, and advantageous to the trade of foreigners, for the reasons following:

I. THE Portugal sugars, which are imported into France, pay but 15 livres the hundred weight, and are exempted from the duty of 3 per cent. of the western domaine, which those of our colonies pay.

II. HIGH duties hinder great consumption; the dearer any thing is, the more sparing are people in using it; this is contrary to the design of improving the colonies. Besides,
it

it is certain, that when sugars come to sink in their price, they cannot bear so high a duty: it will, therefore, be expedient to reduce the duty of 15 livres to 8, and the duty on brown from 3 livres to 30 sols; for, at this very time, white sugars are worth but from 25 to 30 livres the hundred weight, and the brown from 12 to 13 livres.

III. WHEN the crop of sugars shall be in any degree plentiful, the enterpost ought to be allowed, to favour the vending of it, and carrying of the over-stock to foreigners. In Holland the brown sugars pay but 20 sols, and the white but 30 sols; it would therefore be convenient to reduce the duties in France to such a foot, that our sugars might be carried out with the same advantages as those of other nations.

THE royal council seems to have designed to remedy these inconveniences, by the arret of the 28th of June, 1698, which allows the carrying directly to foreign parts clayed and refined sugars, paying only the 3 per cent. duty of the western domaine.

BUT the execution of this arret would be prejudicial to the state, because the French ships, going directly from the American island to foreign ports, are necessitated, after they have unladen, to refit; this creates expence, money must be laid out in subsisting the ships companies, and in revictualling to return to France. This is consuming foreign commodities; our carpenters, sail-

makers, rope-makers, and other mechanics, who work to the sea, are deprived of the profits, which they would reap, if the ships made their voyage directly back to France.

THE crews oblige the captains to pay them their wages, it cannot be avoided, the cargo being a security for the wages of the seamen; this money is dissipated among foreigners in debauchery, and their families, which are in France, are deprived of their subsistence: in a word, this practice will ruin our navigation, instead of increasing it.

IV. THE mismanagement of the clerks (or agents) of the farmers, is very prejudicial to the commerce; they make a difficulty to return the duties (or pay the drawbacks) which they are obliged to do; when the sugars refined in France are sent out of the kingdom; they take advantage of their authority, and of the protection with which the council honours them; the length and charge of the proceedings discourage the merchants.

V. PROVISION should be made by proper regulations, against the frauds which the inhabitants of the islands are apt to commit. Care has been already taken to correct those which they used in making of sugars, by ordering every one to put his mark on the casks with a hot marking-iron, in order to discover and proceed against the culpable: it is necessary to oblige every one of the inhabitants to keep in his house a good beam

beam and scales, with weights of lead or iron, marked according to the standard, and to forbid them to make use of stillards and weights of stone. It is likewise necessary to oblige the director, who was paid a duty for weighing after the rate of one per cent. for all goods, though he does not weigh them, to send every year an expert master-weigher, with brass weights, and other necessaries, for ascertaining, and marking according to the standard, all the weights of the inhabitants, making them pay for the materials added to defective weights, and this for remedying the frequent abuses which are committed by false weights.

THE deputies are obliged to observe further to the royal council, that, for three or four years past, a duty is levied at St. Domingo of two sols per livre on indigo shipped off there. This novelty is the more pernicious, because that drug serves for dying our manufactures in blues or blacks, and because we make a considerable traffic thereof to the north. It is of great importance for the royal council to be pleased to take off this duty, which is capable of ruining the cultivation of this drug, which is very near as good as that of Guatamala.

VI. IT might be proper to add to the regulation by which the council enjoins every ship to carry a certain number of lads or fellows, who hire themselves to service for augmenting the colonies, which might be taken

out of the Hotel Dieu, and maids brought up to, and expert in manufactures, to be married to the hired men-servants after they have served out their times; and to forbear sending the common prostitutes, who are more likely to corrupt and infect the country, than to people it; and, as there are abundance of beggars in France able to work, who live in perfect idleness, it would be essential to order the justices to cause numbers of them to be taken up, and shipped off to our colonies.

VII. LASTLY, it would be convenient to establish four consular jurisdictions, in the islands of St. Domingo, St. Christopher, Martinico, and Guardeloupe, in the nature of those established in France: they might be composed of one judge and four consuls, who might decide sovereignly all causes to the sum of —, and for the greater sums, give a liberty of appeal to the sovereign court of the place.

ABOUT forty years ago the French were little versed in commerce, and little skilled in navigation. In those days it was necessary to form companies, and to grant them privileges, in order to engage them to beat out, for the king's subjects, tracks of commerce which were unknown to them. It is expedient and very beneficial to the state to act in the like manner, as often as new settlements of colonies, clearing and cultivating of new discovered places, or new inventions are proposed;

posed ; yet, in these cases, the privileges ought not to be granted but for a certain number of years : but, unless on such occasions, nothing is more destructive to a state than exclusive privileges."

No man of sense, can read these sentiments of the French deputies of commerce, which they laid before the royal council, but must applaud them, they being so well adapted to the advancement of colonies, especially, in their infancy, as it were : nay, we find, from the sense of these deputies themselves, that the whole trade of France was then but in it's infant state ; for they acknowledge, that, about forty years before this, the French were little versed in commerce, and little skilled in navigation : and, although England has had the start of them in trade and navigation by some ages, yet we experience, that they have already overtaken us. Could they have possibly effectuated these great things, if the laws and regulations of their trade, and the encouragements they have constantly given within this century, were not exquisitely well calculated to answer the end proposed ? They had the advantage, indeed, of our laws for their guidance ; and they have shewed as much sagacity in imitating the best, as in rejecting the worse : whereby they have, in many respects, improved in their laws and regulations of commerce and navigation upon ours ; and, if there is any thing importantly useful to be borrowed
from

from them in our turn, it is to be hoped, that we shall not be so unwise as to condemn it, because it is of French production.

Regulations concerning hired servants, and fire-arms, exported by merchantmen to the French colonies in America and New France. November 16, 1716, registered in parliament.

Of hired or articted servants.

A R T I C L E I.

ALL captains of merchantmen that shall go to the French colonies of America, and New France, or Canada, excepting those in the negro trade, shall be obliged to carry thither hired servants, viz. a ship of 60 tons, and under, shall carry three hired servants; from 60 to 100, four ditto; and, from 100 and upwards, six hired servants.

2. The terms of carrying these servants shall be mentioned in the permission given by the admiral to the captain for sailing.

3. Those servants shall be between the age of 18 and 43, none less than four feet in stature, strong, fit to work, and shall serve three years.

4. Such servants shall be examined by the officers of the admiralty at the port from whence the ships shall sail, and those shall be rejected who are not qualified according to

to the preceding article, and of a good constitution.

5. The particular characteristics of the servants shall be minuted in the ship's book.

6. Such of them that are handicrafts-men and mechanics, useful to the colonies, shall be accounted as two, and the trade each is of shall be specified.

7. The captains of such merchantmen, as soon as arrived, shall deliver them to the commissary appointed for the purpose, who shall examine whether they answer the descriptions required, and are the identical persons who embarked.

8. The captains and inhabitants of the colonies shall agree upon the price; but, if they cannot agree, the commissaries shall oblige those inhabitants that have not the number of hired servants required by the ordinances, to take them, and settle the price.

9. The captains shall bring a certificate from the commissioners, testifying the said servants to be the same as embarked.

10. The captains, on their return to France, shall produce the said certificate to the officers of the admiralty.

11. The captains and owners of ships shall be absolutely condemned in the penalty of 200 livres for every such articulated servant not carried to the colonies, without appeal.

Of fire-arms.

ARTICLE I.

All captains of merchantmen who shall sail to the island colonies in America, and New France, or Canada, except those who are concerned in the negro-trade, shall be obliged to carry thither in each vessel four buccaneer-guns, or four fuseses for hunting, mounted with brass.

2. The condition upon which these guns may be carried, shall be inserted in the permission given by the admiral for such ships to sail.

3. These buccaneer-guns shall be four feet four inches long, light, and carry balls of 18 to the mark pound weight.

4. The fuseses for hunting shall be four feet long, and light.

5. The said captains shall, on arrival in the colonies, deposit the said arms into the king's arsenal where they shall land, in order to be examined and proved in the governor's presence.

6. If any piece shall not hold in the proof, the captain shall be fined 30 livres.

7. The said 30 livres shall be immediately laid out by the governor in buccaneer-hunting-guns, and distributed to the poor inhabitants.

8. The said captains shall leave the said arms till they are sold, or till the governor shall

shall have distributed them among the companies of the militia ; in which case he, in concert with the intendant or commissary, shall order payment for the same.

9. The captains shall take a certificate from the governor, attested by the intendant, of the sending back such guns, and of the sum paid on account of not standing proof.

10. They shall also be obliged, on their return to France, and in making their declaration, to carry with them the said certificate to the officers of the admiralty.

11. The captains and owners of such merchantmen shall be condemned by the officers of the admiralty in 50 livres fine for every such gun that they shall omit to carry into the colonies, without appeal.

Of prosecutions and fines.

A R T I C L E I.

ALL prosecutions, occasioned in disregard to the said regulations, shall be undertaken by the king's solicitor of the admiralty.

2. The fines made to the admiralty shall belong to the admiral ; and those made by the marble-table, the one half shall go to the admiralty, the other to the king, according to the ordinance of 1681.

THE governors, intendants, or commissaries in the colonies, shall jointly transmit an account every half-year to the council of marine,

fine, of the number of articted servants and guns that every merchant shall send to the colonies, of the sums paid for defective arms, and how the arms have been employed.

IN consequence of which, letters patents were granted by the king, in the manner we have before given instances of, to cause the said regulations to be duly observed in his dominions.

IT is obvious enough, from the least reflection, that, (1) The intention of the preceding regulations is, to people the French colonies with a number of whites proportionate to that of blacks, that the latter might not be an over-match for the former, and disturb the plantations with insurrections. (2) That, by sending over French workmen, as articted servants, is to render labour cheaper in the plantations, and so far to instruct the negroes in such workmanship as may render them the more serviceable to the planters. And, (3) To accustom the people to the use of arms, as well to defend their colonies at the least expence to the crown, as to train them to hunting, and that not only to supply them with food at the least expence, but for the sake of the peltry trade in New France, or Canada, which is the essential article of that commerce.

Marine

Marine laws to be observed in all the ports of the islands and French colonies, wherever situated. Of January the 12th, 1717.

Of the judges of the admiralty, and their jurisdiction.

A R T I C L E I.

THERE shall be, for the future, judges appointed, well skilled in MARITIME AFFAIRS in all the French colonies, and in all places where the French have settlements, called officers of the admiralty, distinct from the civil ones, who shall conform themselves according to the ordinances made in 1681, and other marine laws.

THE king's * lieutenants and sollicitors cannot be admitted till 25 years of age; if they are not graduates, yet that shall be dispensed with, provided they have a competent knowledge of the maritime laws and ordinances, in which they shall undergo an examination before admittance.

Of the methods of proceeding in the courts of admiralty and their judgments.

DEMANDS for the payment of part, or all a ship's cargo, ready to sail to France from

* A lieutenant, in this sense, is a magistrate that presides in the courts of admiralty, to see that the royal edicts, ordinances, &c. are duly put in execution.

the colonies, shall be tried *summarily*, and executed, notwithstanding an appeal, and the detainers of such merchandises shall be compelled by the fail of their effects, and even by the detention of their person, to discharge their obligation, &c.

Of granting permissions for sailing, and reports relating thereunto.

No vessel shall sail from the ports and havens of the colonies, and other French establishments, either to return into France, or to pass from one colony to another, without permission or licence from the admiral, on pain of confiscation of ship and cargo, &c.

THE masters of ships whose ordinary navigation lies in carrying sugars, or other merchandises, from one port to another in the same island, as also those who navigate from island to island, and go from Martinico to the islands of Guardeloupe, Grenade, Grenadins, Tobago, Mary Galante, St. Martin, St. Bartholomew, St. Alouzie, and St. Vincent, St. Dominico, and those that go from the island of Cayenne to the province of Guiana, to the coast of St. Domingo, and to the island of Tortuga, shall take licences from the admiralty, which shall be granted to them for one year.

THOSE who carry on trade from the Isle Royal, or Cape Breton, from port to port, or who go to the adjacent islands, as the island of Sable to that in the gulph of St. Laurence,

rence, and to the coasts of the said gulph, shall likewise take out licences from the admiralty, which shall be granted them for one year; but, if they come to Quebec, they shall take out a new licence.

THE masters of the said ships, before receiving their licences, shall give security not to go into any island, or to any foreign coast, on pain of confiscation of ship and cargo, and a fine of 300 livres.

THE masters of ships, who shall trade in the river and gulph of St. Lawrence, shall also take licences from the admiral, which shall be granted them for a year; and those that shall go from Quebec to Cape Breton shall do the same.

LICENCES for fishing shall not be granted without the consent of the governors, who shall take cognizance of that branch of trade, that it is not abused by trading with foreigners.

ALL masters of ships arriving in the colonies and other French settlements, shall be obliged to make their report to the lieutenant-general of the admiralty, 24 hours after their arrival, on pain of suffering an arbitrary fine.

EXCEPTING only those, who arriving at Cape Breton on the fishery account, for they may enter into the ports and havens where there is no admiralty; in which case they shall make their report at the nearest place where there is a court of admiralty, and that

within one month or more from the time of their arrival, under the same penalty.

HIS majesty forbids all masters of ships from unloading any merchandises before making their report, unless in case of imminent danger, on pain as well of corporal punishment, as confiscation of the merchandises so unloaded.

THE king's solicitor of every court of admiralty shall be obliged, at the end of every year, to send to the admiral a state of the officers of the admiralty of their jurisdiction, and of whatever has occurred of importance, as likewise a list of the ships arrived there, with the day of their arrival, and of their departure, according to the manner that shall be prescribed them.

ALL merchants, masters, and captains of ships, are forbid navigating in the American seas, to carry on any commerce with foreigners or to land with this intent on the coast or islands of their settlements, under pain the first time, of confiscation of ship and cargo, and, in case of repetition, the masters and sailors shall be sent to the galleys.

THE masters and pilots, in making their report, shall represent their licences, declare the time and place of their departure, and the loading of their ships, the course they have steered, the hazards they run, the accidents happened to their vessel, and every circumstance relating to their voyage.—They shall also represent the journal of their voyage, which shall

shall be returned to them, if desired, by the officers of the admiralty, within eight days, and without any expence, after they shall have extracted whatever is requisite to render the said navigation more secure *, of which they shall take care to give an account to the admiral every three months.

THE captains and masters of ships who arrive from the French colonies in the ports of France, shall be obliged, in making their report, in what manner they were received in the colonies, how justice was administered to them, and what charges and averages they were obliged to pay from their arrival to their departure: his majesty commands the officers of the admiralty to interrogate the masters and captains upon these particulars; to receive the complaints of the passengers and sailors, who have any to make †; and to direct a verbal process thereof, which shall be made, in order to be sent to the admiral of France.

Of the visiting of ships.

ON the arrival of ships, the officers of the admiralty shall visit them, according to the edict of 1711. They shall take account with

* This is certainly a very judicious regulation, and tends greatly to the security of navigation.

† This also is mighty well calculated for the regulation of navigation.

what merchandises they are laden, what sailors they have, what passengers they have brought, and they shall signify the day of the ship's arrival, and shall verbally give an account thereof.

THE visitation of ships intended to return to France, shall be made before their loading is taken in, by the officers of the admiralty, with an approved carpenter, and in presence of the master, who shall be obliged to assist therein, under pain of an arbitrary fine, to examine if the vessel is in fit condition for the voyage intended.—They shall likewise examine into all the ship's tackle, and every thing thereunto belonging, excepting the sailors and the provisions, and this before one or two captains appointed for that purpose by the officers of the admiralty, in order to know whether the ship is fit for the voyage in all respects; and the masters of ships who are preparing for their loading shall be obliged to apprise the officers of the admiralty thereof, two days before they begin so to do, under the penalty, for disregard hereof, of the expence of unloading the said ship, and reloading of another *.

THEY shall also take the declaration of the master, with regard to the quantity and quality of the provisions, in order to judge whe-

* Is not this exquisite policy, for many reasons that will naturally occur to the judicious reader?

ther they are competent to the length of the voyage, and the number of sailors and passengers.

If two thirds of the sailors make declaration against the master of the ship and the purveyor, that the provisions are not of good quality, or that there is not the quantity mentioned in the master's declaration, the officers of the admiralty shall testify the same : and, in case the declaration proves false, the master and the purveyor shall be each condemned in the fine of 100 livres, and to take the provisions themselves as shall be ordered, which shall be prosecuted by the solicitor of the admiralty, and of another *whom the sailors shall nominate,, &c.*

THE officers of the admiralty shall prepare a verbal process of the condition of the ship, of the tackle and the provisions ; a copy of which shall be delivered to the masters, who are obliged to represent the same to the admiralty at the place of their return, under the penalty of an arbitrary fine.

THEN follow letters patents of the same date, ratifying the foregoing, and ordering the strict execution thereof ; of the nature of which, as we have given instances before, we shall not repeat the same.

THE king's letters patent, concerning the regulations for the commerce of the French colonies, of the month of April, 1717.

ARTICLE I.

THE armaments of ships intended to sail to the said island colonies, shall be made in the ports of Calais, Dieppe, Havre, Rouen, Honfleur, St. Malo, Morlaix, Brest, Nantes, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, Bayonne, and Cette.

2. MERCHANTS, who shall fit out ships in the ports of the cities aforesaid, for the French islands and colonies, shall give security to the secretary of the admiralty, whereby they shall be bound under the penalty of ten thousand livres to cause their ships to return directly from the colonies into the same port from which they sailed, unless otherwise compelled by stress of weather or shipwreck; and the merchants shall cause such securities to be deposited in the farmer of the revenue's office.

3. All provisions and merchandises, either of the production or fabrication of the kingdom of France, even silver plate, wines and brandies of Guyenne, or other provinces, designed to be exported to the French island colonies, shall be exempted from all duties of exportation and importation, as well from those of the provinces of the five great farms, as of those reputed foreign provinces; and likewise from all local duties, in carrying mer-
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chandises from one province to another, and in general from all other duties, which tend to our advantage, those only excepted, which relate to the general farm of aids, &c.

4. All warlike ammunition, provisions, and other things necessary, bought in the kingdom for the victualling and fitting out of ships appointed for the French isles and colonies, shall enjoy the same exemption from duties.

5. The provisions and merchandises of the kingdom, appointed for the French isles and colonies, and coming from one sea-port to another in the kingdom, shall be, upon their arrival in the ports, where intended to be landed in the said isles and colonies, warehoused, and not be moved from ship to ship, on pain of confiscation, and a thousand livres penalty.

6. Merchants who shall have brought provisions and merchandises of the kingdom into the port, appointed for embarkation, shall be obliged to declare, at the custom-house of the place of their unloading, if there is any one, if not, at the nearest to the said place, the quantity, quality, weight and measure of the provisions and merchandises designed for the French isles and colonies, in order to have them visited, leaded, or marked, by the commissioners of the farms, to have their security discharged, and be obliged to return, within three months, a certificate of their being taken from the depository

warehouse for embarkation, as before declared; but such embarkation may be made without warehousing of provisions and merchandises brought by land or river-carriage.

7. Carriers shall be obliged to represent, and cause to be examined, those discharges of security by the commissioners and directors of the farms in the cities, wherever they are established; and the said commissioners shall testify, without any delay or expence, the number of tons, cases, &c. included in the said discharge, and observe if the leads and marks affixed, &c. are entire and undefaced, without minutely examining into the said provisions and merchandises, or opening the tons, bales, or cases, &c. unless the leads, &c. shall be broken, defaced, or changed. — And if, on examination, any fraud appears, the goods shall be confiscated, and the offenders condemned in 500 livres penalty.

8. The said provisions and merchandises shall, before their embarkation, be visited and weighed by the commissioners of the farm, in order to ascertain the quantity, quality, weight, and measure thereof, and they shall not be laden in any vessel without the said commissioners being present.

9. Merchants shall give security to the officer of the farms at the port of embarkation, to report, in a twelvemonth or more, a certificate of the discharge of the said provisions and merchandises in the French islands and colonies; and the said certificate shall be

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wrote on the back of the discharge of the security, and signed by the governors and intendants, or by the commandants and commissioners subdelegated in their respective districts, and by the commissioners of the farms of the western domaine, on pain of paying four times the duties.

10. Provisions and merchandises coming from foreign countries, whose consumption is allowed in the kingdom, even those which come from Marseilles and Dunkirk, shall be liable to the duties of importation due to the first office of farms, by which they shall enter into the kingdom, notwithstanding they shall have been declared to be intended for the French islands and colonies; but, when they shall be exported to the said islands and colonies, they shall be entitled to the exemptions mentioned by the third article.

11. We permit, notwithstanding, to come from foreign countries, into the ports before-mentioned in the first article, salt beef, to be sent into the said islands and colonies, and the same shall be free from all duties of importation and exportation, on condition that it shall be warehoused as aforesaid, on pain of confiscation.

12. Merchants of our kingdom shall not load for the French islands and colonies, any foreign merchandizes whose importation and consumption are prohibited, on pain of confiscation, and 3000 livres fine, which shall be imposed by the officers of the admiralty.

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13. The silk, and other merchandizes of Avignon, and the county of Venaissine, which shall be declared for the french islands and colonies, shall pay the duties required at importation, and be exempt from all duties of exportation, and all others, those excepted which depend on the general farm of aids and domaines.

14. Swiss linens that are free from all duties of importation, shall not be allowed the exemptions mentioned by article the third, although designed for the French islands and colonies.

15. Merchandizes and provisions of all sorts, of the produce of the French islands and colonies, shall be warehoused at their arrival in the ports of Calais, Dieppe, Havre, Rouen, Honfleur, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, Bayonne, and Cette; to the end that, when they are unhoused to be exported into foreign countries, they shall be entitled to the exemption of duties of importation and exportation; even to those belonging to the farms of the western domaine, with a reserve only of three per cent. to which they shall be liable, &c.

16. Merchants of the cities before-mentioned, who shall export by sea merchandizes which come from the said islands and colonies, shall be obliged to make a declaration at the office of farms established in the port from whence they shall depart, of the place where they are intended to be sent into foreign coun-

countries, and to give security, within six months, or longer, to report a certificate in proper form of their unloading, signed by the French consul; and, in case of his absence, by the judges of the place, or other public persons, on pain of paying four times the duties.

17. Merchants belonging to the ports mentioned in the first article, shall be allowed to send by land, into foreign countries, raw sugars, indigo, ginger, rocou, and cacao, which come from the French islands and colonies, and cause them to pass, by transit, through the kingdom, without payment of duties of import or export, nor other duties, except those depending on the general farm of aids and domaines, on condition of declaring to the office of farms, at the port of their departure, the quantities, qualities, weights, and measures, and of having them visited and leaded, and taking the discharge of their security, and promise, within four months or later, to produce a certificate of the sending such merchandize out of the kingdom; which certificate shall be wrote and signed on the back of the said discharge of the security, by the commissioners of the last office of farms at their going out of the kingdom, after the said commissioners have allowed the leads, and visited the said merchandizes; and the carriers shall be obliged to cause the said discharges to be inspected by the said commissioners

sioners of the farms of that rout, and by the directors of the farms, where such are established: all which must be done and performed on pain of paying four times the duties, and confiscation of the carriages and horses of such who shall neglect or offend as carriers.—These precautions taken, the said merchandizes shall not be opened, and the said directors and commissioners shall verify, without any delay or expence whatever, the number of tons, casks, bales, &c. and examine if the leads thereunto affixed are whole and entire; but, in case the said leads are broke or altered, or any way defaced, then they are to visit the said merchandizes, and seize them in case of the laws being violated, the goods to be confiscated, and the offenders condemned in 500 livres fine.

18. The five following sorts of merchandizes, which shall be sent by transit into foreign countries, shall go out of the kingdom by no other places than those hereafter named, viz. those appointed for the ports of Spain, situate on the Mediterranean-Sea, by the ports of Cette and Agde.

19. Those which shall go out of the kingdom by the land for Spain, by the office of farms, from Bayonne, by the way of Beobie, Ascaing, and Dainhoa.

20. Those designed for Italy, by the said ports of Cette and Agde.—Those for Savoy and Piedmont, by the office of Pont de Beauvoisin, and of Champarillan.—Those for Geneva

neva and Switzerland, by the office of Seiffel and Coulonges.—Those for Franche Comte, by the office d'Auxonne.—Those designed for the three bishoprics, and Lorrain and Alsace, by the office of St. Minehould and Auxonne.—And those designed for the Low Countries, belonging to foreign nations, by the office of Lisle and Maubeuge.

21. We absolutely forbid the said merchandizes going out of the kingdom by other ports and offices, when they pass by transit, with exemption of duties, on pain of confiscation of merchandizes, carriages, and horses, and liable to 3000 livres penalty.

22. The merchandizes hereafter specified coming from the French islands and colonies, and allowed to be consumed in the kingdom, shall pay, for the future, for duties of importation in the ports of Calais, Dieppe, Havre, Rouen, Honfleur, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, Bayonne, and Cette; viz.

Muscavado, or raw sugars, the hundred weight, 2 livres 10 sols; 33 sols, 4 deniers of which, shall be appropriated to the farmer-general of the western domaine revenue, and 16 sols 8 deniers to the farmer-general of the five great farms.—The clay or cassonade sugars, 8 livres per hundred weight; 2 of which shall be appropriated to the farmer-general of the five great farms.—Indigo, 100 sols per hundred weight.—Ginger 15 sols per hundred weight.—Cotton-wool, 30 sols per hundred.—Rocou, 2 livres 10 sols per

100 weight. Sweet-meats and preserves, 5 livres per hundred weight.—Cassia, 1 livre per hundred weight.—Cacao, 10 livres per hundred weight.—Dry raw hides, 5 sols a piece.—Tortoise-shells of all sorts, 7 livres per hundred weight.

23. The sum total of the duties on the said nine last species of merchandize shall be appropriated to the farmer-general of the five great farms of the revenue.

24. The merchandizes specified in the preceding article, which shall be carried by sea into the ports of St. Malo, Morlaix, Brest, and Nantes, may not be brought into the other provinces of the kingdom to be consumed, but upon payment of the same duties.

25. All merchandizes coming from the French islands and colonies shall pay, upon their arrival in the said ports of Bretagne, above and besides the ordinary duties, those of provostship, such as are done at Nantes, without any drawback thereof, when the said merchandizes shall be exported to foreign countries, nor any diminution of the duties declared by the 19th article, when they are brought into the provinces of the five great farms, or other provinces of the kingdom.

26. White unrefined sugars coming from the colony of Cayenne, and entering by the ports of Calais, Dieppe, Havre, Rouen, Honfleur,

Honfleur, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, Bayonne, Cette, and intended for home-consumption, shall only pay 4 livres per 100 weight, in conformity to the arrets of the 19th of September, 1682, and the 12th of October, 1700. And, with regard to those which shall be carried into the ports of Bretagne, they shall there pay the same duties as the clay sugars coming from the other French colonies; viz. at their arrival, the duties of the provostship of Nantes, and other local duties; and, at their passing out of Bretagne to go into the province of the five great farms, and other provinces of the kingdom, for consumption, the 8 livres mentioned in article 19.

27. Merchandizes coming from the French islands and colonies, and not mentioned in the 19th article, shall pay the duties fixed by the tariff of 1664, in the provinces of the five great farms, and the local duties, as has been heretofore done in the provinces reckoned foreign; excepting refined sugars coming from the said islands and colonies, which shall pay, at every entrance of the kingdom, even in the ports of the province of Bretagne and Bayonne, 22 livres 10 sols per 100 weight, conformably to the arrets of the 25th of April, 1690, and the 20th of June, 1698.

28. The duties required by the said arret of the 25th of April, 1690, upon foreign
sugars

sugars of all qualities, shall be also paid in all the ports of the kingdom, even in the ports of Bretagne, and in those of Marseilles, Bayonne, and Dunkirk, notwithstanding all privileges and exemptions before granted: and the said sugars need not be warehoused, as required by the said arret of the 25th of April, 1690, or other subsequent arrets, which shall be made null and void; except nevertheless with regard to the cassonade sugars of the Brazils, which shall be warehoused in the ports only of Bayonne and Marseilles, and shall not go out of the warehouse with exemption from the duties required by the arret of the 25th of April, 1690, but to be exported into foreign countries, &c.

29. All merchandizes of the production of the French islands and colonies shall pay to the farmer-general of the revenues of the western domaine, at their arrival in all the ports of the kingdom, even in the free ports, and in those of the provinces reputed foreign, once for all, 3 per cent. ad valorem, when they shall be declared to be exported into foreign countries.

30. We expressly forbid all the inhabitants of our islands and colonies, and all the merchants of our kingdom, to export from the said islands and colonies, into foreign countries, or into the foreign neighbouring islands, any merchandizes of the produce of the
French

French islands, on pain of confiscation of ship and merchandize, and of 1000 livres penalty; which shall be inflicted by the officers of the admiralty, and the captains and masters of ships to be answered in their own name, besides imprisonment for a year, and also to be declared incapable of commanding or serving in the quality of an officer aboard of a ship; wherefore all captains shall be obliged to represent, at their arrival in France, a state of the merchandizes that shall have been loaded at the said islands, signed by the commissioners of the western domaine.

31. We prohibit also, under the like penalties, all merchants of our kingdom, captains and masters of ships designed for the French islands and colonies, from taking or loading in any foreign country, even in the island of Madeira, any wines, or other provisions and merchandizes, to be carried into the said colonies.

32. All sorts of sugars and syrups of the French islands and colonies shall be declared at their arrival in all the ports of the kingdom, by the quantity of the casks, without the merchants, captains or masters of ships, being obliged to declare them by weight; but the declaration of other merchandizes shall be made according to custom, by the quantity, quality, and weight; nor shall any merchandizes be unloaded but in the presence

sence of the commissioners of the farms of the revenue.

33. The warehouse wherein to deposit the merchandizes and provisions of the kingdom, intended for the French islands and colonies, as also those of the produce of the said islands, of salt beef from foreign countries, and of cassonade sugars of the Brazils, shall be chosen by the merchants themselves, at their own expence, and locked up with three different keys; one of which shall be given to the commissioners of the great farms of the revenue, the other to the commissioner of the farm of the western domaine, and the third into the hands of an overseer appointed by the merchant himself.

34. The easiness of the duties of importation, by these presents laid upon all raw and muscavado sugars, coming from the French islands and colonies, the taking off the duties imposed by the arrets of the council of September, 1688, and the 1st of September, 1699, upon the footing of 9 livres, and 6 livres 15 sols, shall remain, for the future, regulated at 5 livres, 12 sols, 6 deniers per 100 weight of refined sugar, in the cities of Bourdeaux, Rochelle, Rouen, and Dieppe, which shall be exported into foreign countries; and of the said 5 livres, 12 sols, 6 deniers, there shall be restored 3 livres 15 sols by the farmer-general of the western domaine, and 1 livre, 17 sols, 6 deniers, by

by the farmer-general of the five great farms."

ON April the 3d, 1718, a royal ordinance was made, prohibiting all captains of ships who shall carry negroes to the French islands, against landing them, or any of their cargo, without leave had and obtained from the governors, in order to prevent any contagious distemper being spread among the inhabitants.

" Royal letters patents, containing regulations of trade between Marseilles and the French islands of America, given at Paris in the month of February, 1719.

A R T I C L E I.

The fitting out of vessels designed for the French islands and colonies of America, shall be done in the port of Marseilles as in the ports mentioned by our letters patents of the month of April, 1717.

2. Merchants, who fit out such ships, shall be obliged to apply to the secretary of the admiralty of Marseilles, to oblige themselves, under the penalty of 10,000 livres, to cause such ships to return directly into the port of Marseilles, unless compelled by shipwreck, or other inevitable accident, justifiable by verbal process. The merchants shall give such obligation into the office of farms, and shall not embark in the said ships any provisions

fions and merchandizes without permission first had and obtained in writing, and in presence of the commissioners of the farms of the revenue, under pain of confiscation of the said provisions and merchandizes, and a penalty of 3000 livres, which shall be laid by the officers of the admiralty.

3. All provisions and merchandize of the produce or fabrication of the kingdom, even silver plate, wines, and brandies, of Provence, Guyenne, or other provinces of our kingdom arms and ammunition, and all necessaries of our kingdom for the victualling and fitting out of ships, which shall come into the port of Mar-seilles to be exported to the French islands and colonies, shall be exempted from all duties of export or import, as well as those of the provinces of the five great farms, as those reputed foreign provinces; and likewise from all local duties, in passing from one province to another, and generally from all other duties, which are to our advantage, except those depending on the general farm of aids and domains, which exemption the merchants of Mar-seilles cannot be entitled to, without observing what is hereafter ordained.

4. The provisions and merchandizes mentioned in the preceding article, coming by sea from another port of the kingdom into that of Mar-seilles, shall, at their arrival, be put into the warehouse of entrepost, and shall not be moved from ship to ship, on pain of confiscation, and of 1000 livres penalty.

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5. Merchants who shall cause to be brought to Marseilles, either by sea or land, the said provisions and merchandizes designed for the French islands and colonies in America, shall be obliged to declare, at the office of farms at the place of their unloading, if such office be there; if not, at the nearest there is, the quantities, qualities, weights, and measures, to cause them to be visited and leaded by the commissioners of the farms, to take their discharge of security, and to submit to report, within three months, a certificate of their unloading into the warehouse of the entrepost, on their arrival at Marseilles: we will and decree, that, in six months from the registering of these presents, the merchandizes manufactured in different provinces and places of our kingdom, except those in the city and territory of Marseilles, shall be reputed as foreign merchandizes, and shall not be shipped upon vessels which shall depart from the port of Marseilles for the French islands and colonies, without paying the duties that shall be hereby decreed, if, in the place the nearest to their unlading, declaration has not been made, that they are intended for the said islands; and if, upon their arrival in Marseilles, they have not been put into a warehouse of entrepost.

6. The land-carriers shall be obliged to represent, and cause to be examined, their discharges of security by the commissioner of

the office of farms, and by the directors of the farmers of the revenue, in those cities wherein they are established, through which the said provisions and merchandizes pass; and the said commissioners and directors shall certify, upon the spot, and without delay or expence, the number of tons, casks, and bales, &c. contained in the said discharge of security, and shall inspect whether the leads affixed thereunto be whole, undefaced, and unchanged, without visiting the said provisions and merchandizes, or opening the said tons, cases or bales, unless the leads are broken or altered: and, if on examination any fraud appears, the merchandize shall be confiscated, and the offenders condemned in 500 livres penalty.

7. The said provisions and merchandizes shall be, before their embarkation, visited and weighed by the commissioners of the farms, in order to certify the quantity, quality, weight, and measure thereof, and they shall not be loaded in any vessel, but in the presence of the said commissioners.

8. Merchants shall make at the office of farms their report, within a twelvemonth or more, a certificate of the unloading of the said provisions and merchandizes in the French islands and colonies; and the said certificate shall be wrote on the back of the discharge of the security, and signed by the governors and intendants, or by the commandants or commissaries, subdelegated by the
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the commissioners of the office of farms of the western domaine established at Marseilles, on pain of forfeiting four times the duties.

9. Provisions and merchandises coming from foreign countries, the consumption of which is allowed in the country, and which shall be received in the port, city, or territory of Marseilles, shall not be embarked to be exported to the French islands in America, till declaration has been made at the office of farms, of their quantity, quality, weight, and measure, and that the same duties have been paid at the office as required, when they were first imported into the kingdom.

10. Foreign provisions and merchandises, which shall be consumed in the kingdom, and which, after having paid the duties of import at another office of farms, and brought into the said city of Marseilles, to be exported into the French islands and colonies of America, shall be entitled to those exemptions contained in article the 3d, by observing the same regulations, which have been before prescribed for the original merchandises of the kingdom.

11. We allow to be brought from foreign kingdoms into the ports of Marseilles salt beef, in order to be exported to the said islands and colonies ; and it shall be exempt from all duties, even that of 40 sols, which is known by the farm of the gabelles, or excise duty, on condition that on it's arrival it shall be

housed in an entrepost, till embarkation, on pain of confiscation.

12. There shall not be loaded in the port of Marseilles, for the French islands and colonies, any merchandises, which import and consummation shall be prohibited in the kingdom, on pain of confiscation, and a penalty of 3000 livres, that shall be inflicted by the officers of the admiralty.

13. The silk and other merchandises of Avignon and the county of Venaissine, which shall be declared for the French islands and colonies, and which shall have paid the duties of the custom-house of Lyons, with which they are charged in going out of the said county, to come into the kingdom, shall be exempt from all duties, as well upon their entrance into the territory of Marseilles, as on their embarkation; provided, on their arrival at Marseilles, they shall be housed in a warehouse of entrepost, till their embarkation; and the same shall be observed, for the rate of the said merchandises, as has been before decreed in regard to those fabricated in our kingdom.

14. Swiss linens, which are exempted from all duties at importation into the kingdom, shall pay to the offices of farms, upon the confines of the territories of Marseilles, the ordinary duties of export, although designed for the French islands and colonies.

15. Merchandises and provisions of all sorts, coming from the French islands and colonies,
shall

shall pay, on their arrival at Marseilles, once for all, the duty of 3 per cent. ad valorem to the farm of the western domaine, and that when even they shall be intended to be exported into foreign countries.

16. The merchants of Marseilles may transport by land, into foreign countries, clay and cassonade sugars, ginger, and racou, coming from the French islands and colonies, and cause them to pass by transit across the kingdom without paying any duties at importation and exportation, nor any other duties, excepting those depending on the general farm of the aids and domaines; on condition of declaring, at the office of farms, the time of their departure, the quantity, quality, weight, and measure, in order to be visited and leaded, to take a discharge of the security, and be obliged to report, within four months or longer, certificates of the exportation of the said merchandises out of the kingdom; which certificates shall be wrote and signed on the back of the said discharges of security, by the commissioners of the last office of farms at the said exportation, after the said commissioners have inspected the leads and visited the said merchandises; and the land carriers shall be obliged to cause to be inspected the said discharges of security, by the commissioners of the offices of farms lying in the rout, and by the directors of the farms, where any are established; the whole
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hereof to be done and performed on pain of paying four times the duties, and of confiscation of the carriages and horses of the carrier so offending; which precautions being taken, the said merchandises shall not be opened, and the said directors and commissioners shall certify only, without any delay or expence, the number of tons, cases, or bales, and examine if the leads thereunto affixed be whole and entire: in case the said leads shall be broke, altered, or defaced, we do permit the said commissioners, to visit the said merchandises, and to seize them in case of violation of the laws, to be confiscated, and the offenders condemned in 500 livres penalty.

17. The said three sorts of merchandises which shall be sent by land from Marseilles by transfit into foreign countries, shall not be sent out but by way of the places hereafter named; viz. those destined for Savoy and Piedmont, by the office of farms at the bridge of Beauvoisin and Champarillan.—Those designed for Swisserland or Geneva, by the office of Seissel and Coulonges.—Those for Franche Comte, by the office of Auxonne.—Those for the three bishoprics, Lorrain, and Metz, by the office of St. Meneshoult and Auxonne.—And those designed for the low countries, under foreign dominion, by the office of Lisle and Maubeuge.

WE expressly prohibit the said merchandises from going out of our kingdom by any other offices, when they shall pass by transit with exemption of duties, on pain of confiscation of merchandises, carriages, and horses, and a fine of 3000 livres.

18. Merchandises hereafter specified, coming from the French islands and colonies, and which, after their arrival in the port of Marseilles, shall be brought into the kingdom, accompanied with certificates of the commissioners of offices of weights, &c. shall after pay only for the duties of entry, viz.

RAW, or muscovado sugars, the hundred weight, 2 livres, 10 sols; 30 sols 4 deniers of which shall be appropriated to the farmer of the western domaine; and 16 sols 8 deniers to the farmer-general of the five great farms.

CLAY, or cassonade sugars, 8 livres the hundred weight; two livres whereof shall be appropriated to the farmer of the western domaine, and six livres to the farmer-general of the five great farms.

INDIGO, 100 sols per hundred weight.—Ginger, 15 sols per hundred weight.—Cotton in the wool, 30 sols per hundred weight.—Rocou, 2 livres 10 sols per hundred weight.—Sweet-meats, 5 livres per hundred weight.—Cassia, one livre per hundred weight.—Hides, raw and dry, 5 sols a-piece.—Tortoise-shell of all sorts, 7 livres per hundred weight.

THE sum total of the duties upon the said nine last sorts of merchandises shall be raised
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for the benefit of the farmer-general of the five great farms.

CACAO, indigo, cotton-wool, and hides raw and dry coming from the French islands and colonies, shall be liable to those easy duties before decreed, only on condition that they are housed, on their arrival at Marseilles, in a magazine of entrepost, from whence they shall not be moved, but in the presence of the commissioners of the revenue-farms, to whom they shall deliver their certificates; in default whereof, the said merchandises shall pay, at their importation into the kingdom, the same duties as foreign merchandises do.

19. Cacao, and indigo, produced in the said islands and colonies, and which, on their arrival, have been housed in a magazine of entrepost, and taken thence in presence of commissioners of the farms, may be sent into foreign countries, and pass, by transit, over the kingdom, in observing what is required by the 16th and 17th articles.

20. White and unrefined sugars of Cayenne, which shall be warehoused as aforesaid, on their arrival in the port of Marseilles, and which shall afterwards be brought into the kingdom, shall pay only 4 livres per hundred weight.

21. Merchandises coming from the French islands and colonies, and not mentioned in the 18th article, shall pay, at entrance into the kingdom, such duties as before known and usual

usual, except refined loaf sugar, which shall pay at every place of entrance into the kingdom (when even they are intended for the consumption of the city and territories of Marseilles) 22 livres 10 sols per hundred weight, in conformity to the arrets of our council of the 25th of April 1690, and 20th of June 1698.

22. The duties required by the said arret of the 25th of April 1690, on foreign sugars of all sorts, shall be paid in the port of Marseilles, notwithstanding all privileges and franchises before granted to that city; and the said sugars shall not be intitled to the benefit of the entrepost, granted either by the said, or other subsequent arrets; excepting, however, the cassonade sugars of the Brasils, which shall be warehoused in the port of Marseilles, and shall not be taken out of the same with exemption of duties required by the said arret of the 25th of April 1690, unless to be exported into foreign countries.

23. We expressly forbid the inhabitants of these islands and colonies, and all merchants of Marseilles, to export from the said islands and colonies into foreign countries, or into the neighbouring foreign colonies, either on French or foreign bottoms, any merchandises of the produce of the French islands, on pain of confiscation of ship and merchandise, and a fine of 1000 livres penalty; which shall be laid by the officers of the admiralty, and
against

against the captains and masters of ships, to answer the same in their own person, to suffer a year's imprisonment, and be rendered incapable of commanding, or serving again as an officer on shipboard: wherefore, all captains shall be obliged to represent, at their arrival in France, an account of the merchandise they have loaded in the said islands, signed by the commissioners of the western domaine.

24. We expressly prohibit also, under the aforesaid penalties, all merchants of Marseilles, captains and masters of ships, bound for the French islands and colonies from lading, in any foreign country, even in the island of Madeira, any wines or other provisions and merchandises to carry them into the said colonies.

25. The duties of import which shall be paid upon merchandises of the islands and colonies, shall not be drawn back, when even they shall be sent to foreign countries, and they shall be liable to the duties of exportation; excepting, nevertheless, sugars of all sorts, indigo, ginger, cassia, rocou, cacao, drugs, and spiceries.

26. Sugars of all sorts, and syrups of the French islands and colonies, shall be reported at their arrival, by the quantity of casks or cases, without subjecting the merchants, captains and masters of ships, to report them by weight; but the report of other merchandizes shall be made according to ordinary

dinary usage, by the quantity, quality, and weight; nor shall any merchandize be unloaded, but in the presence of the commissioners of the farms.

27. Warehouses serving for the entrepôt, required by the articles 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19, 20, and 22, shall be chosen by the merchants themselves, at their expence, and locked with three different keys; one of which the commissioners of the five great farms shall have, another the commissioners of the western domaine, and the other any overseer appointed by the merchants.—Thus we order and decree, &c.

A royal ordonnance, forbidding all governors, and lieutenant-generals, all particular governors, and intendants of colonies, from having plantations.—Paris, 7 November, 1719.—By the king.

HIS majesty being informed, that, among the governors and lieutenants-general, particular governors and intendants of the French colonies in South-America, there are some who possess plantations of sugar, indigo, cacao, and other provisions and merchandizes of the said colonies; and that some intend to settle new ones, which being inconsistent with his majesty's service, and, besides, their residence in the said colonies being only for a time, this may prove injurious to them in the consequences, when his majesty shall require them elsewhere for his service: his
majesty

majesty has, with the advice of his uncle the duke of Orleans, regent, ordered, and does hereby order for the future, that no governors, or lieutenants-general, &c. shall purchase, or otherwise establish, any plantations of sugar, indigo, tobacco, cacao, cotton, ginger rocou, or other provisions or merchandizes of the said colonies: his majesty, notwithstanding, permits them to have gardens for fruits, pulse, and herbage, for their own use only; and, with respect to those who have plantations already, his majesty forbids them to make any increase thereunto, upon any pretence whatsoever, &c.

A royal ordonnance, issued against captains and supercargoes of merchantmen, who shall carry on foreign trade to the French islands in America. Paris, 26 November, 1719. By the king.

His majesty being informed, that, notwithstanding the great attention and care that he is desirous of taking to prevent foreigners trading to the French islands of America, the captains and factors of the ships of his subjects that go to the said islands, receive on board their vessels, in the roads, provisions and merchandizes, that are brought to them by foreign boats, and that they purchase them, either with ready money, or with French or Indian provisions, from the facility they have to unload and sell them to
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the inhabitants: it being of importance to prevent a contraband trade so prejudicial to the commerce of the kingdom, that it hinders the sale of the merchandizes and provisions brought from France, retards the vent of the cargoes of the said ships, prolongs their stay in the islands, which occasions mortality among the sailors, and great expence to the merchants: all which being necessary to put a stop to, his majesty, with the advice of the duke of Orleans, regent, forbids all captains, factors, or supercargoes of French ships, from carrying on any commerce, directly or indirectly, with foreigners, on pain of the offenders being sent to the galleys for ever. His majesty orders and commands Mons^r. the count of Toulouse, admiral of France, and all governors and lieutenant-governors of the said islands, all particular governors and officers of the superior courts of the colonies, and other officers belonging thereto, to pay strict obedience hereunto, &c.

Regulations by the king, concerning foreign or contraband commerce carried on in the French colonies.—Paris, July 23, 1720.

THE king being informed that commerce with foreigners continues to be carried on in some of his colonies, notwithstanding the prohibitions to the contrary that have been made by

divers ordinances and regulations, and especially by that of the 20th of August, 1698. And being desirous to prevent the continuance of this disorder, and to secure to his subjects the *whole commerce* of all his colonies, his majesty has judged it necessary, by and with the advice of Mons. the duke of Orleans his uncle, regent, to make the present regulations.

ARTICLE I.

HIS majesty orders all officers and captains of ships to seize all vessels, barks, and others, as well French as foreign, carrying on contraband commerce with his colonies in America, and to reduce them by force of arms, and bring them into the nearest island where the prize was taken.

2. His majesty permits all his subjects to steer the proper course for the taking of the said ships and vessels carrying on foreign commerce; and orders that, for the future, it shall be inserted in the commissions of ships of war and merchantmen, that shall be granted by the admiral of France, that the bearers thereof shall be permitted to run upon those ships, barks, and other vessels, as well French as others, carrying on a foreign commerce to the French colonies of America, to reduce them by force, and carry them into the islands nearest to the place where they were taken; the said commissions,

sions, however, shall not be granted without the same security being given as in times of war.

3. The prizes thus made, either by his majesty's ships, or those of his subjects, shall be judged of by the officers of the admiralty, conformably to the ordonnances and regulations made for that purpose, without appeal to superior courts; except in time of war, when the proceedings shall be sent to the secretary-general of the marine, to be judged by the admiral as usual; and, if the prize be condemned, one tenth shall go to the admiral, according to the ordonnance of 1681.

4. The produce of the prizes made by his majesty's ships shall be divided, after the one-tenth part thereof appropriated to the admiral, viz. one tenth to the commander of the ship that took the prize, one tenth to him who commanded the squadron, one tenth to the governor and lieutenant-general of the colony whither the prize shall be carried in, one tenth to the intendant, and one half of the surplus moiety to the sailors, the other to the commissioners of the treasury of the marine, for the maintenance of the colonies, according to his majesty's orders.

5. Prizes made by the ships of his majesty's subjects shall be adjudged to him who took them; except the one tenth to the admiral, and upon the surplus of the produce there shall be raised one fifth; one half

whereof shall be deposited in the hands of the commissioners of the treasury of the marine in the colonies, in order to be employed for the maintenance of the hospitals of the said colonies, according to his majesty's pleasure; and the other moiety shall be divided thus, two thirds to the governor and lieutenant-general, and the other third to the intendant of the colony, where the said vessel making the capture shall have been fitted out: and, with regard to those prizes, which shall be made by ships fitted out in France, the said moiety shall be divided, as aforesaid, between the governor and lieutenant-general, and the intendant of the colony where the prize shall be carried in.

6. His majesty orders, that the particular governors of the colonies of Cayenne and Cape Breton shall enjoy, for the prizes which shall be brought into the said colonies, either by his majesty's ships, or by those of his subjects, as also by those fitted out in the said colonies, such proportions as specified in article the 4th and 5th of the present regulation made for the governors and lieutenants-general, and the commissioner of the ordinances of the said colonies shall be entitled to those parts allotted to the intendant.

7. His majesty requires that the present regulation shall be executed according to its form and tenor, notwithstanding all ordinances and regulations to the contrary, which
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his majesty hereby makes null and void. His majesty orders and commands Mons^r. the count of Toulouse, admiral of France, to have a strict regard to the execution of the present regulations, to cause them to be made public wherever needful, &c.

The king's declaration, with regard to merchandises of the French colonies.—

Paris, 14 March 1722.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, king of France and Navarre, greeting.—Whereas by the 26th article of our letters patent of the month of April 1717, containing regulations for the commerce of the French islands and colonies, we have expressly forbid the inhabitants of the said islands and colonies, and the merchants of our kingdom, to export into foreign countries, or into foreign neighbouring islands of the said colonies, either by the means of French or foreign vessels, any merchandises of the produce of the French islands, on pain of confiscation of ships and cargoes, and a penalty of 1000 livres; and, besides the captains and masters of such ships being obliged to answer the said confiscation and penalties in their own person, to suffer a year's imprisonment, and also to be declared incapable of command, or of serving in the capacity of an officer on shipboard again: in consequence whereof, the captains are obliged to represent, on their arrival in France, a

state, signed by the commissioners of the western domaine, of the merchandises which they have laden at the said islands and colonies. Although the last disposition of the said article is essential, and the greatest security that can be taken against such foreign trade, by the certification that should be made of merchandises, on the arrival of ships in France, from the state of the loading made in the islands ; yet we are informed, that the greatest part of the masters of ships returning from the said islands, are dispensed with, in regard to their report of a state of their loading, according to the form required ; and that the commissioners of our farms in the ports of France cannot subject them thereunto, nor proceed securely against them, apprehending that our judges will not have due regard thereunto, by reason that the said 26th article of the regulations of 1717 does not inflict any penalty against those, who shall neglect to make such report, signed by the commissioners of the western domaine, but only against those who shall carry on foreign trade ; which renders the prohibitions in regard to this commerce ineffectual, from the impossibility of knowing in France, whether all the merchandises which have been loaded in the said islands are faithfully reported, at the ports of their return, and whether no part thereof has been unloaded in foreign countries : whereupon we judge necessary to
remedy

remedy the same, by a certain disposition which declares the penalties inflicted by the regulation of 1717, against the masters of ships, who shall carry on foreign commerce; that the same penalties shall be incurred by those, who shall neglect to report the state of their loading, signed by the commissioners of the French islands and colonies, &c.—For these and other reasons us hereunto moving, with the advice of, &c. &c.—We have, by these presents, signed with our hand; and we decree, will, and ordain, &c. that the 26th article of our letters patents of the month of April 1717, shall be executed, according to the due form and tenor thereof, and, in consequence of the same, that masters of ships, returning from the French islands and colonies, shall be obliged to represent, on their arrival in France, a state, signed and certified by the commissioners of the western domaine, of the merchandises which they shall have loaded at the said islands and colonies.—We decree, that on failure of the said masters making a report within 24 hours of their arrival in the ports of France, to the commissioners of the office of our farms, the said state of their ships loading, or on failure of reporting the merchandises agreeable to the said state, such masters of ships shall be looked upon as having carried on a commerce at these islands with foreigners; in consequence whereof their ships and merchandises shall be confiscated, the owners of the said merchandise and the

captains and masters of the said ships condemned in the whole fine of 1000 livres, and be liable to the other pains and penalties inflicted by the said 26th article of our letters patents of the month of April 1717. Thus we give and command, &c.

Letters patents, upon the arret, which fixes the time of a year of the entrepost of merchandises coming from the French islands and colonies into the ports therein mentioned, and of those which shall be declared by the entrepost for the said islands.—Versailles, May 23, 1723.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, &c.—
Whereas, by our declaration of the 19th of January last, we have, for the causes and considerations therein given, in confirmation of our letters patents of the month of April, 1717, for regulating the commerce of the French islands and colonies, ordered, that the merchants proprietors of the provisions and merchandises which shall be housed according to the entrepost, and designed for the said islands and colonies, shall be obliged, after one year's entrepost, to declare to the offices of farms at those places, the quantities, qualities, weight, and measure of the said provisions and merchandises, which shall remain in warehouses, which declaration shall be certified by the adjudicatory commissioners of our farms, and, in case of neglect, and false declaration—

claration, that the merchants proprietors of the said provisions and merchandises shall be condemned in 500 livres penalty, besides the payment of the duties of the merchandises which shall be found wanting in their declaration : and, in case of the sale of the said merchandises so warehoused, the merchants proprietors thereof shall be obliged to discharge the duties thereupon, one month after sale, on pain of the like penalty, and of 500 livres.—And being informed that it is yet necessary to limit the time of entrepost, as well for the provisions and merchandises declared and intended for the commerce of the French islands and colonies, as those which come from the said islands and colonies ; in order to prevent the abuses introduced, and which will always encrease, by reason of those entreposts, if they subsist for an unlimited time : we have provided, by an arret made in our council of state, we being present, the 3d of the month and year of the date hereof, for execution of which, what we have ordered is requisite.—For these reasons, with the advice of our council, who have considered the said arret hereunto annexed, under the counter-seal of our chancery, &c. we have decreed and ordained, and by these presents, signed with our hand, we decree and ordain, that the time of the entrepost, as well with regard to merchandises, which shall come from the French islands and colonies into the ports of Calais, Dieppe,

Dieppe, Havre, Rouen, Honfleur, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, Bayonne, Cette, Marseilles, and Dunkirk, as those which shall be declared and intended for the said islands and colonies, and warehoused in the same ports, and in those of St. Malo, Morlaix, Brest, and Nantes, shall be and remain fixed, for the future, to one year, to be accounted from the day that the said merchandises and provisions shall have come into port. And, with respect to those which are actually warehoused, they shall be intitled to the benefit of the entrepost for one year, from the day of the publication of the said arret, and of these presents; after which time, the said merchandises shall be liable as follow, viz.—Those declared and housed for the French islands and colonies, to the same duties as they should have paid, had they not been declared for the islands; and those that come from the said islands and colonies, shall be subject to the duties regulated according to our letters patents of the month of February, 1719, and according to those of the month of October, 1721.—Thus we command, &c.

AN

An arret of the king's council of state, revoking those permissions before granted to the merchants of the kingdom, to carry to Cadiz, Genoa, Leghorn, and Naples, directly from the French islands of America, merchandises of the produce of the said islands. June 14, 1723. Extracted from the registers of the council of state.

THE king having been informed that to facilitate, during the time of the plague with which the city of Marseilles, and some other places of the kingdom, have been afflicted, the exportation of merchandises of the French islands of America into Spain and Italy, where the admittance of French ships coming directly from the ports of France was refused; it was allowed to all merchants of the kingdom, to send merchandises to Cadiz, Genoa, Leghorn, and Naples, of the produce of the French islands of America, without putting them into entrepost warehouses, required in the ports of France by virtue of the 15th article of letters patents of the month of April, 1717. But, the motives to this toleration ceasing, it becomes necessary to re-establish the execution of the 2d article of the letters patents of the month of April, the intent of which is very important for the security of the duties of the farms, and to prevent the contraband exportation of the merchandises of the French islands

islands of America into foreign countries : against which his majesty being willing to provide, and being present in council, and having heard the report of the Sieur Dodun, counsellor in ordinary to the royal council, and comptroller-general of the finances, hath revoked and annulled the said permissions granted to the merchants of his kingdom, to carry to Cadiz, Genoa, Leghorn, and Naples, directly from the French islands of America, merchandises of the produce of the said islands : wherefore his majesty orders and decrees, that all ships which shall depart from the ports of France, designed, according to the first article of the said letters patents, for the commerce of the French islands and colonies in America, as likewise those which shall depart from the ports of Dunkirk and Marseilles, in order to send the merchandises of France to the said French islands and colonies of America, shall be obliged to make their return directly into the port of their departure ; and, to this end, the merchants who shall fit out the said ships, shall make the submission required by the 2d article of the letters patents of the month of April, 1717, to the secretary of the admiralty, which shall be executed, for the time to come, according to their form and tenor. Done at the royal council of state, held at Meudon, the 14th day of June, 1723.

A royal

A royal ordinance, declaring Gilles Robin, captain of the ship St. Michael, of Havre, incapable to sail, for the future, in any ship intended for the colonies, for having carried on a contraband trade at St. Domingo. The 25th of July, 1724. By the king.

HIS majesty being informed that, in violation of the prohibitions so often made and repeated, to prevent carrying on a contraband commerce with foreigners in the islands of America, several captains and traders have occasioned the loss of their ships, by foreign merchandizes, which have been brought to them by foreign vessels in the roads of the said islands, which is not only contrary to the trade of the kingdom, but causes the ruin of those who fit such ships out, these captains consuming, by the long stay they make in the colonies, in carrying on this fraudulent traffic, the advantages the proprietors might have reaped, if their voyage was shorter: the above named Gilles Robin, commanding the ship called the St. Michael, of Havre, fitted out for Leogane, upon the coast of St. Domingo, was surprized in the month of February last, carrying on, in the night-time, contraband or foreign trade, with a small English ship; upon which, he being tried in the court of admiralty of the said place, his merchandizes were confiscated, and the said Gilles Robin condemned in the
penalty

penalty of 2000 livres, and six months imprisonment. His majesty thinking it necessary to suppress the like abuses, by examples which may include in their consequence captains of merchantmen, who may fall under the like circumstances, he hath declared, and does hereby declare, the said Gilles Robin incapable of sailing for the future in any ship bound for the colonies.—His majesty orders and commands Monsr. the count of Toulouse, admiral of France, the governors and lieutenant-governors of America, intendants of the marine officiating in his ports and colonies, &c. to have strict regard to the due execution of the present ordinance, which shall be registered by the secretaries of the admiralties at the ports which have permission to fit out ships for the said islands and colonies; and also read, published, and fixed in the said ports, &c.—Done at Chantilly, the 25th of July, 1724.

Royal letters patents, in the form of an edict, concerning the foreign or contraband commerce to the islands and colonies of America.—Given at Fontainebleau, in the month of October, 1727.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, &c.—The care that the late king, our most honoured lord and great-grandfather, took for the advancement of the commerce of our islands and colonies, that which we also have taken
by

by his example, since our accession to the crown, the expence that has hitherto been for this purpose, and that we still annually continue, have only in view the security and the increase of the trade and navigation of the said islands and colonies: and herein we have had all the success that could be expected; our said colonies *being very greatly augmented, and in condition to carry on a considerable trade and navigation*, by the sale of negroes, provisions and merchandizes, carried thither by the ships of our subjects, in exchange for sugars, cacao, cotton, indigo, and other productions of the said islands and colonies. But we have been informed, that a fraudulent contraband commerce has been introduced, which, besides diminishing the commerce and navigation of our subjects, may prove of dangerous consequence to the support of our said colonies.—The just measures we take that they may be supplied from France, and from our other colonies, with the negroes, provisions, and merchandizes they need, and the protection we owe to the trade of our subjects, have determined us to fix, by a certain law, such precautions, and lay such severe pains and penalties upon the offenders, as may put a stop to such fraudulent traffic: for these, and other reasons us hereunto moving, with the advice of our council, and of our certain knowledge, full power, and royal authority, we have,

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by these presents, signed with our hand, decreed and ordained, that there shall not be received, into the colonies submitted to our obedience, any negroes, effects, provisions, and merchandizes, unless carried thither in French ships or vessels, which shall take in their lading in the ports of our kingdom, or in our said colonies, and which shall belong to our subjects born in our kingdom, or our said colonies: In consequence whereof we will and decree as follows, viz.

Of ships carrying on foreign or contraband commerce.

A R T I C L E I.

WE forbid all our subjects born in our kingdom, and in our colonies, to cause any negroes, effects, provisions, and merchandizes to be brought into our said colonies from foreign countries, or foreign colonies, except salt beef from Ireland, which shall be brought in French ships, and which have taken their loading in the ports of the kingdom, on pain of confiscation of ship and cargo, and 1000 livres penalty against the captain, who shall also be condemned to the galleys for three years.

2. We forbid, under the same penalties, all our subjects to export from our said islands and colonies any negroes, effects, provisions, and merchandizes into foreign countries, or
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into foreign colonies: we permit, nevertheless, our French merchants to carry directly from our islands of America into the ports of Spain, sugars of all sorts, excepting raw sugars, together with all other merchandizes of the produce of the said islands, according to the regulations made by the arret of our council of the 27th of January, 1726.

3. Foreigners shall not land with their ships, or other vessels, in the ports, roads, or havens of our islands and colonies, not even in our UNINHABITED islands, nor navigate their ships within a league round those isles and colonies, on pain of confiscation of their ships and vessels, and also of their loading, and 1000 livres penalty, &c.

4. We order all our officers, captains, commanders of our ships, &c. to pursue all foreign sea vessels which they shall find within the said latitude, and even those belonging to our own subjects carrying on foreign or contraband trade, and reduce them by force of arms, and bring them into the island nearest to the place where such prize has been taken.

5. We permit all our subjects to pursue the said ships and sea vessels, and those belonging to our own subjects carrying on foreign or contraband commerce; and we decree, for the time to come, it shall be inserted in the commissions granted, either for war or commerce, by the admiral of France, that those who bear such commissions may

pursue the ships, and other sea vessels, which they shall find under the before-mentioned circumstances, and reduce them by force of arms, and bring them into the island nearest the place where the prize has been made; but these commissions shall not be delivered to them without giving the same security as is done in time of war.

6. Prizes made on these occasions, either by our ships, or those of our subjects, shall be adjudged by the officers of the admiralty, consistently with the ordinances and regulations issued on this occasion, without appeal to the superior council of the islands or colonies where the prize shall be adjudged; with this exception, that, in time of war, the proceeding of the court, with regard to the prizes made upon those nations with which we may be at war, shall be sent to the secretary-general of the marine, in order that the case may be adjudicated by the admiral, as usual on those occasions; and one tenth of the produce of those prizes determined lawful, shall be appropriated to the admiral, according to the ordinance of 1681.

7. The produce of prizes made by our ships shall be divided, after deduction of the admiral's tenth. viz. one tenth to the commander of the vessel which makes the prize; one tenth to the governor or lieutenant-general of the colony whither the prize shall be carried in; one tenth to the intendant; and the surplus of the moiety to the sailors; and the

the remaining half part shall be deposited in the hands of the commissioners of the treasury of the marine in the said colony, to be appropriated according to our orders, &c.

8. Prizes made by the ships of our subjects shall be adjudged to him who made them, except the tenth to the admiral, and he shall be entitled to one fifth upon the surplusage of the produce, the half whereof shall be deposited in the hands of the commissioner of the treasury of the marine in the colonies, to be employed as we shall judge proper; and the other half shall be divided, two thirds to the governor, our lieutenant-general, and the other third to the intendant of the colony where the ship taking the same shall have been fitted out: and, with respect to prizes made by ships fitted out in France, the said moiety shall be divided, as before said, between the governor, our lieutenant-general, and the intendant of the colony whither the prize shall have been carried in.

9. The particular governors of the colonies of Cayenne, Guardaloupe, and Cape Breton, shall be entitled for prizes carried in thither, either by our ships, or those of our subjects, fitted out in France, or in the said colonies, to those proportions settled by the 7th and 8th articles of the present edict, to the governor our lieutenant-general; and the commissioners of the ordinances of the said co-

lonies shall be entitled to those appropriated to the intendant.

10. We command all officers of our troops, or militia, commanding in the different parts of our colonies, even the captains of militia in their divisions, to arrest such foreign vessels as shall be found in the ports, roads, and havens of their district, and also French ships carrying on a contraband trade in those places : and $\frac{1}{8}$ of the produce thereof shall belong to the admiral, and $\frac{1}{3}$ to the officer who made the prize, $\frac{1}{3}$, which shall be divided in halves, between him that commands the detachment, and the soldiers or inhabitants who have composed the same. The remainder of the whole, shall be deposited in the hands of the commissioners of the treasury of the marine, to be employed according to our order, &c.

11. Ships, or other foreign vessels, either of war or merchantmen, which by storm, or other urgent necessities, shall be forced into our colonies, shall not water, on pain of confiscation of merchant's ships and cargo, except in ports or roads where we have garrisons, viz. in the island of Martinico, Fort Royal, in the borough of St. Pierre, and à la Trinité; in the island of Guardaloupe, at the road of La Basse Terre, at Little Cul-desac, and at Fort Lewis; at Grenade, in the chief port, as well as at Marie Galante; and, in the island of St. Domingo, at Petit Guave,
Leo-

Leogane, St. Louis, St. Marc, Port de Puisse, and Cape Francois: at which places they shall not be stopped, provided they make appear they were not intended for our colonies; and, upon this appearing, all desirable succour and aid shall be given them. We order the governor, our lieutenant-general, or other commanding officers, to send a detachment of four soldiers and a serjeant on board the said ships and vessels, to prevent the embarkation and debarkation of negroes, effects, provisions, and merchandises, under any pretence whatever; which detachment shall remain on board such vessels, at the expence of the proprietors thereof, so long as they shall remain in the ports and roads of our colonies.

12. Captains of the said vessels thus at liberty, who shall have occasion for provisions, rigging, or other utensils, to enable them to continue their voyage, shall be obliged to ask permission of the governor, our lieutenant-general, or commander, in his absence, and of the intendant, to embark them; which permission shall not be granted till their request is communicated to the director of the domaine; and these shall be granted by the said governor, our lieutenant-general, or commander in his absence, and an ordinance made importing the said permission; and, in case the director of the domaine should oppose the same, his motives for so doing, as well as those of the governor, lieutenant-general, or commander in his absence, and the

intendant shall be transmitted, with a copy of the said ordinance, to the secretary of state for that department of the marine, to give us an account thereof: we require, however, that the said ordinance be provisionally executed, &c.

13. If it is absolutely necessary to refit or careen the ships of foreigners thus at liberty, to unlade their effects, provisions, and merchandises, the captains thereof shall be obliged to ask permission of the governor, our lieutenant-general, or commander in his absence, and of the intendant; which permission shall not be granted till the request be communicated to the director of the domaine; and there shall be granted an ordinance importing the said permission. And, in case the director of the domaine opposes the said permission, his motives, as well as those of the governor, our lieutenant-general, &c. shall be represented, together with a copy of the ordinance, to the secretary of state of the marine, to acquaint us of the same: we require, however, that the said ordinance be provisionally executed; and, in case of the landing of the said merchandises, there shall be given a verbal account, in presence of the director of the domaine, containing the quantity and quality thereof, signed by the captain of the ship, and by the said director of the domaine; which account shall be sent to the secretary of state of the marine; and the said governor, our lieutenant-general, or commander in his absence,

absence, shall place a centinel at the gate of the warehouse where the said merchandise shall be deposited, to prevent any being taken out, or sold in the said colonies; and, while the said merchandise shall remain in the said warehouse, which shall be shut with three locks, one of which keys shall be given to the intendant, another to the director of the domaine, and the other to the captain of the said ship. We require also, that, in case he has landed negroes, he shall draw up a list, wherein they shall be exactly characterized, who shall be sequestered in the hands of some responsible person, that they may be restored again, &c. the whole hereof must be performed on pain of confiscation of the value of the said negroes, and also the ship and cargo.

14. The expence of such ships or vessels in our islands and colonies shall be made there, and paid in cash or bills of exchange: and, in case the captain has not money, nor can find any one in the said islands and colonies, who will answer for the payment of the said bills of exchange, permission shall be granted by the governor, our lieutenant-general, or the commander in his absence, and the intendant, on the request of the captains of the said ships (which shall likewise be communicated to the director of the domaine) for the sale of a certain number of negroes and merchandises, to make good the said expence ONLY; and an ordonnance granting the said

permission shall be made, signifying the said expence, together with the quantity and quality of the negroes, and merchandises sold: and, in case the director of the domaine should oppose such sale, his motives, together with those of the governor, our lieutenant-general, or commander in his absence, and the intendant, shall be represented to be sent, with a copy of the ordonnance, to the secretary of state of the marine: and we require that the said ordonnance shall be executed provisionally, and that the sale, so permitted, shall not exceed the amount of the expence incurred, under any pretext whatsoever.

15. We require, that as soon as the said foreign ships shall be at liberty, and in condition to take in again their loadings of negroes and merchandises so landed, there shall be a re-examination of the same, signed by the director of the domaine, a copy whereof shall be sent to the secretary of state for the marine, and after the said embarkation the said vessels shall put to sea.—We require also, that those which shall be thus at liberty, depart the first favourable opportunity, after being in a condition for sailing, on the penalty against the captain of 1000 livres, and confiscation of ship and cargo: the governors, our lieutenant-governors, particular governors, or other officers commanding in our colonies, shall not permit the said ship to make any longer stay, than what shall be absolutely necessary to fit them for sea,

16. We

16. We forbid the captains of the said foreign ships, supercargoes, and others thereunto belonging, to land or sell any negroes, or other merchandises brought by the said ships, nor to ship any negroes or merchandises of the French colonies, on pain of confiscation of the said ships and loading, and 1000 livres penalty besides, which shall be paid without abatement by the captains and sailors.

Concerning negroes, effects, provisions, and merchandises, found on the sea-shores, and in the ports and havens, brought as well in French ships carrying on contraband trade, as in foreign ones.

A R T I C L E I.

NEGROES and merchandises found on the shores, ports, and havens, brought by French ships carrying on unlawful commerce, shall be confiscated, together with the ship and loading, and a penalty of 1000 livres laid on the captain, besides being condemned to the galleys for three years; the moiety of which penalty shall go to the informer.

2. Negroes and merchandises so found upon the shores, and in the ports and havens brought by foreign ships, shall also be confiscated, together with the vessel from whence they were unloaded, and the cargo and the captain condemned in 1000 livres penalty, which shall be

be paid without deduction by him and the sailors, and one moiety thereof shall go to the informer.

3. The said confiscations, pains and penalties, shall be adjudged by the officers of the admiralty, without appeal to superior courts.

Of negroes, effects, provisions, and merchandises, found on land, coming as well in French ships carrying on contraband commerce, as in foreign ones.

A R T I C L E I.

NEGROES and merchandises found on land, brought by ships belonging to our subjects, carrying on illicit trade, shall be confiscated, together with the ship and cargo, and the captain condemned in the penalty of 1000 livres, and sent to the galleys for three years.

2. Negroes and merchandises which shall, in like manner, be discovered, landed, brought by foreign ships, shall also be confiscated, together with the ship and cargo, and the captain condemned in the penalty of 1000 livres, which shall be paid without abatement, by him and the sailors.

3. Those in whose possession such negroes and merchandises shall be found, brought by French ships carrying on illicit trade, and by foreign ships, shall be condemned in 500 livres penalty, and be sent to the galleys for three years.

4. One

4. One moiety of the said fines and confiscation shall go to the informer, the other to the farmer of the revenue of our domaine.

5. Prosecution of such offenders shall be made before the judges in ordinary, without appeal to superior courts.

Of appeals in regard to sentences past, as well with respect to French ships carrying on contraband commerce, as foreign ships doing the same.

A R T I C L E I.

APPEAL lodged in superior courts, with respect to sentences passed in the ordinary courts of law, or in those of the admiralty, on occasion of contraband trade being carried on by French ships and foreign ones, shall be adjudged in the following manner :

2. Our superior courts shall continue to assemble after the usual manner.

3. The sittings which they commonly hold, and during which all causes are dispatched that are ready to be heard, shall be divided into two parts.

4. At the first sitting there shall be heard as well civil as criminal causes, which concern individuals, and others that concern foreign or contraband trade, or have any relation thereunto, as foreign ships, &c.

5. All causes which concern the said foreign or contraband trade, or have any relation there-

thereunto, and likewise all those concerning foreign ships, shall be heard at the second sitting, which shall be held immediately after the first.

6. The governor, our lieutenant-general, the intendant, major, officers; those only shall assist at the said second sittings, and also five counsellors that we shall name for this purpose, the solicitor-general and the secretary: we require, that in case any of the said counsellors should not be at the said sittings, either by absence, sickness, or any other lawful cause, sentence shall be passed, when there are but three of the said counsellors only.

Of merchandizes coming in foreign ships,
and brought by means of French vessels.

A R T I C L E I.

MERCHANDIZES coming in foreign ships, that shall be found in ships belonging to our subjects, shall be confiscated, and the captains of the said vessels, factors, &c. fined in three thousand livres penalty without deduction, and moreover the captains to be sent three years to the galleys, and the factors, &c. suffer six months imprisonment; the said confiscations and penalties shall go, the one half to the informer, and the other part shall be deposited in the hands of the commissioner of the treasury of the marine in our colonies, to be employed as we shall direct, either for the increasing or maintaining hospitals,

tals, buildings, or other necessary works of the said colonies.

2. The said captains, factors, &c. shall be obliged to justify by invoices, manifestoes, charter-parties, bills of lading, &c. in regular form, and this before the intendant at the first requisition, that the merchandizes sold are the intire produce of those laden in France; and, for want of those, they shall be censured and reputed to have sold merchandizes coming in foreign ships, or French ships trafficking in foreign or contraband trade, and as such shall be condemned in the penalties contained in the preceding article.

3. We refer the cognizance of causes that may require expedition, to the intendants of our colonies, and those we forbid to be tried in other courts.

4. We require, that, in cases where the said captains shall be convicted of the said offence, the said intendants shall place some reputable person on board such ships, in order to be carried into France to their owners.

5. We require, that all persons of what rank or condition soever, who shall be convicted of contraband commerce by vessels belonging to them, or that they have hired ships on freight that have favoured such trade in foreign vessels, or who have sent, into foreign countries or colonies, negroes, effects, provisions, or merchandizes of our colonies, may be cendemned, besides the penalties imposed

posed by these articles, to the galleys for three years.

6. We require, that such foreigners who carry on foreign commerce, and import negroes, and foreign merchandizes into our colonies, and likewise those who send negroes and merchandizes into our colonies, and likewise those who send negroes and merchandizes from our colonies into foreign countries, shall be liable to prosecution for the same, five years after commission, and that the proof thereof may be made within that time.

7. All contests of this kind, either as plaintiffs or defendants, shall be referred to the jurisdiction and cognizance of the intendants of our colonies, and we forbid all other courts and judges from trying the same.

8. We empower our commissaries of ordonnances, and our first counsellors in the islands and colonies, where there is no intendant, to supply their place.

Of foreigners settled in the colonies.

A R T I C L E I.

FOREIGNERS settled in our colonies, even those who are naturalized, or who may be so hereafter, shall not act as merchants, brokers, and agents, in affairs of commerce, in any manner whatsoever, on pain of 3000 livres penalty to the informer, and be banished

nished for ever from our said colonies; we permit them only to purchase lands and plantations, and to deal solely as planters in commodities produced therefrom.

2. We grant, to those who are at present engaged in trade, three months time, from the day of registering these presents, to lay the same aside, and the offenders shall be condemned in the penalties laid by the preceding article.

3. We forbid all merchants and traders in our colonies, from having any agents, factors, book-keepers, or other persons concerned in this commerce, who are foreigners, although they be naturalized: we require them to be dismissed within three months at the farthest, from the day of registering these presents, on the penalty of 3000 livres inflicted on such merchants and traders, and against the said agents, factors, book-keepers, or other persons who shall be engaged in their affairs, and to be banished for ever from the said colonies.

4. We enjoin and command our solicitors-general, and their substitutes, to attend duly to the execution of these three preceding articles, on pain of answering the same in their own persons.

Thus we require and command all our faithful friends who enjoy superior posts in the said islands and colonies, that these presents may be known, published, and registered, and the contents hereof strictly observed

served according to their form and tenor, notwithstanding all edicts, declarations, arrets, and ordonnances, to the contrary, which we have by these presents made null and void : For such is our pleasure. And, to the end that this may be for ever in force, we have hereunto affixed our seal. Given at Fontainebleau in the month of October, in the year 1727, and in the 13th year of our reign.

An arret of the royal council of state, containing regulations on the point of contests between the admiralty of France and the farmers-general of the revenue, with regard to contraband and prohibited commerce, made as well at sea, and in the ports, havens, and water-side of the kingdom, as in the French islands and colonies of America.—Of the 25th of May, 1728. Extracted from the registers of the council of state.

THE king being in council, and the memorials presented as well by the admiral of France, as by the adjudicatory of the united body of farmers-general of the revenue, on the subject of controversies arisen between the admiralty of France and the said farmers-general, in regard to contraband and prohibited commerce, &c. And, in regard to the application of the penalties and confiscations made, which have occasioned contests
between

between the judges of the admiralty and the judges of the said adjudicatory of farmers-general: his majesty, to put an end to those contests at present, and to prevent others for the future, having determined by a certain regulation what are the rights that belong to the one and the other, hath attended to the report of the *Sieur Le Peletier*, counsellor of state in ordinary, and to the royal council, and comptroller-general of the finances; and his majesty, being in council, has decreed, and doth decree, &c. what follows, viz.

A R T I C L E I.

THE knowledge of offences committed, and discovered in France, on the vessels and in the ports, roads, coasts, and shores of the sea, with respect to contraband and prohibited commerce, carried on by importation and exportation of merchandizes, shall appertain to the *Sieurs intendants*, and commissaries, resident in the provinces and generalities of the kingdom, in conjunction with the officers of the admiralty, without appeal to the council in civil affairs, and shall be the dernier resort in criminal cases, &c.

2. The produce of the penalties and confiscations shall belong to his majesty, or to the adjudicatory of his farms, at whose request and expence all prosecutions shall be carried on, without the admiral of France

pretending any thing thereto, under any pretext whatsoever.

3. The officers of the admiralty shall have cognizance in the first instance of offences in regard to foreign commerce, as well in regard to affairs of a civil as criminal nature, and contraband or prohibited merchandizes, which shall be discovered to be carried on by ships, and in the ports, roads, coasts, and shores of the sea in the French islands and colonies, with appeal to superior courts, except those offences contained in title 5 of the letters patents of the month of October, 1727; the cognizance whereof shall belong to the intendants and officers of the admiralty, in calling to their assistance, if need be, the number of graduates, or officers, required by the ordinances in cases of pronouncing corporal punishment,

4. The produce of the penalties and confiscations arising from such offences which shall be discovered by the commissioners of the western domaine, in the ports, coasts, and shores of the sea in the French islands and colonies, shall be remitted to the account of cash of the domaine, and belong one moiety to his majesty, or to the adjudicatory of his farms, and one moiety to the informers, and employed by the domaine that shall have contributed to the discovery and the capture.

5. The

5. The cognizance of such offences as shall be discovered on land by the officers of the domaine to the said islands and colonies, shall belong to the intendants, without appeal to the council, except where corporal punishment is inflicted; in which case, the cognizance in the dernier resort shall be left to the said Sieurs intendants, in calling to their assistance the number of graduates, or officers, required by the ordinance; and the produce of the penalties and confiscations that shall arise, as well in civil as criminal cases, shall be remitted to the cash-account of the domaine, one moiety whereof shall belong to his majesty, or to the adjudicatory of the farms, the other moiety to the informers, and the servants of the domaine who have contributed to the discovery and capture.

6. The product of the penalties and confiscations which shall arise from the prizes at sea by the pinnaces and commissioners of the farm, authorized by the commissions from the admiralty of France, shall be remitted to the domaine, and be appropriated (one tenth belonging to the admiral being deducted) one moiety to his majesty, or the adjudicatory of his farms, the other moiety to the informers, and those employed by the domaine who have contributed to the capture.

7. The penalties and confiscations, with regard to affairs undetermined in France and America, shall belong to his majesty, or to

the adjudicatory of his farms, according to articles 4, 5, and 6 of the present regulations.

8. Effects and merchandizes seized, as well in France as in the French islands and colonies, by the commissioners of the adjudicatory of farms, shall be deposited only in the office of farms; and, with relation to prizes taken at sea (one tenth of which fall to the admiral of France) the adjudicatory of farms, or their commissioners, shall be obliged to secure them in a warehouse, under two different keys, one of which shall remain with the officers of the admiralty, and the other with the receiver of the depository of farms, till definitive judgment be given.

9. And, to indemnify the admiral of France for those rights which may be pretended to belong to him, as well in respect of contraband trade in France, as that in the French islands and colonies, and to put an end to the litigations which such pretensions may occasion, there shall be paid to him annually, on the first day of the year, by the adjudicatory of farms, to commence from the present year 1728, the sum of 20,000 livres; which, for the future, shall put an end to all pretensions of this nature in the present admiral and his successors; nor shall the farmers of the revenue interfere with the determinations of the officers of the admiralty,

ralty, with respect to confiscations, nor any thing which does not immediately concern contraband and prohibited trade, and the care of the duties of the farms.

10. The farmer of the revenue, under pretence of care thereof, be it either for the loading of salt, and to prevent contraband trade, or for whatever other reason, shall not have, or put to sea, any vessel of what size soever, without leave and commission from the admiral of France, registered at the admiralty of the place, under the penalty contained in the ordinance of 1681; except, however, small boats requisite to visit ships in creeks, ports, and roads. With respect to the loading of salt, there shall be permissions granted for such ships every voyage: and, in relation to vessels and pinnaces that are always on the sea for the service of his majesty's farmers of the revenue, their leave and commission shall be granted them annually.

11. The adjudicatory of the farms shall be allowed to have upon the sea, and at the mouths or entrances of rivers, armed vessels, pinnaces, and shallops, on condition of the said vessels transmitting, every six months, to the secretary of the admiralty of the province, an account, certified by the commissioner-general of the farms, of the sur and christian names of all persons therein employed.

12. The adjudicatory shall be permitted to fit out the said vessels, and to chuse their sailors, provided they are not in the service of the royal marine.

13. Licences shall be granted them from the admiral of France for such vessels and pinnaces which they may judge requisite for their purpose, in order to be armed upon the coasts of the kingdom; and these licences shall remain in force for one year, and be renewed annually at their expiration, under the penalties contained in the ordinance of 1681.

14. With relation to those pinnaces, boats, or other vessels that the farmers of the revenue may think necessary to arm at the island-colonies in America, to go within the extent of the limits prescribed by the regulations made in regard to vessels carrying on contraband commerce, they shall be obliged to take out a commission of the admiral of France, as required by article the 5th of the letters patents of the month of October, 1727, which commission shall remain in full force for one year only.

15. If any vessel, carrying on "contraband commerce on the coasts of the islands of America, should be attacked by any armed vessel commissioned by the admiralty of France, and also by a vessel armed by the farmers of the revenue, under the like commission from the admiralty, the prize shall be divided between them, according to the num-

number of sailors and cannon in the respective armed vessels, conformably to the ordinance of 1681.

16. There shall be no innovations made with regard to prizes and offenders, which concern damaged salt and tobacco, in the ports, and on the coasts of the kingdom; the full power to judge of which remaining in the officer of the gabelles, and others who have cognizance thereof, according to the regulations issued for that purpose; all which shall be executed according to their form and tenor, without deviating from the present arret.

17. Upon this occasion, our letters patents of the month of October, 1727, shall be taken into consideration, as likewise other regulations concerning contraband and prohibited merchandizes. His majesty enjoins the Sieur intendants and commissaries throughout the provinces and generalities of the kingdom, and the said French islands and colonies, to be vigilant in the execution of the present arret, which shall be executed, notwithstanding any obstructions thereunto; of which, if any arise, the cognizance thereof shall be left to his majesty in council, and all courts and ordinary judges are hereby forbid to interfere in these cases.—Done at the royal council of state, his majesty being present, held at Versailles the 25th of May, 1728.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, &c.—To our faithful friends and counsellors, concerned in our councils, masters of requests of our household, Sieurs intendants and commissaries throughout the provinces and generalities of our kingdom, and our French islands and colonies in America, greeting, &c.—We command and injoin you, by these presents, signed with our hand, to be vigilant and attentive, each in his respective station, to the due execution of the arret, the extract whereof is hereunto annexed, under the counter-seal of our chancery, issued this day in our council of state, we being present, for the reasons therein contained.—In the first place, we order and command our serjeant, on this requisition, to signify and publish the said arret, to all whom it may concern, that no one may be ignorant thereof, and to take all requisite measures to put our commands in execution, without other permission, notwithstanding any impediments hereunto; the cognizance of which we reserve to ourselves and our council, and forbid all other courts or judges any way to interfere therein.—We will and ordain, &c.”

UPON the 3d of October, 1730, a royal declaration was issued, concerning the regulation and collection of the capitation-tax at the Windward islands of America: and, on October the 4th, 1731, instructions were also issued, to facilitate the execution of the said declaration.

declaration. In regard to the first of these, although there is every thing done that could be, to prevent the evasion of the tax, and all frauds in the collection, yet there does not seem less judgment in joining moderation with rigor and severity. Example: in article the 9th of the said declaration it is said, "That such who shall break up fresh land in the French islands and colonies shall be exempted, for two years, from the said tax of capitation, not only for their own persons, but for their domestics and negroes employed therein.—Likewise those who shall establish new plantations, either for cacao or indigo, shall be intitled to the same privileges."—These being the chief particulars which relate to traffic, we shall take no other notice of the before-mentioned declaration than to observe that the latter, viz. the instructions for execution of those of October the 4th, 1731, contain such plain and intelligible rules for the execution of every distinct article of the former, that it is not possible either for the officers of the crown to mistake their duty, or the people the intention of the legislator.

THE next essential particular that occurs, according to the order of time, with regard to the laws of France, in relation to their American islands and colonies, is a royal regulation with respect to the wheat-meal of Canada, which was issued by the king the 18th of May, 1732; and which is introduced with the following preamble:

" His

“ His majesty being informed, that the meal sold in Canada, and which is exported thence to Cape Breton, and other of the French islands in America, is frequently of a bad quality, there being mixed therewith meal of other grain than that of wheat-corn, and that the same is barrelled up too moist, or in casks not sufficiently dried : his majesty desirous to prevent a continuation of the like abuses, which will absolutely ruin and annihilate the said commerce of meal, which is highly beneficial to the said colony of Canada : his majesty has ordered, and does order, &c. as follows, viz.”

A R T I C L E I.

MERCHANTS and manufacturers of wheat-meal in the colony of Canada shall be obliged, from the day of the publication of the present ordinance, to mark with fire both ends of the barrels wherein such meal shall be packed, before the sail or embarkation of the said barrels, on pain of three livres penalty for every barrel not so marked, that shall be offered to sale, be sold, or embarked.

2. Merchants and others shall be obliged, on pain of 20 livres penalty, to deposit the image or impression of the said fire-mark which they use (viz. those merchants and other manufacturers of meal residing in the city of Quebec, or under it's government) in the rolls of the admiralty established in the said

said city ; and those dwelling in the cities of the three rivers, and at Mont-Real, or under the government thereof, shall be deposited in the rolls of the royal jurisdictions of the city, within the districts of their habitation.

3. Those who shall embark the said barrels, if meal, shall be obliged to mention, in their invoice of the said barrels, the distinct mark thereof, and to mention the same likewise in the bills of lading, on pain of 20 livres penalty for every offence.

4. The captains of those ships on which the said barrels of meal shall be laden, shall be obliged, before their loading, to certify whether the said barrels be marked ; and, in case they are embarked without marking, they shall be condemned in the penalty of three livres for every barrel so embarked.

5. Meal barrelled and offered to sale in Canada, which shall be found to be of bad quality, shall be confiscated, and the proprietor thereof condemned in four livres per barrel penalty.

6. Meal sent from Canada to Cape Breton, and to other of the French islands in America, which shall be found to be of bad quality, shall likewise be confiscated, and the proprietor thereof condemned in a penalty of 4 livres per barrel.

7. Cognizance of offences committed in Canada against the present ordinance, on account of barrels of meal being exposed to sale on the land, and before having been embarked,

ed, and which barrels shall not be marked, and on default also of not depositing the said mark with the secretaries of the royal jurisdiction, together with the bad quality of the said meal; shall belong to the intendant of New France, or to his subdelegates in his absence; but, if the said offences shall be discovered in any other places than on the keys, and in the ships and vessels, or in the warehouses wherein they shall be put from the first time of their landing; and, in case the said fire-mark hath not been duly deposited, in conformity to the present ordinance, in the rolls of the admiralty of Quebec, the officers of the said court shall take cognizance of the said offences.

8. The officers of the admiralty of Quebec, and those of Cape Breton, and of other French islands in America, shall take cognizance, each within the extent of his district, of offences committed by neglect of the fire-mark required at both ends of the said barrels, and also of the bad quality of the meal, provided the offence be discovered upon the keys, or in the ships or other vessels, or in the warehouses where they shall be deposited for the first time of their being landed: they likewise shall take cognizance of the default, in omitting to mention the mark of the said barrels in the invoices and bills of lading of the concerned.

9. The officers of the admiralty of Cape Breton shall be obliged to direct a verbal process,

cess, with respect to the bad meal ; which process shall be sent to the intendant of New France, in order to be transmitted to the officers of the admiralty of Quebec : on which account the proprietors of the said meal shall be condemned in the penalty of 4 livres per barrel, as aforesaid.

10. The officers of the admiralty of the other French islands in America shall, in like manner, be obliged to direct a verbal process, with regard to the bad meal ; which process they shall send to the secretary of state, having there the jurisdiction of the marine, to be transmitted by him to the officers of the admiralty of Quebec, to the end that the proprietor may be condemned in the penalty of 4 livres for every barrel of bad meal.

11. Cognizance of offences committed against the present ordinance, which shall be discovered after the landing of the said meal at Cape Breton, or at other French islands in America, and after they shall have been bought up from the keys or warehouses wherein they may have been put, shall belong to the intendant of the island where they shall have been landed, and, in his absence, to his subdelegate.

12. The intendants of the said islands, or their subdelegates in their absence, shall be obliged to direct the like verbal process, in relation to bad meal ; which process they shall send to the secretary of state for that jurisdiction

jurisdiction of the marine, to be transmitted by him to the intendant of New France, to the end that the proprietors may be condemned in the penalty of 4 livres per barrel, which shall be found bad.

13. These verbal processes, made on account of the bad quality of meal arriving at Cape Breton, and other the French islands in America, shall signify the quality and condition in which the meal shall be found, together with the mixture of what other grain shall be therein made; they shall mention likewise to what the bad quality of the said meal is to be attributed.

14. The penalties and confiscations which shall have been adjudged by the intendant of New France, shall belong (viz. for offences committed in the government of Quebec) to the general hospital of the said place; for those committed in the government of the three rivers, to the Hotel-Dieu of the said city; and, for those committed in the government of Mont-Real, to the Hotel-Dieu there established.

15. The penalties and confiscations decreed by the judge-commissary of Cape Breton, subdelegated by the intendant of New France, shall belong to the hospital of the said island; and those decreed by the intendant of the other French islands of America, or their subdelegates, shall be appropriated to the nearest hospital.

16. The

16. The penalties and confiscations decreed by the officers of the admiralty, shall belong to the admiral of France.

HIS majesty orders and commands Mons^r. the count of Toulouse, admiral of France, and the governors, his lieutenant-general, and intendants in America, to keep a vigilant eye, every one in his own person, to the due execution of the present ordinance, which shall be read, published, and fixed up in every place where needful, and registered in the rolls of the admiralty of the respective colonies wherein they have jurisdiction.—Done at Compeigne, the 18th of May, 1732.

UPON the 21st of May following the count of Thoulouse, admiral of France, issued his orders to all concerned, to have strict regard to the execution of the preceding ordinance.

An arret of the royal council, forbidding all privateers and merchants, carrying on trade in the French islands and colonies, to send stuffs or painted linnens of the Indies thither, or those of Persia, China, or the Levant.—May 9, 1733. Extracted from the registers of the council of state.

THE king causing to be laid before him the letters patents of the month of April, 1717, touching the regulation of the commerce of the French islands and colonies of America, by the 12th article of which it is declared,

declared, that the merchants of the kingdom shall not ship for the said islands and colonies any foreign merchandises, whose import and consumption in the kingdom are prohibited, on pain of confiscation, and a penalty of 3000 livres, which should be decreed by the officers of the admiralty: also other letters patents, of the month of February, 1719, including regulations of trade from Marseilles to the said islands and colonies, the 12th article of which contains the same disposition: also those of the month of October, 1721, by which his majesty granted to the city of Dunkirk the privilege and liberty to carry on trade to the said islands, and ordained, by article 14, that the general regulation of the month of April, 1717, should be executed in whatever was not repugnant to the dispositions made by those last letters patents: and his majesty being informed that the merchants who carry on the commerce of the said French islands and colonies, might export thither stuffs and painted linens of the Indies, Persia, China, or of the Levant, under pretence that these sorts of merchandises (whose use and importation are nevertheless prohibited) are not expressly comprehended in the said 12th article of the general regulation of 1717; against which his majesty desiring to provide, and considering the advice of the deputies of council of commerce, heard the report of the *Sieur Orry*, counsellor of state, and counsellor in ordinary to the royal council, and comp-

comptroller-general of the finances, the king, being present in council, has ordained, and and does hereby ordain, that the letters patents of the month of April, 1717, of February, 1719, and October, 1721, shall be executed according to their form and tenor. In consequence of which, his majesty expressly forbids all privateers and merchants, carrying on trade to the French islands and colonies of America, to carry thither stuffs or painted linens of the Indies, of Persia, China, or the Levant, under what denomination soever, on pain of confiscation, and a penalty of 3000 livres, and to be EXCLUDED from being concerned in the said commerce for the future.—The like prohibitions are made to all captains, master-pilots, marine officers, sailors, passengers, and others who make up the crews of ships designed for the said islands and colonies, to carry thither, in any shape whatsoever, any of the said stuffs and painted linens, on pain of confiscation, and of 3000 livres penalty against the captains, master-pilots, marine officers and passengers, besides their being rendered incapable of commanding and serving in any vessel whatsoever; and, with respect to sailors, and others whereof the ship's crew consists, on pain of one year's imprisonment, or more, according to the case: his majesty commands and enjoins the Sieurs intendants and commissaries in the marine provinces of the kingdom, and the officers of the admiralty, and likewise the go-

vernors and intendants of the said French islands and colonies, or all commanders and commissaries subdelegated, to have a strict regard, each for himself, to the execution of the present arret, which shall be read, published, and fixed up, wherever needful. Done at the king's council, his majesty being present, held at Versailles the 9th of May, 1733.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, &c.—To our friends and faithful counsellors, concerned in our councils, the Sieurs intendants and commissaries, dispersed, for the execution of our orders, throughout our maritime provinces, and to the officers of the admiralty, also to the governors and intendants of the French islands and colonies, or to the commanders and commissaries subdelegated in their districts, greeting: we command and enjoin, by these presents signed by us, to have a strict regard, every one in his own person, to the execution of the arret hereunto annexed, under the counter-seal of our chancery, this day given in our council of state, we being there present, for the reasons therein contained, &c.

An

An arret of the royal council of state, which grants the merchants of St. Jean de Luz, for their whale and cod fisheries at Canada and Cape Breton, the same rights, privileges, and exemptions granted by letters patents of the month of April, 1717, for the trade of the French islands and colonies of America. — July 20, 1734. Extracted from the registers of the royal council of state.

UPON a petition presented to the king in council, by the merchants of St. Jean de Luz, containing, that as yet, with regard to the cod and whale fisheries, which is the only commerce of that city, they are under the necessity of sending ships, as well to the island of Terra Nova, which makes part of the French colonies of America, as to Davis's Straights in North America; notwithstanding they have never enjoyed an exemption of duties on merchandises designed for the French colonies, with respect both to the cargo or the victualling of their vessels; of which they have always refused the acquittance of security at Bourdeaux, under pretence that there is no warehouse of entrepost established in their port; and that in the letters patents of the month of April, 1717, containing regulations for the commerce of the French colonies, which signify the ports where vessels are to be fitted out, that of St. Jean de Luz hath been omitted: and, as that omission makes it

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impossible for them to carry on the commerce of the colonies upon an equality with other merchants of the kingdom, included in the said letters patents, they being liable to these duties, from which others are exempt: which have proved so burthensome, that they have sustained considerable losses, for some years passed, in their cod and whale fisheries: for these reasons they request, that his majesty would please to order the establishment of a warehouse of entrepost in the said city of St. Jean de Luz, for fitting out ships for the French colonies of America, and that they may enjoy those exemptions of duties, and other privileges and advantages, granted to the merchants, contained in the letters patents of the month of April, 1717. His majesty having seen the said petition, heard the sentiments of the deputies of commerce, and the report of the Sieur Orry, counsellor of state, and comptroller-general of the finances, and the king being present in council, hath granted, and doth grant, to the merchants of St. Jean de Luz, for their whale and cod fisheries at Canada and Cape Breton, the same rights, privileges, and exemptions which are granted for the commerce of the French colonies, to the merchants of the kingdom, included in the letters patents of the month of April, 1717; to which end, his majesty orders that there may be established, in the said city of St. Jean de Luz, a warehouse, wherein the merchandises and provisions de-
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signed for the victualling of ships fitted out for the said fisheries, shall be lodged, according to the entrepost, and in conformity to the 30th article of the said letters patents.—Done at the council of state, held at Versailles, the 20th. of July, 1734.

An arret of the royal council of state, and letters patents in consequence thereof, concerning the entrepost, as well in respect to merchandises intended for the French islands and colonies, as those which come from thence.—Of the 6th of May, 1738. Registered in the council of aids.

THE letters patents of the month of April, 1717, being represented to the king in council, containing regulations for the commerce of the French colonies, by which his majesty hath ordered, by articles 5, 6, and 30, that the provisions and merchandises of the kingdom intended for the said colonies, together with those also of the said colonies, shall be warehoused, according to the entrepost in the ports therein designed, and that the warehouses for that purpose shall be chosen by the merchants, at their expence, and locked with three different keys, one of which shall be deposited with the commissioner of the five great farms, another with the commissioner of the western domaine, and the third with

the overseer appointed for that purpose by the merchants: the declaration of his majesty, of the 19th of January, 1723, which orders that the merchants, the proprietors of the provisions and merchandises designed to be warehoused, and intended for the French islands and colonies, shall be obliged, after one year's entrepost, to declare, at the offices of farms of those places, the quantities, qualities, weights, and measures of the said provisions and merchandises, which shall remain in the entrepost warehouses; which declaration shall be certified by the commissioners of the adjudicatory of the farms; and, in case of offending there-against, by a false declaration, the merchants proprietors of the said interposed merchandise shall be condemned in the penalty of 500 livres, and likewise obliged to the payment of the duties of the merchandises which shall be found wanting according to their declaration: and lastly, in case of the sale of the said merchandises, the merchants proprietors thereof shall be obliged to discharge the duties one month after sale, on pain of the like penalty of 500 livres. The arret of the council of the third of May, 1723, and letters patents, in consequence thereof, of the 21st of the said month, by which his majesty hath fixed the time of entrepost, as well with respect to the merchandises of the islands and colonies, as of those declared and designed for the said islands

islands and colonies, shall be for one year, reckoning from the day that the said merchandises shall have been so warehoused; which time being expired, they shall be liable to duties. And his majesty being informed, that, in the cases where the farmer of the revenue, on account of the difficulties which attend warehouses under keys, permits the merchants to make the entrepost in their own warehouses, many of whom lodge the said merchandises, or change the warehouses, without making any declaration thereof to the farmer, which hath occasioned divers abuses : his majesty, being resolved to remedy the same, by adding to the abovesaid regulations fresh precautions, which may, in in some measure, supply the default of the keys, which, in the terms of the letters patents of April 1717, should be deposited with the farmer of the revenue, &c. The king having heard the report of the Sieur Orry, counsellor of state, and comptroller-general of the finances, being present in council, hath ordered, and doth hereby order, that, in case where the farmer of the revenue shall permit merchants to put merchandises in their own warehouses, the said merchants shall be obliged to declare, to the commissioners of the farms, the warehouse wherein they design to place them, and to give to the officer of farms security to represent them in the same quality and quantity, at the time re-

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quired,

quired, under the pains and penalties hereafter mentioned.—His majesty forbids the merchants to take out the said merchandises from the warehouses wherein they shall be deposited, or even to shift them from one warehouse to another, till they have made a declaration thereof to the said office, and taken out a licence for that purpose, &c. His majesty orders, that, in case of fraud, the said merchants shall be condemned to the confiscation of the value of the merchandises wanting, and besides in the penalty of 500 livres, &c. and, in case of a change of warehouse without declaration made thereof, they shall be deprived of the benefit of the entrepost, and liable to the payment of all the duties, &c.

Then follow letters patents to enforce the same.

MAY the 21st, 1741, was issued an arret of the royal council of state, permitting privateers for the French islands and colonies to load salt in Bretagne, or in other parts where customary, to be employed at Cape Verde, for the salting of beef designed for the said islands, without paying any duties, &c.

ON July the 19th, 1742, a royal ordinance was made, forbidding all captains of ships disarmed in the said islands of America,

rica, from paying in the said islands the balance due to their ship's crew, and injoining them to make the discounts in the presence of the officers charged to take an account of several classes of the sailors, and regulating the peculiar forms requisite upon those occasions, &c.

JUNE the 24th, 1743, an arret of the royal council of state was issued, ordering that the merchandizes of the produce of the French islands of America, intended for Cape Breton, shall be discharged, to the 1st of January, 1747, of the duty of weight of 1 per cent. and that those merchandizes of the produce of the said islands, designed as well for Cape Breton as for Canada, shall be discharged, during the said time, of the duties of 3 per cent. of the western domaine, together with the duty of 40 sols per 100 weight upon sugars of the said islands, which shall be sent there.

OCTOBER the 29th, 1743, an arret of the royal council of state was issued, ordering that the merchants and privateers of Marseilles shall be obliged to bring to the office of the western domaine all merchandizes coming from the French islands of America, so well as those which shall be embarked for the said islands, to be there visited, and the duties discharged.

APRIL

APRIL the 20th, 1744, an arret of the royal council of state was made, suspending, during the late war, the execution of the second article of the letters patents of the month of April, 1717, concerning the commerce of the French islands of America.

ON the 22d of December, 1750, an arret of the royal council of state was declared, containing an exemption of the duty of 3 per cent. of the western domaine, on cottons brought from the French colonies of America, for home-consumption, and to subject them to the same duties of exportation that they paid before the arret of the 12th of November, 1749. Also ordaining that the duty of 3 per cent. of the western domaine shall continue to be collected upon cotton of the French colonies exported to other nations; and that the duty of one half per cent. established by the declaration of the 10th of November, 1727, shall continue to be collected upon the cotton of the said colonies, in the same manner as collected upon other merchandizes which come from thence.

ON the 17th of August, 1751, an arret was issued by the royal council of state, fixing at 8 livres per 100 weight the duties on the exportation of cotton-wool out of the kingdom, coming from the French island colonies, and those on cotton-yarn at 10
livres

livres per 100 weight, as well for the duties of the five great farms, as for those of the western domaine; ordaining also, that the duty of one half per cent. augmentation of the western domaine shall remain to be collected at importation in the kingdom, upon cottons coming from the said islands.

WE have dwelt the longer on the laws established in France for the regulation of the trade of their American islands and other colonies, because these things seem to be little known in this kingdom, and because they point out the measures which that nation has taken, from the year 1701 to the present time, for the advancement of the commerce of their colonies. And, as the success and prosperity of this neighbouring nation, in these islands and colonies, have been so remarkable and conspicuous to the whole world, within half a century, a knowledge of those laws, whereby such great things have been effected, one should seem to think, must be acceptable to all who would enter into the causes of such unparalleled consequences.

THAT our readers may form a right judgment of these laws and regulations, we shall observe the following particulars, viz.

I. THAT they are grounded on the representations of the deputies of commerce, made, from time to time, to the royal council

cil of state: that those deputies of commerce are persons well skilled and experienced in those branches of trade about which they lay their sentiments before the royal council.

2. THAT these laws and regulations, in general, are derived from a very exact and circumstantial state of the commerce, as carried on by the practical merchants and traders; which indicate that the legislators in all countries cannot be too well informed of all the various methods and arts made use of by traders in the prosecution of their respective branches, the better to enable them so to adapt and conform their laws to the nature of peculiar branches, that the national prosperity cannot fail of being promoted.

3. THAT the fines and penalties made on traders violating those laws are very rigorous and severe; and that the French nation are no less strict in the execution of those laws, than they are circumstantial and deliberate in the enacting them: witness the case of captain Gilles Robin, for carrying on illicit trade with an English vessel at St. Domingo.

4. THAT the laws of trade in France should seem, suitably to the nature of the constitution of their government, to be wisely accommodated to preserve the whole trade of their islands and colonies to themselves, in order to render them absolutely subservient to the prosperity of their mother-kingdom.—That,

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to this end, we find them, by their laws, extremely vigilant to prevent all contraband trade from being carried on with foreign nations in their colonies, they judging it highly detrimental to the interest of their colonies, as well as of the kingdom of France in general.

5. THAT, since the laws of France in general are so well calculated to prevent such contraband trade, we may presume that, whenever this nation permits such trade with their American colonies, they are certain to be gainers by it; otherwise we may reasonably enough believe, that they would soon put an effectual stop thereto, as the due execution of their laws could not fail of being effectual to that purpose.

6. THAT as the French encourage a trade being carried on between the British northern colonies and the French sugar-islands in America, as is taken notice of in these papers, it is to be feared that the French are too sensible of the advantages arising from that trade, or they would as little admit of that in particular as any other; and, if that proves a gainful branch of trade to the French, does it not become the wisdom of Great-Britain so thoroughly to examine into this commerce with the French colonies, as to determine whether a commerce beneficial to France can be so in its consequences to Great-Britain?

7. THAT

7. THAT the French take all proper care to promote a trade between Canada, or New-France, and their island colonies; and that it should not seem to appear bad policy in Great-Britain to promote, as much as possible, the commerce of our North-American colonies, with our own sugar-islands, rather than to permit them to carry on a trade to the French sugar-islands.

8. THAT the French have surprisingly increased in their sugar-trade, as well as in every other part of the commerce of their islands and colonies in America, is a fact uncontrovertible; and that their maritime power, in general, has augmented, in the like proportion, is as little to be disputed.

THE number of prizes that were taken from the French in the late war, and the frequent arrivals of their numerous fleets, have roused and opened the eyes of many that would not be convinced before: and, since our indolence is at length awakened, our security alarmed, and every breast seems to be filled with those passions which are inkindled by the love of our country, is it not full time to exert our whole strength, to reduce this nation within bounds, if possible?

In order to answer so desirable an end, it will be necessary to search narrowly into the present state, laws, establishments, and rules of commerce, as well foreign as domestic, and to retrench what is superfluous and inconvenient

convenient in our own laws, and to supply what is insufficient by prudent regulations. But, above all, does it not behove Great Britain seriously to think of making such foreign alliances, as will enable us to humble this eternal disturber of Europe once for all? For this I will presume to say may be done : and now or never seems the time !



DISSERTATION XXI.

The system of the French with regard to their African trade; wherein will appear, by what measures they have become so successful therein, and they have had so greatly the advantage over us.

THE African trade is estimable to the French, as well as other European nations, who have a share in it, on account of the gold, the ivory, and the slave trade. Though the commerce of this country, as it has hitherto been carried on, affords but few articles, in comparison to that of others, yet it is valuable and important; and the more so, in that it is so necessary a trade to the Europeans, as they are at present circumstanced. For

THIS commerce is not only profitable to the respective Europeans, in the direct way of trading from their several countries to the African coast, but is so much the more so to those nations, which have colonies and plantations to support by the dint of negro-labour, for want of a competent number of whites, for the cultivation of sugars, tobacco's

baccoes, and all other plantation-productions.

How greatly beneficial this traffic has proved to the French nation in this respect, we may judge from the extraordinary encrease of their sugar colonies. It is not above half a century since they did not employ above 100 sail of ships for the supply of their own kingdom for sugars; but in the late war it was discovered, that they employed above six hundred sail. This is one of the great nurseries of trade and seamen, that has rendered the French no less formidable in America than Europe.

By what means these mighty things have come to pass, cannot be so effectually represented, as by the authentic ordonances and arrets; which shews the real spirit of their laws.—We need trace these no farther back than the year 1716.

THE king's letters patent for the liberty of trade upon the coast of Africa, published at Paris, January 1736.

[The preamble runs thus, which I shall note with all brevity, for the sake of some useful observations.]

LEWIS, &c.—To all, greeting.—By letters patent of the late king, dated January 1685, there was established a company by the name of the Guinea Company, to continue for the space of 20 years, excluding all
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others the trade of negroes, gold dust, and other merchandize trafficked in upon the coast of Africa, from the river Searraleone to the Cape of Good-Hope; and likewise granting to this company divers privileges and immunities; and, among other grants, exempted them from half the duties of all merchandizes, brought from all places within their district and isles of America upon their own account, although the time limited by these letters patents should be expired.—The late king, &c. thought good, on account of engagements this company had made, in order to supply the Spanish West-Indies with negroes by the Asiento contract, to continue to them the same privileges and immunities, under the title of the Asiento treaty, until the month of November, 1713.—The merchants of our kingdom having represented how much it tended to the benefit of trade in general, and in particular to the improvement of the French islands in America, that the commerce of the Guinea coast should be free and open to all his majesty's subjects; the late king did not think it proper to form a new company, though there were many persons ready to offer themselves, and enter into such an association; and, as we are willing to encourage the freedom of commerce, and deal favourably with the merchants and traders, who shall undertake this traffic, and afford them every thing necessary to render it more considerable than it has

has been, and by that means to provide for our subjects of the French isles in America a sufficient number of negroes, for improving the cultivation of their lands: for these and other reasons moving us hereunto, we have thought fit, by the advice, &c. And have declared, resolved, and ordained, &c. That

ARTICLE I.

WE have permitted, and do permit, to all the merchants of our kingdom for the time to come, to have a free trade for negroes, gold dust, and all other merchandizes that may be brought from the coast of Africa, from the river Searrallyonne to the Cape of Good-Hope, provided their ships are fitted out in the harbours of Rouen, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, and Nantes.

2. The masters and captains who trade to the coast of Guinea, shall be obliged to declare at the secretary's of the admiralty office, established at the place of their departure, and give security at the receipt of customs, to oblige them to return into one of the ports of Rouen, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, and Nantes; except, nevertheless, those ships which shall go out from Rouen, Rochelle, and Bourdeaux, should be drove, at their return, into Nantes, or St. Malo.

3. The merchants of those ships that shall transport to the French isles of America negroes bought upon the coast of Guinea, shall pay, upon the arrival of their ships in the
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ports of Rouen, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, and Nantes, into the hands of the treasurer-general of the marine in being, the sum of 20 livres for every negro that shall be carried to the said islands, for which they shall give security to the secretary of the admiralty, on their being permitted to take their leave of our most dear and truly beloved uncle, Lewis Alexander of Bourbon, count of Thoulouse, admiral of France, &c. and as to those merchants, whose ships shall only trade for gold dust, and other commodities upon the said coast, they shall likewise be bound, upon the arrival of their said ships in the said ports, to pay into the hands of the treasurer of the marine the sum of three livres for every ton his ship's burden shall contain; which twenty livres aforesaid, and three livres, shall be employed, by order of the council of marine, for the keeping in repair the fortifications, factories, and custom-houses, which are or shall be settled on the said coasts of Guinea, which expences we will defray for the time to come.

4. Nevertheless, the payment of the said three livres per ton duty is excused during the three next following years, from the day and date of these presents, to all our subjects, whose ships shall trade to the Guinea coast for gold and other merchandizes, slaves only excepted.

5. Be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all manner of merchandizes that shall be

be brought from the coast of Guinea by our subjects, directly to the ports of Rouen, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, and Nantes, we exempt from one half the duties of importation, that are farmed, or may be farmed; likewise our will is, that all sugars, and other merchandizes, of all our subjects that shall be brought from the French American islands, arising from the sale and truck of negroes, be equally exempted from the said half duties of importation, on their producing a certificate from the superintendant of the isles, or commissary-governor, or commissioner of the customs in the West-Indies, that the goods shipped at the said islands arose from the sale and barter of negroes, which the said ships had there unloaded, the said certificate specifying the ships names, number of negroes that shall be shipped to the islands, and lodged in the receivers office, who shall grant to the captains and masters a duplicate of the same, without any expence.

All our receivers, commissioners, or deputies, are forbid to take more duties, upon pain of four times the value.

6. Linens of all sorts, toys, mercery, glassware wrought and plain, iron-bars, plate-iron, guns, swords, and other arms, gun-flints, being the manufacture of this kingdom, shall be free from all duties of exportation, usual both in our receiver's office, and all the offices in their passage, and the ports they are bound to, on condition it is proved they

are intended for the Guinea trade; until which is confirmed, the said goods shall be lodged in the custom-house, under two different keys; one kept by the receiver-general of our customs, the other by whomsoever the merchants shall propose, at their own expence. As for the wines of Anjou; and other products of the river Loire, bound to Guinea, they shall be under the same restrictions as those bound to the French American islands, according to the arret of council 23 September, 1710. And, with respect to the wines of Bourdeaux, we will and ordain, that they are regulated, as if shipped for the American islands, on taking a bill of loading there of the said wines, and giving them the usual security.

7. We grant to the said merchants leave to lodge, in the ports of Rouen, Rochelle, Bourdeaux, and Nantes, the goods called cowries, striped blue and white India cottons, printed linens, grain crystal, small Dutch looking-glasses, Dutch tobacco-pipes, and others from the north, coming only by sea for the Guinea trade: we grant likewise the same room in our custom-house for two years and no longer, from the date of these presents, for Dutch knives, kettles, and other sort of copper utensils. Provided the aforesaid foreign goods shall be specified to the commissioner of the customs upon their arrival, and afterwards deposited in the king's warehouse for that purpose, locked with two keys,

keys, one to remain in the hands of the commissioner, the other with whom the merchant shall name, all at their own expence.

8. The commissioner of the customs in each of the aforesaid ports shall keep a register, which shall be lettered and marked by the director of the customs, in which the aforesaid commissioner shall register in parcels the goods specified in the two foregoing articles, as soon as they shall be deposited in the warehouse. The aforesaid commissioner is forbid to give a certificate for their clearance, upon the security that was taken at the first office, until the proof, the register, and the unloading of them, shall be examined into in the aforesaid staple warehouse, from whence they shall not be taken until they are to be put on board the ships bound to the coast of Guinea. And, at the loading of the aforesaid goods, both foreign and French, for the coast of Guinea: our will is, that there be mentioned in the margin of the register, &c. the name of the ship they were put on board, and signed by the commissioner, the merchants they are consigned to, and the captain who receives the goods on board, &c.

9. Nevertheless, we grant leave to the merchants and traders of the city of St. Malo to fit out and equip, in their ports, ships for the coast of Guinea, and for the French coasts of America, and to make their returns to the aforesaid ports on the foregoing clauses, articles, and exemptions, already mentioned,

paying us for the goods which shall come from the coast of Guinea, and the French isles of America, the settled duties, according to the usual custom in the aforesaid port of St. Malo, for the profit of our most dear and truly-beloved uncle Louis Alexander de Bourbon, count of Thoulouse, duke of Penthièvre, admiral of France, and governor of Bretagne, &c.

So soon after, as the 27th of September, 1720, there passed an arret of the council of state, granting and re-uniting perpetually to the French East India company, the exclusive privilege of the trade of the coast of Guinea, &c.—The preamble to which, as contained in the registers of the council of state, is as follows, and well deserves the attention of this kingdom—It runs as follows, viz.

THE king's letters patent of January, 1716, being represented to the king in council, whereby his majesty permitted all the merchants of his kingdom, to carry on freely the commerce of negroes, gold dust, and all other the merchandises trafficked in on the coast of Africa, from the river Searraleone, inclusively, to the Cape of Good Hope; and his majesty being informed, *that instead of the advantages that were expected from this general freedom allowed in that commerce, there resulted three great inconveniences: viz. (1) the concurrence of numerous different traders, who came on this coast, and their endeavours to hasten their cargoes, to avoid the expence of demurrage,*
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causing the natives of the country to fall the price of French commodities so excessively, and so greatly enhancing the price of Negroes upon the French; and also that of gold dust, and all other the merchandises of the African coast, that the whole trade became ruinous and impracticable to be carried on: his majesty has resolved to accept of the offers of the East India company, to send annually to the number of 3000 negroes at least, to the French islands in America, instead of the number of one thousand carried thither by letters patents in the year 1685; and his majesty is pleased to establish in favour of the said East India company, an exclusive right of trade to the said coast of Guinea, which will be easier for the said company, and more advantageous to the state, than the said company can otherwise afford to do; and can thereby be enabled to make such establishment, by which their ships that they send to the coast, will always find cargoes of slaves and merchandises ready for their return, and whereby they will not only be capable of supplying the French colonies in America, with negroes at a very reasonable price, that shall be necessary not only for the cultivation of their lands, but to carry thither a considerable quantity of gold and gold dust, and other sorts of merchandises fit for that traffic: his majesty upon this occasion desiring to make his intentions public, and being in council, with advice of the duke of Orleans ordains, &c.

1. His

1. His majesty revokes the liberty of a free trade granted by his letters patent of January, 1716, on the coast of Guinea, and grants and unites the trade to the East India company for ever in negroes, gold, and other the merchandises, brought off the coast of Africa, from the river Searrallyonne, inclusively, to the Cape of Good-Hope, &c.

2. His majesty expressly forbids all his subjects to carry on trade and navigation to those countries under any pretence whatsoever, and under pain of confiscation of the vessel, arms, ammunition, and merchandises of the said East India company.

3. We grant to the said East India company, the full propriety of all the lands, which they shall possess within the extent of the present grant, to make such establishments as they shall think proper; to erect forts for their security, and to transport thither arms, and cannon, and settle commanders and the number of officers and soldiers that they shall judge requisite to secure their commerce, as well against foreigners, as the natives of the country: to which end the said company is permitted to make such treaties with the Negroe-princes as they think necessary.

4. All prizes taken from those who shall interfere with the company's exclusive trade, shall be judged according to his majesty's ordinances and regulations for that intent.

5. The

5. The said company shall be exempt from all duties of export on their merchandise exported to those places within the said grant, and for the French islands and colonies in America.

6. In relation to all merchandises that the said company shall cause to be brought for their account from the countries within the said grant, they shall be free from one moiety of the duties belonging to his majesty, or to the farmers of the revenue ; and all such farmers, and their commissioners, and all other are obliged to demand no more, on pain of restoring the same in a fourfold degree.—His majesty commands that all sugars and other species of merchandises that the said company shall bring from the French islands of America, arising from the sale and barter of Negroes, shall be entitled to the same exemption, in proving by certificate of the superintendent of the said islands, or one of their appointed commissioners, or the commissioner of the western domaine, that the said merchandises embarked from the said islands, arising from the sale and truck of negroes that have been discharged there in the company's vessels ; which certificates shall mention the number of vessels, and the number of negroes which shall have been imported into the said islands, and remain in the office of his majesty's farmers, whose receivers shall give the duplicate without expence to the captains of the said ships, &c.

7. His

7. His majesty in the like manner forbids all mayors, sheriffs, consuls, jurats, findicts, and inhabitants of the cities, to exact from the said company any duties of octroy, of any kind whatsoever, upon the provisions and merchandises that they shall transport to their magazines, and sea-ports, to lade on board their vessels; his majesty exonerating the said company from the said imports notwithstanding all arrets, and ordonnances to the contrary.

8. He discharges the said company from the duty of twenty livres for every negroe, and of three livres per ton of portage of the said vessels by the 3d article of the aforesaid letters patents of January, 1716, laid upon the merchants who should traffic to the said coast of Guinea, and gives and grants to them forever all the forts and factories erected and established upon the said coast; whereby his majesty shall be freed from all necessary expence, for the future, with relation to the support and maintenance of the said forts and factories, and that of the garrisons, and the appointments of governors and all other officers therein employed.

9. In consideration whereof, his majesty orders that there shall be paid to the said company out of the revenues of the western domaine, 13 livres for every negroe, that they shall make appear to have imported into the said islands and colonies of America, according to certificate from the intendant of the islands,

islands, or governor in his absence, and twenty livres for every mark of gold dust, that they shall make appear to have brought into the kingdom by the certificates of the directors of the mint of Paris.

10. Besides the rights, privileges and exemptions before mentioned, the said company shall be entitled to for the benefit of it's commerce on the said coast of Guinea, all those which it has a right to enjoy for the benefit of their commerce to the province of Louisiana, in consequence of letters patents of the month of August, 1717, together with all those which have been enjoyed, in consequence of letters patents of the late king of the month of January, 1685, by the antient Guinea company established in virtue of the said letters patents, as fully as if they were by these presents expressly declared again, &c.

Letters patents, containing regulations for merchandises, which traders of this kingdom import from Holland and the North, for the Guinea trade. Given at Fontainbleau, September 7, 1728.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, king of France and Navarre: to all our friends and faithful counsellors, members of our court of parliament of Paris, greeting: it being represented unto us, that our letters patents of the month of January, 1716, for the liberty of commerce upon the coast of Africa; in the
seventh

seventh article of which we have granted to all our merchants permission to warehouse in the ports therein-mentioned, among other merchandises, white, blue, and striped cottons, printed linens, which they shall import from Holland and the North, by sea only, for the trade of Guinea: and being informed that, by the indulgence of this grant, they have introduced into our kingdom, to the prejudice of our established manufactures, India cottons, of a finer quality than what need be sent for that trade; we have provided against it by the arret of this day, given in our council of state, we being there present; for the due execution of which, we have ordered all necessary letters to be dispatched: for these, and other reasons hereunto moving us, by the advice of our council, we have, by these presents, signed with our own hand, ordained, and we do accordingly ordain, as follows:

1. We expressly forbid, and prohibit, all ships in the Guinea trade, or other kind of trade, to import from Holland, or any other country of the North, into our kingdom, to commence from the publication of these presents, under the pretence of warehousing, any white India linen, called caladaris, painted India linen, called chints, or stuffs of all silk, or half silk, upon pain of confiscation of the said goods, and a penalty of three thousand livres,

2. We

2. We permit, nevertheless, all merchants, and traders to import from Holland and the North all other sorts of linen and stuffs fit for the Guinea trade, except those comprised in the foregoing article, on condition they first acquaint the secretary of the admiralty of the place of their abode, the ship's name on board which they are laden, and the office of customs, of the quantity and quality of the linens and stuffs which they shall require to be imported from the said foreign countries.

3. The captain who, in consideration of the aforesaid declarations, shall import merchandises fit for the Guinea trade, and allowed by the above article, shall be obliged to load them on board the ship fitted out for that purpose, and send them, in six months at farthest, to the coast of Guinea, upon pain of confiscation of the said goods, and a thousand livres penalty.

4. If, nevertheless, the merchant-adventurers should be, by any unforeseen accident, obliged to alter the voyage of the ship which was intended for the coast of Guinea, he may, in the space of six months, appoint another, on board of which he shall be obliged to load the said goods, and, that time being expired, counting from the time of their goods being landed, they shall be confiscated, and the adventurers shall be condemned in 1000 livres penalty.

5. The

5. The owner of the goods ordered from Holland, or other country of the north, shall be obliged to send, by his factor or supercargo, the bills of loading, of which the captain is the bearer, the invoice of the said goods, mentioning the particulars of their qualities and quantities, the bails, chests, or casks, &c. in which they are contained.

6. In case the aforesaid invoices are not according to the declaration before-mentioned, we will and ordain that the merchandizes specified in the invoice be seized and confiscated, and the adventurers condemned in the penalty of 1000 livres.

7. We also forbid the adventurers to make any declarations, in ambiguous terms, of goods unknown, and the commissary to receive them, upon pain of confiscation of the said goods, and the commissary deprived of his place for receiving such declarations.

8. We further will and ordain, that our foresaid letters patents of the month of January, 1716, be executed, according to the form and tenor, wherein they deviate from these presents. Thus we will and ordain.

The king's proclamation, concerning the commerce of GUINEA; ordering that three negro boys should be paid for upon the footing of two negroes of maturity; and two negro girls for one negro. Given at Paris the 14th of December, 1716. Registered in parliament.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, king of France and Navarre, to all whom these presents may concern, sends greeting: the late king, our most honoured lord and great-grandfather, having permitted from the month of November, 1713, to the traders of the kingdom to go, by virtue of passports, which were delivered to them, to contract for negroes at the coast of Guinea, and afterwards to export them to the American islands; on condition of paying, for each of those as shall be sent to St. Domingo, 30 livres, and 15 for those which shall be carried to the Windward islands, according to which they are to submit; we have judged it necessary, in the month of January of the present year, to grant, by our letters patents, the free liberty of commerce to that coast (of which the Guinea company had the exclusive right of trade) till the said month of November, 1713. And, in consequence whereof, we have granted permission, by the said letters patents, to the traders of our kingdom, to send their vessels thither, to agree for the

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purchase of negroes, and afterwards to transport them to the said islands; for every one whereof that should be disembarked, we ordain that they should pay to the treasurer-general of the navy 20 livres. We also ordain, by an arret of the 28th of the said month of January this year, that the merchants who have taken passports since the month of November 1713, shall pay to the said treasurer-general the sums specified pursuant to their obligations: but, the merchants having represented to us that the same duties were required for boys and girls, as for men and women negroes, although three negro boys cost no more in Guinea than the price of two negroes of maturity, and are only sold in the like proportion at the islands; and the same for two negro girls, who are bought and sold for no more than one negro; whereupon we have resolved to explain our intentions: for these and other reasons moving us thereunto, and according to the advice of our most dear and well-beloved uncle of Orleans, regent, of our most dear and well-beloved cousin the duke of Bourbon, &c. we have by these presents signed with our hand, declared and ordained, and hereby we declare and ordain, That such merchants who have sent, or shall send their ships to the coast of Guinea, to contract for negroes, and afterwards transport them to the islands of America, shall not be obliged to pay for every negro boy of 12 years of age, or under, that
shall

shall be disembarked at the said islands by the passport ships of the late king, only the two thirds of the duties to which they are liable for each negro; and for every negro girl also, of 12 years of age, and under, the moiety or half part of the said duties shall only be paid; and for every negro boy of the same age that should have been, or shall be disembarked at the said islands, by virtue of the said letters patents, the two thirds of the duties shall be paid that is for each negro; and for every negro girl of the same age the moiety of the said duties, &c.

An arret of the king's council of state, concerning the commerce of Guinea, of the 13th of September, 1729. Extracted from the register of the council of state.

THE arret of his council, of the 7th of September, 1728, being laid before the king, and his letters patents dispatched upon it the same day, containing regulations for merchandise imported from Holland and the North, for the Guinea trade; by the second article of which, his majesty has permitted to all merchants and traders to cause to be imported from Holland and the North all sorts of linen or stuffs, excepting those comprised in the foregoing article; provided they first acquaint the secretary of the admiralty with the place of their abode, and the ships they are

put on board of. His majesty being informed, from the complaints of some merchants, that the officers of the admiralty retarded their voyages, by refusing to receive their declarations, upon the terms of the said second article, by reason the said letters patents were not addressed to the admiral of France, nor registered: all which we being willing to remedy, the king being in council, and attending to the report of Sieur le Pelatier, counsellor of state in ordinary, and comptroller-general of the finances, hath ordered, and accordingly orders, that the said letters patents of the 7th of September, 1728, be executed, according to their form and tenor, to the intent that they may be registered at the admiralty-board, established in the ports, destined by the first article of his majesty's letters patents, given the month of January, 1716, for the general freedom of commerce upon the coast of Africa: his majesty commands and ordains Mons. the count of Thoulouse, admiral of France, to see the present arret put in execution, which shall be registered in the admiralty, established in the ports destined for the general freedom of the commerce of Africa. Made at the king's council of state, his majesty being present, held at Versailles, the 13th of September, 1729.

The king's ordinance, prohibiting captains of ships that shall bring negroes to the islands, from landing, or sending their crews and cargoes thither, without permission from the governors. Of the 3d of April, 1718. By the king.

HIS majesty being informed that the captains of ships that bring negroes into the islands of America, have communication with the inhabitants of the said colonies, and suffer their crews, their negroes, and other parts of their cargoes, to be landed, although the negroes that they bring, and other parts of their cargoes, are infected with the plague, which it is of high importance to prevent. To the end that from the frequency of these practices the said contagious distempers may not infect the inhabitants of the said islands: his majesty, by and with the advice of Monsr. the duke of Orleans, regent, forbids all captains of ships who shall import negroes into the said islands, from coming on shore, or to suffer their crews or cargoes to be landed; and likewise to have no correspondence with the inhabitants, either by themselves, or by any of their ship's crew or cargoes, without permission first had and obtained from the commanding officer of the place where they shall arrive; which permission shall be allowed them, provided there is no infectious disease on ship-board; and, in case there is, a place shall be provided for them, where
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they

they might land the infected, in order to have them cured before they have the least communication with the said inhabitants. His majesty orders and commands Mons^r. the count of Thoulouse, admiral of France, and all governors and lieutenant-generals in South America, particular governors, and other officers, to pay due regard hereunto, &c.

An arret of the king's council of state, for the payment of the bounty of 13 livres for each negro, and 20 livres for every mark of gold that the Senegal company from the African coast shall cause to be imported into France, coming from those countries, granted to the said company by the 24th article of his majesty's letters patents of the month of March, 1696, during the establishment of the said company. Of the 22d of August, 1724. Extracted from the registers of the council of state.

UPON a petition presented to the king in council, by the old directors of the royal Senegal company of the coast of Africa, established by his majesty's letters patents of the month of March, 1696, registered where needful; containing that, by the 24th article of the said letters patents, his majesty had granted to the said company, by way of bounty, the sum of 13 livres for every negro that the said company should import into the islands

islands and colonies of America, and which should be paid to the said company by his royal treasurer, in consequence of certificates granted by the intendant of the said islands, or the governors in his absence ; and, by the 25th article, his majesty likewise granted to the said company the sum of 20 livres for every mark of gold that should be imported into France, coming from those countries within the company's charter, which should be paid by the royal treasury, upon the certification of the director-general of the mint at Paris. For the execution of these two articles, his majesty granted two ordinances to the said company, the one of the 13th of June, 1717, of the sum of 34,374 livres, 7 sols, and 6 deniers, in consideration of the importation into Cape François, on the coast of St. Domingo, 2635 negroes, from the 17th of April, 1714, to the 27th of August, 1716, pursuant to the attestations of the captains of those ships by which they were imported, as well as of the directors of the said company established at St. Domingo, and the certificates annexed, of Sieur de Boismorant, chief secretary of the marine of the 15th and 16th of November, 1716, and what the said company had imported, from the 6th of October, 1715, being five marks, seven ounces, six gros, of gold dust, which were sent to the mint at Paris, pursuant to the director's certificate of the said mint : the other ordinance,

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of

of the 10th of June, 1718, the sum of 14,963 livres, for 1151 negroes that the said company imported to the said Cape François, from the 2d of February, 1717, to the 22d of February, 1718, according to five certificates for that purpose; two of which are from the said Sieur de Boismorant, one from Sieur Mithon, commissary-general of the marine, and two from Sieur Chastenoye, major and commander of the island of the said Cape François, bearing date 2 February, 26 March, and 30 November, 1717, and 22 February, 1718; all these certificates being dated and attested in the said two ordinances: but, as the said company are not able to produce these certificates to the Sieurs Gruyn and Turmenyes, they having been deposited in the office of marine, where they were represented; that it is impossible to obtain duplicates, as well by reason of the death as of the exchange of officers who signed them; and moreover, because it would be a great difficulty upon the said company, under pretence that the said certificates have not been given by the Sieurs intendants, governors of the said islands, pursuant to the terms of the said letters patents, but only by the principal officers, who were then on the spot: the company hope that his majesty will be pleased to order the payment of the said sums of 34,374 livres, 7 sols, and 6 deniers, on the one part, and of 14,963 livres on the other, in producing only, to the said Sieurs Gruyn

Gruyn and de Turmenyes, the said two ordinances, with the acquittances of the cashier, attested by two of the directors, without being obliged to produce the said certificates, which cannot be obtained, &c.

IN consequence of which petition of the company, the following patent passed the royal council; which shews how inviolably those acts, in regard to trade, are observed:

LEWIS, by the grace of God, king of France and Navarre, &c. The old directors of the royal company of Senegal, and of the coast of Africa, established by our letters patents of March, 1696, registered, where it was necessary, have represented to us, that, by the 24th article of our said letters patents, we have granted to the said company, by way of bounty, the sum of 13 livres for each negro that shall be imported into our isles and colonies of America; which should be paid to the said company by our treasurer, on the certificate of our intendant of the said isles, or our governors in his absence. And, by the 25th article, we have likewise granted to the said company the sum of 20 livres for each mark of gold that they shall cause to be imported into France, coming from places within the limits of the company's charter, which should likewise be paid by our treasurer, upon the certificate of our director-general of our mint in Paris; that, in due performance

mance of these two articles, we had granted two orders to the said company, the one of the 13th of June, 1717, of 34,374 livres, 7 sols, 6 deniers, in consideration that they had sent, from those parts of Africa to Cape François on the coast of St. Domingo, 2635 negroes, from the 17th of April, 1714, to the 27th of August, 1716, according to the copies of the declarations of the captains of the ships who brought them, and the directors of the said company, settled at the said St. Domingo, and the certificates of the Sieur Boismorant, principal secretary of our marine, commissary of the port of Cape François, of the 15th and 16th of November, 1716, and that the said company had caused to come from Africa, the 6th of October, 1715, five marks, seven ounces, six grains, of gold dust, that they had remitted to the officer of our bank of Paris, according to the certificate of our director of the bank. The other order of the 10th of June, 1718, of the sum of 14,963 livres, for 1151 negroes, which the said company had caused to be brought from Africa to the said Cape François, according to five certificates, two of which were of the aforesaid Sieur Boismorant, one of the Sieur Mithon, commissary-general of our marine, governor of the said countries, and two of the Sieur Chastenoye, major of the island, our commandant of the said Cape François, dated the 2d of February, the 26th of March, and the 30th of November,

vember, 1717, and the 22d of February, 1718; all which certificates were examined and dated in our two said orders; but as the said company could not send them to the Sieurs Gruyn and Turmenyes, our royal treasurers (as mentioned in the preceding petition) being sent to the office of our marine, where they were exhibited and deposited, it was not possible to bring duplicates of them, on account of the death of the officers that had signed them, and likewise would occasion the company some difficulty, upon pretence that the certificates were not signed by our governors and intendants of our islands, in the terms of our letters patents, but only by our principal officers that were there; the said company petitioned that we would have ordered the payment of the said sum of 34,374 livres, 7 sols, 6 deniers, for the one, and 14,963 livres for the other, producing only, to the said Sieurs Gruyn and de Turmenyes our said two orders, with the receipts of the cashier, examined by the two directors of the same, without being obliged to produce the said certificates, which they should have done, if they had had them, &c. Upon which our orders were granted, which were sufficient warrant and authority, to our treasurer: whereupon we have, by our arret of council of the 22d of August last, provided in favour of the petitioners, and ordered all necessary letters to be dispatched for the execution

cution of the same; which the petitioners have most humbly accepted: for which reasons, and by the advice of our council who have seen the arret, made the said 22d of August last, an extract of which is hung to the seal of our chancery, we have, by these presents, signed with our hand, conformably to the arret ordered, and we do order, that the Sieur Rolland Pierre Gruyn, our treasurer, and commissary in the office of his late father, Pierre Gruyn, shall pay unto the said company, upon the cashier's receipt, the sum of 34,374 livres, 7 sols, 6 deniers, expressed in our order of the 13th of June, 1717; and that Le Sieur Turmenyes de Nointel, also our treasurer, pay the sum of 149,63 livres, mentioned in our order of the 10th of June, upon the receipts of the said cashier; which sums shall be allowed in the accounts of said Sieurs Gruyn and Turmenyes, by virtue of the said receipts, examined by the two directors of the said company only, without being obliged to produce the certificates upon which our said two orders were granted, which we have dispensed with, and to dispense with the manner in which it was done, nevertheless not to be made a precedent, &c. This is our pleasure. Given at Versailles, the 2d of December, 1724, and the 10th of our reign.

The king's declaration concerning negro slaves of the colonies. Given at Versailles, 15 December, 1738. Registered in the parliament of Paris.

LEWIS, by the grace of God, king of France and Navarre, &c. to all that shall see these letters, greeting: the account we ordered to be laid before us, at our coming to the crown, touching the state of our colonies, has made us sensible of the reasonableness and necessity of those orders, contained in the letters patents, in form of an edict, of the month of March 1685, relating to negro slaves. We ordered them to be put in execution, by the first article of our edict of the month of October 1716, and it being represented unto us, at the same time, that many of the inhabitants of our islands of America were desirous to send into France some of their slaves, to be instructed in the principles of religion, and learn some art or trade, but were fearful lest such slaves, upon their arrival in France, should pretend they were free, and not slaves; we have explained our intentions upon this subject by the articles of our edict, and have laid down regulations, which we have thought proper to be observed by masters, who shall bring or send over slaves to France: We have been informed, that, since that time, there have been great numbers sent over from
thence,

thence, so that the inhabitants who have chose to leave the colonies, and are come to settle in the kingdom, keep their slaves with them, contrary to the meaning of the 15th article of the same edict, whereby many of the negroes there have contracted bad habits, and entertain notions of independency, which may be of dangerous consequence; and besides, their masters have neglected to have them taught some useful trade; inso-much that, among the numbers that are brought to France, there are but few that have been sent back to the colonies, and those that have, were of little service, and of very dangerous principles. The care we have always had, to the support and increase of our colonies, would not suffer us to let such abuses continue, which are so contrary to both; in order to put a stop to which, we have resolved to make some alterations in our edict of the month of October 1716, and to add others, that seem to us necessary: for these and other reasons of our own knowledge, full power and royal authority we have declared and ordained, and by these presents signed with our hand, we do declare and ordain, as follows:

A R T I C L E I.

THE inhabitants and officers of our colonies, who shall send over negro slaves into France, of either sex, for their improvement in the principles of religion, and instruction

struction in some trade or employment, proper for the colonies, shall be obliged to have permission for so doing, of the governor, general, or commanding officers of the island, where they shall be; which permission shall express the owner's name who sends such slaves, or the name of him to whose care they shall be committed; the names of the slaves, with their age and marks; and the owners of the said slaves, and those who shall be charged with their conduct, shall be obliged to register the said permission, as well at the office of the place of their residence before their departure, as at the place of their embarkation, in eight days after their arrival, in the manner as is expressed in the 2d, 3d, and 4th articles of our edict of October, 1716.

2. In the registers that shall be made of the said permission, in the admiralty of the ports of France, there shall be mention made of the day of the arrival of the slaves in the harbours.

3. The said permission shall be registered again, at the marble table of the palais at Paris, designed for slaves that shall be brought into our said city, or at the register of the places where they shall be brought to reside; and it shall specify, in the said register, the trade which the said slaves shall learn, and the masters who shall instruct them.

4. The slaves, of either sex, who shall be brought to France by their master, or by whom-

whomsoever sent, shall not pretend they have their liberty, because they are come into this kingdom; but shall be obliged to return into our colonies, whenever their masters shall think proper: but, if the master does not observe the forms prescribed in the foregoing articles, the said slaves shall be confiscated to our use, and sent back to our colonies, and employed as we think fit.

5. The officers employed, by our authority in the colonies, shall have leave to come to France, and those who shall have brought slaves to serve as domestics, shall not keep them longer than the times limited for their stay; but, at the expiration, shall send them back to the colonies, upon failure of which, they shall be confiscated, and employed there, to our service, as we shall think proper.

6. The inhabitants, who shall bring or send slaves to France, to learn some trade, shall not retain them there longer than three years, reckoning from the day of their arrival in the port; such slaves as are not sent back, as aforesaid, shall be confiscated to our use, and employed in the colonies, in our works.

7. The inhabitants of our colonies, that are willing to settle in our kingdom, cannot there keep, in their houses, slaves of either sex, when they have not disposed of their habitations, in the colonies; and the slaves which shall remain, shall be confiscated, to be employed in the colonies for our use.

They

They may, nevertheless, send them to France, observing the rules above prescribed, leaving the colonies to learn some employment, in order to make them more useful, at their return to the said colonies; and, in this case, they conform to the regulations prescribed in the foregoing articles, under penalty of being carried there again.

8. All who shall carry or send negro slaves into France, and shall not send them back, according as prescribed in the three foregoing articles, shall be obliged, besides the loss of their slaves, to pay for each slave not sent back, the sum of a thousand livres, into the hand of the commissioner-general of the treasury of the marine at the colonies, to be employed in the public works; and the licence which they might otherwise have obtained, from the governor-general, and the commanding officers, shall not be granted until they have given security into the hands of the aforesaid treasurer of the marine, for the payment of the said sum, which security shall be mentioned in the said licence.

9. All those who have negro slaves in France, of either sex, shall be obliged, in three months, reckoning from the day of the publishing these presents, to make a declaration of them to the board of admiralty nearest their habitation, and give security to send back, in a year from the date hereof, the said negroes into the said colonies: upon failure of which, or not giving the aforesaid

security, the said slaves shall be confiscated, and employed in the colonies for our service.

10. The negro slaves who shall be brought to France shall not marry there, without consent of their masters, notwithstanding what is mentioned in the 7th article of our edict of October 1716.

11. Masters that shall have brought slaves of either sex, into France, shall not make them free, under any pretence whatsoever, only by will; and such freedom thus given, shall not be of force, unless the testator dies before the expiration of the time, in which slaves, brought into France, ought to be sent back to the colonies.

12. All slaves brought into France to learn trades, as aforesaid, their masters who are to instruct them therein, shall take care that they are brought up in the catholic religion.

13. Our edict of October, 1716 shall be in full force, where it does not derogate from these presents.

Thus we give in command, to our friends and faithful counsellors, members of our court of parliament at Aix, ordering these regulations to be read, published, and registered, and their contents kept, observed and executed, according to their form and tenor, notwithstanding all edicts, ordinances, declarations, arrets, regulations, and usages to

to the contrary, wherein they differ from this. This is our pleasure.

An arret of the king's council of state, which prohibits GUM * from the river Senegal being exported out of the kingdom for one year, under pain of confiscation, and three hundred livres penalty, 2d November, 1751. Extracted from the registers of the council of state.

THE king in council being informed, the great quantity of gum from Senegal, that was exported to foreign countries, would occasion a scarcity of the said drug in his own kingdom, which his majesty willing to prevent: the king being in council, and hearing the report, hath ordered, and does, by these presents, order, that, reckoning from this present arret to the 1st of November, 1752, no gum Senegal shall be exported out of the kingdom to foreigners, on pain of confiscation, and three hundred livres penalty. Therefore, his majesty commands and enjoins the intendants and commissaries, in the several provinces of his kingdom, to

* This gum is an exceeding useful material in the silk manufacture of France; and, therefore, the French have engrossed almost the whole gum trade of the coast of Africa, and even prohibited the exportation of the gum Senegal, lest they themselves should have a scarcity, or rather other nations the benefit of the same in their manufactures.

have due regard that this arret of council be strictly put in execution ; which shall be read, published, and fixed up, wherever it shall be requisite, and that none may plead ignorance thereof. Done in the king's council of state, his majesty there present, held with regard to the finances, at Fontainbleau, 2d November, 1751.

So well calculated for the advance of the French trade of Africa, as well as of their sugar islands in America, do these measures appear, that the rapid increase of those trades in that kingdom is not at all to be admired ; and especially so, since, from the treaty of Utrecht, they have had no competitors in those trades, who have been able to do them any injury. Such has been the sinking and almost bankrupt state of our late African company, from this æra ; and such the jarring interest between them and our separate traders, that France has taken the advantage of both ; for they have some years since absolutely excluded our separate traders, as well as the company, from the whole trade of the Gum Coast ; and, from the impotent condition of the company to support their dignity and authority, pursuant to their charter, in Africa, this nation has, by means of the great French company of the Indies, traded uninterruptedly under the nose of our British forts and settlements, while our traders have
not

not been suffered to approach theirs with impunity.

CAN we wonder, then, that the French should so well stock their sugar colonies with negro labourers, as to be able, not only amply to supply their own European dominions with sugars, which they formerly took from us and the Portuguese, but to engross so considerable a share of the sugar trade out of our hands in foreign markets?

BEFORE the peace of Utrecht, the French had the *Affiento* for supplying the Spanish West-Indies with negroes; which proved the means of introducing immense quantities of the French manufactures into Spanish America; and, therefore, as the *Affiento* trade was carried on by France, it was extremely beneficial to that kingdom. But, when they had greatly enriched themselves, and thereby greatly impoverished the whole Spanish Indies, as we have shewn in the preceding discourse, and had so overdone that trade, as to render it good for little to any successor, they very wisely parted with it; and, by the treaty of Utrecht, transferred the *Affiento* to the English South-Sea company; and, what advantages they have made by it, is too well known to need explanation.

By the French getting rid of the *Affiento*, at a time when they had made it worth nothing to any body else, they received this

advantage by giving it up; they had greater plenty of negroes wherewith to stock their own colonies, and they came cheaper to them; whereas our acceptance of the Affiento, at that time of day, rendered them dearer to the British plantations, and they have continued so ever since: and yet the French have preserved a very lucrative share of the Spanish West-India trade from that time to this.

BEFORE I quit this point of French policy in relation to the African trade and the Affiento, there occur some observations that well deserve our attention, viz.

1. THE French Affiento with Spain was carried into execution by their Guinea company, while they enjoyed the exclusive privilege of that trade, and having no competition in that trade from the French separate traders, the company purchased not only their negroes for the Affiento at a very cheap rate, but all other the merchandizes which the coast of Africa affords, and they also supplied their own colonies cheaply with negroes.

2. SUCH was the state of our late Royal African company at this time, that they were in no condition to support a competition in this trade with the French.

3. WHEN England accepted of the Affiento by the treaty of Utrecht, when the French, as has been observed, had made the most of it, England carried this contract with the

the court of Spain into execution by the South-Sea company, instead of the late Royal African company, endowed with due powers, privileges, and immunities, together with a large joint capital stock, which plain reason and national policy then dictated. For what was the consequence of giving the Affiento to the South-Sea company? Did not this create such a rivalship in the negro trade between the South-Sea company and the late Royal African company, as proved highly detrimental to both, by raising the price of negroes to an exorbitant price? Is it any wonder, therefore, that France made great advantages by this trade, while we made none? while we, indeed, ruined both our companies, as trading companies? But still to encrease our disadvantage in the African trade, with relation to the Royal Affiento with the court of Spain, England laid the whole African trade open to all the separate traders; which not only compleated the ruin of the late African company, but of our South-Sea Affientists; for after this, there was not only a rivalship in the negro trade between our two companies, but there commenced a rivalship between all our separate traders themselves, and between them and both these companies.—This still more and more enhanced the price of negroes from four or five pounds a head, as they formerly were, to that of thirty and forty, to the unspeakable injury of our colonies; and

indeed to the unspeakable injury of the whole African commerce of England.—But what was the conduct of France during this time? why truly they, in the year 1716, after they had vouchsafed to transfer the *Affiento* to our South-Sea company, laid their African trade open too, as we had before done.

BUT when France came to experience the effects hereof they changed their measures, as we find from the tenour of their royal ordinances, which say, *that his majesty being informed, that instead of the advantages that were expected from this general freedom allowed in that commerce, there resulted three great inconveniences: viz. the concurrence of numerous different traders, who came on this coast, and their endeavours to hasten their cargoes, to avoid the expence of demurrage, causing the natives of the country to fall the price of French commodities so excessively, and so greatly enhancing the price of negroes upon the French; and also that of gold dust, and all other the merchandises of the African coast, that the whole trade became ruinous and impracticable to be carried on; his majesty grants the exclusive privilege of this trade to their present great East India company, &c.—*

HERE we find that the French did not try the experiment of laying this commerce open to all the subjects of France but four years, by finding the same destructive of the whole trade, as is expressly declared by the above ordon-

ordonnance : and, however great a friend I am to the free liberty of trade, and an enemy to monopolies in general; yet I can't help signifying upon this occasion, that it seems to remain a matter of doubt with me, whether the French method of carrying on their African commerce hath not been preferable to ours ? For, if the French experienced that trade to be ruinous and impracticable to be carried on, when it was laid open to all the subjects of France, by reason of the great and constant rivalry in that trade among the separate traders, which raised the price excessively of negroes, and all the other merchandises, on the African coast : if this proved an undoubted truth to the French, how then can we be surpris'd, that the late royal African company that existed at that time, and the South-sea-Affiento company also, who were rivals in that trade, could possibly prosper ; and especially so, since these two companies likewise, were not only rivals to each other, but had all the separate traders of England to rival them both, and these to rival each other likewise ? Is it to be admired therefore that our two companies became bankrupts, while this trade of France has proved extremely lucrative ? And, by their management, under the wise regulations, which we have shewn has so surprisingly enriched the French sugar islands ? Can we be surpris'd, that the French should so
greatly

greatly supplant this nation in the Sugar trade of Europe, when they have in the general supplied their sugar planters with negroes, at less than one third of the price that we have done, for above these forty years past?

HERE then seems to appear, (what has never been thought of, perhaps, or, at least, has never been duly represented to the public) the true cause of such a general loss in our whole European sugar trade; for, if our planters in the general have, by our method of carrying on the African trade, been obliged to pay two thirds more for their negroes than the French have done; how was it possible for them to maintain a competition in that trade with the French? So that although the separate traders, who have been concerned in our African trade, since it has been laid open, may have been greatly enriched; yet does it not well deserve consideration, whether their peculiar prosperity has not occasioned that loss which our whole sugar trade has sustained since that period of time? I mention this only by way of quere, and as a matter of doubt. For, although the negro trade may have encreased, since it has been laid open, yet, as that freedom of trade, has, from the peculiar nature of it's rivalry, so highly enhanced the price of negroes to the British planter beyond what the French have paid, is not this

this cause alone sufficient to account for the decay of our whole sugar trade, whether we have recourse to any other? If the African traders have gained what the sugar planters, and the nation, in other respects, have lost, does it not still shew that our foreign competitors have raised their sugar trade upon the ruins of ours? Although other causes may have concurred to the loss of this trade; yet whether this cause itself, has been adequate to the effect, we submit to future national enquiry; suggesting these things, with a view only, to be reconsidered: and, if there is a possibility of regulating our African commerce upon a footing more nationally interesting, and upon a footing that will the better enable us to compete therein, with the French; let it be thought of, and let it be accomplished. And the reader having now before him, the methods whereby the French have regulated their African, and their sugar colony trade, he may impartially compare them together, and judge for himself, and for his country, which ought to have the preference in point of national policy, the great rudder whereby I shall endeavour to steer all my labours.

MUCH I could chearfully add, as is humbly conceived, that might tend to the happy restoration of this estimable branch of trade; but having no view, by detecting past mistakes

takes to give the dangerous enemy advantage over the kingdom, I shall say no more publicly; but when I shall be properly called upon to give my judgment hereupon in private, I shall always be ready to do it to the best of my abilities, the most to the interest and the honour of the kingdom.

D I S-



DISSERTATION XXII.

Another view of the French management of their African trade, and the foundation they have laid to obtain the whole dominion in this commerce.

BEFORE the French sugar colonies flourished, England supplied France with a great part of the sugars for their home-consumption.

SINCE the French sugar colonies have been in a flourishing state, the French have not only supplied themselves with sugars, but have greatly supplanted the English in the sale of sugars at most foreign markets.

THE trade of the French sugar colonies depends on the following distinct branches of trade, (1) the trade carried on from Old France to Africa, by means of the great French East India company. (2) From Africa to the West Indies to supply their sugar-islands with negroes. (3) From the West Indies to Old France to supply their home-consumption for sugars. (4) From the

the French sugar islands to and from their colonies on the continent of America. (5) From the French sugar-islands to and from the divers parts of Europe which the French now supply with sugars.

FROM these various branches of trade, arising solely from the SUGAR-ISLANDS, the French have since the peace of Utrecht increased their commerce, their shipping and their seamen beyond imagination: and the produce and trade of their sugar-islands daily encreasing in divers other productions besides sugars, must daily strengthen the power of that rival kingdom.

THIS encrease of the trade and naval power of France has been greatly owing to their African trade, which we have seen is so regulated and encouraged as to supply them cheaply and plentifully with negroe-slaves, for their making of sugars, indigo, cacao, cotton, and all other the estimable productions of their West India plantations.

BEFORE the French got possession of the forts upon the coast of Africa, in the river Sanaga, or Senegal, and on the island of Arguin and Gorée, the English traded freely and openly to all places on the said coast. Since the French have been in possession of the above-mentioned forts, they have not only taken upon themselves to exclude the British nation from those parts, and have many years, in times of profound peace, taken and confiscated all such British ships as venture

tured to go thither, but they have come uninterruptedly, though unjustifiably, to traffick within the British rights and privileges, and daringly traded even under the nose of the British forts and castles in Africa.

THAT part of the coast from whence the French have absolutely excluded the British nation from trading, is called the *Gum coast*, which extends from Cape Blanco, to the river Gambia, which is above five hundred miles.

So beneficial is the gum trade in general of this coast, that we have a recent instance of two merchants of the city of London (viz. Mess. J—and F—) who gained above 10,000 l. sterling by a loading of Gum Senega, which they obtained on this coast in spite of the French, the first cost of which, on the outset, did not amount to 1000 l. sterling.

THE gum, which the French monopolize on this coast, is called the Gum Sanagal, which is had chiefly in the river Sanagal. This gum is of such important value to the French, that it appears from their registers of the council of state before cited, there passed an arret of the French king's council of state of November 2, in the year 1751, which prohibits all gum from the said river Sanagal being exported out of the kingdom for one year, under pain of confiscation, and 300 livres penalty.

THE reason of such prohibition was, that this gum is an exceeding useful material in
divers

divers of the capital manufactures of France; such as the silk and other fabrics, which require a glossy beauty and lustre to recommend them to foreign nations. They prohibited the exportation of this commodity, not from any scarcity, but merely to prevent the English and others from rivalling them in such manufactures, wherein this gum would be necessary.

THE other particular places on the African coast, where the French have many years encroached on the British rights and privileges of commerce, are at Anamaboe, situate on the Gold Coast, within sight of Cape-Coast-Castle; the principal fort in Africa belonging to the English African company: and from this place called Anamaboe the French have for many years carried prodigious numbers of the choicest negroes to be had in Africa, to improve their sugar colonies. But it is to be hoped, from the wisdom of the parliament in allowing 6000*l.* to rebuild the fort at Anamaboe, and from such other measures as shall be taken at this crisis, that our wrongs and injuries received in Africa will be redressed, as well as those in America. Another place whereat the French have of late years usurped a right of trade, is at *Wydad*, where the English have the fort called *William's Fort*, by virtue whereof the English enjoyed the sole right of trade.

IN the river *Sierraleone* the French have lately pretended to a right of trade, where they

they have no fort, and where the English have *Bence-Island*: and to such an unjustifiable degree has this nation carried their encroachments in this river, that they have fired upon British ships that have the sole right of trade here, and have thereby endeavoured to exclude the English as much from the commerce of this river, which may be rendered highly more beneficial than ever it has been, as they have from that of the Gum-Coast, from *Cape Blanco* to the *River Gambia*.

THE French likewise have lately attempted to settle themselves in the river Sherbro, on the coast of Africa, where the English had a fort at *York-Island*, in the said river; but at present have none, the old fort being demolished, or become quite useless, in regard to a defensible and commercial intent and purpose. The motive to settle themselves in this river, is by reason that slaves, gold, ivory, bees-wax, and divers excellent woods for dying, especially that valuable wood called *Cam-wood*, are here to be had cheaply and plentifully; and because here are also a good river, a secure harbour for shipping, and great plenty of good provisions. Nor should it be forgot that the *Cam-wood* above-mentioned, which is extremely useful in the dying of our woollen manufactures of various fashionable colours, is to be had no where else in any quantities; which renders this a commodity no less valuable than the logwood for the dying of blues and blacks.

To secure this important river to themselves effectually, the French likewise attempted before the present war broke out, to settle at the Bannanas-Islands, near the mouth of the river Sherbro; which, as it is a very wholesome situation, is certainly well judged to answer their intended purpose.

NOR do the projected encroachments of the French in this part of the world end here. For they have attempted even to settle themselves at the *Cape de Verd Islands*, though they belong to the Portuguese. This they did last year, and it seems the Portuguese sent a ship of some force to prevent their intended settlement; which shews that this nation are upon their guard to obstruct such encroachment at their first appearance. But,

THIS intended settlement of the French at the *Cape de Verd Islands* at this conjuncture, is hardly done with a view to give umbrage to the Portuguese; it appears to be done rather with a view to have it more in their power to annoy the English; because their men of war occasionally, and their East-India ships constantly, touch at the *Cape de Verd Islands* for water, &c.

BY virtue of *James-Fort*, belonging to the English in the river Gambia, the English nation long possessed the sole and uninterrupted right to the trade of this river: but within these few years the French have so intruded on our rights of commerce here,

that

that, by means of their *Fort Al Breda*, erected towards the north-side of the river, they have shared a great part of the trade of this river with us. And moreover, as a branch of the *Sanagal river*, possessed by the French, comes into the *Gambia*, the French, by means of this communication, and their *Fort-Joseph* in the said river *Sanagal*, cut off a great part of the English trade from the river, and thereby render the English settlement of *James-Fort* proportionably useless.

By means of the African trade, the French have reaped the following benefits and advantages.

1. THEY have, by dint of negro labour, brought their sugar-islands to that degree of prosperity and splendor wherein we at present behold them.

2. THEY have been enabled by this trade to settle the *neutral islands* of *St. Lucia*, *St. Vincent*, *Dominica*, *Tobago*, &c, by supplying them with a number of negroes to cultivate the *West-India* productions, and a proportionable number of whites to supervise and controul them, and discipline them for defence.

3. THEY have, by means of this trade, established and upheld the credit of their great *East-India company*, which enjoys the exclusive right and privilege of the whole *African trade*, and is the principal support of their *East-India trade*.

4. BY means of this trade, and their before-observed encroachments upon the English rights and privileges of commerce, the French have raised the price of negroes upon many parts of the coast from 5*l.* per head to 20*l.* and 30*l.* per head and upwards: and although the rise in the price greatly affects the English, yet it does not affect the French trade and planters, by reason of the extraordinary bounties, privileges and immunities which the French government allow for the encouragement of their African trade; which considered together with our too long disregard of the before-mentioned encroachments, have enabled our rivals so greatly to supplant us in this important branch of commerce, as well as in the whole sugar trade of Europe.

ALTHOUGH I have, in the arrets and ordonnances of the French relating to their affairs, given a general account of the beneficial privileges and immunities which they give for the support of their African trade; yet, as few will be capable of forming a just idea of those things, we shall explain them more specifically. They consist of,

1. AN exemption from all local and provincial duties, of any kind, upon their goods and merchandizes in France, as also from all duties for merchandizes exported to Africa, wherewith to purchase negroes, &c. which, considering the number of ships the French employ in this trade, cannot be computed

at

at near so small a sum as 150,000 l. sterling per annum; nor the whole exemption of duties at so small a rate as 3 per cent. thereon:

Say, however, that the whole shall be computed at no more than - - 1.
3000

2. An exemption from half the customs on all sugars and other merchandizes imported from the French sugar colonies in America, being the produce of the sale of negroes there; the amount of which may be judged of by the following very moderate computation, viz.

Suppose 15000 negroes (whereas good judges reckon them at least 40000) are imported into the French sugar islands annually; and that 10000 of that number only should be sold for sugars to be returned to France, at the rate of 40 hundred weight of sugar only per head.

The duty on importation on sugar into France is 3 per cent. on about two thirds of the value; which is at the rate of 2 per cent.. There is also an inland duty of 3 livres, or 2 s. 9 d. sterling per hundred weight.

Suppose the price of sugars is computed at no more than 25 s. per hundred on an average; this, upon 10,000 negroes, makes 400,000

M 3

weight

	1.
Brought over - -	3000
weight of sugar: and this, at 1 per cent. being one half of the duty upon importation, amounts to -	5000

Then 400,000 hundred weight of sugar at 1s. 4d. $\frac{1}{2}$ per hundred weight, being one half of the above inland duty of 3 livres, or 2s. 9d. sterling per hundred weight, is - 27500

3. A bounty of 10 livres, or 9s. 2d, sterling, to be paid out of the king's revenue, for every negro carried to the French sugar-islands and colonies in America; which, upon the said 15000 negroes only, amounts to - - - - - 6857

4. A bounty of 9s. 2d. for every ounce of gold dust that shall be imported from Africa into France. Suppose only that 5000 ounces of gold was imported from Africa into France, which is quite trifling and inconsiderable, when we are assured how rich their ships in the Guinea trade are in gold, as appeared by some captures made in the last war, is no more than - - - - - 2296

The total is per annum 44671

N. B. THE exemption of duties on what the other 5000 negroes produce in coffee, indigo,

digo, cotton, cacao, &c. is left out in this account, that no exaggeration may be made. And indeed so moderate is the computation made in every article, that there is reason to believe if the total was estimated at double the sum, it would not be over rated. And if to those encouragements we add that of the exclusive powers and privileges given to their great East India company in this trade, it must give the French a great weight of influence and authority in this branch of commerce, and impower them to make such intrusion on the English rights, as before represented.

YET their encouragements to the African trade do not terminate here only: there is one single article alone, that may not be inferior in it's good consequences to all the rest; which is, the policy in that court of giving their most industrious planters credit out of the king's treasury for negroes, and other materials, necessary to the prosperity of the plantations, the management of which lies between the comptroller-general of the finances, and the East India company, that these bounties may be allowed only to persons of known probity and industry. To such also the French king grants lands in his American plantations gratis, and lends money to the planters, in case of hurricanes, which destroy their plantations, and other unavoidable misfortunes.

5. By means of this management of the African, and American trades, the French

have been enabled, not only to supply themselves cheaply with sugars, but have supplanted the English in this great article, at most of the foreign markets in Europe.

6. By means of their African trade, the French do in a great measure, reap the benefits of an *Assiento Contract* with the court of Spain, although there is no such *treaty*, at present, subsisting between the two crowns. For, by the preceding methods of encroachment on the commerce of Africa, and also the great encouragements we have seen that are given to their African trade, the French are enabled to supply the Spaniards, by the way of St. Domingo, with negroe slaves, to work their mines in Spanish America; whereby they pour in immense quantities of the French manufactures into New Spain, under the cover of this trade, whereby the lawful British commerce, by the way of Old Spain to New, is proportionably injured; and yet so it has long been, that this illicit trade from the French colonies to the Spanish Indies is never complained of by the court of Spain, although every traffic of that kind, supposed only to have been carried on by the English, or the Dutch, is always magnified by the Spaniards.

How dependant the French themselves have long since judged their sugar-colonies to be upon their African trade, appears from a memorial presented by the deputies of the council of trade in France, to the royal council of
state,

state, so long ago as in the year 1701 ; from which æra we may date the prosperity of the French sugar-colonies, and all other branches of their trade dependent on that of Africa.

Le commerce de Guinée, says the memorialist, est si relatif à celui des Isles Françaises de l'Amerique, que *l'un ne sçauroit subsister sans l'autre* : par ses commerces nous avons retranché à nos concurrens les grands profits qu'ils faisoient sur nous, & nous pouvons nous mettre en estat d'en faire à nôtre tour sur eux à leur imitation, & sur tout *des Anglois*. Nous pouvons les augmenter considerablement ; puisque cette nation dans les isles, avec moins d'avantage que nous, dans un terrain moins estendu, & dans beaucoup moins de temps, a trouvé le moyen d'occuper toutes les années plus de 500 vaisseaux, pendant que nous avons beaucoup de peine d'en occuper une centaine.

Tout le monde connoit l'utilité de la marine, & que le tranqulité, & la gloire d'un estat en depend très souvent ; on sçait que le commerce ne peut subsister que par elle : La fortune de negociants y est toujours attachée, elle fait vivre un très grand nombre de sujets, matelots & artisans. Personne n'ignore, que *la navigation de la France ne doive au commerce de ses isles tout son éclat, qu'elle ne peut se soutenir, & s'augmenter que par lui*.

Ce commerce est sans doute, de tous les commerces de long cours que les François font, le plus utile à l'état ; parcequ' il se fait
sans

sans transport d'argent, sans secours des denrées & des manufactures etrangeres, & qu'il n'y a que les sujets du roy & du royaume qui en profitent.

THIS was the sense of the most experienced and judicious traders in France, in the year, 1701 ; and have we not too well experienced all that they presaged of this trade ?

SINCE then it is apparent, that not only the whole dependance of the French but of the British sugar, and other colonies is on the African trade ; ought not our African affairs to have been one of the principal objects of the care of every administration ? How comes it to pass that we have for so long time suffered the French to make those encroachments upon this commerce, which is the great and fundamental support and preservation of our whole American trade ? Has not the great care of the French, in regard to this trade, proved, according to their own acknowledgment, one principal cause of their extensive trade and dominion in America ; and has not our neglect and disregard hereof proved one essential cause of the decay of our trade and dominion in this part of the world ; and, in consequence hereof, may we not reasonably enough presume, that France has been excited to turn their thoughts upon invading us both in America, and in Africa, at the same time ?

HAVE

HAVE we not seen, from the before-cited French memorial, that our enemies allow the commerce and navigation of their sugar-islands has proved one of the chief nurseries of their naval power? And has not their African trade proved the only support of this great maritime nursery? What then can any man of common sense and impartiality say, to those measures, that have suffered for several years past those encroachments of the enemy upon our African trade, that has so greatly tended to render their maritime power so formidable to us, as we now experience? And has not our want of due regard and attention to the encroachment of the French in North America encouraged them to insult us there also, and provoke us to the present war? It is above seven years, since I have, with all becoming decency, and moderation, endeavoured to point out these, and numerous other great national evils, that seem to have concurred to bring the affairs of this nation into their present deplorable situation.—But we hope that things will soon take a different turn. To which end, however, it is necessary; it is of the highest concernment to this kingdom, that every sore should be laid open, and probed to the bottom; and that not by harangue, and declamation, or personal rancour, and acrimony, but from *facts*, and a plain deduction of candid reasoning deducible therefrom, that carries it's own conviction with it.—This, we are willing to hope,

hope, will prove of no less public utility, in case of a peace, than if the war should continue : for, if the former takes place, works of this kind will the better enable us to think of making a more lasting and honourable peace ; and till wars cease, they will shew were the greatest strength of the enemy lies, and where is our own greatest weakness, in order to guard against injurious events.

D I S -



DISSERTATION XXIII.

A summary view of the commerce of France in the East Indies, and by what practice and gradations they have encreased the same.

HENRY IV. of France was the first who attempted a share in the trade of the Indies, which met with but bad success, till that illustrious *commercial minister of state*, Monf. Colbert, so deservedly honoured, by Lewis XIV, undertook that concern. This minister conceived the design of reviving the French East India company, notwithstanding all the misfortunes it had met with, and which had over and over, baffled the skill of all his predecessors.

BEFORE he discovered his intentions, he was indefatigable to become perfectly well instructed in the affair he had resolved to carry into execution. This he did by drawing to his acquaintance and caressing such merchants, seamen, and others, who were reputed to be the best acquainted with the subject.

ALTHOUGH this company had stood in need of no encouragement from the crown, yet,

yet, upon an enquiry into the state of the company's affairs in the year, 1684, it appeared, that they had run out to the amount of above 300,000 l. sterling, which was not less than one half of their original capital stock. These, and the subsequent misfortunes of the company, occasioned such general clamours, that induced a universal opinion that it was even impossible for the French to carry on a trade with advantage to the Indies. But these vexatious circumstances were little in comparison to the loss of their able and generous protector Mons. Colbert, who ever exerted his influence in their favour, and would have brought the company much sooner than it was into a prosperous state, had he not been cut off, before there was time to accomplish it.

MONS. Pontchartrain, his successor, who neither wanted abilities, or probity, but whose notions with respect to commerce were either crude, or undigested, or, which was worse, narrow, and obscure, could effect little. Nor, from the commencement of his administration was he any friend to the company, he countenancing every attempt to their injury, and discouraging whatever might tend to their establishment.

AFTER a tedious series of difficulties and discouragements; there still arose a new spirit in France of still further distressing this almost bankrupt corporation, under colour of augmenting the royal revenues, and protecting

testing their own manufactures, which afforded bread to the people.—Under this pretext, the company were restrained from selling chints, and other piece-goods, to foreigners; which proved not only a great loss to the company, but the nation, among whom the profits of that trade would have circulated: whereas, by the prohibition, so much money was kept out of France, and not more of their own manufactures vended in foreign countries.—They suffered divers other obstructions to their prosperity too tedious to enumerate.—And while they were envied and persecuted at home, from selfish views, they were no less maltreated and distressed abroad.

IN the year 1682, they were reduced to such an ebb, as to be obliged to enter into a scheme for the permission of private trade, upon certain conditions.—Nor did they submit to this only, but were even under the necessity of resigning the whole trade to separate traders, upon easy terms. From this expedient they found some relief, which induced to the extension of their scheme; and for the preservation of their servants in the Indies, who were above ten millions in debt, they fairly sacrificed themselves. For, in the year 1712, they entered into a treaty with some private merchants of St. Malo, by which they yielded up to them all their privileges as a company, on the best terms they could obtain, with a view to furnish

nish such as were employed by them in the Indies with sums sufficient to keep under the interest of their debts, and thereby prevent all things from running into confusion. On the expiration of their privileges, they solicited a renewal thereof, not from hopes of reviving their trade, but to renew their agreement with the merchants of St. Malo, merely for the preservation of their settlements, and prevention of the ruin of their servants in the Indies.

Thus the private traders enjoyed all the advantageous trade derived from the company's settlements, without contributing to their original expence, or even to that by which they were supported.

THE duke of Orleans, who established a new kind of government in France, sustained his authority by schemes that never attended all the victories of Lewis the Great.—He affected to act on motives diametrically opposite to those of his predecessors ; he declared that the great end of government was the good of the people.—That it was impossible this should be promoted by wars.—That peace was an universal blessing to France, as well as other nations.—That commerce was the effect of tranquillity.—That the consequence of an extensive trade were more certain resources of power than conquest.—This gave the company great expectations ; all which ended in the famous Mississippi scheme,

to pay the public debts of France without money; which proved, as all such detestable designs do, a superlative bubble, like to that of our South-Sea company project, which took place almost immediately afterwards: so infatuated has this nation been to adopt every bad scheme, and reject the numberless wise and judicious, as we have seen through these papers.

THIS state of public affairs occasioned an union between the western company and this; the former whereof had swallowed up some other companies.—The edict of union extinguished the title of both these companies no less than those others therein comprised, and gave to the whole the name of the Company of the Indies, which it bears to this day.

To this new company was granted an exclusive privilege of trading from the Cape of Good-Hope to the extent of the East-Indies; as also to the islands of Madagascar of Bourbon, and of France, and coast of Soffola in Africa, the Red-Sea, Persia, and dominions of the Mogul, of the king of Siam, and of the emperors of China and Japan, as also to the South-Seas, from the Straits of Magellan, or La Maire, to the East-Indies that way; forbidding all the rest of his subjects, and their several traders to be concerned therein, under pain of the confiscation of their vessels and effects.

To this company also was given the possessions and effects of the other companies,

charging them with their debts.—The better to discharge which, the edict creates in their favour 25,000,000 of new actions, to be purchased for ready money.—They have also full licence to import all sorts of manufactures of silk, silk and cotton, gold and silver stuffs, dyed cottons, as well as painted and striped, *on condition that none of these shall be vended in the French dominions, but sold to foreign nations, &c.*

THIS edict had more effect than the government expected from it; such an eagerness appeared of subscribing, that, instead of 25, the subscription amounted to 50 millions, which caused other regulations; the principal of which was, that they should take off four times of old actions, in order to be entitled to the new; so that, in order to purchase 5000 livres of the new actions, the subscribers were obliged to take 20000 of the old.

The great end proposed by all this was, to find means of *suppressing that immense quantity of paper money, which was so heavy a burden on the state.* To which end, annuities, to the value of 25 millions, were created; which not answering that intention, the new company of the Indies offered their assistance, and undertook to discharge them at the rate of 50 millions in one month; so that *the whole load of this paper money, amounting to near sixty millions of our sterling money,*

money, was to be extinguished by the end of July, 1721.

IN consideration of the zeal manifested by the company in this proposal, the king, by his arret, dated July 1720, changed the terms on which the company held their privileges, and declared them PERPETUAL, restraining himself and his successors from ever treating them as other companies had been, in order to their establishment—Thus this company acquired the title in France of the PERPETUAL COMPANY OF THE INDIES, with all the privileges of the other four companies that existed prior to this, confirmed to them for ever.

IN two years time it was declared, that, in consequence of the annuities granted and assigned to the company from the crown, they should be able to assign annually the sum of 10 per cent. which should be paid duly and punctually for ever: in consequence whereof, the directors were to be at full liberty to export and import what they thought proper, without being accountable annually to their constituents, because the dividend was to be certain and regular; and they were to manage things so, as that the deficiencies of one year might be made good by the profits of another.

THOUGH this course of management had one great convenience, by ascertaining the interest to the proprietors, yet the circumstance of not accounting for the profits

proved of such ill consequence, notwithstanding the regular payment of the dividend, that the proprietors could never be cured of a suspicion, that the East-India merce had been carried on rather for the benefit of the crown than the company; and this contributed to keep their actions low, though they had such extraordinary interest paid them with great regularity.

THE grounds of this suspicion lying in the annuities paid by the crown to the company, which were sufficient for securing such a dividend, without the least assistance from the profits of their trade, made the thing not incredible; especially when the dividends remained certain for 20 years together, though the commerce of the company had been greatly encreasing.

To understand this matter rightly, as well as the true state of the company's affairs in general, and how they came to have a fund capable of discharging regularly so high an interest for such a number of years, it will be requisite to give a succinct relation of the rise and progress of the other companies that have been incorporated with this, by the before-mentioned edict, and of the West-India company in particular, wherein abundance of curious particulars will occur, that may be useful.

THE China company in France was originally set on foot in the year 1660, but was soon after absorbed by that of the East-India company,

company, which had the sanction of royal authority in 1664.—When this company declined, the old company was revived, by the crown granting their licence, which was renewed to one Monsieur Jourdan, an opulent merchant, who fitted out a very large ship for that voyage, which sailed in march 1698, and returned safely the 3d of August, 1700, very richly laden.

This success encouraged Mons. Jourdan, and others interested with him, to fit out the same ship again, which they accordingly did in the following spring, and returned again in September, 1705, with no less advantage to the adventurers than before. One would have thought such success sufficient to have established this new company; but the general war wherein France was then engaged, rendered it impracticable: thus the company lay dormant, though possessed of its rights, which extended to the coast of China, Tonquin, Cochin-China, and the isles adjacent, till it was, for the reasons of state shewn, united to the western company.

The company of Senegal, though under another denomination, was one of the earliest in France, being carried on by a society of merchants at Dieppe, yet without the sanction of royal authority. This company made a little settlement in an island at the mouth of the river Sanegal in Africa, and carried on no inconsiderable trade thither.—Afterwards this

commerce fell into the hands of the merchants of Rouen, who, in the month of November, 1664, yielded up the same to the West-India company.

WHEN that company was dissolved, about 10 years after, the old Senegal company was revived, and three opulent merchants undertook that commerce; which they carried on with extraordinary advantage to themselves, till the year, 1681; when the minister, Mons. Colbert, conceiving intentions to enlarge this traffic, prevailed on those merchants to accept of a valuable consideration for their privileges, and to admit of it's passing into the hands of a larger number of persons, with new privileges, which they possessed for many years. But it appearing, that their exclusive rights were too extensive for their capital stock, it was judged for the public benefit, to divide this company; and hence sprung the Guinea company of France, to whom the greatest part of their privileges was assigned, and the rest remained to the old Senegal company, which still continued in a prosperous condition.

YET, from variety of accidents this company came to be so reduced, that they were obliged to give up their privileges to some rich merchants of Rouen, who carried on this trade with tolerable success, when it became united, as we have seen, to the company of the Indies.

THE Guinea company also had it's ebbs and flows, till the accession of Philip V. to the crown of Spain, who, in the year, 1701, granted them the liberty of the Asiento for negroes, under which it continued to flourish, to the enriching of France, and the great impoverishment of the Spanish Indies, as we have shewn in our preceding discourses.—At the treaty of Utrecht this company lost it's existence; and yet so the French managed it, that they made this loss, as England mistakingly thought it, turn greatly to their gain by vastly improving their sugar-colonies, as we have shewn.—But, when France had rendered the Spanish Asiento worth no nation's acceptance upon the footing that we took the same, it was very graciously conferred upon our South Sea company; and France took care to make the exercise of this contract a handle for heartburnings, between Spain and England; which gave rise to the Spanish depredations, and, that at length, with other pretences of illicit commerce carried on by the English, occasioned the late war, which ruined our Asiento company, and that trade has been largely carried on by France ever since, from Hispaniola to Spanish America, without any formal Asiento granted them by the court of Spain; which commerce, however illicit, has been connived at by Spain, though highly complained of if any thing of this kind is carried on our parts from Jamaica, &c.

AT this conjuncture the Mississippi scheme took place in France, the consequence of the

pretensions of that crown to Louisiana. At this time the regent of France had under his consideration Mr. Law's projects, which was first to reduce all the public debts in France into one form. For which purpose it became necessary to erect, under specious appearances, a new company with such privileges as might create hopes of most extravagant gains to the proprietors. Hereby a considerable part of the whole commerce of France was thrown into the hands of this great French company of the Indies, and the royal bank of France was united hereto to give the greater colour and sanction to this mighty Mississippi scheme: which proved at once the most iniquitous contrivance that ever entered into the heart of man, and unhappily followed this nation England did in a great measure follow this infamous example, by adopting of the South Sea scheme, which proved much more odious to this nation than the Mississippi project did to France. Nor has this South Sea affair, of illous ever, yet been rightly laid before the public, but it shew each day, perhaps even all the lands, does belonging to this most detestible scheme of a company of the Indies at this time of skillive, considered as the center of the whole French commerce, it monopolising so considerable a proportion thereof, and truly the rise and fall of that company's stock might be truly looked upon as a political, and to conclude the consequence of the

of commercial barometer, which exhibited the state of the French trade and the public credit.—To pass over the Mississippi scheme, and stick to the progress of the company, as before observed,

THE regular dividend, made by this company had a double effect; they contributed greatly to uphold the public credit, and that of the company.—The former was necessary to prevent these confusions, as long as they could, which happened on the ruin of the regent's system; which was near ruining the whole nation.—But the same regular payment of dividends was of unspeakable service to the company in their trading capacity, without which they could not have possibly subsisted; this policy keeping the proprietors from either enquiring, or receiving any *general accounts of their dealings*.—This was one of the great secrets of the French councils, and the design of restoring the affairs of the company; and is what of all other that France has conducted with the greatest address; for by this means they gained time for the company; and, by affording them money in season, they revived their East India trade, put all the company's debts into a train of payment, replaced all her factories; and, if the last war had not broke out, would have soon placed her, as a trading company, in as good a condition in that capacity, as she was as a corporation of public creditors.—And such is the policy of France, that they have now

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conquered all things, in regard to this company, and rendered the same as substantial to their general commerce, as to their public credit.

THE effectual establishment of this great company was owing to the peaceable administration of the late cardinal Fleury; but this was no otherwise due to him, than as he continued the direction of these affairs in the hands of Mons. Orry, who, perhaps, did more service to this nation, than all the statesmen, and generals, that were employed in this reign.—Though his management was somewhat thwarted, and thrown into disorder a few years since, yet he overcame the greatest difficulty, in regard to this company, and put her concerns into such a channel, as will, perhaps, render their company formidable in comparison to any other in Europe.

THE capital of the present company, as before observed, was composed of the original capital of the western company, and of 25 millions added thereunto, upon the incorporation of the East India company therewith; but after the ruin of Law's system, and all things were in confusion, it was found requisite, that the king should make a revision of the actions possessed by proprietors, in order to distinguish between such as had acquired their property fairly, and such as had thrust themselves into the company's books, to serve the purposes of mere stockjobbing.

IN

IN consequence of this revision, the king fixed the actions of this company to 56,000, and which formed a capital of 112 millions; for their dividend upon which, they had a yearly revenue assigned them of eight millions four hundred thousand livres.—By another arret in 1725, 5000 of these actions were cancelled, and burnt; so that the capital of the company, by this means, was reduced to 51,000 ACTIONS, and their DIVIDENDS secured by the annual payment of eight millions from the farmers-general of the farm of tobacco, the exclusive, perpetual, and irrevocable privilege of vending which, was granted to the company in 1723, and confirmed to them in 1725, together with the profits arising from the furs imported from Canada; so that the fund for the payment of their annual dividends was as effectually settled, and secured, as it was possible a matter of that nature could be in France.

YET the affairs of this company went on in a very precarious way for about fourteen years.—But, in the year, 1737, Mons. Orry being at the head of the finances of France, the company fell under his care.—He saw that great supplies were necessary to extricate them from the difficulties under which they laboured, and, therefore, having made a strict scrutiny into their affairs, he furnished them with

with such sums as were necessary for augmenting their commerce; so that in the short space of two years he doubled their returns; and, in three years more, brought them to three as much as they had formerly been.

By the management of this able minister, the company's sales at Port **Orient** became regular and considerable, encreasing in such a manner, that the public sale in the year, 1742, produced about a million sterling; besides which, they reserved in their magazines goods, to the value of four millions of livres more; and the first ships that arrived in 1743, brought home still a richer and more valuable cargo.—This sudden and extraordinary change in the company's affairs alarmed all Europe, but more especially the maritime powers, who saw, with unspeakable concern, a company, that but a few years before was looked upon as annihilated as to it's commerce, now rising into as high credit as any in Europe; which animated the northern powers to prosecute schemes of sailing into the East-India trade likewise.

But what was still more extraordinary than all he rest, upon the first breaking out of the last war, the company did not seem to be affected so much as might have been expected, their dividends being still regularly paid; and which kept up their credit to such a degree, that, at Christmas, 1744, their actions were at 2000.—But the war with Great Britain

Britain increasing the expences of France on the one hand, and lessening her income on the other, the secret at last came out ; that Mons. Orry was obliged to acquaint the directors of the company, that the king's affairs were so circumstanced, as not to permit him longer to supply the company in the manner he had hitherto done ; so that now they were to stand upon their own bottom, and carry on their trade for the future as well as they could.—This unexpected stroke reduced the actions to 800.—And, during the time of the late war, their affairs were in a lamentable condition ; for that occasioned so high a demand for money in France, that it brought on a suspension of their dividends, and thereby gave a severe stroke to their public credit ; and the blow struck by commodore Baret in the Indies, and the loss of their ships we took at Cape Breton, went so far towards the ruin of their commerce abroad, that another such stroke, from Great Britain, would, probably, have absolutely annihilated the company as a trading corporation, for one 20 or 30 years at least.—But, since the peace, the company has surprisngly recovered itself *

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Here then is a fact, with regard to the French East-India company ; that by the late war it was reduced to so low an ebb, that the continuance of the war for another season would certainly have absolutely ruined this great company, and have struck such a blow to the whole public credit

THAT some tolerable judgment may be made of the progress of this company, the following

credit of France, that we might not have been obliged to have given up Cape Breton—for the sake of peace.—But how their great India might have been much sooner ruined would be very easy to shew, if I was so desired.—But

The weight of the last war, as to the enemy's part, must have been supported by one or both of the kingdoms engaged as principals, though it was reported that Spain was to have been the largest share; but how either of them were to have got money, when we had so greatly the advantage of them by sea, was the question. France, that is the richest country, seemed pretty well exhausted, at least was more ways than one vastly on the decline, both on account of the failure of her commerce, and the large drains upon her from abroad, not only of money, but of men, to the prejudice of her manufactures. The crown of Spain, it is well known, never hoard up treasures; their whole dependence is upon their American returns, which, at the time we are speaking of, were so backward, that the court was greatly distressed for their own necessary supplies; therefore could, at this time, lend France no other aid than their credit on the future return of the galleons; which, though not to be despised, was very far from answering the like purpose as their having cash of their own.

The armies of both crowns in Italy were extremely expensive, as they were generally lodged in dear and expensive countries; and as meeting many impediments by sea, they were most generally obliged to supply their army by land-carriage, and often through very rough and difficult roads.—The French army in Flanders drew considerable sums out of the conquered provinces; but as money levied that way is usually told to the government over a gridiron, as the old phrase has it, and if they had it all, it would not have maintained a fourth part of their army, there was an absolute necessity for it that way, as well as in Italy; and that the finances fell very short, is well known. In a word, the expense of France in the last war was not short of fourteen millions sterling yearly, which no nation in Europe can afford, without constant supply by trade; the principal branches of which are the East India, West-India, North-America,

following account of the number of ships returning annually from Pondicherry, and the value of their cargoes, may be useful.

America, and Great Britain.—And all these we know were greatly distressed.—And the Spanish treasure not coming in aid, nor, as matters stood, could they have much credit abroad, as we got most of the cash which foreigners had to spare, and their old friend Genoa then in a bad state, it is very difficult to conceive how France could have subsisted her troops another season.—While the trade was open, France could not want resources infinite, more especially if allied with Spain, and the treasures of America find their way home freely; but when neither of these were the case, the notion at that time of the resources of France, seems to be very ill grounded. And therefore we appear to have been very unfortunate in making a peace with such an enemy so circumstanced, since it does not seem very easy to reduce them to the like state again.—Yet there are ways to do it, and to a much worse.

of

Of the commerce of the French company of the Indies, shewing the number of ships returning annually from Pondicherry, and the value of their cargoes*, from 1727 to 1742 inclusive,

	Ships.	Pagoda's.
In 1727 October		
1728 January	3	248,265
September		
1729 January	3	220,032
September		
1730 January	3	248,083
October		
1731 January	4	600,711
October		
1732 January	4	302,006
September		
1733 January	4	260,640
September		
1734 January	4	392,987
September		
1735 January	4	375,341
September		
1736 January	3	223,484
October		
1737 January	5	351,691
October		
1738 January	5	522,315
October		
1739 January	5	586,156
October		
1740 January	4	485,732
October		
1741 January	4	555,643
October		
1742 January	7	954,376

* The reader is desired to observe, that the same number of ships were sent annually from Bengal as from Pondicherry, and

FROM what has been said, it is apparent that the French have spared no expence, nor left untried any point of policy, to uphold the company of the Indies; and, notwithstanding what it suffered in the late war, we find they are still in a flourishing condition. Nor can it be otherwise; for this company is established on so broad a bottom, that if one branch of trade proves temporarily bad, their other branches generally make them some compensation: as the interest of this corporation is so intimately interwoven with that of the state, we find, upon all critical emergencies, it stands in need of no aids which the state can afford it.

ONE of the greatest advantages that this company has been to France, seems to be the encouragement which has been given, by means thereof, to the French sugar-lands and colonies in America; for the French Senegal company (which was the African company of that nation) being united to the India company; and this company having granted them such bounties, exemptions, privileges, and encouragements, as amount to above 40,000 l. sterling per ann.

and consequently the numbers of this list are to be doubled. He is desired to take notice also, that the sums set down are the prime cost of the goods in India — And, lastly, that the value of a pagoda is about 9 French livres, or 7 s. 6 d. sterling; by the help of which directions, this table will be found to comprehend a short history of the progress of this company.

in order to enable them to carry on their African commerce to the greater advantage of the company, as well as of their sugar colonies; it is not to be admired, that the French should make so rapid a progress in the trade of America, as we experienced they had done in the late war.

BUT what gives the French still a greater weight of interest in Africa than the benefit of these encouragements, is the company's sole privilege of this trade, exclusive of all the other subjects of France. For, by virtue of these powers and immunities, the French have supplied their colonies with 10,000 of the choicest and most robust negroes from the coast of Africa, to 1000 that have been carried by all the British traders to our own plantations.

BY virtue of this great French company, invested with all those extraordinary privileges, that we have amply represented in our dissertations on the French police regarding their African and American commerce; we cannot be as little surprised, that our rival nation should make such extraordinary advances in their American and their African trade, as they have done in that of the East Indies. For, however, injurious in the general monopolies certainly are to commerce, yet this French monopoly is so politically tempered, so wisely modelled, and constituted, that it's monopolising detrimental

tal edge is quite blunted ; whereby this corporation has proved no less beneficial to the trade of France, than some others, have been hurtful and destructive, when not regulated by the like rational maxims and principles : which, to lay them before the reader in the light they appear to me, will fall under the following particulars, viz.

1. That the French have made their East-India company instrumental to the preservation and encrease of their African commerce ; wherein they have become more considerable upon the coast of Africa, than any other nation.

2. The French African commerce as it has been conducted by this company has proved the great nursery of all the French sugar-islands and colonies, by supplying them cheaply and plentifully with negroes, as we have seen, for the cultivation of their sugars, cotton, cacao, indigo, and all other the valuable productions of those colonies.

3. The French American commerce has enabled them to supplant the English in the sugar trade of Europe ; and to encrease in seamen, and mercantile shipping in a tenfold degree to what they were before the peace of Utrecht.

4. The French India company has maintained a competition in trade with the English in Asia ; and been thereby instrumental

to encrease the French seamen and naval power no less than our East-India company has done that of this kingdom. From hence we may easily discern, how powerful the motives have been to induce the French to support and uphold this company at all events. For, we have seen from the French royal edicts and ordonnances, that after the Affiento with Spain was given to our South-Sea company, the French laid the African trade quite open to all their subjects, whereby not only their whole African trade was likely to have been ruined, but that also of their sugar, and other colonies, which depended thereon: and, therefore, to save those inestimable branches of their trade from absolute ruin, the French declare, in their royal edicts, that they were obliged to grant the exclusive privileges in their African trade to their India company, with all those immunities thereto annexed, which we have enumerated in our preceding discourses. So that the advantages arising to the trade and navigation of France from granting the exclusive privilege therein to their India company, is thought by far to overbalance all the disadvantages that might be presumed to arise from such a kind of monopoly: and, certainly, as this French company is modelled, at present, the French have not herein mistaken their true commercial interests; reason no less than experience
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having evinced the rectitude of their policy in this respect. Thus we have seen how conducive to the flourishing state of the French commerce in general, this rival nation has rendered even a monopoly! We shall now touch the progress of this French company in Asia, and view what a figure they are likely one day to make in that part of the world, if they should not be somehow checked in their career.

THE original seat of government of this company in the Indies was at Madagascar; but, after the first Dutch war, they removed to Surat, and, after that, to Pondicherry.—This was in the year, 1674; and as the company, at that time, had an extraordinary demand for piece-goods, they could not have settled in a better place.—This place they immediately well-fortified, by order of the court; so that, in the year, 1710, this place was become one of the most considerable in the Indies; and, if their affairs in Europe had kept pace with their improvements made in the Indies, the French company would soon have been upon a level with those of their neighbours the English and the Dutch.

THE settlement of Pondicherry becoming the capital residence of the French East India company, is well situated for this commerce. The town lies in the province of Gingy, on the coast of Coromandel, and distant not above 100 yards from the sea-shore.—The magazines of the company, and of private persons,

persons, are numerous and magnificent; a spacious and beautiful market-place, six fine gates, 11 bastions, for the defence of their walls, a regular citadel well fortified; upwards of 400 cannon upon their works, besides an excellent train of field-pieces, bombs, mortars, and all sorts of military stores in their arsenal. — The governor lives with great splendor and dignity, and has, besides his own palace, another grand one, adjoining to a most beautiful garden, superbly furnished for the reception of the foreign princes and ambassadors of those parts, who, whenever they resort thither, are treated with infinite respect, and all their expences defrayed by the company; which has been found, by experience, of far greater consequence to the interest of their commerce, than the expence it occasions. No settlements in India are better regulated, or more wisely governed, than this, and it is become extremely populous by Mahommedans and gentiles, as well as christians.

THERE cannot be a place better seated for trade than this, being in the midst of the European settlements on the coast of Coromandel, and having all the bay of Bengal open before them; so that here the company's magazines are full of all the commodities and manufactures, not only of the coast of Coromandel, but of other parts of the Indies, such as Bengal, Surat, and the coast of Malabar, as also of such as are imported

ported from Persia, and the coast of the Red-Sea.—Here likewise are warehouses for all sorts of European commodities, which are conveniently transported from thence, as occasion requires, to all the markets in the Indies.

THE staple trade of the place is piece-goods, of which the finest are in Golconda, and the best painted here; they have likewise great quantities of silk, raw and manufactured, gold and silver brocades, perfumes, spices, and diamonds; in which last branch of trade they have made a great progress of late, and for which it is certain they are very conveniently situated, as being at a small distance from the finest mines in the Indies; and by having persons amongst them as well skilled in jewels as any in the world, they reap no less advantages in this respect than any other Europeans settled here.—And certain it is, that the India trade of France has laid an extraordinary foundation for the encrease of their European trade in general.



DISSERTATION XXIV.

Of the policy of England with regard to her management of the African trade; with considerations how the same might have been better conducted, and far more extended for the general interest of the nation; with a further comparison between our management and that of France, respecting the same: and by what means our East-India company may be rendered instrumental to the security and advancement of this commerce,

FROM our last discourses, the measures taken by France to establish their African trade, which has proved the great instrument of advancing their whole American commerce, will be fresh in the reader's memory; and, therefore, by way of contrast, it may be proper next more fully to consider our own policy, in relation to the manner of carrying on this commerce.

I SHALL not enter here into a detail of the rise and progress of our late Royal African company, that being done in my Dictionary

tionary of Commerce; I shall at present only touch such essentials relating to this trade as, is humbly conceived, may tend to its better establishment, and more extensive advancement.

FOR above these 250 years past, it has been the constant practice of all such European nations as have made new discoveries in foreign parts, and gained any established power and authority in remote and barbarous countries, to build and maintain forts and castles; and, by virtue of such possession, to claim a right to whole kingdoms, and to exclude all other nations from trading in, to, or from them. Thus the Portuguese long enjoyed the whole trade to Africa and the East-Indies;—the Spaniards for many years claimed and engrossed to themselves almost the whole continent of America, and most of the adjacent islands;—the Hollanders have rendered themselves masters of the Spice-Islands in the East, and from them supply the whole world with those universal commodities by such quantities, and at such prices as they think fit.—By the like practice the Dutch, for some time before and after the year 1660, attempted to gain the absolute possession of the most valuable parts of the coast of Africa, and to exclude this nation from any share in that commerce, and thereby brought on themselves a war with this kingdom in 1664.

BEFORE

BEFORE our late Royal African company had built a sufficient number of forts and castles on the gold-coast, the Dutch interrupted our trade, and seized and confiscated our ships on this coast, and within its dependencies.—After our company built and maintained forts and castles on the Gold-coast, the said company, and other British traders, carried on a free and uninterrupted commerce here.

BEFORE the French got possession of their forts in the river Senegal, and on the islands of Arguin and Gorée, on the north coast, the English traded to all places on the said coast without molestation.—Since the French have possessed the before-mentioned forts, they have not only excluded the British nation from those parts, but have, in times of peace, taken and confiscated all such British ships and vessels as have ventured to go thither in time of peace; yet such care has been taken of this branch of our trade, that we have suffered the French to trade uninterruptedly within our sole rights of trade, and under the very nose of our forts and castles.—In those places where we have forts, we carry on trade with the natives;—where other nations have forts, and we have none, we are excluded the right of trade.—This proves the necessity of supporting our forts and settlements on the coast of Africa, and of so supporting them, that we may uphold our absolute right, our weight and dignity

dignity of trade here; or how can we expect to maintain the same? How can we expect to supply our colonies with negro labourers? How can we expect to enjoy the benefits of our sugar-islands? and how can we expect to uphold a rivalry in trade with our powerful and destructive competitors the French in all those essential branches?

WE have seen that France has upheld her African commerce by the weight and influence of an opulent company, a perpetuated company, supported and upheld by the crown of France by mighty privileges and immunities; by a company endowed with extensive privileges for ever; by a company constituted upon so firm and solid a basis, as renders it the grand support of the whole American and East-India trade of France no less than that of Africa. And have we not seen, from the royal edicts of that nation, that, if they had suffered this trade to have continued open to all the separate traders of France, not only this important branch of trade must have been absolutely ruined, but likewise their whole American commerce that depended thereon? It is, therefore, they did not suffer this trade to remain open above four years.

AND what have the French declared by their royal edicts to have been the great cause that this trade was going to absolute ruin, while it remained free and open to all his majesty's subjects? Was it not that general com-

competitorship therein that separate traders maintained? Did not this raise the price of negroes to such an exorbitant degree, that the French planters must have been ruined in the purchase of them? Did not this enhance the price of all African commodities as well as negroes, and depreciate those of France? Does not the carrying on the trade in this manner evince this to be the inevitable consequence thereof? And did not this compel the French to give the same to their great East-India company, together with all the privileges of their four former companies thereunto annexed? Has not this given the French such influence in Africa, as to encourage them to drive the English out of the whole trade of the Gum-coast? Has not this encouraged them to rob us many years of our most valuable negroes from Anamaboe? Has not this excited them to interfere with us at Whydah, and made them insult us in the river Sherbro, and Serralione; and, in a word, to take all those advantages of us on the coast that I have before particularized in my former discourses? And how could we expect otherwise, when we fairly draw the parallel between French and British measures, in regard to the management of this trade? Let any impartial man faithfully compare our measures with those of France; let him put them in fair contrast with each other, and let him say, if his reason will suffer lie, that those of France have been calculated for
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the ruin and destruction of this trade; and those of England for its preservation and prosperity, in the honest national light: no man can maintain this, though he should assert it, according to my humble judgment.

WAS our African trade ever put on so good a foundation as the French is? Had our late royal African company ever any effectual encouragement to support this trade, as the French have? Every one that is acquainted with it's history, knows the contrary. Did not the proprietors run out their fortunes to build forts, and establish settlements for the benefit of the public? But what advantages did they ever gain in trade to make them compensation? None. Were they not great sufferers by our wars with the Dutch and the French? And what recompence did the nations make them? Had this company ever a beneficial *Asiento* with Spain as the French Senegal company had before the peace of Utrecht? After they had exhausted their capital in building forts, making settlements, and engaging the negroe-princes in this nation's interest, without receiving any commercial benefit equivalent thereto, what public encouragement did they obtain to enable them to support the trade? Why, truly, in 1697, the parliament laid the trade open to all the subjects of England for 13 years, and imposed a duty of 10 per cent, *ad valorem*, on all goods and merchandises exported to Africa,

Africa, during that term, for the maintenance of their forts, and castles; the whole of which duties amounted to no more than 73,785 l. 10 s. 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ d., and their expence in support of their forts did not stand them in less, at a medium, than 20,000 l. per Annum, for 14 years, from 1697, which amounted to 280,000 l. in the whole.—And when the said act was expired, did not all the subjects of Great Britain enjoy the benefit of this trade; and yet the sole expence of the forts was left to the company till the year, 1730? Did not this necessarily decrease our weight and influence in Africa all this time? For the company had no power to resist the shameful encroachments of the French on the Gum coast, and elsewhere; and the nation all this time never interfered, to maintain it's dignity and honour in opposition to the French intrusion.

THE court of England by the treaty of Utrecht, accepted of the Asiento contract, when, as I have observed elsewhere, it was not worth our acceptance, under the terms we received it, France having greatly overdone that commerce beforehand. But what tendency had this Asiento to promote the African trade, upon a national footing? From this time we had two African companies, as it were, subsisting; the one the late royal African company; the other, the Asiento company. Did not this create a competition
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in trade between these two companies for a time? Did this benefit either, by raising the price of negroes on both? I am not insensible that there was an agreement between these two companies for a time, but that was so wisely managed, as to answer the end of neither, and much less that of the nation: so that our *Affiento* had no tendency to advantage the African trade, nor to render negroes cheaper to our own British planters. This trade being open also to all his Majesty's subjects; and a constant rivalship therein subsisting between all those separate traders, as well as between the two before-mentioned companies, what became the case of the British planters all this time with respect to negroes? Did not this great competition in the whole trade encrease the price of negroes above 300 per cent.?

WHEN the French enjoyed the *Affiento*, and made considerable advantages thereby, they had only one African company; and these French *Affientists* possessed the sole exclusive privilege of that trade; they had neither any other company to compete with them to raise the price of negroes, nor other African merchandise, much less had they the whole body of French separate traders to rival them therein, as our late British *Affientists* and the royal African company both had. How can we wonder then that the French should make such extraordinary advantages thereof, while our South-Sea company made none?

none? Can we, therefore, at all admire, that while the French had the *Affiento*, they were capable of affording negroes cheaply and plentifully to the Spaniards, and by favour thereof to throw into all Spanish America such immense quantities of their other merchandise, as we have seen they did, and so greatly to enrich France, and, at length, so highly to glut New Spain therewith, as to make it not worth our acceptance at the treaty of Utrecht to take that negroe-contract from Spain? It certainly was not, unless it had been modelled upon quite other conditions than it was.

I SHALL not touch upon any other conditions of an *Affiento* at present that might be apprehended to have proved more beneficial to ourselves, and have given less umbrage to the court of Spain in the exercise of that contract: I shall only here observe, that had our South-Sea company, as *Affientists*, been possessed of all our African forts and settlements, and carried that commerce on from the coast of Africa at the first hand, as the French had done before them; had this been the case under our *Affiento* company, so regulated, in relation to our African commerce, as not to have interfered with the rights of our separate traders, in supplying the British colonies with negroes: had this been done, even under the injudicious terms and conditions of our *Affiento*, the South-Sea company, as *Affientists*, might have

have greatly advantaged themselves and the nation by this commerce: our South-Sea Affientists, considered as a well-regulated company, in respect to the African trade, might have been able to have become the powerful protectors of our whole African commerce, as well that branch which respected our separate traders, as that which related solely to the supply of the Spaniards with negroes.—A company, like our South-Sea company, backed with an ample capital trading stock, and supported with due powers from the crown of England, would have kept the French in due subjection on the coast of Africa.—Such a company would have effectually maintained our beneficial right of trade on the Gum-coast for 500 miles, which the French have insolently excluded us from.—This company would have effectually excluded the French from trading for immense numbers of negroes at Anamaboe, under the nose of our best British forts.—They would have prevented the French from encroaching on our trade at Whydah, Gambia, Serraleone, and Sherbro.—Such an Affiento company would have maintained, not only all the rights and privileges of the British commerce in Africa for their own benefit, for the benefit of our separate traders, and for that of the nation in general: they would, we say, have not only supported the dignity and honour of the British empire in this estimable branch of

our trade, but they might and would have been enabled so to have extended their commerce into the bowels of Africa, as might and would have unspeakably advantaged the trade, the wealth, and the power of the whole kingdom, and have prevented all insults and encroachments by our rivals.—All this might have been done ; and no less than this ought to have been done ; and if those who formed our *Affiento* had understood this commerce as they ought to have done all this, and more, might have been done for the honour and interest of the nation in general, and no less for the advantage of our separate traders, than that of our South-Sea company.—These measures might and would have prevented the fatal effects of our never-to-be-forgotten South-Sea enthusiasm.

LET not our separate traders be so partial to themselves as to imagine that such a company, properly and wisely regulated, could have injured their private interest. On the contrary, it would be no great difficulty, perhaps, to shew how, and by what means the interest of such a regulated company might have co-operated with our separate traders to have kept the French in due subjection in Africa, to the mutual benefit of them both, for the common interest of our plantations, and the general interest of the kingdom. These things might be easily shewn.—But,

IN this place, it may be necessary for me only to take notice, that if all the negroes that the French have, in barefaced violation of our rights of trade, taken from the coast of Africa since the treaty of Utrecht, had been left to our South-Sea Assientists, and our traders of London, Bristol, and Liverpool, they would have had at their service three to one more than they have had to supply the occasions of them both ; — and, by proper stipulations, regulated by parliament, between our Assientists and our separate traders, they might have purchased whatever negroes they both wanted, for at least one-sixth part of the price which they both were obliged to give ; because, on the case supposed, the attentive reader will please to observe, that our Assientists, nor our separate traders would, in such case, have had the competition of our old Royal African company of England to have combated, nor the competition of the French, which has proved infinitely more disadvantageous : in fine, our Royal Assientists and our separate traders might easily have went hand in hand, and have kept the French so effectually under, as would have put it out of their power to have advanced their sugar and other colonies in America, by means of their African trade, as I have elsewhere shewed they have done ; and consequently the French could neither have supplanted us in the sugar-trade throughout Europe, nor have become so formidable

to us in all America, as we, at present, experience them to be: In a word, I must beg leave to declare, from my attention to the measures of France, in regard to the advancement of their commerce, and their naval power, I cannot help ascribing the same, in a great measure, to our constant *ill management of our African commerce, and the wise management of the French with relation thereunto.* For I desire it may be remembered, as I have observed on another occasion, that although our African traders have prospered, yet our national loss of the sugar-trade throughout Europe, and our loss of the Asiento by our ill-regulation of that branch of our African trade, greatly over-balance all those gains.—And the power gained by France as well in Africa as in America hereby; the whole loss of the commerce of the Gum-coast, and the weight of the power of France in Africa, if they have dispossessed us of our forts and settlements in Africa, as we are informed they have, must demonstrate to every impartial man, that our African affairs have not been rightly conducted.

I AM too well apprized of the jealousies of our African traders to imagine, that they will easily be brought to think that they could have carried on the African trade so much to their private advantage as they have done, in conjunction with any opulent and powerful company to support that trade in concert with them,

them, though such company had been ever so wisely regulated for that purpose: but, with great deference to the judgment and experience of those gentlemen, I cannot help differing from such who may be of this sentiment. For I humbly conceive, that they might have reaped much greater advantages than they have done, provided all our rights, privileges, and immunities in the African commerce had been inviolably preserved, by the means of a weighty company; for had this been the case, would they not have been great gainers, as merchants, in the general sugar-trade of Europe, that France has, by our shameful neglect of this trade, supplanted us in? And, if the British planters had had the cultivation of double the quantity of sugar in consequence thereof, would not this have proportionably encreased their demand for negroes? And if the French had not been suffered, since the peace of Utrecht, to have taken a negro from any part of the coast within the British rights, would not there have been at least above double the quantity of negroes to have been purchased? And when the rivalship of the French had been absolutely destroyed, within only our own limits of that trade, might not our separate African traders have purchased two or three negroes for the same price they have done one? For certainly it would have proved no less for the interest of the regulated company to have kept the price of negroes low to have supplied

plied their Affiento, than for the interest of our separate traders to have acted in concert with them for that purpose. Nay, might not such an agreement have been made between the company and our separate traders, that the former might always have had their magazines duly supplied with negroes, as well for the use of the separate traders, as of themselves? And might not this have been done also at certain fixed and stated prices? whereby might not our separate traders have saved all these losses they have sustained by demurrage, and from strolling from one part of the coast to another to make up their cargo, at a great expence? That this was practicable might easily be shewn, was I disposed to descend to particulars; and this might all have been done at the expence of France, not at that of the company, or the private traders.

MOREOVER, would not a great and a powerful company be capable of doing that in Africa that never can be accomplished by separate traders in their disjointed capacity? Would not such a company be able to extend the commerce of Africa into the very heart of that great empire; which can never be done by separate traders? What share we have hitherto enjoyed of this trade, is no more than a little of the coasting part; we being scarce acquainted with the internal trade for above 200 miles, and in the whole of that we have but very little experience.—

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The trade of Africa in general we look upon even yet to be only in its infancy, in comparison to the great extent of this part of the world. Have we ever enjoyed any thing more of this commerce than the mere skimming of the coasting trade, and that under difficulties and discouragements enough, arising, as well from the interruption of the Dutch as the French?

HAVE we not all reason to believe, that Africa will admit of a very extensive and lucrative commerce, if we can propagate the same into the very heart and center of these extensive territories? We know little of that infinite variety of vegetable, mineral, and animal production, that we may presume abound in this part of the world, and which might afford an infinite variety of trafficable objects. But do we not know, from our little coasting traffic, that these countries abound with commodities of inestimable value, though we have participated of but a small share of them? Do we not know that their vegetables afford us fine woods, as well for dying as workmanship; and may we not suppose that here are as fine drugs as any in other parts of the world, if we took proper measures to obtain a knowledge of them? We know with what a valuable commodity their elephants furnish us; and what numberless other animals this country may abound, that would afford matter for traffic, we are but very little acquainted with. Certain we are

also, that this country does no less abound in gold than in delicate vegetables, gums and ivory; and why not in diamonds and other precious stones, as well as innumerable fossils and minerals of inestimable worth? Certain likewise it is, that there are scarce any productions in all our British American islands but might be cultivated on the continent of Africa, and that perhaps within few miles of the sea-coasts: and if ever we should be unhappy enough to be dispossessed of our sugar-colonies, our trade in this part of the world might contribute to make us compensation: at all events, however, it is wise and prudent to make every advantage in our power that this trade will admit of; for we know not what occasion we may have to make the most of every thing we have the least claim to.

In tracing mankind as near as we can to their origin, we find them in the general to have been no better civilized, than the Africans. What has so much tended to civilize the human species as commerce? This being the parent of treasure, splendor, and magnificence, have not these prevailing motives been conducive to the general propagation of all the commercial arts? And wherever they have been duly introduced, they have scarce ever failed to polish and humanize the most brutish savages. And why not the Africans? However some countries may abound with what we Europeans are pleased

to denominate humane barbarians ; yet, we well know, that nature is one and the same in all parts of the world, suitable to it's climate and it's situation ; and the colour, and stature in men is as little to be despised as the soil where they inhabit, and the productions of the earth : and soils of all kinds, and in all climes are improveable ; and why not the human nature ? Are not the rational faculties of the negroe people in the general equal to those of any other of the human species ? And experience has shewn that they are no less capable of the mechanical and manufactural arts and trades, than the bulk of the Europeans. I shall enter no further into the philosophy of human nature.

FOR my own part, I cannot help expressing my dislike to the slave-trade, and wish an end could be put to it ; and I am inclined to believe that practicable without injury to our plantations. At present, however, we shall take things as they are, and reason from them in their present state, and not from that wherein we could hope them to be. Certain it is that wherever the commercial Europeans have humanely cultivated a trade with the most savage people, they have always reaped advantages sufficient to induce to pursue the practice. The Dutch afford us an eminent example of this in their East India settlements. Have they not by dint of trade civilized innumerable of the natives, and thereby brought them to the European way of
cloathing,

cloathing, and imbibed most of their peculiar customs and habits? Why then may not numberless of the Africans be brought to do the same? If their country affords productions valuable enough to pay for our manufactures, why should we neglect to induce them to a general wear of them? If they possess wherewith to give an advantageous barter for any of our productions of arts, why should not effectual policy be used with them to induce them to a general liking thereof? That they have estimable commodities that will turn to profit to give in exchange for ours, is certain; and that it is practicable to bring them to a general use of multitudes of our commodities, is not less so, from what little we have experienced of their disposition. If we could so exert our commercial policy amongst these people, as to bring a few hundred thousands of them to cloath with our commodities, and to erect buildings to deck with our furniture, and to live something in the European way, would not such traffic prove far more lucrative than the slave-trade only, or the dealing with them only for those small quantities of gold, and other commodities which we do?

If once we could propagate and establish our fashions amongst them; if they could be brought to pride themselves in living in our manner, and that it was thought disgraceful not to cloathe and live in such certain manner; would not this naturally rouse their passion

sion to obtain those productions of their country, to give in return for our commodities? Would not this animate and inspire them to search their countries for every thing valuable both above ground, and below, to maintain a traffic, that once became generally fashionable amongst them? And as they have innumerable things in the several kingdoms of nature, whose uses, and whose virtues they cannot be so well acquainted with, they would lay in time all nature's work at our feet; they would clear their lands; take to the cultivation of those things, we have found valuable amongst them, breed those animals we esteemed, and search, at our instigation, to the very center of the earth for all her invaluable treasures. May we not very reasonably judge that this would prove the natural consequence of cultivating such a commercial correspondence with these people? And when our people came to obtain a free and friendly trading intercourse with the natives, may we not presage that great must be the consequence? For our customs and fashions would spread from nation to nation; from country to country; till by travel and commerce, we became as familiarly acquainted with this rich and extensive country as with any in Europe.

AND what infinite advantages might arise to these kingdoms, if we should prove the first who cut out such new tracts of commerce? For the first establishers will always obtain

obtain the greatest advantages; and may so fix ourselves in the favour and friendship of those savage nations, as not easily to be supplanted by any rival traders.

By such like measures, have not all branches of traffic with foreign countries been obtained? And what reason have we to despair of extending the commerce of this part of the world to a degree equal to that of any other belonging to the whole British empire? With a commerce that must prove of such a nature and extent; and so beneficial to these kingdoms, what comparison will the mere slave-trade bear, and that small quantity of African commodities wherein we, at present, deal?

ARE not these motives sufficient to induce us to the preservation of that footing we have obtained in Africa? But how these great things may be accomplished is the next point that falls under our consideration.

As our African trade is, at present, carried on, we can never hope for any of those advantages; and, therefore, other kind of measures must be thought of than what we have hitherto fallen upon. And what these measures are, must, from what has been urged in the preceding papers, be obvious to every one, who has attended to the matter.

BUT before I open myself explicitly upon this occasion, I crave leave to premise the following particulars, viz.

I. That

1. That while no other means can be found to supply our colonies with white people sufficient to perform the laborious business requisite in our sugar-colonies; or, if experience should prove that whites like blacks cannot sustain the heat, and the fatigue necessary; or, if we cannot carry on our sugar-plantations to such advantage, by the means of whites, as our rivals in this trade, may do by blacks; we cannot think of giving up the slave-trade, notwithstanding my good wishes that it could be done.

2. That what I am about to suggest is not intended to interfere with such a share and degree of the African slave-trade, and the connections this gives with the West-India trade, as our British separate traders, at present, enjoy, though it grows worse and worse upon their hands; and will at length, perhaps, become quite impracticable to be carried on at all in the manner it is, by reason of the greater and greater dearness of slaves upon the coast; unless this trade shall be established upon a better foundation than it at present is.

3. From what has been said, it appears, that the French African trade, and all the advantages they have thereby received in regard to their sugar, and other American colonies, have been owing to this trade being effectually protected, supported, and enlarged by their great East-India company; and it also appears, from the French royal edicts,
that

that this nation apprehended, their African commerce could not be duly supported for the benefit of their colonies, by the means of a free and open trade; and, therefore, they assert that they were under the necessity of granting the same to a company with exclusive privileges.—These things premised, I shall now desire permission to observe what I would submit to public consideration, for the better security and advancement of this traffic; which is as follows; viz.

1. That though I would not adopt the measures of France wholly, in regard to the regulation of this trade; yet neither can I judge it eligible inviolably to adhere wholly to the present measures that we have taken for this purpose.

2. That, therefore, I would propose to adopt both; I mean that of a great and a powerful company, with exclusive privileges and immunities to propagate and establish the *inland commerce* only of Africa to the utmost: and I would propose also, that the whole slave-trade, and the connection that has with our West-India commerce, may be left, as it at present is, solely to our British separate traders.

3. That every branch of the trade to Africa, excepting that which is commonly called the slave-trade, shall be given to the East-India company *by act of parliament*, with an exclusive privilege for ——— years, with liberty, to erect such inland forts, and factories,

ries, as they think proper, and shall be invested with such other immunities, as to the wisdom of the legislature shall seem meet.

4. That the forts and castles in Africa, and every thing thereunto appertaining be vested in the East-India company, and the 10,000 l. per Annum, which is now allowed by parliament to the present African company, shall be granted to the said East-India company, in order the better to enable them to support and maintain these forts and castles already erected in Africa.

5. That certain parts and proportions of these several forts, which are already erected shall be allotted by the said act of parliament, to the sole and uninterrupted use of the separate British African traders, the better to enable them to carry on their slave-trade.

6. That in the carrying on the said slave-trade, the separate British traders shall have full and unrestrained liberty to traffic with the negroes for slaves in the same manner they, at present do; and shall not on any account, be debarred and molested by the said company, in trading with the negroes for such gold dust, or gold, or ivory, &c. as they at present do; but that this dealing shall be limited and restrained to a certain degree, according to the number of slaves, which these traders shall purchase on the coast: and that the company shall on no account interfere in the slave-trade with the separate traders.

7. That

7. That in order to render the trade the more beneficial to the separate traders, as well as the country, an agreement shall be settled between the company, and the separate traders; which agreement shall be regulated by the act of parliament, aforesaid, that the separate traders shall not give more than things of such a certain value for the goods they shall deal in besides slaves; and that the company shall be restrained to the same value in their barter; whereby the price of these commodities may not be enhanced by rivalry in trade between the company and the separate traders.

8. That the company shall always be obliged to protect the said private traders in their traffic, as much as they shall their own agents; and shall prevent all foreign interlopers attempting to trade anywhere on the coast of Africa, within the limits of the charter of the late royal African company.

9. That every other branch of the inland African trade shall be solely under the controul, direction and management of the East-India company; and the separate traders shall not interfere therein, further than they have been wont to do, in regard to the usual custom of carrying on the trade.

10. That the East-India company, when possessed, by act of parliament, of the additional powers and privileges, shall be distinguished by the name and title of the Royal East-India and African company, or by such other
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appellation as the wisdom of parliament shall judge eligible.

11. That one half of the commodities *ad valorem* to be vended in Africa, shall be of British produce and manufacture, and the other half of the produce and manufactures of the East-Indies, according to invoice, and all after-charges, &c.

12. That the said royal East-India and African company shall be obliged to erect all such inland forts and factories at their own expence, as may be necessary to facilitate all trade between the interior parts of Africa and the Sea-coast; and shall be at the sole expence of making treaties and alliances with the negroe-chiefs and princes for the greater security and enlargement of their commerce.

THESE are the general heads that I would presume to sketch out, leaving them to be amended by those who are better judges. If the whole African trade, except that part commonly called the slave-trade, was absolutely vested in the East-India company, upon some reasonable terms and conditions, there is no doubt to be made, but that trade would, by means of so powerful and wealthy a company, be carried on to the very center of that great extended and populous country:—and, what immense quantities of our own, as well as of the East-India commodities, might be vended among these people, is not easy to say; especially, if the natives could be gra-

dually civilized, and brought generally to wear, and otherwise consume the European and Indian commodities. But it can never be expected, without the erection of interior forts and factories; and those duly maintained and upheld by a powerful company, with a large trading stock, that this commerce will ever be encreased to the degree it is capable of. And, as it would be the interest of this company to cultivate the inland commerce to the utmost extent, as having no manner of concern with the slave-trade, there is all reason to believe, that, where we now export twenty shillings worth of commodities to Africa, we should then export one hundred pounds worth. There are considerable quantities of the East-India goods, at present, sent to Africa; but, if that company were so settled there, as to encrease the commerce in that part of the world, to the degree it is capable of, the consumption of those would certainly, as well as that of British commodities, in general, encrease beyond imagination. And we very well know, that those people have the valuable commodities of ivory, gums, dyeing woods, gold, &c. &c. to give in exchange; and doubtless, when the trade came to be extended to the degree it will admit of, there would be discovered an infinite variety of trafficable particulars, with which the Europeans at present are totally unacquainted.

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So well constituted a company, supported for half a century only, with such powers and privileges as before intimated, or with such others as shall make it for the interest of the company to drive the inland trade to it's utmost height, would be instrumental, we may reasonably believe, to make Britons as well acquainted with the interior territories of that extended country, as they at present are with the coast only. So that if the wisdom of the nation should, at any time hereafter, judge it for the public interests to deprive this company of it's exclusive privilege, and lay the trade quite open; would not the separate traders and the public in general, reap unspeakably greater advantage thereby, than they ever possibly can do, if some powerful company does not undertake the establishment of this very extensive and gainful branch of commerce?

NOR do we apprehend that separate traders can have the least reason to complain, or object against the establishment of such an extended commerce into the heart of Africa, as may easily be effectuated by virtue of a company, properly constituted and regulated for the purpose, and perhaps, by no other measures whatsoever.

HAVING endeavoured, to inform myself in regard to what has been urged against every kind of trading company that has existed in this nation; I am not unapprized of what may

be objected against my own proposition, and particularly what may be offered from the consideration of the miscarriage of the late royal African company: from which some probably may please to argue, that it is impossible for any kind of African company long to subsist, without annihilation of their trading capital.

BUT, with all deference to the judgment of those who are pleased to think so, I would beg leave to remind the reader of what has been before noticed: viz.—With respect to this late company, it must be observed, that they were never bottomed upon a parliamentary constitution; that they were ever in the precarious situation of depending only upon the royal prerogative, without any parliamentary sanction. It is no wonder, therefore, that they could never raise above the capital stock of a hundred thousand pounds; the bulk of which was soon sunk in the purchase, repairs, and erection of forts and castles; and the profits of their trade sunk by the wars we had with the Dutch and the French in Africa; in consequence of which, they had so trifling a stock left wherewith to trade, that it was not possible, under all these disadvantages and discouragements, they should ever make a tolerable progress in this commerce, any way proportionate to the apparent extent it would admit of. Where is the admiration, therefore,

fore, that a company, erected upon so sandy a foundation, should never be able to support it's head, and at length sink ?

As this trade has yet never had a fair trial, by means of a company founded upon parliamentary authority, no man can presume to say, that what has never been tried will miscarry.

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DISSERTATION XXV.

Farther considerations on the African trade, and our East-India company; shewing wherein the latter may prove conducive, by having the trade to Africa annexed to it, as proposed in the preceding dissertation, to enable Great Britain the better to maintain the balance of trade and power against France in Africa, America, and the East-Indies.

FROM what has been already urged, no one can avoid discerning that the commerce of France, as it has been carried on in Africa, with relation to its important connection with the French sugar and other colonies, has proved the essential cause of all the prosperity and dominion of the French in America, and has greatly contributed to render their East-India company so opulent and formidable in Asia.

On the other hand, we have seen, that England having carried on her African trade on principles diametrically opposite to those
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of France, it has, from time to time, greatly injured, and now almost totally ruined that trade as such, and the French maintain the superior dominion on that coast. It has also enhanced the price of negroes to such a degree to our British planters, that it has proved the principal cause of the loss of our sugar trade throughout Europe, and occasioned sugars to come so excessively dear to us for domestic consumption; this has also prevented the breaking up of more land in our island colonies, for the greater cultivation of sugars, by reason of the extravagant price of negro labourers necessary for that purpose. These things have done unspeakable injury to our planters in general, ruined numbers of them, and raised the price, and obstructed the production of all our other American commodities: and these have proved no less disadvantageous to all our West-India traders in general, than to the nation; for if we had prevented these evils by the right management of our African commerce, those traders would have been far greater gainers thereby than they have been, and we should have maintained such a superiority in our African, and consequently in our whole American commerce, as would have hindered the present height of the French power in America, and elsewhere, that we now experience it has rose to.

SINCE, therefore, it may be justly said, that the preservation of our whole commercial interest in America, and therefore, in

a great measure, in Europe also, depends upon the proper regulation of our African trade, I hope I shall be excused if I urge all that appears to me needful to the permanent and prosperous establishment of this so valuable a branch of the British traffic.

HAVING in the foregoing discourse, given my thoughts how I apprehend this commerce may be carried on and extended by the means of such an important joint-stock company as our East-India company at present is, in conjunction with our separate traders; it will be necessary to consider such objections as may be urged against this company; more particularly so, since I have taken the liberty, unrequested, and perhaps unthanked, to suggest the propriety of giving additional powers and immunities to this company; which, in the eye of many, is already looked upon as a detrimental and destructive monopoly; and what I have proposed further in their favour, may give a greater handle for clamour and calumny against them: and, therefore, as I have spontaneously undertaken the cause of this corporation, and to suggest the reasonableness of extending its privileges to the African commerce; I am obliged in justice to endeavour to vindicate this company against what, in the general, has been, and what may, on account of what I have now said in its favour, be urged against them.

PREVIOUSLY to what I shall take the liberty to say in behalf of this trading company, I must desire the reader's favour to recollect the substance of what has been already said throughout the course of these dissertations; for the prevalence of truth has obliged me to maintain a connection, and I hope a consistency, throughout the whole. What I would, upon the present occasion, require the reader chiefly to call to his mind is, how greatly we have suffered in the commerce of Africa, by laying that trade absolutely open, without the existence even of any joint-stock company to uphold our commercial dignity, weight, and influence in this part of the world; while the French, by following the contrary measures, have aggrandized themselves at our expence.—We have laid before the reader likewise that system of wise laws and regulations whereby our great rivals govern their African and American trade in a manner consistent with the prosperity of both.—Whereas we seem to have paid no regard, by our regulations of these trades, to that essential and mutual dependency that subsists between them. We have seen also the difference of the constitution of our several colonies in North-America; and how, in consequence thereof, the security of the whole have been endangered;—whereas the French colonies have all one uniform constitution, and every part co-operates for the general safety and preservation

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tion of the whole.—We have seen also how we have neglected to regulate our Indian affairs, and have thereby lost the alliance and attachment of those people;—whereas, on the contrary, we have seen by what means the French have gained the friendship of those people, and made them subservient to their mischievous machinations against our dominions.—These and many other are the principles of policy, the reader will recollect, that are placed in contrast in this work, to shew wherein the French have outdone us in the cabinet, as if it were an indignity to us to counter-act them in their own way.—But does not every one see the egregious absurdity thereof?

If the French can raise 100 sail of men of war at present, will any one say it is not necessary for us to have more than 100 sail?—May we not with equal wisdom say, that although the French make use of arms and ammunition in combat, that we should rashly fight them unarmed? Every one sees the folly of all this. Well then, if common sense instructs us to put ourselves upon an equality with an enemy in military concerns, why not in commercial ones? We do not say, that we are to follow France in all their points of government: that the judicious reader will discern is going beyond the standard of policy we would come to: no; our free constitution, and our religion will not, without destroying our invaluable rights and liberties,

liberties, admit of any thing unconstitutional: but our constitution will, with all safety, admit of our counter-acting France, or any other power, in our commercial system, by the same policy by which they would supplant or over-reach us.—Are not these principles the basis of all treaties of peace and friendship, and more particularly of those of commerce?

EVERY true friend to his country will desire that the due spirit of liberty may be ever cherished amongst us. I shall ever think it my duty to contribute thereto. But as our fondness for the words liberty and freedom sometimes lead to licentiousness, and even anarchy in government; so may not a too great eagerness for an universal freedom and liberty of trade carry us such lengths, that we may, at length lose all the trade we have? Though peculiar monopolies have certainly proved injurious to trade; yet is it not notorious that we owe all our trade originally to monopolies? In the striking out new and unbeaten tracts of commerce, what private people will hazard their properties therein?

As the primary motive to the grant of monopolies was to cut out, by dint of joint-stocks, new channels of traffic; so the motives to their continuance should be the preservation of such trades only, as we cannot preserve without them. When the French laid their African trade absolutely open to all the subjects of France, have not their royal ordonnances

ordonnances explicitly declared, that not only that trade, but their whole American trade would have been ruined, if they had not taken other measures? And we presume, that we have shewn the reason of the thing speaks loudly for itself. Now, if at the time the French lately commenced the carrying on this commerce by their great extensive India company, England had carried her trade on by a great extensive company too, in conjunction, as has been observed, with an open slave-trade to our separate traders; we may safely affirm that we should have preserved all the sugar and plantation trade we have lost, and prevented the growing power of the French upon the declension of our own. The reason of this has been before amply shewn.

If then we have absolutely lost all our European sugar, and a great part of our other plantation trade, by the dread of a well-regulated monopoly to support, protect, and extend the same in Africa, whereon it depends; if the French have raised their commerce and naval power in general, by the means of a joint-stock company, and have greatly reduced and almost ruined ours by the means of such a company, are we to be frightened by the scarecrow sound of a monopoly out of all our trade, when such means are absolutely necessary for its general protection? As we have lost our sugar and other parts of our plantation

tion trade for want of a powerful company in Africa, who will undertake to insure us that we should not lose the whole commerce of Asia, if we were to annihilate our exclusive East-India company?

If it could be fairly demonstrated that the East-India trade is really a losing trade to this nation, as it is now carried on, we might be indifferent about the existence of our India company. But this has never yet been done to my knowledge; when the circle of this traffic has been impartially taken into consideration. Some, indeed, have insinuated that the whole commerce of the East-Indies is a losing trade to all the European potentates interested therein. Must we not with difficulty credit this? Is it not something extraordinary that all the great states who are engaged in it should be so blind to their advantage? If this be the case, is it not still more to be admired that such a losing and detrimental trade should draw new states into its circle? And that they all too should chuse to carry the same on by joint-stock companies, endowed with exclusive privileges? The presumption certainly is, that all the states engaged therein have found from experience that they are gainers by this trade and all its consequences in the general: and that the several companies, in the general, have been gainers thereby is as little to be doubted. If they were extraordinary losers, it could not be long concealed; and therefore we may

reasonably enough presume, that the credit of their general account of profit and loss exceeds their debit.

BUT if the several companies therein concerned were no extraordinary gainers; yet, if the respective nations wherein they are established experience, upon the whole, that they are gainers, would it not be impolitic to lay them aside? On the contrary, would it not be wisdom to support them?

IF it be needful to maintain a balance of power in Europe, why not in Asia among the European powers established there? Will not the rise or decline of their trade and power in the Indies effect that of their particular states in Europe? Though the companies should be losers, yet does not these trades increase the naval powers of other various European states, and thereby render them more or less respectable in the European balance of power? If so, then it is needful for England to maintain a balance of power in the East-Indies, that contributing to its maintenance in Europe.

BUT who will secure the nation that the balance of trade and power could be upheld by England in Asia, if that trade was laid absolutely open to all the traders of Great Britain? As the French, by laying their African trade absolutely open, experienced how negroes and other commodities were greatly enhanced there; and how their own commodities were depreciated by a general rivalship
among

among the separate trade ; so can we suppose that the French will ever try the like experiment in the East-India commerce ? For would not a general competition amongst their separate traders in Asia have the same effect it has in Africa ? Would they not have reason to dread the ruin of this whole trade, as they had like to have experienced in regard to that of Africa ?

In the encrease of the East-Indies, as well as in all other branches of foreign commerce, we must have an eye to the policy of our neighbours, and more particularly to that of a rival nation. And while all other nations make use of rich and powerful joint-stock companies, and those possessed with such immunities and encouragements given them by their respective nations, does it seem politic in any of the rest to affect singularity in this matter, and carry the trade on in a manner different from all the rest ?

If we should make any change in the manner of carrying on this commerce, while other nations carried the same on by the means of great joint-stock companies with exclusive privileges, all the change that we could with any safety, perhaps, make, would be by a regulated company without a joint-stock ; and this might prove a dangerous experiment, if we may appeal to the touchstone of experience. For, if in Africa, which is at home, in comparison to the distance of the East-Indies, we have not been able to main-
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tain the balance of trade and power, and much less to extend the former there; if in Africa, we have lost all our weight and power among the negroe-chiefs and princes, for want of a powerful joint-stock company to uphold our interest; we have no great reason to expect, that a regulated company without a joint-stock could maintain our share in the balance of trade and power in the East-Indies. Have we not reason, on the contrary to fear too, that the trade would indeed soon prove quite ruinous to this nation, and that the whole of our proportion of that commerce would fall into the hands of our rivals? and if once we lost our settlements and our commercial connections in that part of the world, we should have no share in the ballance of trade or power arising therefrom.

In hereafter it should be judged eligible to make any alteration in our manner of carrying on the East-India trade; it is submitted; whether private traders might not, under certain regulations, be admitted into some certain proportion of this trade, in conjunction with the present joint-stock company, without injuring either the one, or the other, and making both, by acting in concert, become more subservient to the general interest of the nation? If they could be both made to harmonize and play into each other's hands for the common interest, and to give us a more exclusive and beneficial trade there than
we,

we, at present, have, and add more to our weight and influence there, in opposition to foreign competitors: If, we say, the existence of such a company, and private traders too, could be made perfectly compatible, upon fair national principles, it would certainly prove the best way to carry on this commerce.

AND whether it is practicable for a good understanding to be maintained between such a company and private traders, (the experiment being duly tried in our African commerce) would prove a good touchstone afterwards to try something similar thereto in the Asiatic traffic; for the regulation must be well adapted to the peculiar circumstances of both those trades: and although the general principles upon which the regulation shall be made in both trades may be the same; yet there may be some exception, to these general principles in the one case that may not be requisite in the other.

ALTHOUGH the government should be at the expence of supporting and maintaining forts and castles in the Indies, or impose a duty for that purpose, on the exports, or imports, *ad valorem*, &c.; yet, it is to be greatly feared, that such measures would not uphold our weight and influence to such a degree as our rivals do theirs by different conduct. This having proved our case in Africa, we must dread it from that experience.

MOREOVER, such is the nature of traffic, that a mere military force, capable only of supporting forts and garrisons, might, from the peculiarity of the conduct of such uncommercial gentlemen, be more liable to destroy, than cultivate commercial friendships, upon a footing equal with those who constitute a trading interest at the head of their military.

A REGULATED company, duly supported by a British government, might possibly be devised for the temporary support of a general freedom of trade: but, that the nation could permanently preserve such a distant commerce, any thing like what the meanest of our rivals therein do, I have never seen satisfactorily proved; and until I do, I must, from national principles be an advocate for the continuance of our East-India company. Nor do I discern the disadvantages that could arise to these kingdoms, if our East-India company were no less powerful in Asia, than that of the Dutch; which is attended with unspeakable commercial emolument to the **Hollanders.**

It has been frequently said, that our East-India company does not trade to the extent of their charter; but that from an unrestrained liberty of trade, it would be drove to the full extremity; that thereby no part of the Indies would remain untraded to: I am afraid, indeed, that this trade would soon be carried to such an extremity that it would not be
worth

worth carrying on at all, and that many would soon be ruined who engaged in it. But what should induce the company to suffer any beneficial trade to remain uncultivated? It does not proceed from a deficiency of capital, or credit; and why should we apprehend them neglectful of their interest? A company cannot, indeed, trade at so small an expence, and therefore, cannot afford to trade at so small profit as private traders: This is allowed in general: but the previous question is; whether we should long enjoy any share in this trade at all without such a company?

CERTAINLY the exclusive correspondence and high credit of the company in the Indies, enable them to traffic every where within their charter, where they can be gainers; and to do so where they could not, would shew no regard to their proprietors. But private traders will gain where they cannot. Is not this begging the question? When our company dropt the trade, can we suppose that the chasm of trade, which they had left, would not be instantly filled up by the other great trading company? If our traders did pick up a little paultry trade, by their strolling coasting; or, if the Indians brought trade down to the national forts and castles, whither our traders should resort, would not this general competition amongst them raise the price of India commodities, and depreciate that of our European? Has not the experience of the African trade proved the

truth of this beyond doubt? But the African traders, since that commerce has been laid open, have been greatly enriched, and why might not the private East-India traders? This does not follow. The case is not parallel in it's essentials. If the African traders lose by their direct trade to Africa, they gain by the West-India trade, and the re-exportation of West-India commodities: But has it not been shown, that although our African traders have become enriched, it has been at the expence of our planters; at the expence of the loss of our whole European sugar, and other parts of our plantation trade? &c.

IF I am rightly informed, the point, in regard to the India trade lies here. Such branches of that trade, by which the company cannot gain, or are not so gainful as others they prefer, are carried on by private British merchants, trading under the company's licence. It is allowed there is a wide difference between granting licences to carry on a coasting trade in India, and a free liberty to carry on the trade from Europe to India: but these free merchants, who obtain the company's licence, and traffic only in such of our commodities as the company export, amply supply most places with our goods where there is any tolerable profit to be got. But, it is said, private traders would supply them cheaper than licenced merchants do at second hand. This is to be proved. I doubt it: private traders, perhaps, could not buy so cheap

cheap at home as the company does: nor could private traders sell to such advantage as licenced merchants do under the company's sanction, and protection; for their general rivalship would induce the Indians to treat them as they pleased.

It is of the last consequence to a nation that carries on a trade to the Indies, to have, from time to time, a distinct account of its state and condition. But how could this be done by separate traders, who in such distant countries are presumed to have no inland correspondence with the Indian artist and manufacturers, &c.—Should it be said, that we might have British factories there, as in Spain, and Portugal. We might so; and what what would the consequence be? If the goods were left in such distant countries to be sold; our traders might leave millions of money there, perhaps, to be annihilated. But if factors make their returns by barter from voyage to voyage, will not their commission greatly diminish the profits of the trade? Besides, must there not be the expence of supercargoes likewise?

WHOEVER considers how merchandises are to be distributed in India, and affairs in general conducted there; what a connection and dependency there is between the commerce of the several countries included within the company's charter, will easily discern, that if the whole trade was in the hands of a dis-

jointed body of traders, and not under the direction of a company thoroughly experienced herein, it would certainly be difficult, if not impossible to carry the same on to advantage.

PROVIDED the forts and settlements were lodged in the crown, and the management of the trade only in the hands of a regulated company, it could not but be attended with great inconveniencies, as experience shewed, in Charles II. time, when Bombay came to the crown by his marriage with the Infanta of Portugal; and, therefore, both that island, and the island of St. Helena, have been granted the company for the sake of public conveniency.

FROM the disorder of the company's affairs in that reign, as well as in that of king James, we may discover that it is greatly detrimental to this commerce, that the company should be under the power of the crown, to stand indebted to that for all encouragement, and to have no other resource in case of grievance; for, does not this, on the one hand, render the trade precarious, and on the other hand, interest a great body of people in support of the prerogative, a consequence injurious to the constitution.

HAS not experience effectually shewn the mischiefs which flowed from the subsistence of two East-India companies at the same time? Were they not convinced that nothing but their union of interests could afford a
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proper remedy? If this trade was laid open, would not this, as it were, multiply companies, all acting upon separate interests? would not this create eternal clashing of interests, and give the powerful united companies of other nations opportunity to destroy them all? Some have been so sanguine as to conceive, that by our laying this trade open, we should be able to ruin all the established companies in Asia. Let such remember the viper and the file.

UPON supposition that private traders could make it appear, that they could vend much larger quantities of our commodities in India than the company do, and that without importing larger quantities of India commodities: and supposing that proportion of India commerce neglected by the company, can be proposed to be carried on by private traders to the interest of the nation, and not detrimental to the company, why do not private traders apply to parliament with such proposition? And pray leave to carry on such neglected trade under the sanction of the company, on making them reasonable allowance for such licence?

IF on examination it should be found practicable for the company to open a direct trade, as has been suggested, in order to take off a greater quantity of our commodities, either by the Cape of Good Hope, or by the freights of Magellan, or with other parts of the Southern continent, it is right to recommend these things to the company.—And, if

found unexceptionably practicable, and profitable by competent and impartial judges, how can we suppose that the company would neglect such advantages? But, if the company, from private views, incompatible with those of the public, refused thus to exert themselves in their own, and the public interest; upon fair proof hereof made in the face of the legislature; and becoming application to the same on the part of the petitioners, I make no doubt but the parliament would indulge them to undertake these trades that the company should reject. For this, and all other companies are but so many corporations endowed with powers in trust for the public, to whom they are always accountable; and by whom they are always liable to be over-ruled, and controuled, when they act repugnant to those reasons of state whereon their charters are founded.

THE objections that have been judged by some to have been of the most weight against this company are as follow; The first is grounded on the exportation of bullion, which is stated thus: the common measure of all things in a commercial way, is silver, and consequently the great criterion of the wealth of the nation, is her extracting this common measure from other nations, by virtue of bringing the balance of trade in our favour; but the East-India trade is carried on by exporting this real, this intrinsic wealth, as it is called by some, and which never returns,

turns, but is employed in the importation of India commodities, that are not necessary, but only mere instruments of luxury.

BEFORE we proceed to answer this objection, it may be requisite to observe previously, that the necessaries of life are produced in every country, at least in every habitable country: and it is to what some call luxury, that all trade whatever is owing: so that if nations are to deal in nothing but their own productions, here seems to be an end to all commercial intercourse between foreign states: if we admit this principle, we should not only drink sage instead of green tea, but make use of honey instead of sugar, and water or beer at all times instead of wine; we should, in short, endeavour only to cultivate and improve the produce of our own country, subsist upon it, and leave all the rest of the world to shift for itself.

How consistent a maxim this would be, for people who inhabit an island, and how reasonable it is for those who derive most of the blessings we enjoy from trade and maritime power, to argue in this manner, we leave the reader to judge. But, if we set this objection so far aside, as to allow that commerce between nations giving bread to myriads of the human species, and make the country wherein the same flourishes rich, happy, and powerful, the particular trade of the East-India company becomes as defensible

sible as any other; for if such exportation of bullion does not injure the nation, then there is no weight in the objection: that it does not under the circumstances of the present company, we have great reason to believe. For,

WHEN the first charter was granted them, lest this should prove an evil, it was properly guarded against by a proviso, that the company should be obliged to bring in as large a quantity of bullion as they carried out, in the interval between the voyages, made at the risque of the company. Nor has it ever been made demonstrably appear, that the silver this company has carried out, has tended to the impoverishment of the kingdom; for if all that silver that has been in this kingdom remained in circulation; if we had neither exported any, nor had any converted into wrought plate, would not the price of all commodities have been considerably raised, especially when added to that quantity of paper circulation that of late years has existed amongst us?

BUT, instead of impoverishing the nation, as this commerce has encreased, it should seem to have encreased the wealth of the nation in general, by bringing in, on the one hand, large quantities of silver for our Indian merchandizes re-exported, and detaining here, on the other, those sums of money which must otherwise have been exported for foreign produce and manufactures; which would have been
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worn here, if we had not long been better and cheaper supplied from India.

IT has been formerly objected, that the wearing of India-piece-goods prejudiced our own woollen manufactures ; but this has, in a great measure, been cured by the laws passed for that purpose. It may not, however, be amiss to observe, that those manufactures are chiefly to be encouraged, which contribute to exportation ; since it is certain, that the cheaper people can be cloathed here, let that cloathing come from where it will, the cheaper they can afford to work upon their own manufactures ; and it is the general cheapness of labour and of our native commodities, that is the essential point to be studied in a trading nation ; for if we can underwork other countries, we shall infallibly undermine their trade, and extend our own ; for though private people may be enriched by our home consumption, yet the public may be no gainer thereby ; which consideration will enable the intelligent to discern how clamours may be raised against such trades as are highly beneficial : and this, from confounding the interest of private men, or great bodies, with that of the public. If the India trade, therefore, has in its consequences been instrumental, upon the whole, to bring in a greater balance of money than it has carried out, it has proved nationally gainful, and therefore should be supported.

MONEY

MONEY, as a medium, is necessary to the carrying on trade ; for where that fails, the commercial negotiations stagnate ; for credit, which supplies that defect, is the expectation or assurance of money, when demanded.—Nevertheless it is a mistake, perhaps, though a common one, to think that money is the cause of a good or bad trade ; since it is not money that so much influences trade, as it is trade that discovers the money ; which is the medium whereby trade is the more conveniently managed, but not the source from whence it arises : thus, when the trade is quick and brisk, then money, the medium, comes more into view than when it is otherwise ; and then, by changing hands oftener, an hundred pounds makes as great an appearance in commerce as a much larger sum.

No private trader, or company, sends money or bullion into other countries, but with a view to gain the more by it. It was a maxim of the wise prince Ferdinand the first, great duke of Tuscany, who raised the commerce of his subjects to an incredible height, to lend them money, and permit them to send the same out of his dominions in the way of traffic. Mr. Mun, a very skilful and eminent English merchant, tells us, that he himself experienced the duke's liberality upon the like occasion, who lent him 40,000 crowns gratis, although he knew that he should send the whole away in specie

specie to Turkey, to purchase merchandizes; the duke being well assured, says he, that, in the course of that trade, the same would return again, according to the Italian proverb, with a duck in the mouth. This judicious gentleman further informs us, that, by this policy, the duke encouraged trade to such a degree, that, of his own knowledge, Leghorn, which was only a poor little mean town, became a great and opulent city; being in his time become the most famous place of commerce in all Christendom.

THERE has not been any point of trade more generally misunderstood, perhaps, than what relates to gold and silver, or bullion, which some would have not to be reckoned a commodity, or merchandize; and therefore not permitted to go out, when once brought into the kingdom. But those who seem to have judged the best of the matter, have been of a different sentiment, and contended for its free exportation no less than its importation.

THOSE nations that bring in gold or silver by means of their exports of variety of merchandize, are upon an equal footing with those countries that have mines in their possession, and barter their gold and silver for commodities; and, in such trading states, that have no gold or silver mines, gold and silver become a species of merchandize, as well as any other; a merchandize that may be turned in trade with advantage, and therefore

fore more valuable in such a country, than where they were first dug from the mines. Industry, and skill to improve trade, and the apt situation of a country for it, afford more real treasure to a people than even the possession of gold and silver mines: nor can any quantity thereof, that may be dug out of the mines, bear a proportion with what may be made to arise from the whole labour of a trading, industrious, and populous nation. For the national stock, though small at first, is by such means, ever increasing, and that increase still accumulating more and more; so that the augmentation arising from such accumulating increase, and the gold and silver gained from other nations in trade for commodities, makes a perpetual addition; which being permanent, such nation has no bounds to its wealth; while other countries that possess mines, and rely on their produce, generally work them chiefly for the industrious of other countries, and may become beggars, notwithstanding their first property of all the gold and silver in the world.

THE first prohibition in Spain against exporting gold and silver, was an early obstruction to their commercial industry, and rendered that treasure in a great measure useless to the bulk of the people. But if, on the contrary, gold and silver had been allowed commodities, it would of course have put them upon methods of turning them to more advantage: whereas, while their hands have been

been bound up by their own laws, the gold and silver brought from thence have been the tools wherewith other nations have wrought, and gained their riches. Had not this mistaken policy diverted their thoughts from an *active* commerce, they would certainly have been, at this day, a different nation to what they are. At present, indeed, they seem to be sensible of their *faux pas*, and *England*, as well as other countries, is likely soon to experience the effects of a different policy, unless the former in particular takes wise measures to prevent it, before it is too late.

SHOULD it be objected to this reasoning, that as we have a great trade for our product and manufactures, and thereby bring in a general balance of gold and silver, besides other returns in commodities for our expence; we ought only to carry out commodities in trade, and let the gold and silver remain among ourselves, and by our laws prevent the exportation thereof; which is carrying out that treasure again which comes to us by the balance of our trade.

To this it has been answered, that gold and silver are no otherwise of intrinsic value in themselves than as they are a *settled* and *constant measure*, whereby to value commodities of all kinds; which seems manifest from hence, that in such countries, as in *Africa*, &c. where they are not the *settled* and *constant measure for commodities*, they are of no more use than any other trafficable
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commodity; and as particular species of merchandizes in demand throughout the world, are to be had some at one place, and some at another; so gold and silver are commodities wherein most nations agree that the difference in the barter of all other commodities is answered and made up, and thereby of general use almost every where; which being thus subservient to trade, it is highly injurious, nay, it is its very destruction, to take it from that use: but as to the imagination of retaining the same in the nation, without circulating out of it, this must be a national loss; for that is keeping such a dead stock to that value, which affords no manner of increase, and is of no more use, while it so continues, to the increase of the public capital (however shifted in private hands) than the like value of statues, paintings, buildings, &c.: the use of it among us serves to no other end than the convenient transacting of payments with one another, in our domestic negotiations; and, when that end is answered, the plenty of gold and silver will be rather a national loss (besides its lying dead) as it will naturally enhance the price of our own merchandizes to ourselves, and thereby lessen the demand for them by foreign nations; and consequently, in time, ruin the trade, and impoverish the people, by enabling them to pursue only a *passive*, instead of an *active* general commerce, as has been hitherto the case of countries

tries that have depended on their mines, and the mistaken policy of not esteeming gold and silver commodities.

BUT should it be granted convenient for us to keep within ourselves all the bullion we can acquire, yet long experience has shewn the impracticability of keeping it by any laws; that could only be effectuated by the good management and regulation of our trade. Though the Spaniards make the exportation thereof death, nevertheless, in the way of trade, it is exported at noon-day; the balance they pay for the manufactures of other countries, necessarily carries away their money, notwithstanding the rigour and severity of all their penal laws to prevent it*. It is, therefore, taking due care that the exportation of our native commodities shall always over-balance the importation of foreign commodities, which must keep our money at home, and that only can do it. For if, upon the balance of the exports and imports of our other commodities, we are gainers, and thereby payments are made to us in gold and silver, by other countries (for the balance can be paid us in nothing else at last) that gold and silver being suffered to be made a commodity to fetch goods from some other countries, whence we cannot

* This, also, shews the mistaken policy of the *Portuguese*, in regard to the treatment our merchants lately received at *Lisbon*.

have them for any thing else, the re-exportation thereof to other countries would become a beneficial article in our commerce, and return a great balance in its own kind, (our trade otherwise, in products and manufactures, still over-balancing as before) and would add greatly to the national stock; and, without such a freedom in trade, a superfluous plenty of bullion, or money, would be rather injurious than otherwise.

If, by the wise regulation of our trade with foreign nations, the balance is on our side, and we are gainers by sending out our money to purchase such goods, that may be sold again to other countries, we must, by such an encrease of treasure as this will give us, always be masters of the exchange all over the world; which is such an advantage in trade with any nation, that although it may only be a trifle in our favour, it has a national tendency arising from itself, to augment that balance still more and more to our emolument.

FROM what has been said, it seems pretty evident, that gold, and silver, or bullion, in any shape, ought to be reckoned a commodity, and is to be made use of to advantage in trade, as well as other commodities are; and therefore ought to have a free exportation, as conducive to the increase of the capital stock of the kingdom. It must, however, be allowed in the general, that, if we carry on such a trade as importing consum-
able

able commodities to be spent among us, more than our own commodities will answer in the balance, which thereby must be paid in gold and silver, this will certainly be to our detriment, by draining us, without any returns, to such an excess of our bullion and our specie, that we shall not have a competent quantity wherewith to circulate our trade, and be attended with a decay in our manufactures: but, if this should be our case, it is not to be remedied by any laws against the exportation of our gold and silver, but by the due regulation of our trade, by retrenching our consumption of foreign merchandizes; by establishing new trades, new arts and manufactures in the nation: in a word, by purchasing less merchandizes of other countries, and selling more of our own; for the exportation of our gold and silver could not be the cause of such our loss, but the effect of such our ill-managed commerce.

THERE would be little difficulty still further to corroborate this reasoning with a train of weighty arguments, and to confirm the same from the concurring sentiments of the ablest statesmen; but I think there is little occasion.

HOWEVER, since we have great reason to believe, that neither the constitution of our East-India company, nor the manner of carrying on that traffic from the first to the last, are or can be so detrimental to the nation

tion as some have been wont to think; we ought to consider how, and by what means this company may be constitutionally improved; and especially so, if it is not so well adapted to the national interests as could be wished.—But till we had endeavoured to remove the ordinary prejudices that may have been conceived against this company, I judged it would be to little purpose to attempt to suggest a word in regard to the encrease of its powers and privileges with relation to our African commerce.

WE have seen the necessity of supporting and carrying on our African trade in a manner different from what we have ever hitherto done; and we know that no measures can extend the inland commerce into the heart and center of Africa but a great trading company: and the East-India company being greatly experienced in commerce, and their present trade having a connection with that of Africa, they seem a company the most suitably adapted for this great purpose.—And if they should be endowed with the exclusive privilege of the inland African commerce, may they not hereby be made instrumental to bring both silver and gold in great quantities into the kingdom, by means of extending the inland African commerce? For the most authentic writers inform us, that there are silver as well as gold mines in those parts. And why not diamond ones also?

also? And what great variety of other articles of traffic this part of the world might produce, no one can say: but this we can say, with truth, that as yet we know very little of what great things this commerce will admit.

ITS situation for commerce is certainly beyond either of the other quarters of the world. It stands, as it were, in the center between the other three, and has thereby a much nearer communication with Europe, Asia, and America, than any other quarter has with the rest. For, 1. It is opposite to Europe in the Mediterranean, for almost 1000 miles in a line east and west, from beyond Tripoli to cape Spartel at the Streight's mouth; the distance seldom 100 miles, no where 100 leagues, and often not 20 leagues. 2. It is opposite to Asia for all the length of the Red-Sea north and south; the distance sometimes being not above 5 leagues, seldom 50; and it fronts all the southern coast of Asia, viz. the coast of Cilicia; and that of India, though at a greater distance, yet much nearer than any other country. It is wonderfully accommodated for commerce, by the interposition of islands from Madagascar to Malabar; and more particularly by means of the alternate trade-winds, which render the navigation safe, easy, and constant. 3. It also lies opposite to America, or about the distance of 500 to 700 leagues, including the islands, for a coast of above 2000 miles:

whereas America no where joins Europe, except where it may be a terra incognita, under a distance of 1000 leagues, and not Asia under that of 2500.

It is furnished with the greatest and most convenient navigable rivers, and, perhaps, with as many of them as any other of the chief parts of the world: such are the Nile and Nubia on the north shore, running into the Mediterranean-sea; the Niger, or Rio Grand, running into the Atlantic ocean, on the west-side of Africa; the Congo, the Zairi, and the Loango, three rivers of prodigious extent, south of the line, which enter themselves into the Ethiopic ocean on the same west-side, but beyond the Gold-coast: also the Natal, the Prio St. Esprit, the Melinda, and the Mozambo, all rivers of a very great length and breadth, which enter themselves into the Indian ocean to the east-side of Africa.

THESE are all rivers of the first magnitude; besides which, there are innumerable others, which, though not equal to the former, are yet very noble streams, fitted for navigation and commerce, and which, by their long courses, penetrate far inland: and was this country blessed with a people qualified for trade and business, they might become the medium of an endless commercial correspondence.

THE country is populous beyond credibility, the soil fruitful, the season, for the greatest
part

part, mild and clement, and the air salubrious: and, if once a turn for industry and the arts was introduced among them, a greater quantity of the European produce and manufactures might be exported thither, than to any other country in the whole world. And, as the natives in general stand in great need of European commodities, so they have the most valuable returns to make for them. This the Europeans experience, from the share of traffic they carry on with them at present.

To what a great degree this country abounds in gold, we have not only the testimony of the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the French, as well as English, who have settlements on the coast of Africa, but the vouchers of the most authentic historians.

THERE is no country in the world, says the historian Leo Africanus, richer in gold and silver than the kingdoms in Africa; as those of Mandingo, Ethiopia, Congo, Angola, Butua, Quiticui, Monomotopa, Cafati, and Mehenemugi. By means of settlements of strength on the continent of Africa, adds he, the Europeans might, by the exchange of their commodities, draw into their hands all the gold of those countries. And here is a prodigious number of elephants, which would not only facilitate the inland intercourses of commerce, but also afford a very beneficial branch of traffic, in the teeth of these notable animals. In the same historian are

numberless passages relating to those rich mines, and shewing how easy it would be for the Europeans to carry on a very extensive traffic with that part of the globe.

THIS account of the great treasures of Africa is confirmed likewise by the *Nubian geographer*, who somewhere, says, that the king of Guinea, the greatest city in all the countries of Negroland, has a mass of gold of 30 pounds weight, as it was naturally produced in the mines; which is completely pure, tough, and malleable, without having been smelted by the ordinary arts of refining that metal from its native ore. Father Labat, a modern French author, has descended to a very minute specification of great variety of rich mines, which he says are very shamefully worked by the Negroes, by reason of their being totally ignorant of the nature of mining: nor have they ever yet come to the main vein of any of their mines.

THE copper is the next valuable ore found in this part of the world. The quantity of this metal is not fully searched into, though there is great reason to believe it is exceeding great: so great, that it is commonly said amongst them, that the mountains, which we call Atlas, are all copper. Thus much, however, is certain, that the quantity is extraordinary great, that is discovered in several countries distant and remote from each other; as in Fez, Tunis, Abyssinia, or Ethiopia; and

and it is allowed to be the finest copper in the whole world.

ON the northern coasts they have such plenty of corn, that their fields, though but very meanly cultivated for want of a knowledge in agriculture, yield them an hundred-fold encrease. Gums, ivory, wax, civet, ostrich-feathers, are in such quantities, that any expence of them can scarce ever be missed.

AND, in these warm climates, the country, besides what nature has of herself disseminated, is, and must be, capable of improvement, in all the nicest and most estimable productions, which the well-cultivated world supplies us with, from other places in the same latitude.

It cannot be doubted, but the fruitful rich lands, every-where to be found upon the coasts, and within the country, upon the banks of the rivers near the gold-coast, and the slave-coast, would produce all the richest articles of the East- and West-India commerce. Doubtless the spices of Banda, Ternate, and Amboyna, might be produced on the rich and fruitful shores of Melinda, on the east side, or, of the slave-coast on the west-side, of Africa ; and that as easily, and to as great advantage, as where they are now produced ; the latitude being the same, and the soil not unlike.

THE cinnamon of Ceylon, the tea of China and Japan, and the coffee of Mocha
would

would all there be produced, on the same coast, from the Rio de St. Esprit, and southward to the river Natale ; a temperate, fertile, healthy, and manageable soil.

UPON the foundation of these facts, nothing seems wanting to render Africa equal by nature, if not in many respects superior, to any of the three parts of the world. For although the middle of it, lying between the tropics in the torrid zone, and under the line, is exceeding hot ; yet even in the hottest part it is habitable, and inhabited ; and the people who dwell in these extreme hot climates, do abound in plenty, have cattle, corn, cooling-fruits, shades, rivers, &c. and live very agreeably and healthy ; as in the island of St. Thomas, under the very line, also on the gold-coast, and in the kingdom of Benin, and Angola on the west shore ; and in Ethiopia, Melinda, the coast of Zanguebar, and several of the more intemperate places on the eastern shore.

BUT, making allowance for some of the inland countries remote from the sea, which we are told are without water, and therefore desert, yet they are not equal to the uninhabited wastes either of Europe, Asia, or America. Notwithstanding this, Africa, in one respect, has greater advantage than the other parts of the world, for it feels no cold, the most northerly latitude being about 37, and the most southerly about 35 degrees, so that
infinitely

infinitely the larger part enjoys the finest and most temperate climate.

It is melancholy to observe that a country, which has near 10,000 miles sea-coast, and noble, large, deep rivers, should yet have no navigation; streams penetrating into the very center of the country, but of no benefit to it; innumerable people; without knowledge of each other, correspondence, or commerce.

At the entrance of these rivers into the sea are the most excellent harbours, prodigious in number, deep, safe, and calm, covered from the wind, and capable of being made secure by fortifications; but no shipping, no trade, no merchants, even where there is plenty of merchandises. In short, Africa, though a full quarter of the globe, stored with an inexhaustible treasure, and capable, under proper improvements, of producing so many things delightful, as well as convenient within itself, seems utterly neglected by those who are civilized themselves, and it's own inhabitants quite unfollicitous of reaping the benefits which nature has provided for them. What it affords in it's present rude, unimproved state, is solely given up to the gain of others, as if not the people only were to be sold for slaves to their fellow-creatures, but the whole country was captive, and produced it's treasures, merely for the use and benefit of the rest of the world, and not at all for their own.

WHE-

WHETHER, instead of making slaves of these people, it would not rather become such nations that assume to themselves the name and character of Christians, to give them a relish for the blessings of life, by extending traffic into their country in the largest degree it will admit of, and introducing among them the more civilized arts and customs, may be submitted to consideration.

THE Dutch, by recommending their dress, and introducing their customs among the natives, have prodigiously improved the commerce of the spice islands, and wonderfully humanized the inhabitants, who were as savage in their manners as the negroes.

BUT it is to be feared that, while the slaving trade with these people continues to be the great object of the Europeans, it will ever spirit up wars and hostilities among the negro-princes and chiefs, for the sake of making captives of each other for sale. This, therefore, will ever obstruct the civilizing of these people, and extending of the trade into the bowels of Africa, which, by the contrary means, might be easily practicable.

THE obtaining a competent number of servants to work, as the negroes at present do, in the colonies belonging to the several European potentates, who have settlements in America, does not seem at all impracticable. Europe in general affords numberless poor and distressed objects for that purpose; and, if these were not over-worked, as the
negroes

negroes particularly are in Martinico, and in other the French colonies, the Europeans would make as good servants for the American planters as the blacks do: and, if also all the Europeans were upon a level in regard to the price of labour in their colonies, we cannot but think they would all find their account in laying absolutely aside the slave-trade, and cultivating a fair, friendly, humane, and civilized commerce with the Africans.

TILL this is done, it does not seem possible that the inland trade of this country should ever be extended to the degree it is capable of; for, while the spirit of butchery and making slaves of each other is promoted by the Europeans among these people, they will never be able, perhaps, to travel with safety into the heart of Africa, or to cement such commercial friendships and alliances with them as will effectually introduce our arts and manufactures amongst them.

WE must, however, at present, take the state of the trade as it stands, and men as they now are: these hints may possibly some time or other rouse some noble and benevolent Christian spirit to think of changing the whole system of the African trade, which, as things are now circumstanced, may not be so easily brought about.

THIS trade, in it's present state, is of as great advantage as any we carry on, and is, as it were, all profit, the first cost being some things of our own manufactures, and others generally

generally purchased with them, for which we have, in return, gold, teeth, wax, and negroes; the last whereof is a very beneficial traffic to the kingdom, as it occasionally gives so prodigious an employment to our people both by sea and land. These are the hands whereby our plantations are at present improved; and it is by their labours that such quantities of sugar, tobacco, cotton, ginger, fustic, and indigo are raised, which employ a great quantity of shipping for transporting them hither; and the greater number of ships employs the greater number of handicraft trades at home, spends more of our produce and manufactures, and breeds more sailors, who are maintained by a separate employment; for, if every one raised the provisions he eat, or made the manufactures he wore, traffic would cease; which is promoted by a variety of employments men have engaged in, which constitutes a mutual dependence, without invading each other's province. Thus the husbandman raises corn, the miller grinds it, the baker makes it into bread, and the citizen eats it; thus the grazier fats cattle, and the butcher kills them for the market: thus the shepherd sheers his sheep, the spinister turns the wool into yarn, the weaver makes it into cloth, and the merchant exports it; and every one lives by each other: thus the country supplies the city with provisions, and that the country with necessities.

ON the whole, the African trade, both for exports and imports, and also as it supplies our British plantations with labourers, and advances navigation, is certainly very beneficial to this kingdom: but that the laying this trade absolutely open, while our rivals carry the same on, by the means of great trading companies with joint-stocks, will prove the most effectual means to promote our share therein, is greatly to be doubted.

CERTAIN it is, that this way of carrying the trade on can never tend to it's advancement into the interior parts of Africa. And why should we not attempt this? Will not whatever encrease we make herein prove a new acquisition of trade to the kingdom? And if our private traders cannot accomplish this, why should we not establish a rich and powerful company that can? What motive can private traders have to deny, or envy that trade to a company, which they can never obtain themselves? But, if once this inland trade shall be thoroughly settled, and the nation shall think fit to lay the same again open to all his Majesty's subjects, then our private traders will be gainers, by virtue of the foundation which such company shall have laid, Was not the foundation of all our present trade laid, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, by joint-stock companies with exclusive privileges? Why should not the same reason rule now for the propagation of any new trades that will not be undertaken by private traders, because

because of the hazard that attends it? Why then should not the East-India company have annexed to it the exclusive privilege in all the inland trade of Africa, if they should think proper to accept of it? Would not a measure of this kind, uphold our balance of trade and power in Africa, in a manner equivalent to the weight of the great French India company? And whatever tended to add to the wealth and the power of our India company in Africa, would not this spread it's happy effects into Asia, and enable the company the better to maintain our national balance of trade and power in India, also in opposition to our formidable rivals? And our American trade greatly depending upon our African; by these means it should seem that this our India company might be capable of sustaining our commercial weight and dignity in America, Asia, and Africa, as does the French East-India company; and by their timely watching, and timely checking for the future, all insults and encroachment in those trades under their peculiar care, might they not become greatly instrumental to the prevention of future wars, and thereby save an immense expence to the nation? Or, if it should be judged, that such an additional power would be too much to be given to the East-India company, why should not a new company be established to carry on the inland commerce of Africa to the utmost extent it will admit of? But for the reasons before given
our

our East-India company being well experienced in commerce; and the India trade being connected with that of Africa, they would be reciprocally beneficial: and, if our India company brought us silver as well as gold from Africa, this would help their India commerce, and take off that odium under which they labour for exporting our silver in the present way of their traffic.

Vol. II.

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D I S-



DISSERTATION XXVI.

The encrease of the naval power of France and Spain by means of their fisheries, and of the necessity of England's balancing that degree of naval power, by the carrying of her fisheries to the full extent they will admit of.

IN queen Anne's wars, when the French king was importuned by his people to admit the Dutch and English fishing boats into Dieppe, Dunkirk, St. Vallery, and other ports, with their herrings, the king answered, NO! BY NO MEANS; IF MY PEOPLE WILL HAVE HERRINGS, WHY DO THEY NOT CATCH THEM, AS THE ENGLISH AND DUTCH DO? Upon which, the merchants of those parts immediately fitted out vessels, and took herrings sufficient for all the country.

FROM this time the French have taken every measure to improve their fisheries; in which capital article of commerce, they have been encreasing ever since the treaty of Utrecht, and have become our most dangerous
rivals

rivals herein. The French have a considerable whale-fishery, and the French fishermen of St. John de Luze, Bayonne, and other ports in that part of the bay of Biscay, are become the most expert harpooners in the world, without excepting the Dutch, and the Hamburgers.

BUT the French have not only encreased in the whale-fishery, but, which is of far more consequence to Great-Britain, they have exceedingly encreased their fishery to Newfoundland, as well on the coast as on the great bank. The consequence of this encrease of their fishery we have, to our sorrow, too sensibly felt. Nor do they fish only on the great bank of Newfoundland for such fish which are cured without drying, as the Dutch do in their white herring fishery in the open sea, but have had the address to obtain that the island of Cape Breton should be yielded up to them, to fortify, and do what they please with; where there may, and doubtless will, make a second Dunkirk, as I have observed upon another occasion, and where they may carry on their dry fishery, as well as at Placentia. But, as if this was not privilege enough for them, they have obtained that, in the fishing-season, they may resort to the very island of Newfoundland itself, and erect stages, &c, to cure and dry their fish at *.

* Ought not this to be guarded against in making a peace with France?

BUT this is not all; the world is well amended with the French since the time that they paid a tribute for the liberty of curing and drying fish at Newfoundland, which was granted them by king Charles I. in the 10th year of his reign. At this time the French are not only exempt from tribute, but, by their neighbourhood at Cape Breton, will oblige us to keep large garrisons as well at Nova Scotia, as Newfoundland, if we will prevent our being surprized; where at Newfoundland they have the liberty of the fishing season equally with us, from Cape Bonavista northward to the northern point of the said island, &c. by which situation they are also become our rivals in another branch of our fishery; that of salmon: for, at the harbour of Bonavista, which is to the northward of the Cape, and therefore within their limits, is an extraordinary good fishery of salmon.

HAD the late king William granted the Dutch any one of the islands of the Orkneys, in propriety to fortify, or a liberty of resorting to, or erecting drying-houses necessary to cure red herrings in any such island, or in England, or Scotland, it would have been remembered, with good reason, a thousand and a thousand times over. But the French have had the cunning to procure for their fishery such liberties and privileges as can scarcely be consistent with our safety, or interest; and, therefore, the world may be left to judge who are our GREATEST and MOST

DAN-

DANGEROUS rivals in the FISHERY. They are now become so much our rivals in this trade, and are encreased to such a prodigious degree, that they employ yearly above 500 sail of shipping from St. Malo, Granville, Rochelle, St. Martins, Isle of Rea, Bayonne, St. Jean de Luze, Sibour, &c. to carry on their fisheries on the great bank of Newfoundland, and on the coast of that island; that is, in their wet and dry fish: nor do they now only supply themselves with the fish they formerly had from us, but furnish many parts of Spain and Italy therewith, to our prodigious loss.

THEY have the properest salt of their own, which renders their voyages much shorter than ours; for, we have been obliged to go from hence to Rochelle, Olleron, St. Martin, &c. to fetch that commodity, which they have at their own doors; and thereby we have most frequently spent a month or six weeks more in our voyage than they do.

THE French are so sensible of the prodigious advantage of this fishery, and so very intent upon pursuing it, that, from their first attempts to make themselves considerable at sea, they have had it perpetually in view.— They first obtained leave to fish at Newfoundland, upon paying a duty of 5 per cent. afterwards they got that acknowledgment relinquished: but, at the treaty of Utrecht, they went far greater lengths; for thereby

they procured a cession to be made to them of Cape Breton, a maiden fishery, that had scarce ever been touched; whereas Newfoundland was greatly exhausted, and also several islands in the gulph of St. Lawrence. Not content with that, they further obtained a liberty of curing and drying their fish, setting up stages, and resorting to our island of Newfoundland, during all the time that it is of any use to resort thither; which is during the fishing-season.

THEY, indeed, delivered up to us the possession of Placentia, and some other places in Newfoundland; but then they took care to have a much better place for their fishery yielded to them, in lieu thereof; with this extraordinary favour to them, more than to us, that they have the liberty granted them to frequent our island of Newfoundland, and erect stages, &c. thereon, for curing and drying their fish; but we have not the privilege allowed us of doing the same on any of their islands, or on the island of Cape Breton, while they have express permission granted them to fortify as they please.

THUS the French are become our rivals in the FISHERY by our own consent; which is the more wonderful, in that it is owing to this fishery, that they dared to contend for the mastery at sea with the maritime strength of England and Holland united.

IT is true, the English and Dutch are most frequently called the maritime powers; but
we

we think it a jest, at this time of day, to appropriate the name of maritime powers to Great Britain and Holland, exclusive of France, when we consider what a figure that nation made at sea before the battle of La Hogue in 1692, and what a figure they are able to make at present from the daily encrease of their marine, since the late treaty of Aix la Chapelle.

THE history both of France and England will shew us, that since the former procured leave to fish at Newfoundland, and their settlement and fishery at Cape Breton, they have grown very formidable at sea, and that their royal navy has augmented in proportion to the number of ships employed in these fisheries.—What have we not to expect then, since they have obtained a right to a better place for their fishery, in the opinion, even of the French themselves, as the reader will soon see by the inclosed letter, written by a minister of state in France, to the duke de Gramond at Bayonne? The occasion of it was, that the people of St. Jean de Luze and Sibour (two places in the county of Sibour) being under apprehensions that their fishery at Newfoundland was to be delivered up wholly to Great Britain, the duke wrote a letter to Paris to be rightly informed, and received the following answer,

Copy of a letter written by Monsieur de Pontchartrain, to Mons^r. the duke de Gramond, from Fontaineblau, 19 September, 1713.

“ I have received, Sir, the letter you did me the honour to write me the third of this month, with two letters that were directed to you by the inhabitants of St. Jean de Luze and Sibour, upon the subject of their fishery of dry fish. From the account I have given the king of their demand, his majesty directed me to write, by his order, to Mons^r. the duke d'Aumont, his ambassador extraordinary at London, to ask of the queen of Great Britain a permission for them to go the next year to Placentia, and the liberty to continue their fishing in ALL the ports and harbours upon the coast of Newfoundland. I shall do myself the honour to acquaint you with Mons^r. the duke d'Aumont's answer.

I agree with you, Sir, that the country of La Bour will suffer much, should they be deprived of their liberty of carrying on their fishery of dry fish; and you will be persuaded of the attention I have to procure to the merchants that drive this commerce, the means to continue them in it, when I have informed you, that the king sent from Rochford, in the month of May last, one frigate, to go and lay the first foundation of an establishment in the island of CAPE BRETON, where
fish

fish is MUCH MORE ABUNDANT than at the island of Newfoundland, and where one may make the fish, and manage the drying thereof easily. This frigate arrived June 26 at Placentia, from whence she was to continue her course for Cape Breton, to which place I have caused to be transported 100 men, to begin the settlement. His majesty will send, in the beginning of the year, three ships, to transport thither the garrison of Placentia, and the inhabitants of the island of Newfoundland, and to put the last hand to the establishment of that port. The merchants of this kingdom may then send all such ships as they shall think fit to order, for the fishing of dry fish, and for the oils that are made from the fish on the said island. This favour ought to animate the merchants that drive this commerce, to carry it on with vigour, from the advantage they will draw from it. This is all I have been able to do in their favour. I desire you to be persuaded of the great sincerity wherewith I have the honour to be ———”.

FROM this letter it is plain the French never intended to quit the fishery of dry cod, and that they have, from this period, very much rivalled us therein, to our great detriment, and their unspeakable emolument.— And, with regard to their herring-fishery, have we not frequent accounts of many hundreds of their buffes being upon our coasts in the season? which may one day prove highly dangerous

dangerous to this kingdom upon other occasions, as well as injurious to our own fisheries of that kind.

THE present commercial system of Spain being grounded on that so zealously recommended by that great Spanish patriot and statesman Don Geronymo Utzaritz, we shall shew his sentiments in regard to the fisheries which he exhorts his countrymen to strike into.—After having shewn the advantage which the Dutch, the French, and the English have reaped from their fisheries, he takes no little pains to animate the Spanish nation to pursue the like policy; and he even asserts, that the Spaniards have a right to fish at Newfoundland: so that we are one day likely to have rival upon rival in this branch of our trade.

“It ought to be a principal concern of the government, says this politic Spaniard, to prevent foreigners from enervating the kingdom so much as they do, by the importation of salt-fish, and the great consumption it meets with in Spain, that of bacalao in particular, which is known to be so considerable a part of the food of all its provinces in general.

IN order to calculate the consumption, it is to be observed, that, in the provinces of the crown of Castille, the fast-days amount to a hundred and twenty in a year, and that they exceed a hundred and sixty in those of the crown of Arragon, and in Navarre, where
flesh

flesh is prohibited on Saturdays, which is not the case in Castille. The computation may be a little over or under, on account of some variation there is in the devotional fasts. But, if we rate the number to be a hundred and thirty in the year, one kingdom with another, throughout Spain, upon a moderate supposition that every family, one with another, shall expend four ounces of bacalao every fast-day (which is not an ounce to one person) there will be consumed, in a million and a half of families, six millions of ounces, which amount to 3750 quintals per day; and for the hundred and thirty fast-days in a year, 487,500 quintals; which, at the rate of five dollars, the current price, a little more or less, when foreigners sell it to us, amount to 2,437,500 dollars. And, if we add the great quantity of cured salmon, herrings, pilchards, and other fish from abroad, which is also expended in these kingdoms, one may reasonably imagine, that the money they annually drain from us, by this article, is above three millions of dollars: and it is one of the principal causes of our unhappy situation.

I AM aware there is no small number of persons who, for want of health, are dispensed with eating fish upon days of abstinence; but there are also many convents of men and women, some of which live upon fish every day in the year, others the greatest part of it; so that what these societies exceed the
hundred

hundred and thirty days of abstinence, may be a balance for such as eat flesh on those days.

THIS general calculation I have thought proper to give, in order to have it more clearly seen how much of our substance other nations drain from us by the sale of cured fish; though I do it with some reluctance, because I am to draw precise conclusions from principles doubtful, and incapable of being ascertained. But, should any one think I run far wide of the truth in my estimate, either exceeding or falling short of it, every one will be at liberty to correct them, and form others more exact from better information, and clearer notions of this matter.

I AM also very sensible, that bacalao is a diet of great relief to those parts where fresh fish is scarce; but we should not, on that account, throw off all thoughts of repairing the great injury they do us by the sale of this and other salt fish, and neglect to avail ourselves of such measures as prudence shall dictate, in particular the advantages which our OWN SEAS afford, and some other prudent considerations invite us to, and flatter us with an easy way to supply our wants, if not wholly, at least in a great measure; since it is well known what plenty of fish there is on the coast of Spain, especially that of Galicia; as is also certain, that, on the coast of the Andalusia's, there is abundance of tunnies, sturgeon, lampreys, cuttle-fish, chevins,

chevins, and several other sorts of wholesome fish, some of which salted, and others dried, are kept whole years, not only for a supply to those provinces, where there is a great consumption, but also to furnish us in the inland parts; and the only thing we want is to encourage a fishery, both on our own coasts, and in other seas; and in this sort of commerce by his majesty's subjects, I shall, therefore, proceed to point out such measures as seem to me most prudent, and likely to take effect.

IN chapters 73 and 74, I recommend the stationing of guarda costa's, and shew that, among other great advantages, they would be a means to enlarge our fisheries on the coast of Spain and elsewhere. To their contents I refer for what concerns the encouragement and security of those fisheries, and intend only to add, that I esteem it a very prudent step to lay as heavy duties, as treaties of peace and commerce shall allow, upon the importation of bacalao, and other salt-fish into Spain, without any abatement or indulgence whatever, not excepting the voluntary and accidental allowances which of late years have been made to fish, and some other things in the customhouses of Catalonia, on their importation, besides their not being charged in that principality, or the kingdom of Valencia, with the duty of the millon, which most part of the salt-fish pays in the ports of Castille.

It

It will also be proper for salt-fish to pay intire the duties of the alcavala and ciento's, in all places where it should be sold, or the sale repealed, guarding it with necessary precautions, whether the towns be under composition or administration. This is to be understood of the provinces where those duties are established.

In chapter 23, giving examples from the French, I set forth some of the immunities which his Most Christian Majesty, in the year 1713, granted to bacalao, and oils proceeding from the fishery of his subjects; and also observe, that they were allowed to export stores, arms, ammunition, utensils, and provisions for the ships, or vessels, intended for the said fishery, and even the salt that should be wanted to cure the fish. To this I may add, that in several articles under tit. 15, of the ordinance of 1680, in respect to the settling of the gabel, or revenue of salt in that kingdom, are also found many indulgences, and other encouragements granted for curing of bacalo, salmon, herrings, pilchards, and other sorts of fish; in particular the abatement of the price of it, and also the rules and precautions necessary to prevent frauds, set forth at large.

THE 24th chapter contains a prohibition, that was made in France, against the importation of pilchards from foreign countries, in order to favour their own fishery, and the trade

trade of his majesty's subjects in this commodity.

IN chapter 28, where I produce some examples taken from the English, it is observed, that the duty upon salt used in curing white herrings was taken off in that kingdom in the year 1722, as also what was charged upon the exportation of the same herrings.

IN chapter 36, which treats of the measures employed by the Dutch, mention is also made of some indulgences, and other encouragements, in favour of their fisheries.

UPON the foundation of these examples, taken from three nations that best understand commerce, and most prosper in it, and what one's own reason suggests as proper to be done, I am of opinion we should give leave to all his majesty's subjects that go to the fishery in their own vessels, whether on the coasts of Spain, or in the Mediterranean, to carry out, free of all duty, at least biscuit, all sorts of pulse, dried or green, and salt-fish caught in the Spanish fisheries, and even a certain quantity of oil, vinegar, and brandy, in proportion to the number of hands and days, a few over and under, that they shall be employed in the fishery, being fully convinced that the subjects of other powers, upon no pretence whatever, can fairly claim an equal privilege in this case with his majesty's people. For all conventions, or treaties of commerce, even though they should be strictly observed, were made for very different purposes.

purposes. Nor shall I stay to explain this matter, as the motives, cases, and other circumstances that distinguish the two things, are invariable and manifest. But it is further observable, that, for these indulgences to the fishery, and his majesty's subjects, there will be no reason to make an allowance to the farmers of the revenue, both on account of their trifling value, and because they must experience, from the great improvement made by this means in the fishery, and trade of the towns, where the revenues are farmed, a considerable encrease of them other ways, as has been already shewn in the case of manufacturies. And, to take away from the farmers all pretence for it, there should be an exclusive article to this effect in their contracts for the kingdoms of Mercia, Granada, Seville, Gallicia, the Asturias, and the four towns; for in the provinces upon the coast, the provincial revenues are never farmed, nor the customs any where else.

THE navigation and commerce (says the same eminent Spanish writer) of these provinces [meaning Biscay and Guipuscoa] by sea, have been much impaired by losing several ships in the expeditions of the late war: for they have not yet been able to replace them, and build others, as they have had very bad harvests, and are not yet paid the whole of what was due to them for freights and other things: so that it will be very reasonable and expedient to order the balance
of

of their accounts to be paid immediately, that they may be enabled to build and fit out other vessels, and thus revive and improve their fishery and commerce by sea.

As it is also certain that money is now very scarce in Guipuscoa, where the principal disbursements were usually made for building ships, and other necessary and chargeable preparations for a fishery that is any ways considerable, I should apprehend it a very good piece of policy to make them a tender, out of the king's revenue, of 25 or 30,000 doub-
lons, without interest, for their first expences, which usually run high, upon condition of their repaying it in six years. My intention is, that in the two first years they be not obliged to return any part of it; but, in the four following, to do it in equal payments, till the whole be discharged; and, for a security that the loan be repaid in the form and manner that shall be stipulated, let the province of Guipuscoa stand engaged for it, besides the joint bonds given by the private persons who are to receive the money. That the distribution of the money, the execution of the bonds, the securities, and other points, may be well conducted, and with all the precaution that is requisite on such an occasion, let there be chosen out of that province, or sent from the court, a minister of known abilities and public spirit, charged with this commission; and, to dispose their minds to it, encourage associations, and every thing
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that should tend to enlarge the fishery of bacalao, on the banks of Newfoundland, as also the fisheries for whales, herrings, &c. in those parts where found to be in plenty.

SHOULD the English, in opposition to all the reasons above-mentioned, still persist in disturbing his majesty's subjects in this fishery, and it be not proper to employ force in order to take satisfaction, and maintain their just rights, till we have first tried all the gentler methods which prudence dictates; in my opinion, they should also be given to understand, that his majesty, among other expedients, may avail himself of the sovereign right he possesses to prohibit the consumption of bacalao in all his dominions. This too is a measure very practicable, and may be done without any great inconvenience to the common people, whenever the fishery of his majesty's subjects, both on *our own coasts*, and in *other seas*, shall be encouraged and enlarged in the way I propose, and also supported by the provisions I before recommended on the subject of *guarda costas*. For as the fishery of bacalao was not begun, or even discovered, in Newfoundland, but since the year 1500, and Spain, though much more populous, was able to support herself for above a thousand years without this commodity, and all the time observe the vigils and days of abstinence in the Catholic religion; it should, methinks, be no extraordinary or difficult thing to maintain ourselves without it, and so well as to find

find no want of it. But I should not advise this step till the other, which I have pointed out as a means likely enough to relieve, in a great measure, the misfortune we sustain from the large consumption of salt-fish from abroad, prove to be insufficient for the purpose.

IN chapter 29, which treats of the conduct and practice of the English, and the vast sums of money they drain from us by the sale of bacalao *, and other salt-fish, I introduced a few remarks and observations upon this calamity, and the means which might be employed to prevent it in a great measure, and which I was led into by the reflections of an English writer, well affected to the crowns of Spain and France, in his treatise, under the title of *The interest of England ill understood in the war of queen Anne*. And as we should never lose sight of the principal of those observations and reflections, which are the foundation of the particular provisions in support of the fisheries, I have thought proper to repeat some part of them in this place.

THIS minister invites the bishops to allow, throughout the year, the use of certain kinds of food prohibited upon particular days, and means,

* If the Spaniards should attempt to lay any prohibition, or higher duties on our fish, than what are now laid by subsisting treaties, they may soon be convinced that the crown of Great Britain has it in her power to retaliate upon them, by proper measures to be taken in regard to the regulation of our own commerce.

no doubt, eggs, cheese, milk, and butter, which some religious foundations are restrained from many days in the year. In all probability he would also insinuate, that the prohibition of flesh might be moderated, as it is in the provinces of the crown of Castile, in respect to Saturdays, and may be extended to the town of Arragon. In all these measures he apprehends the pope will readily concur, for the reasons he there gives, and others hinted at; and, without daring to speak out, was, in my opinion, willing to tell us, that if by such means we would reduce the consumption of bacalao, and other cured fish, which they bring us from the north and Newfoundland, we might take away this great advantage from the English, and other powers, who, by the sale of them, drain us of millions of crowns, increase their own strength, and ruin us. These great disadvantages so very much interest our conscience, as well as all good policy, that they deserve the particular attention of all Catholic princes, and especially the pope. From the pious zeal of this holy father we have reason to flatter ourselves, that as soon as he shall be informed of these inconveniencies, he will allow, and even encourage, the measures that tend towards a remedy, even though it be necessary to substitute, in the place of numerous fast-days, another species of abstinence and restraint, that equally administers to the mortification of our souls, and does not turn out so much to the advantage of the rivals of the
crowns

crowns and the Catholic church, as those frequent fast-days do, by opening a way for the importation and consumption of their salt-fish, which is a main branch of their commerce, and a great foundation of their riches and strength.

THOUGH I have some reluctance at the thought of giving my sentiments as to the generality of these points, that are of so delicate a nature, methinks I may, without any scruple, decide in one particular. It is to solicit the permission of his holiness to allow of flesh in the kingdoms of the crown of Aragon, and in Navarre, upon those Saturdays that happen not to be particular vigils, under the restraints, and as it is practised, in the provinces of Castile. This I propose, both on the strength of the solid and well-known motives already given, and because it would be no more than what has been established for many ages, and is now practised in most parts of the kingdom of Spain, &c.

As to the measures insinuated in the reflections of this writer, which regard the taking off in part the prohibition of flesh on some other days in the year, and permitting religious houses certain sorts of food, which they are restrained from, besides flesh, during the whole, or most part of the year, I judge it a point of greater moment, and to require more deliberation. The utmost I shall have courage to offer is, that there be laid before his holiness the reasons already given, and others that will occur, in particular the increase

crease of strength, and other advantages, which several nations, by means of the great consumption of salt-fish in Spain, acquire and employ against the Catholic church itself; that, in his wisdom, he may vouchsafe to determine upon, and establish those provisions, which he shall judge most effectual, and proper for a remedy; so far at least as to take off part of the inconveniencies that have been described. For never shall we be able to find a more sure way to succeed in redressing either the grievance itself, or its accidental circumstances, than by referring it entirely to the great piety, holy zeal, and infallibility of his holiness." Vide *The theory and practice of commerce and maritime affairs*, written in Spanish, by the late Don Geronymo de Uz-tariz, member of his Catholic Majesty's privy council, of the royal board of trade and the mint, and his majesty's secretary in the council and chamber of the Indies.

THUS have we given an idea of the nature and importance of the fisheries to Holland and France, as also of the measures that are likely to be taken in Spain in relation to the same branch of commerce. What seems to confirm this to be the real intention of the court of Spain, is their apparent endeavours to increase their royal navy, by enticing away numbers of our ship-builders for that purpose: and, if they are determined to increase the number of their men of war, and likewise to establish fisheries in
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order effectually to man them, is it not time that we should be upon our guard, as well with respect to Spain as France? There are, it seems, also other powers that are attempting fisheries, and aiming at the acquisition of some share in maritime commerce.

THESE are facts, not groundless conjectures. In regard to the pretended claim of the Spaniards to fish upon our coasts of Newfoundland, it may not be useless to observe, that there was no more care taken of that fishery in the Utrecht treaty than before; for they went so far, that they sent one Gillingham, at this time an Irish papist, to our court, to get the liberty of fishing at Newfoundland. That this Gillingham was far from being snubbed by the then ministry, for coming about such an impudent business, is well enough known. Nay, the lord Lexington, who had not refused the embassy to Spain, when that monarchy and the West-Indies were about to be ravished from the house of Austria, and given to the duke of Anjou, thought this Irish papist was so welcome to the ministry, that, in his letter to the lord Dartmouth, then one of the secretaries of state, he frequently excuses himself for not writing upon that subject, because they had full accounts of the matter from Gillingham. Nay, the queen's plenipotentiaries, the earl of Strafford and Dr. Robinson bishop of Bristol, went so far, as to suffer a clause to be inserted at the end of the

15th article of the peace with Spain; whereby, to use the words of the secret committee, they gave a pretence to the Spaniards to claim a right to fish at NEWFOUNDLAND, contrary to the 7th and 8th articles of the treaty made with that crown by Sir William Godolphin.

THE board of trade being consulted upon this occasion, made the following answer to the lord Dartmouth, dated January 13, 1712-13 :—" We have considered the extract of a memorial from the marquis de Monteleone, relating to a claim of the inhabitants of Guipuscoa to fish on the coast of Newfoundland, and thereupon take leave to inform your lordship, that we have discoursed with such persons as are able to give us information in that matter, and we find that some Spaniards are come hither with passes from her majesty, and others may have fished there privately; but never any, that we can learn, did do it as of right belonging to them."

WE see by this, that, even before the conclusion of that French peace, the queen's passes had been given to the Spaniards, to take the benefit of the most profitable branch of the English commerce; but the Spaniards have not carried their point in it; and, by the 4th article of the treaty which Mr. Dodginton made in December 1713, some of the ground lost to them by the Utrecht peace was recovered, and all innovations made
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in trade were to be abolished ; the most scandalous of which was their fishing at Newfoundland.

THE policy of other neighbouring nations who have long established fisheries, and others who are daily attempting the same, at the expence of Great Britain, should effectually rouse and alarm us, not only to preserve that share in the fisheries we already have, but to excite and animate us to make the utmost advancement in this invaluable branch of traffic that we are capable of ; more especially so, since we have it in our power, by a natural right, to fish upon our own coasts, and perhaps have an equal right to hinder and prevent all other nations from doing so.

I SHALL not here, however, enter into the sole right of Great Britain to the sovereignty of the British seas, though a great fund of argument might be urged on that head. What I shall observe at present is, that, although it may not be advisable, at this conjuncture, to attempt to put an absolute stop to all other nations from fishing upon our own coasts ; yet it is to be hoped, that this indulgence to others is not to prevent ourselves from making the best advantages that God and nature has given us, by storing our coasts with such immense plenty of fish.

NOR can we see reason for indulging any other power to make free with our coast-fishing except our ancient and natural allies the Dutch ; but, if they will not act vigorously

bully in concert with us against the common enemy; if they will allow themselves to be so far influenced by France as to suffer their own state as well as ours to be ruined and undone; if our old friends and allies will turn our enemies, and suffer the whole protestant cause to sink together with themselves, and England; how can the Dutch reasonably expect, that we can cordially grant them any indulgence in trade that is in our power to deprive them of? On the contrary, if the Dutch will at present remain refractory, and deaf to all the remonstrances of the court of London, touching the preservation of the whole protestant interest; will it not, at the proper time, become the wisdom of the court of England to change her system with regard to the Dutch, and grant them no favour whatsoever that is in her power to deprive them of? And how England may be enabled to do this, and that with advantage rather than any injury to herself might be here shown, if it was prudent: but that I leave others to think of, whose duty it more particularly is.

For my own part, I have for many years past endeavoured to show, the necessity, the indispensable necessity of a stricter union between Great Britain and Holland than ever yet was; and I am willing to believe, that when I have the honour to submit my private memorials to the consideration of such who will make the right use of them; the ways and means will

will appear no less practicable then rational, and perfectly compatible with the interest of the two states, and preservative of the protestant cause in general.

So greatly have the principles which I have endeavoured to propagate upon this point affected the court of France, that they have employed, it seems, one or more of their ablest writers * to blunt the edge of all that I have urged, in regard to a topic of such weight and importance.

WE have now taken a view of the measures, which the court of Spain is about to pursue, with respect to the advancement of fisheries; and we have also seen how the French have actually encreased theirs, and in consequence thereof their whole maritime power. Let these facts be weighed, with their united effects, and no friend to the liberties of Christendom, will say, that it can be for the interest of Great Britain and Holland to be divided, or become lukewarm to each others interests, either about the fisheries, or any other point of commerce. But, it is well known, where machinations have been eternally hatching to distract both England and Holland at home, and divide them from each other, in regard to their interest abroad, by groundless jealousies. Is it, how-

* L'observateur Hollandois—Said to be wrote by the abbé de la Ville, late minister from the court of France to the States General of the United Provinces.

ever, less impolitic in Holland to listen to such destructive suggestions with relation to our fisheries, than it would be in England, till sufficiently provoked to deprive the Dutch of the privilege of fishing on our coasts?

If the Dutch are so unhappily circumstanced as to be divided and unsteady in their councils, dwindling in their marine, and in danger of losing for ever their barrier : if Holland shall lose all her weight and influence in Europe, as a protestant potentate, it is necessary, it is wise and politic in Great Britain to encrease in her power, her weight and influence, as Holland shall decline : it will be no less for the interest of Holland than Great Britain that the latter should encrease in her fisheries, and every branch of commerce, if she alone is to support the protestant cause, and Holland among the rest. While Holland shall depend upon England for her security, she can have no cause to complain, if England was to deprive her of such branches of her trade, as she has no right to : but this is not her case, with regard to her own coast fisheries : and, if she indulges Holland therein upon the same conditions as she does her own subjects, as being a natural and ancient ally, and always expecting her friendship ; Holland can have no sufficient grounds for resentment against England on this occasion ; and, therefore, ought she not to despise all insinuations on the part of the common enemy to divide us on this account ?

If these intrigues to divide us are not seen through in Holland, it becomes the more necessary, that this kingdom, for her own safety as well as that of the Dutch, should see for them, and improve their own coast, and other fisheries to the utmost. And, if Holland is displeased at this, do they not act upon the same principles that the enemies to us both do? For, they know the consequence of improving our fisheries, is improving the British maritime power; and, if the Dutch suffer their royal marine to dwindle, England should be on her guard to advance hers at least in the like degree; and, especially so, since that of the common enemy is daily encreasing. While this is the case, the common enemy well know that they will with difficulty enslave the republic, while Britain shall maintain and duly exercise a superiority of naval dominion.

If the Dutch will neglect their safety, is there not a greater necessity for us to take care of our own? And gain in trade and power what the Dutch shall lose? And have we not the most natural right to it, who are obliged, though for our own safety, to protect them, while we are able? Had Britain neglected her marine as the Dutch have done; had she been regardless and inactive with respect to France as the Dutch have been, must it not have proved fatal to them both before this time? As it seems inexcusable in the states of Holland to suffer that, so it would be

be inexcusable, from that motive only, in Britain to neglect the most extensive improvement of her fisheries, that thereby she might be capable of advancing her marine, as the Dutch shall disregard theirs: and in this light, let every patriot Dutchman look upon our endeavours to improve this amongst other branches of our commerce: but whoever looks upon this in a light to divide us and the Dutch, can be no friend to either, nor to the liberties of Christendom.

WHEN the Dutch were at war with England, and they wanted to mann twenty or thirty sail of men of war, it was only having recourse to their fisheries, and in a few days, they were in a condition to give us battle, the seamen being only transferred from a smaller to a larger vessel on the same element. It is to be hoped, therefore, that since Great Britain has undertaken the protection of the British herring-fishery, she will never suffer it to drop, although the Dutch should resent it; which, from what has been said, it does not appear to be their interest, notwithstanding their apprehensions to the contrary.

AND here it may not be improper to observe, that there are, in the humble judgment of the writer of these papers, ways and means to remove all umbrage from the Dutch on this, and some other occasions, that has prevented their acting in concert with us: but these I durst not publicly declare, lest
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the common enemy should take advantage of it.

THE benefits arising from our herring-fisheries are extraordinary, if we consider the number of people therein employed; as seamen, fishermen, ship and house-carpenters, smiths, sawyers, coopers, caulkers, butchers, bakers, brewers, carmen, boatmen, sail-makers, net-makers, block-makers, trinel-makers, rope-makers, pump makers, compass-makers, basket-makers, hook-makers, packers, dressers, sorters, labourers, tanners, and spinners of net-work, and sails.—Several of which trades are effected by children, the lame, the blind, and the aged.

“WITHOUT primary encouragements, (says a judicious writer in the year 1680, who intitled his work *Britannia Languens*, &c.), and superintendence of the government, it will be hard to nourish up any new branch of trade, &c.

Amongst the exportations, the fishing-trade ought not to be forgotten, since according to modern calculations *, the mere fishing-trade for HERRINGS AND COD, on the coast of England, and Scotland, employs above 8000 Dutch ships, or vessels, 200,000 of their seamen, and fishers; and the her-

* See Mr. Smith of improvements, &c. page 268-9-70, who computes the whole profits of this fishery to be, in his time, ten millions sterling per annum, and in a manner all gained by other nations.

rings and cod sold by the Dutch in foreign countries, do bring an annual profit of 5,000,000 l. sterling to that nation: besides which, it is accounted that there are at least, 25,000 people more employed and maintained at home about this particular navigation, as in making of fishing-nets, and the curing, ordering, and preparing of the fish, &c. besides the Iceland, Newfoundland, and Greenland-fishings, of very great advantage."

ARE not these considerations motive sufficient to animate us never to suffer this fishery to sink? While our common enemies are raising their maritime power by means of their fisheries, shall not we uphold ours to the utmost? Will not this greatly contribute to enable us to maintain the balance of maritime dominion, on which our security chiefly depends?

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will find it necessary to enter into the details
and to generate into that police that has raised



regard to our own, and be the better able to

regard them in our own system.

The French European trade being closely

India, it was previously requisite to consider

those. We shall now enter upon their

former.

Having taken a view of the com-

merce of France in America, Asia,

and Africa, and of the wisdom and policy of

that nation in carrying on the same; and having

shewn likewise, by way of comparison, where-

in the measures taken for their prosperity there-

in, seem to be in many respects preferable to

ours; it may prove no less useful to take a

succinct survey of the commerce of this

kingdom, as it stands connected with the chief

states of Europe: my intention being to shew

what an extensive foundation they have laid

for commercial dominion; and, in conse-

quence thereof to convince us, that we can

never expect to withstand the power of

France, unless we put bounds to her trade

and navigation. And, however well many

may apprehend they are thoroughly ac-

quainted with the commerce of France and

England, from a general idea only there-

of; yet to make a precise judgment, they

will

will find it necessary to enter into the details, and to penetrate into that police that has raised each to the pitch we find it. For, by so doing, we shall easily discern their mistakes or our own, and be the better able to rectify them in our own system.

THE French European trade being closely connected with those of Africa, America, and India, it was previously requisite to consider these latter, as being a great foundation of the former. We shall now enter upon their commerce in Europe, and begin first with that between Great Britain and France. And, if we take a retrospect hereof from the peace of Utrecht, we shall find that we have been great sufferers hereby.

FROM this period, France has taken from England coals, and allum, copperas, and vitriol, tobacco, some lead, and tin, flannels, and corn in time of scarcity; but all these articles have of late years greatly decreased. Yet we have imported from France, since the same time, wines, brandies, linen, fine laces, fine canbricks, cambrick-lawn, to a prodigious value, brocades, velvets, and many other rich silk manufactures, which have either been run in upon England, or come by the way of Holland.

WE have before represented the detestable scene of smuggling French commodities that has long been, and still continues barefacedly to be carried on at the island of Man; from whence it has spread itself all over the North
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of England, and to Scotland, and Ireland. And is it not notorious enough that the smuggling of wool from Ireland is not the least branch of the French trade that has been carried on with Ireland? Nor has the trade carried on between our continent colonies and the French sugar-islands proved of little disadvantage to us in the general balance of our trade with France. Such, in a word, has been our taste for French products, French manufactures, and French fashions, that we have been frenchified out of more, at an average, than half a million per Annum, in our balance of trade with France, since the Utrecht peace; which amounts to above 20 millions sterling, gained from Great Britain and Ireland by France. Nor do we hear of any smuggling of British commodities and manufactures into France, to compensate for these outgoings to that kingdom.

So bewitching is our French taste, that the British, and Irish money, spent in travel there can hardly be so little one year with another as 200,000 l. sterling per annum, balance against us in this article; the French spending little here, in comparison to what our gentry do in France.

THE commerce of France with Holland is prodigiously to the advantage of the former, the Dutch paying to France in the balance very considerable sums; the reason whereof is, that the Dutch take off immense quantities of wine and brandy from the

French, as also of silk manufactures, wrought glass, and very great variety of other commodities of that nation; which they carry for sale to most parts of the trading world, either for Dutch account wholly, or for Dutch and French account in company, according to the merchants usage, the Dutch sailing cheaper than the French. They have done great business, for French account wholly: on the other hand the Dutch carry little of their own to France, except fish, train-oil, whale fins, pantiles, and spices; all which excepting the latter, are greatly diminished, since the peace of Utrecht.

THE Dutch likewise trade in large quantities of French manufactures to Spanish America from Curaçoa, Surinam, Barbice, &c. And the great inducement to give their manufactures the preference proceeds from the two following causes. (1) The greater cheapness of French commodities in general than English. And (2) their greater variety of fashions that take of late years more with the Spaniards than ours do; wherein the French are always beforehand with us. The Hollanders too take no inconsiderable quantity of French manufactures for their East-India trade.

THE trade of France with old Spain we have all reason to fear has been greatly encreased of late years, to the disadvantage of that of England. Has England at present near the number of British merchant's houses of trade

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at Cadiz, or any other of the chief trading ports of Spain, that she had thirty years ago? If I have been rightly informed, the French have considerably more than we, though we used to have above ten to their one. And we well know that French factories will not vend British commodities, while they can be well supplied from their own country.

LET the value of the foreign merchandizes not only consumed in old Spain, but sent from thence in Spanish bottoms to new Spain, be estimated, and we shall know whether the trade of France has not been more favoured by the Spanish nation than that of England; we shall then know who are most interested in the galleons and flota, the French or the English. Though England may have a right by treaty to be no less favoured by Spain in trade than France; yet, by certain secret encouragements given to the trade of the one, in opposition to that of the other, treaties of commerce may be evaded, and rendered useless. If the commerce from France to Spain has increased to the advantage of the former, and that of England has declined, it must be owing either to certain mercantile machinations, under secret influence, or to the greater cheapness and delicacy of the commodities of the one, which gives them the preference to the other. If the latter is the case, we know the remedy; if the former, we must use the same arts that our rivals do to uphold our trading influence.

With regard to the commerce of the Spanish Indies, it is well enough known what a scene of trade the French have carried on there from their Mississippi settlements over the gulph of Mexico, though the Spaniards have been very complaisantly silent upon that occasion. Nor is it less certain that the French have long exercised a beneficial trade from St. Domingo to the Spanish main; and yet we have heard of no umbrage taken at those practices. We do not hear but the Spaniards have a plentiful supply of negroes for the working of their mines in America; and from whence do the bulk of them go, but from St. Domingo? And, under the cover of this negoce, we can hardly suppose but other is carried on. Thus may the French enjoy all the advantages of an *Affiento*, without any treaty for the purpose, though we had little benefit with one. So it is, that we never hear of any complaint by the Spaniards of illicit trade on the side of France, though great clamours are made against the English about a little logwood, which they have a right to cut too.

Thus, though England may flatter herself that she is as equally favoured in her commerce by Spain as any other nation; yet, by management, treaties may be evaded; and, instead of being upon a level in trade with nations the most highly favoured, we may be the most disfavoured: and I wish this may not be our case. To save appearances,

ances, treaties may subsist : but we have seen how they may be rendered a dead letter. Spain is certainly a great gainer by the commerce of Great Britain ; her loss by the French trade is very considerable. The French are no less rivals to Spain than to England. And is not Spain at present bent upon the establishment of manufactures of her own ? If they shall soon be able to supply themselves with one part of their manufactures, and the French shall be artfully suffered to supply them with the other part of their wants, what will our treaties with Spain avail us ? Is not Spain likewise striking into an active commerce ? Nothing, therefore, can save our trade from ruin, as well with Spain as other states, but the ability to sell as good a commodity for as little money as our rivals do.

We are dazzled with the splendid appearance of Portugal gold, as well as Spanish pieces of eight, and are apt to think that we are mighty gainers hereby. Our trade with Portugal has heretofore been very lucrative ; but this, like that of Spain, is greatly upon the decline ; the French having wormed us out, and themselves into a considerable part of this trade which we enjoyed. The French now send to Portugal fine woollen cloths, various kinds of stuffs, particularly a sort of black goods called DRUGGETS, of which they sell immense quantities for the habits of the clergy (having thereby destroyed the English

crapes, once a very important article of our trade) wrought silk, a great quantity of linens and cambricks, dressed CALVE-SKINS (another lost article of the English commerce) also HATS, SILK STOCKINGS (both which articles they are getting from us every day) all sorts of toys, furniture, ribbands, and most of the ornamental parts of the female dress; grain of all kinds, when the French have it to spare, and sometimes in immense quantities; claret, champagne, and brandy, though prohibited, are smuggled into Portugal in great quantities; as are flowered and figured silks, gold and silver lace, India goods, and other contraband commodities: they likewise import from France printed books, some ordinary sorts of cutlery ware, and abundance of smaller articles, too tedious to enumerate. By the help of wool smuggled from England and Ireland, the French have made attempts to rival us in Portugal in our very great article of the trade in LONG BAYS; but hitherto without success: but it is to be feared that their vigilance and policy, aided by our inattention, may bring this design to bear; and thus we shall imperceptibly lose the Portugal trade too.

THE Italians import into Portugal immense quantities of wheat, a great deal of barley, and also a good deal of Levant rice, vermicelli, and oil. They likewise import prodigious quantities of writing-paper, abundance

dance of wrought silks and velvets, corals, and many expensive curiosities, toys, and other inferior articles, not to particularize religious traffic, which is very great and public.

THE Italians also export from Portugal, hides, a considerable quantity of sugars and tobacco's, cocoa-nuts, pepper, ordinary spices, elephants-teeth, brasil-wood, some drugs, and an immense quantity of bullion. Infomuch that of late years, while gold has bore a high price in England, it has been a drug all over Italy: a circumstance that has been well worthy of British attention. And our balance of some trades in Italy being thus paid us in Portugal gold, we have flattered ourselves that all the gold of that country has been owing to our direct commerce with Portugal, when the fact has been otherwise; and if our Italian trade declines from the loss of Minorca, or from any other cause, we shall soon experience a scarcity of Portugal gold.

How well the port of Marseilles is situated for the whole Italian, the Turkey and Levant trade, and what a considerable share they have obtained therein, is well enough known in the general.

FRANCE was the first nation that made treaties of commerce with the Porte: they were the first likewise that established a court of justice, under the title of that of consularship, to maintain a good harmony between their own subjects and the Turks, and ob-
tained

tained the whole trade, as it were, to themselves for many years, and other nations traded under their banner.

SUCH an ascendancy have these rivals got in the Turkey trade, that they have reduced our sales of above 30,000 woollen cloths a year to about 7000; whilst the French cloths have encreased from a sale of 2000 a year to above 50,000: and the advance the French has made in the Italian trade in general, is too well experienced by our merchants who are concerned therein. That the measures we have taken to restore this trade will effect the end aimed at, a little time will shew. The measures we depend upon for success herein, are laying the trade open, thinking that a competition amongst our traders is the sovereign remedy to make our commodities cheaper, and to supplant our foreign rivals; but I am afraid that our advancement in the Turkey trade will rather depend upon abilities to sell our commodities in general as cheap as France can afford to do, and not upon our traders underselling each other: the only maxim, it seems, we depend upon for outdoing our rivals; a maxim that will prove no less ruinous to the trade, I fear, than a monopoly.

So greatly have the French encreased their trade since the peace of Utrecht, that they now carry their wines and their brandies in their own shipping into the Baltic, where, before the Dutch sent them in Hollands bottoms;

toms; and they bring their naval stores from Peterburgh and Livonia in their own vessels, where before that treaty, no French ship had scarce ever been seen. Nor have the Hanse-towns any share like what they had in furnishing France with iron and copper, or timber, pitch and tar, as they heretofore had.

THEY also carry on a beneficial trade with Dantzic, and have greatly increased their commerce in Muscovy, as well as Denmark. Their trade is likewise greatly extended through many parts of Germany within these twenty years.

WE have now before us a general view of the trade of France, as connected with the chief states of Europe; and it would be no great difficulty to shew that the particular balance is considerably in favour of France with most, if not all of them; and the general being great, it is no wonder that they figure it as they do, and find themselves as capable as disposed to yoke Europe.

If the efforts of this nation to encrease their commerce and navigation, were designed to promote the happiness instead of the misery of other states, I could rejoice at their success, and would endeavour to promote rather than obstruct it. But the case is otherwise; they make the benefits of their trade and navigation a stalking horse to enslave mankind. It is certainly, a virtue in a state to promote industry, encourage arts, multiply traders, and extend commerce, provided

vided it be done to make the people happy. But if we examine the politics of the French, we shall find these beneficent motives, the least of their regards. No, the vain-glory of their monarch, acquired by cutting throats, and ravishing the territories of their neighbours from them, whilst even their own lie uncultivated, and neglected, are the motives which induce them to favour arts, and promote commerce: commerce is to support conquest, and conquest is to extend commerce, but pride and vain-glory are the *primum mobile*, not the happiness of society, and the good of mankind; though the French most blasphemously rob and plunder their neighbours under those pretences.—Commerce brings them in the treasures of all the Indies; and these are employed in raising armies, and in making the world their own: and I am apt to think there is but one way to prevent it; and this very way will make France infinitely more happy and more opulent than it is; for I would conquer the enemy by these arts rather than by destructive measures; providence having afforded treasures to mankind infinitely beyond their wants: and, if it please God to prolong my life for the purpose, I shall have little difficulty to convince them of the truth of the assertion.

—HOWEVER severe many may think my writings sometimes appear against the French; yet the wise will not construe them as a conceived antipathy against that nation: on the

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contrary, I profess myself a great admirer of the wisdom and policy of that nation. If they were no less faithful in their treaties, than they are artful in violating them, their statesmen would not be less admired for their honour than their nation is for it's profound sagacity and politeness. But it is time to tie the hands of their perfidious ministers, in order to spread general felicity over the whole French nation : and this may be easier done, than is imagined.

How we have seen how
 HITHERTO we have seen how
 agriculture maintains and employs them;
 and how the ingenious arts multiply their
 conveniences, by forming and working up
 the productions of nature, and introducing
 into a body politic, a double estate of the
 means of occupying it's members : so that
 those two branches are mutually dependant
 on each other, and their connections cannot
 be broke through without hurting the per-
 fecti-
 tion of both ; nor consequently without de-
 priving society of a great part of it's utility.
 That perfection cannot exist without the
 help of the greatest foreign consumption pos-
 sible. A communication between the several
 parts of earth surrounded or divided by seas,
 supposes navigation, or the art of crossing
 those seas.
 We will consider that art at present, so far
 only as it establishes a lucrative communica-
 tion



DISSERTATION XXVIII.

Of navigation, and fisheries, as they contribute to give the balance of commerce and power.

HITHERTO we have seen how agriculture maintains and employs men; and how the ingenious arts multiply their conveniencies, by forming and working up the productions of nature, and introducing into a body politic, a double encrease of the means of occupying it's members: so that those two branches are mutually dependant on each other, and their connections cannot be broke through without hurting the perfection of both; nor consequently without depriving society of a great part of their utility. That perfection cannot exist without the help of the greatest foreign consumption possible. A communication between the several parts of earth surrounded or divided by seas, supposes navigation, or the art of crossing those seas.

WE will consider that art at present, so far only as it establishes a lucrative communication

tion between different people ; because the benefits resulting therefrom sufficiently prove the necessity of a national communication not subject to precariousness.

WE say a lucrative communication ; for a navigation undertaken in order to import foreign commodities only, cannot be justified but by absolute necessity, or so far, as it may be the cause of a greater exportation.

IN this sense it is plain, that the object of navigation is to transport the superfluities of a nation to others, and to bring back proper and necessary commodities in exchange.

BEFORE we consider the principles that emanate from the object of navigation, it is proper to know the various effects that result from it's operation.

THE operation of navigation should be considered in two lights. The art of sailing furnishes employment for a class of men called seamen, or sailors : the building of the ships in which those men cross the seas, is properly a manufactory. As such it is subject to the laws and principles of manufacturies : it has the same effects, for it affords employment to builders, carpenters, caulkers, sail-makers, rope-makers, weavers, smiths, and an infinity of other men ; if the earth produces iron, hemp, wood, pitch, and tar, those materials being used in the building of ships, their value is thereby increased : in short, that manufactory is carried to perfection by the
the

the same means that others are, and deserves the same encouragements.

NAVIGATION, considered in these two joint lights, affords a great multitude of men, the means of consuming the fruits of the earth, and of procuring the conveniencies invented by useful and ingenious arts. The wages of the men, and the price of the materials employed in navigation, either as an art or a manufactory, is necessarily paid by the consumer of the goods exported. For the charges are always a part of the value of a commodity: nay, the charges of freight are more sure to be paid, than the first value of the goods. For example; if a merchant sends goods to a foreign market, he is sure that the freight or hire of the ship and sailors who carry them, will be paid in full, though he is not sure that the goods he sends will produce, when sold, so much as that freight amounts to: that has been the case in some sudden revolutions of trade; and we see every day instances of goods bearing a lower price abroad than their intrinsic value at home; the freight, however, is paid at all events, without abatement or delay.

THE profits of navigation are, therefore, as clear, as those of agriculture, and manufactories. Consequently navigation encreases the real and relative strength of a body politic.

EVERY

EVERY nation that lets another carry on a navigation which she might do herself, diminishes in proportion her real and relative strength in favour of her rivals.

THE intent, or object of navigation affords two principles, from which many consequences may be drawn.

FIRST, a nation that has no superfluities to export, would have no navigation, unless she were to carry for others.

SECONDLY, superfluities would be of no value to a nation that did not cultivate the art of navigation; or, if superfluities had a value, that value would absolutely depend on people who are navigators.

FROM the first principle it must be inferred, that agriculture and industry are the basis, or motive of a solid navigation. Whatever hurts the true principles of the two former, is destructive of navigation, and deprives society of it's real and relative effects.

THE motives of navigation cannot possibly be encreased without navigation's being so too, if no inward defect prevents it's progress.

IF the motives of navigation have suffered no change, it's decline is a most certain sign, of the diminution of foreign consumptions of the productions of art, or nature, of the subject's being less employed, and consequently less able to live comfortably.

IF the motives of navigation are changed, that is to say, if one commodity ceases to be exported at the same time that another new

commodity is exported ; or, if one exchange in return, is substituted in the room of another ; the balance of trade in money may have encreased, though at the same time, neither more ships, nor more sailors, are employed : and, on the other hand, navigation may be encreased, though the balance in money be not ; that will depend on the diversity of bulks and intrinsic value.

CONSEQUENTLY, the number of tons of shipping employed by a nation, cannot be a general rule, whereby to judge whether the balance of it's trade was more in it's favour at one time than another. For the same reason we cannot judge by that comparison of the real riches of the trade of two nations.

SUPPOSING all things in other respects equally advantageous between two nations for some navigations ; we may determine by the number of ships each employs, whether the one makes a better use of it's advantages than the other.

For, if the one drew from it's colonies, masts, wood, pitch, tar, rice, and tobacco, and the other neglected those branches of navigation ; it is certain, that the former would have a superiority of trade, and of relative strength.

LASTLY, if the combination of the exchanges a nation makes in the whole extent of it's commerce, be very complicated ; it may, by the encrease of it's luxury, have exported more specie than productions either of
it's

it's lands, or industry. Consequently, the encrease of it's navigation cannot be a real and certain indication of the advantage or disadvantage of the balance of it's trade, as Sir Josiah Child, and other writers, have said. That uncertainty would be still greater, and of longer duration, if, by measures taken at home to support the public credit, the nation was prevented from perceiving easily the diminution of it's mass of treasure.

THE second principle is, that a nation's superfluities would have no value without navigation: or, if they had a value, it would depend absolutely on people who are navigators.

WHENCE it follows, that, if agriculture and manufactures are the basis and motive of navigation, they are not less mutually interested in it's preservation and progress.

IF a nation navigates for another, or monopolizes it's commodities, which is the same thing, the agriculture and manufactures of the latter will be checked or encouraged, according as it suits the interests of the former; that is to say, the labour of the people, and consequently, the populousness and resources of the state that sells, will be in the power of the state that navigates. By the same reason, if the dependant nation wants foreign commodities, it will receive only that quantity of them, which it suits the other to furnish, or, at what price that other shall think proper to put on them.

THE profit of the navigating nation will be the amount of the difference between what the goods cost, and what they are sold for; and that profit will be so much lost by the dependant nation.

UNDER those circumstances, than which worse cannot be imagined, the political interests of the dependant nation must, by it's wants, be subordinate to the political interests of the navigating nation.

As it is a maxim in practical trade, that they who have the greatest capitals trade with most advantage, and have the preference; so it is evident, that the longer a nation has been dependant on another for the exportation of it's superfluities, the more difficult it will be to shake off that yoke; unless the navigating nation loses it's advantage by it's own fault.

THOUGH a nation should not be quite destitute of navigation, yet, if that nation does not extend it's navigation to the utmost of it's power, it will still labour under the difficulties we have been speaking of, in proportion to it's degree of neglect. Whence it may be inferred that the welfare and preservation of a state require, that strangers be never permitted to rival our own navigation in the exportation of our own productions, or the importation of necessary commodities.

SUCH is the intent of our excellent act of navigation in England, to which we owe all our trade and maritime strength. But all circum-

circumstances do not admit of an equal application of the same maxims. If every nation with which England traded, had made at that time such an act with regard to her, she would have lost several profitable branches of her trade ; such as that to the Levant and East-Indies. And some branches did suffer till she got a sufficient number of ships, though her docks were then very numerous.

ALL nations are now too intent on their commercial interests, for any one of them to venture on so bold a step : it would no longer be prudent to lay duties on foreign ships, nor to raise those that are paid on what is exported, or imported, by those ships. But another more gentle and more certain method might be taken.

I SAY nothing of the just prohibition against making use of foreign ships to carry national commodities from port to port, and along the coasts of a state, because that is indispensable, and cannot be complained of in any shape : besides, the like treatment in return would not be dangerous, if one were forced to put a stop to the progress of that toleration. The only effectual way to avoid the superiority of foreign navigators, is to promote the greatest rivalship possibly in our own navigation.

THAT rivalship regards two sorts of persons : navigators, and those who employ them. The rivalship of those who employ them,

that is to say, the merchants, depends on several circumstances.

THE number of good harbours in a country, is one of the greatest encouragements to navigation: for the easier an undertaking is, the more it will be attempted: consequently, supposing things equal in other respects, that country which has the greatest number of harbours has it in its power to carry on the greatest foreign trade.

FROM this incontestable maxim follows the necessity of supplying as much as possible by art, what nature has been deficient in; of keeping up those harbours, and especially of not laying the navigation of any one of them under the least restraint or difficulty. That would be depriving ourselves of our own natural advantages, of the rivalship of capitals in trade, of the benefits of fitting out ships, of seamen; and, in short, it would be stripping the poor of one of their kinds of occupation, the most absolutely necessary.

THIS general rule can admit of only one exception: that is, when a state has instituted *free ports*, in order not to be deprived of the advantages accruing from the re-exportation of foreign commodities, not permitted to be used within that state. If the navigation of those free ports be not laid under some restrictions, they will not fail to leave their re-exporting trade for other more profitable branches; and all the use they will make of their

their privileges will be to ruin other rival ports by the sale of the commodities of which they have the monopoly. The intent, therefore, of the state will not be answered; and the equilibrium so necessary between the subjects' occupations, and the several counties of the state, will be destroyed.

ACCORDINGLY, in order not to restrain any part of navigation, some nations have thought it better to let goods be deposited in their ports, than to grant those immunities in favour of any in particular. If that manner of depositing them facilitates commerce, and renders it more general, it must likewise be granted that the preservation of some branches of re-exportation becomes more difficult thereby, or that they are less easily made to agree with the laws of home trade.

REASONS which require the deepest combination, seem to contend for preference; we will at present take notice only of the exception which results from the principle in favour, even of its preservation.

THE rivalry of merchants depends particularly upon the personal advantages they find in that profession. Few would embrace it in a country where they should not have room to hope to be distinguished, in proportion to the services they render; where the retailer and mechanic should be put on a level with him that supports them. In short, where that profession could not be safely or peaceably exercised, either on account of en-

quiries into their gains, or the instability of the laws. The profession of a merchant must likewise be in general lucrative, because gain is the motive as well as the reward of his labour. It cannot be lucrative, if the interest of money be much higher than what is paid by merchants in other countries; if the law subjects navigation to expences unknown elsewhere; if inland duties, or duties on exportation, prevent the sale of a commodity at foreign markets; if the formalities to be observed at customhouses are multiplied without cause, or depend on the pleasure of a clerk, whom it is not thought worth while to bribe: in such cases it is necessary to call to mind Cassiodorus's reflection, 7. cap. varia. 9. *Avara manus portus claudit; et cum digitos contrahit, navium simul vela concludit: meritò enim illa mercatores cuncti refugiunt quæ sibi dispendia esse cognoscunt.* "A covetous hand shuts up ports, and furls the sails of the shipping: for merchants always justly shun what they know to be attended with expence."

THESE general observations naturally lead to this maxim; that navigation, like all other parts of trade, cannot be safely guided without the help of calculation. Every operation that promotes the advantage of other nations in point of rivalry, is destructive of the riches of the subject, and of the state; every operation whereby their advantage is promoted,

moted, is, to the body politic, a source of new prosperity. It is in consequence of this principle that skilful nations lessen, in favour of what is exported by their own ships, a duty, generally more hurtful than advantageous to a state; and likewise favour them in licit importations in proportion to the want of the things imported. It is, however, still more injudicious to suppress entirely all duties on the exportation of national productions, and to let the duties already laid on importations subsist in full; but most of all, to grant our own national ships a reward or bounty of so much per ton, in order to enable them to compete with foreigners in such branches as it is our national interest to encourage and support. By that means a nation may form in a short time a great maritime strength, without being exposed to the resentment of other states, and without suspending the course of its sales. It is by risking large sums that merchants grow rich: states must submit to the laws of trade, if they would reap the advantages of it.

A COMPARISON of the methods practised by two nations cannot be otherwise instructive than by comparing their effects; for their principle may be the same, tho' their practice be different: the best is that which most fully answers the intent and object of the principle. We must, however, agree with that excellent writer, that the custom of
classing

classing seamen affords greater resources for the public service, and that it is most reasonable to acquaint men with the duties of their station. In all cases, the less the duty incumbent on a profession is burdensome, the more easy it will be to establish and maintain an idea of equality of treatment among those who follow it, and the more men will be ready to embrace it.

THERE is, among such seamen as are classed, a rank of men destined to govern and command the rest, distinguished by their views, fortune, birth, and education: it is equally just and important to make a difference between them and common sailors, as we cannot, without danger to the public welfare, confound the farmer with the plowman, the manufacturer with the workman, or the merchant, who fits out a ship, with the carpenter that builds it. It is not riches that entitles them to such distinction, though some regard ought to be paid to that; for if the rich man does not enjoy his ease in his own country, he will carry his fortune to another, where he can. But it is the degree of general usefulness that the state receives from the talents or qualifications of its subjects that ought to make them be considered and respected in proportion. The experience of all ages, and of all countries, shews, that numbers of the best hands are not always sufficient to replace one good head.

IF the profession of seamen, destined to be captains of trading ships, was to be depreciated or slighted without very strong personal reasons, no man of middling birth would follow it. That would be destroying the seminary, in which numbers of great and brave men have been formed: by lessening their ideas of honour, their views and undertakings would be more circumscribed; there would be fewer privateers in time of war, and the enemies of the state would be less molested in their trade; in peace, fewer would be ready to undertake those great voyages which require strength of genius and knowledge superior to what is found in him who is generally called a good sailor; the subordination, so necessary, and so uncommon in merchants ships, would degenerate into licentiousness, and the common men would always be ready to mutiny against their officers; in short, the children of seamen being discouraged from following their father's profession by the prejudice against it, their situation would certainly be less favourable, and the principle of their emulation viciated. The profession of sea-officers in the merchants service is honourable in itself, on account of the dangers to which they are exposed, and lucrative without requiring any great stock of money. Far from encouraging any prejudices against those people, the skill of the legislator consists in taking advantage
of

of their foible, and in guiding men towards what ought to be their end, by the very means by which they are led astray.

It must have been after repeated experiments, by which men grow by degrees more familiar with the sea, that they ventured to cross that element: the first rules of that art probably arose from fishery. That precious branch of employment still maintains its rights over navigation, by being always the nursery and best school of seamen. We have made no distinction between them, in order to conform ourselves the more to the generally received ideas, and not to interrupt the chain of our arguments.

It is evident, from the history of trade, and that of all maritime powers, not one excepted, that great fisheries have always been the epocha of a great trading navigation, and of a great marine. The example of Holland is too well known to require our entering into a detail about it: their herring-fishery alone is valued at about three millions three hundred thousand pounds sterling a year.

BESIDES the advantage which a state receives from its fishery, considered as a branch of the art of navigating, and of the manufactory of ship-building, it likewise encreases the value of salt-pans in countries that have any. It produces every where a considerable value, which before did not exist, in return for an inconsiderable exchange: for the seven
eights

eights at least of the value of a fishery centers in the hire of men and money. Whence it follows, that a nation that sells abroad the produce of its fishery, gains as clear a profit as if that nation sold wine or corn of its own growth; with this difference only, that, value for value, the fishery will have employed most men of different classes; that the lands of a state are limited, and can employ but a part of the inhabitants; whereas the fishery has no bounds, but every man may be a sharer in the profit in proportion to his money. In a word, we need not scruple to say, that fishermen are in navigation as useful and necessary as husbandmen in the culture of the lands, and that they deserve, in their way, to be as much regarded and encouraged.

THE home and foreign consumption of fish, dry and salted, is the measure of the decline or increase of a nation's fishery.

THE home consumption depends on the degree of ease of the common people, by whom the greatest quantities of plain and ordinary things are consumed; and likewise on the duties, which the commodity pays before they have it. In a country where dry and salt fish should be found to have paid half the amount of its value between the sea and inland parts of that country, it is probable that, by reducing those duties to only a quarter part of the value, which is still too much, double the quantity would be consumed, the revenue would be the same, and the number

ber of fishermen would be as many again. The home consumption would likewise be encreased, in proportion to the means taken to prevent the importation of foreign fish. The more a state is deficient in its marine, the more strict it ought to be in so sure and advantageous a way to encrease it.

FOREIGN consumption depends on cheapness: since the seven-eighths of the value of a fishery centers in, or is to be imputed to, the hire of men and money, it is plain that the rate of the interest of money must have a great influence on the price. So that supposing things equal in all other respects between two nations, rivals in their fisheries, that which pays the highest interest will have the disadvantage in its sales; or rather its traders will speculate no farther than the home consumption, and employ the rest of their money in more lucrative branches. Bounties only make up for that difference; for the sea produces for all alike: the best methods for fishing, and curing fish, can never remain a secret long, and they are practicable by all nations who have any share of navigation.

RIVALSHIP of merchants is likewise an effectual way to equal other nations, and to save in a short time rewards or bounties on exportation. That rivalry will be promoted by the motives already spoken of, and in proportion to the degree of home consumption, which is
always

always a present inducement to speculation.

AN inestimable advantage to nations, who know how to procure wherewith to form a great navigation, is, without doubt, to have within themselves, or in their colonies, materials fit for building and fitting out ships. This is a self-evident truth; and the administration of affairs both at home and abroad, equally concurs to establish this maxim, that a people never is stronger than when it least depends on others for its wants. Agriculture, therefore, again comes in here to the aid of navigation, and in her turn receives her reward from it. The advantage of the lowness of the interest of money is of to both, is again evident on this occasion. If, for example, we suppose a country where the interest of money is at five per cent, a thousand pounds put out for 40 years, and interest upon interest added, the capital sum will produce 6,810 l. If a thousand pounds in wood, are not likely to produce their owner the same increase in the same space of time, every one will chuse to put his money out at interest rather than to have the trouble and run the risk of planting: very few will let their woods grow till they are fit to cut.

SINCE the establishment of European colonies in the East- and West-Indies, the navigation of the countries, by which they were founded has been considerably increased. Its
object

object has from that time been extended farther, it's effects have been multiplied, and the application of it's principles has become more important, as we have observed, in regard to colonies. Mother countries, who understand their interests, have thought it a point of prudence to include, even their colonies in their restrictions relating to navigation: their conduct in that respect is founded on sound policy.

EVEN, though a nation could be neither traders, nor conquerors, it would be difficult to conceive how it could support itself without a sea force against the ambition of it's neighbours; if they had any: now, it is certain that a state which has neither fishery, nor foreign trade, can have no maritime force. But if that nation has colonies, or fisheries; if it has a great superfluity of productions to export, either of it's own growth, or arising from the labour and ingenuity of it's inhabitants; the preservation of those concerns becomes a chief part of it's political interests. All that it gains on that side is a diminution of the real and relative power of it's rivals; who consequently gain on the other hand whatever the other loses. These respective interests oblige states to keep up fleets and a naval strength at a great expence, that they may be able at the same time to protect their own labour and industry, the sole support of that strength; and to molest, or even ruin the industry

dustry the sole support of that strength ; and to molest, or even ruin the industry of their enemies. Commerce is what on those occasions gives life and motion to those forces by the number of seamen, which it brings up and forms during the time of peace.

SUPERIORITY of naval strength ought naturally to decide the contest. But it is very proper to observe, that the superiority of naval strength between two nations does not absolutely consist in number and strength of ships, if other circumstances are not equal.

THE proportion between the marine of two states compared together, is a political problem not easily solved ; the combination does not, however, seem impossible. This is not a proper place to attempt it ; wherefore, we shall only observe, that in order to determine the proportion it is necessary to know the uses that may be made of the respective naval forces of each, the necessity, or occasion for those uses ; how far a less strength may be able to reduce a greater to an inability of acting, by the advantages of it's situation and proper distribution of it's forces.

THAT proportion being once settled with regard to any supposed numbers, may easily be applied afterwards to any other numbers.

IF the proportion be always exact between the marine of two states, the superiority of the one over the other will depend on the dispatch and secrecy, with which they arm ;

on the capacity of their commanders, and the experience, courage, and intrepidity, both of their officers, and sailors; on their manner of fighting; on the superior degree of care taken in victualling and providing proper stores for their fleets, squadrons, and arsenals; and on the best combination of their reciprocal expeditions.

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DISSERTATION XXIX.

Of stationing convoys and cruizers for the security and protection of our own trade and navigation, and for the annoying those of the enemy.

UNDER the article ASSURANCE, in my universal dictionary of trade and commerce, I have very fully stated the practical nature of insuring ships and merchandize, to which I refer the reader, who would thoroughly understand this subject.

By the tables therein represented, the difference between an high and a low insurance will very plainly appear, and consequently the advantage the British nation may reap from the superiority of her naval force, in time of war, by a wise regulation of our convoys, and cruizers, in order to protect our own commerce in the first place, and then to annoy that of the enemy; as the one will lower the insurance on our trade, in proportion to the care that shall be taken of it's preservation; and the other will raise the in-

surance on our enemy's trade, in proportion to the force that shall be properly stationed to annoy the same. From whence it appears of what prodigious consequence the proper or improper direction of our naval force is in the article of insurance only ;—not to mention the national gain by captures, the property, lives, and liberties of multitudes of his Majesty's subjects that may be thereby saved as well as a great proportion of the public revenue, besides the reducing our enemies to great distress.—That an idea of the high concernment hereof may appear, it may be proper to observe, how, in time of war now with France, a few ships of war may be employed to answer those purposes.

SUPPOSE a convoy should go from England every four or six months, for Africa, America, and then home to Great Britain, besides the convoys that shall go at proper times directly to America.

SUCH convoy may see all the trade that are ready to sail to the south-west at a proper distance, and, particularly, the trade to *Portugal*, as far as their respective ports ; the *Streights* trade as far as Gibraltar, or Cape St. Vincent ; and then to proceed to Africa, and relieve such ships of war as shall be before stationed there ; which relieved ships may proceed with the trade from *Africa to America*, and relieve such ships of war as shall be stationed there ; which relieved ships may convoy the trade that shall be ready to sail

fail from their respective colonies for Europe and North America, as far as their respective tracts, or latitudes.

THE ships of war that may be thus appointed convoys, will sail in such tracts, as will give them frequent opportunities to annoy the enemy, and gain great advantages to themselves, as they may be from four to six months cruising on the coasts of *Africa*, and as long or longer in *America*.

THE ships bound from *Africa* to our western ports may rendezvous at Plymouth, Falmouth, Cork, or Kingfale.

THE advantage of such a rotation of convoys will be very great, with regard to easing freights and insurance, two very sensible articles in trade in time of war; and the markets on all sides will be more regularly supplied.

FREIGHTS, by the means of frequent and certain convoys, and quick voyages, will be lower, at least, one quarter, as there will be great savings in seamen's wages, victualling, demurrage, and the preservation of the ships, by means of quick dispatch.

SINCE this rotation may, by means of thus exchanging stations, be performed in five or six months, it is apprehended that a few ships of war, over-and-above what are necessary to be stationed in *Africa* and *America*, will answer all these advantages: and, moreover, this will, in a great measure, prevent the decay

cay of his Majesty's ships, by keeping them too long in *Africa* and *America*.

THE practice in queen Anne's war was to let the convoys to the trade to America go out one year, and return home the next, after being relieved by other convoys, whereby they usually remained in *America* 14 months; but of late years, most of our ships of war have remained in *America*, and particularly in the *West-Indies*, about three or four years: wherefore it is submitted whether the method above-mentioned, is not to be preferred to the other? Since his Majesty's ships will then cross the western ocean ofner, which will afford much stronger, and more frequent, more certain and more regular convoys, and our trade would be much better protected, than it was in the late war with *France*, and that with the same number of ships as we employed in that service; and the ships would be fitted for the sea, with more expedition, and at less expence, after their arrival in England.

THE strength of France may be depressed by keeping cruizing squadrons at Gibraltar, and on the coast of Portugal. And as our ships of war may be encreased, it will be proper to have a great many ships of small force in fair weather, in a constant course of sailing to suppress privateers, and seize our enemy's trading ships.—The commanders of such small ships should be accountable for their time *.

* Why may they not be always at sea for a certain fixed time, as well as other ships trading some where or other?

The accounts of their remaining in harbour, &c. may be transmitted to the government by it's civil officers. As large squadrons of men of war have not many opportunities of engaging with our enemy's ships of trade, those small ships will be highly serviceable: one squadron of those cruizers, well made for expedition, and well appointed and regulated, carrying about 12 or 14 guns may be stationed about the islands of *Guernsey* and *Jersey*, there being good harbouring; and they might be a very proper additional force to our cruizing squadrons of small ships at Gibraltar, and on the coast of Portugal, and others may be steddily cruizing on the most convenient parts of our own coasts, where we may intercept the enemy's ships.

Z 4

D I S.



DISSERTATION XXX.

The ill policy of our insuring the ships and merchandizes of the enemy in times of war: with considerations on neutral powers.

IT is to be feared that all our endeavours to encrease our maritime strength, and to annoy the trade of the enemy, will little avail us, if the practice of our insuring the ships and merchandizes of the enemy shall prevail, either directly or indirectly. We may as well, we apprehend, insure all their royal navy, perhaps, as their mercantile commerce and navigation. A matter of this concernment in time of war, being closely connected with the scope of our intentions, it is conceived that this work would not be so useful as we are ambitious it may without it; and therefore shall give a summary of the argument with what brevity and perspicuity we can.

THOUGH insurances in general are both useful and necessary, we beg leave to say, that

that those made for British account on the shipping and merchandises of enemies in times of war, seem to be attended with very bad consequences. During the late war in 1747, the parliament of England, when they prohibited all commerce with France, took into consideration, whether the insurance of goods, imported into, or exported from France, and her colonies, should not likewise be prohibited? Several magnified the advantages arising to the nation from this branch of insurance: and several of our eminent insurers very patriotly speeched it in parliament upon this occasion, as they had done before in the year 1741. But the substance of what was urged in favour of the essential point then under consideration seems to be badly grounded. For all parties agreed that no assistance should be given, or measures ought to be taken on our part, to enable the enemy to carry on the war to greater advantage than they could do without such assistance and measures on our side. The insurers, whose immediate interest it was to execute the orders for these insurances for the enemy, insisted, with confidence, that they were attended with large profits to the nation, that is, to themselves; and that the making such profits on the enemy ought not to be neglected, and transferred to other countries, by a prohibition here. Several worthy members of parliament enquired strictly into the
true

true state of this business, in order to discover whether the nation was so highly benefited by these foreign insurances as was asserted; and many disinterested merchants impartially declared their opinions thereon to the following effect:

1. That the supposed profit of 3 per cent. on a premium of 30 per cent., said in some of the above-mentioned speeches, and calculations of profit to be made, is quite uncertain: that, in proportion as the number of the British ships of war and privateers increase, much more may be lost than supposed to be gained; and that when only 18 per cent. premium was paid for insurance here, the insurers, as well as others, actually know they were great losers by such risks.

2. THAT no merchants, by their skill in computing of chances, can demonstrate what the profits on any voyage will be; and all that can be known is, that those alone have reason to promise themselves advantage from insurances who do or do not underwrite greater or lesser sums, in proportion as the premiums shall rise or fall, and the circumstances shall be more or less dangerous.

3. THAT we have more or less reason to expect profit or loss from foreign insurances, in proportion as there is a greater or less number of persons who have sufficient experience, and know how to make the proper choice.

4. THAT

4. THAT it is evident, if more clear money be paid for losses upon foreign insurances, then the gross sums received for premiums and all charges amount to, the articles set forth by the advocates for the practice of commission, brokerage, and deductions are by no means to be considered as indisputable items of profit: for although they bring clear sums into the pockets of the factors, or brokers, who negotiate such insurances, the losses paid by insurers may greatly exceed the whole foreign disbursement, and consequently the balance will be a national loss.— This point, therefore, as mentioned above, is extremely difficult to ascertain: but there is a plain and incontestable argument against foreign insurances being made for an enemy, which will always subsist so long as Great Britain maintains the superiority of naval power; which is, *That the great object of a maritime nation should be, to take advantage of any rupture with another trading state, to destroy and distress their shipping and commerce, and to cut off all resources for naval armaments.* But to permit such insurances is manifestly to defeat this end, and is contradictory to common sense: for the government and private merchants are, on the one hand, fitting out vessels at a great expence to make captures, and to annoy and distress the enemy; whilst another set of merchants make good the losses, and furnish means for the continuance of their commerce.

5. WHEN

5. WHEN orders come for insurances from places where the eager pursuit of premiums is as strong as it is here in England, it shews that a high premium has been there insisted on: and as people on the spot can be better judges of the nature of the concern, the navigation, ships, commanders, &c. than those at a distance, there can be little hopes of profit of insurances which foreigners have rejected.

6. THAT as it is now customary to accept of estimations, in which the foreigner insured, in case of a loss, finds his account better than if the vessels had not been lost or taken; nay, it is agreed to pay such a sum insured, whether on board the ship or not; it is evident that such agreements have a bad tendency, as they give so much room for frauds.—That no person ever *had proved to a certainty, whether by insurances on foreign trade, more, on the whole, had been gained than lost.*—That it was contrary to sound and good policy, to grant assistance to undertakings which were contrary to the general interest, and diametrically opposite to the intention of *prohibiting the trade with France*, the natural consequence of which should have been the prohibition of insuring their ships and goods. This is to be understood only in times of war; for in those of peace, such insurances should be considered as a business that is to be left to the free will of the merchant.

FROM

FROM the superiority of our maritime power in the last war with Spain, we might have gained far greater advantages over them than we did, had it not been for the practice of our insuring their ships and merchandize; nay, we must have subdued them, and subdued them perhaps without a battle, and without the possibility of resistance; for against such an enemy as we then were, their courage or their discipline was of little use; they formed armies, indeed, which only stood on the shore, to defend what we had no intention of invading, and beheld those ships seized wherein their pay was treasured, or their provisions stored.—Such was our natural superiority over the Spaniards, a species of superiority that must have inevitably prevailed, if it had not been defeated by our own folly; and certainly a more effectual method of defeating it the Spaniards themselves could not have discovered, than that of insuring their ships amongst our merchants. When a ship thus insured was taken, we examined her cargo, found it extremely valuable, and triumphed in our success, by cavalcades of waggon-loads of money through our streets; we not only counted the gain to ourselves, but the loss to our enemies, and determined that a small number of such captures would reduce them to offer us peace upon our own terms.

SUCH

SUCH were the conclusions made, and made with reason, by men unacquainted with the secret practices amongst ourselves, and who did not suspect us to be stupid enough to secure our enemies against ourselves; but it was frequently found, upon a close examination, that our ships of war had only plundered our own merchants, and that our privateers did indeed enrich themselves, but thereby impoverished their country: for it was discovered, that the loss of the Spaniards was to be repaid, and perhaps sometimes with interest, by our British insurers!

10 If it be urged, that we ought not to enact any laws which may obstruct the gain of our fellow-subjects, may it not be asked, why all trade with Spain in time of war with them is prohibited? May not the trade be equally gainful with the insurance; and may not the gain be more generally distributed, and therefore be more properly national? But the trade with Spain at such times is prohibited, because it was more necessary to our enemies than to ourselves; because the laws of war require, that a less evil should be suffered to inflict a greater: it is upon this principle that every battle is fought, and that we fire our own ships to consume the navies of our enemies. For this reason it appears to be evident beyond contradiction, that the insurance of Spanish ships ought to have been prohibited in time of war with
that

that nation ; we should indeed have lost the profit of the insurance, but we should have been reimbursed by the captures, which is an argument that cannot be produced for the prohibition of commerce in time of war.

It has been said, and insisted on by some, though never made appear, that our enemies may insure their ships in other countries ; but this, if true, would lay them under the necessity of establishing a new correspondence for the purpose : and would not this prove at least such a temporary obstruction of their trade, which, though of short continuance, might lay them at our mercy during the interval of such establishment. But let us consider the weakness of this argument.—They *must* be allowed to insure here, because they *may* insure in other places.—Will it not be equally just to urge, that they *must* trade with us, because they *may* trade with other nations? And may it not be answered, that, though we cannot wholly suspend their commerce, it is yet our interest to obstruct it, as far as we are able? May it not be farther affirmed, that, by insuring in other nations, they may injure their allies by falling into our hands, but do not the less benefit us? That, if they do not grow weaker, we are, at least, strengthened ; *but that, by insuring among us, whatever steps shall be taken to put*
a speedy

a speedy end to the war, the equilibrium of it is still preserved the same?

We have introduced this topic among others, to show how industriously we have laboured to strengthen and enrich our enemy the better to enable them to humble us.

—Risum teneatis!

DIS-



DISSERTATION XXXI.

An enquiry how long France may be presumed to carry on the war from the present state of affairs.

WE have seen upon how extensive a bottom the commerce of France stands, and how invincible she must, at length, become by peace, if she meet with no remora to her progress in commercial dominion. Let us penetrate her cabinet now in time of war.

SHE has not a grand alliance now to cope with. Her trade and navigation being at present carried on chiefly by neutral states, it is not in our power to reduce her revenues; for what she loses in freight, she in a great measure, saves by insurance. Nay, the general commerce of France is more extensive now than in time of peace; for their neutral carriers, as well for their own as for French account force the sales of French commodities more than the French themselves do in times of peace by their cheapness; for the Dutch themselves cannot work so cheap as the

French, though they can and do fail cheaper. For, as an ingenious gentleman has observed *, " Bread, in Holland, such as our manufacturers in England eat, is commonly at 3 d. a pound sterling; flesh at 9 d. such as is sold in England at 3 d.; labour as high as in England: whereas, in France, in the provinces, bread is in common at one half penny sterling per pound, or at least at about half the price it is at in England; and flesh in the same proportion. Labour in France, likewise, is but from 3 d. per day, of 14 hours, or from five to seven o' clock, in the cheapest countries, and at about 7 d. half penny in the dearest: in manufactures, at but half the price as in England. Sailors wages a-board the French navy, but from about 8 to 12 s. per month; whereas in England, a sailor has 20 s. per month a-board king's ships. Must not this render their commodities exceeding cheap in comparison to ours at foreign markets?

AND here it may be observed, that this cheapness of labour, provisions, and commodities, was, at first brought about by the sole artifice of the enhancement of their money from 27 livres, to 50 livres the mark of eight ounces of silver troy weight; and this has been done since the beginning of the confederate war in 1702. It is true, this caused

* The progress of the French in their views of universal monarchy.

great convulsions in the kingdom at first, but in the issue, it has been the instrument by which they have sapped the foundations of our trade ; and, if a remedy be not applied, this artifice of the French will worm out British manufactures by gentle degrees in every market in the world : and that no less in time of war than peace, by virtue of neutral powers carrying on their trade for them ; which they cannot do to such advantage by British commodities, by reason of their greater dearth.

By this artifice they have rendered their labour so cheap, that they reap a plentiful harvest in every country, *where they pay but the same customs as the English*, whilst the English merchant is obliged to wait for the gleanings of the market, after the Frenchman has finished his sales.

THE project of the enhancement of money, has given an undue preference in France to money, above land and commodities : but where lies the disadvantage at present, if the gentleman receives but a hundred pound weight of silver for his lands, where he used to receive two hundred pound, if, at the same time, he can purchase as many commodities with a hundred pound, as before the enhancement he could with two ? It is certain it would only affect his foreign consumption. By this scheme the French have restrained the bulk of the people to the consumption of their own manufactures, and commodities, and have prodigiously extended their

their commerce, by underselling all nations. This has enabled their islands to send home sugars, indico, &c. so cheap, as to rival us in all the European markets, and in the Levant: and all this they do, though their manufacturers pay six times as much in taxes on the necessaries of life as they do in England.

DUTOR says, the price of bread, corn, and provisions, is no greater now than in 1683; though in this last year the mark of silver was but 27 livres *, and now 50 are coined out of it. This circumstance, as observed, has rendered their commodities so cheap, that they undersell us, and engross all the markets in the world from our merchants. It is likewise this enhancement of their coin, and the consequent cheapness of their commodities, which has enabled our smugglers to carry on such an advantageous trade with them. If but 20 l. 5 s. were now coined out of their mark of silver of eight ounces troy weight, which was the case in the year, 1660, the French would not be able to sell a gallon of brandy under 5 s. sterling, which now they can sell for 2 s.; nor a pound of tea under 7 s. 6 d. sterling, which they now sell for 3 shillings; nor a yard of silk damask under 12 s. 6 d. which they now

* When the mark was at 20 livres about 1660, labour was dearer in France than in England.

sell for 5 shillings; nor a yard of cloth under 15 s. which they now sell for 6 shillings, abating only in the manufactures, the difference made in the price of those manufactures, with regard to the raw-materials, which cost both French and English men much the same, though the raw silk comes to them cheaper from their Turkey-traders; and their wool used in their fine woollen stuffs dearer from our smugglers than to us.

BUT, though they have got, by this, and the other schemes of policy, that we have represented throughout these papers, the greatest part of the trade to Spain from us, the Turkey trade, the Italian trade, and great part of the East-India and African trades; the northern and cod-fishery and furr trades; yet they cannot be easy, but must attempt to rob us also of our colonies; our trade to which is the only valuable branch we have left, except that of Portugal, where we have seen they are ruining us by their black druggets and by every imaginable artifice.

THE immediate design of the French in their encroachments upon our territories in North-America, and in their approaches towards our colonies, is to open to themselves a communication through those colonies to the Mississippi, and Canada.—They regret the advantages we have in the tobacco trade, and intend to establish plantations for that

commodity in the fertile plains between the river Mississippi, and our settlements in Virginia; though all these lands belong to us.

Is it, therefore, to be wondered that the commerce of France is so greatly advanced throughout the world, as we have shewn it really is? What can hinder that nation from obtaining the commercial dominion they so zealously aim at? Nothing can prevent this effectually but our capacity to sell our commodities as cheap and as good in quality as this rival nation does. But how can this be ever accomplished, if we continue to encrease our public debts and taxes? Our constitution and public faith will not admit us to play such tricks with our money as the French have done. What then ought we resolve to do? The answer is now obvious. Let the measures be taken, that I have faithfully and impartially laboured to recommend in this and all my other writings for the public interest and happiness, or such other as shall be more eligible: Let such a quantity of more land be taken into cultivation as will fairly render things as cheap in England, as in France: and let the whole, or a considerable part of the supplies to carry on the war be raised within the year, without perpetuated taxes still further to enhance the price of our arts, and manufactures: and let the public debts be put into a certain way of redemption: let also England and Ireland be united;
and

and our plantations properly regulated : and let smuggling of every kind be extirpated, especially, that to the isle of Man, by annexing the same to the crown : let every wise domestic measure be taken that tend to the encouragement of the commercial arts : Let the society for the advancement of arts, and trades, be incorporated and supported by parliamentary authority : and after all ; let such a system of foreign affairs be adopted by the crown of England as will put it long out of the power of France to disturb our tranquillity, or that of Europe : and let not this humble attempt be slighted and contemned, because it comes from a private person, because it is not impossible but a private speculative man may happily fall upon that which may escape the most public active person of infinitely greater abilities, and only, because he is too much absorbed in public business.

From the death of Philip the fourth, king of Spain, to the league of Augsburg in 1683, Mons. Colbert took care to encourage arts, diffuse manufactures, promote fisheries, and inland commerce, and all with a view to raise a powerful marine to rival the united forces of the English and Dutch. This was the principal part of the plan of conquest ; and this the French succeeded in to their wishes ; so that in a few years we saw France alone contend with the united squadrons of

the English and Dutch for the empire of the main.

HOT-HEADED Lewis would never have attained his end, had it not been for the prudent counsels of his minister Colbert, who addressed him in this manner when he was venting his spleen against the Dutch, who obstructed his conquest :

“ THE advice I would presume to give your majesty is, to disband the greatest part of your forces, and save so many taxes to your people. Your very dominions make you too powerful to fear any insult from your neighbours. Turn your thoughts, Sir, I intreat you, from war, cultivate the arts of peace, the trade and manufacture of your subjects : this will make you the most powerful prince, and your people at the same time the richest of all nations.—There never will be wanting fools to purchase the manufactures of France ; but France must be strictly prohibited to buy those of other countries. But above all, peace will ingratiate your majesty with the Spanish nation during the life of their crazy king ; and, after his death, a few seasonable presents among his courtiers shall purchase the reversion of his crowns, with all the treasures of the Indies, and then the world is your own.”

THUS commerce is to bring in riches, the treasures of the Indies ; and these are to be employed in raising armies and navies, and
making

making the world their own. Here the end the French pursue in promoting commerce is avowed, viz. that they may be able to plunder their neighbours, and rob them of their territories, that they may recover the empire of Charlemagne, or all that lies between the Baltic and the Adriatic, and from thence to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic ocean, after which, *the world is to be made their own.*

CONQUEST is the design of the French; trade is only attended to as the instrument. The French raise armies, build ships, erect forts, and favour manufactures and commerce, not to make their people happy, but to be in a condition to take advantage of every conjuncture for extending their dominions, and robbing their neighbours. Colbert avows this, and that the dominions of the French king are too great, and make him too powerful to fear any insult from *his neighbours*. And their other politicians say, one state is weak, *another* divided, *another* slothful, and from thence encourage their princes to make a prey of all. And if the commerce is aided and assisted by neutral potentates during a war, will not their revenues be kept in good plight, notwithstanding we may take more of their ships than they shall do of ours; and especially so if we insure them?

WE have seen how their connections in trade with the Spaniards are managed; and

provided Spain shall join them against England, how shall we be able alone to withstand their united power? Do we not experience that our royal navies have not hitherto been able to do them any significant mischief? Nay, they seem to despise our maritime power. And if the whole maritime power of Spain should unite with that of France against us, what head can we expect to make against both, when we have done so little against France alone?

THE royal navy of Spain is said to consist at present of the following ships, viz. one of 114 guns, six of 80, thirty-seven of 70, four of 64, six of 60, one of 54, one of 50, five of 30, four of 26, four of 24, four of 22, five of 16, four packet-boats, mounting 16 guns each, thirteen xebèques of 24 guns, four bomb-ketches, each carrying 12 guns, and four fire-ships; in all *one hundred and three sail*.

I WOULD be the last person in the kingdom who would spread false alarms; but I would be one of the first who would apprize my country of danger, in order to prevent it. And all I would intend by these representations is, that we might prepare against the worst; and I wish the king's ministers would think of the most effectual measures to reduce the power of France within such bounds that we may obtain an honourable and a lasting peace; but this does not appear possible

possible, in my humble judgment, according to the fashionable politics of the day.

FOR how can we expect to deal with France without any maritime allies, when they are such greater gainers in their trade by neutral states than we can possibly be, as our commerce is at present circumstanced? The trade and navigation of France was never till now brought to the height it is; the foundation for commercial dominions was never so formidable as at present. If, when this nation was less powerful, and we millions less in debt, and formed the grand alliance for our security, we could not easily cope with them, what reason can we have to flatter ourselves that we can so easily defeat all their designs at present?

WHILST France continues to enjoy so extraordinary advantages in her trade as we have seen she does in every part of the world, she will have great resources to continue the war, while ours will every day diminish, by reason of the great activity of the neutral carriers in favour of the trade of France, and their inattention and disregard to that of Great Britain; for this plain reason, that the dearness of our commodities renders them not worth their while to deal in them, while they are great gainers by trafficking with those of France. Thus all the neutral powers contributing to the advancement of the commerce of France, while ours is more
and

and more loaded with tax-incumbrances, it does not seem possible for England, under such circumstances. to be able to reduce France to a lasting and an honourable peace: for although his Prussian majesty shall attempt to make all the head he can against France; yet this will not help our trading interest: he will not be able to cut off all essential resources, which enable France to carry on the war. We see by what interesting ties, the ties of a commercial neutrality, that the Dutch have reason to be attached rather to France than England.

TILL, therefore, we can so change the system of Europe, as to raise such powerful allies to act vigorously and faithfully against the power of France, and those allies which she may further draw into her measures, what reason can we have to amuse ourselves with a peace that is likely to be either honourable or permanent? I wish this could be satisfactorily demonstrated to the public. But I am very doubtful that it cannot, without some essential alteration is made in our foreign system; and this alteration, we humbly judge, not impracticable: we apprehend, on the contrary, that such a change might be effectuated with far less difficulty than the old system can be supported to check sufficiently the career of France.

BUT

BUT till something of a new foreign system shall be happily adopted, we humbly recommend these dissertations to the consideration of the public: if they are right in the general, they will live; and if they are wrong, it is to be hoped that the intention will atone for mistakes.

DIS



DISSERTATION XXXII.

Some general maxims regarding the advancement of the national commerce, as founded on experience, and the opinion of the most knowing and judicious.

THE history and nature of commerce furnishes us with three important reflections:

1. PEOPLE have been seen to make up, by dint of industry, for what was wanting in the productions of their own country, and thereby possess more of what men have agreed to call riches, than those who were proprietors of natural riches. But that industry always consisted in supplying one country with the natural riches of another, of which it stood in need: and on the other hand, without industry, no people ever possessed any plenty of gold and silver, which are what men have agreed to call riches.

2. A NATION loses its commerce insensibly, when it does not carry on so great a trade as it is able to do. Every branch of trade supposes a want, either real or imaginary:

nary: the profits arising from them are a means of undertaking more; and nothing is so dangerous as to force other nations to supply their wants themselves. The greatest industry has ever been the effect of the greatest necessity: the prodigious efforts it occasions are like the flowing of an impetuous torrent, whose waters beat with violence against the banks that confine them, till at last they force them down.

3. A COUNTRY in which a great trade flourishes, a constant indication of which is its opulence, will always be most populous. It is certain that the conveniences of life are what most attract mankind. Let us suppose trading people surrounded by others not traders: the former will very soon bring over to them as many of the latter as can reap a profit by being employed in their trade.

THESE three reflections indicate the principle of commerce in a body politic in particular: agriculture and industry are the essence of it: their union is such, that if the one prevails over the other, it destroys itself. Without industry the fruits of the earth can have no value: if agriculture be neglected, the fountain of trade is dried up.

THE intent of commerce in a state is, by labour to maintain in ease and plenty as many men as possible. Agriculture and industry are the only means of subsistence: If both of them are advantageous to those that follow

follow them, inhabitants will never be wanting.

THE effect of commerce is, to give a body politic all the weight and strength, influence and dignity it is capable of receiving. These consist in the number of inhabitants attracted by its political riches, which are at the same time both real and relative.

THE real riches of a state are its superior degree of *independence on other states* for necessities, and the greater quantity of superfluities it has to export. Its relative riches depend on the quantity its trade procures of what men have agreed to call riches, compared with the quantity of the same kind of riches brought into neighbouring states by their trade. A combination of these real and relative riches is what constitutes the art and science of the administration of *political commerce*.

EVERY operation in the commerce of a state contrary to these principles, is destructive to commerce itself.

CONSEQUENTLY, all that can be said on this head is founded on this fundamental maxim, that there is a beneficial national trade, and a national trade which is not so. To be convinced of that, it is necessary to distinguish between what the merchant gains and what the state gains. If the merchant imports foreign goods, by which the consumption of the national manufactures is hurt, it is certain that, though the merchant gains

gains by the sale of those goods, the state loses, first, the value of what they cost abroad ; secondly, the wages which would have been earned by divers workmen in fabricating those goods at home ; thirdly, the value of what the first materials would have produced to the planters of the country or colony where they grew ; fourthly, the benefit of the circulation of all those values ; that is to say, the ease and convenience, the consumption of them would have afforded to numbers of others ; and fifthly, the assistance the prince has a right to expect from the affluence of his subjects.

If those first materials are the produce of its colonies, the state likewise loses the benefits of navigation. If they are foreign materials, this last loss still takes place ; and instead of immediately affecting the produce of the lands, will fall upon the national commodities, which would have been exported for those first materials.

THE gain of the state is, therefore, exactly what we have just said it must lose on the foregoing supposition ; the merchant's gain is only what he sells his goods for more than what they cost him.

ON the other hand, the merchant may lose when the state gains. If a merchant sends imprudently manufactures of his own country to another where they are not wanted, he may lose by the sale of them : but

still the state will gain so much as they are sold for abroad; the circulation of what shall have been paid the land for the price of the first materials, the wages of the workmen employed in manufacturing them, the value of the navigation, if they are exported by sea, the benefit of circulation, and the tribute which the public wealth owes to the state.

WHAT the merchant gains by his fellow-subjects is therefore absolutely indifferent to the state, which gains nothing by it; but that gain is not indifferent, when it increases the debt due by other nations, and is an encouragement to other undertakings lucrative and beneficial to society.

BEFORE we examine by what means legislators fulfil the intent and effect of commerce, I shall observe that there are nine maxims, which our English commercial laws have adopted, whereby to judge of the advantage or disadvantage of a trade.

1. THE exportation of superfluities is the clearest profit a nation can make.

2. THE superfluous produce of the land is exported to most advantage after it is worked up or manufactured.

3. The importation of foreign materials for manufacturing, unwrought instead of importing them ready manufactured, saves a great deal of money to the nation.

4. Ex-

4. **EXCHANGE** of merchandize for mere merchandize is advantageous in general; but not in cases where it is contrary to the foregoing maxims.

5. **THE** importation of foreign commodities, whereby the consumption of national commodities is hurt, or the progress of a nation's manufactures and the culture of its lands prejudiced, must necessarily bring on the ruin of that nation.

6. **THE** importation of foreign commodities of mere luxury, in exchange for money, is a real loss to the state.

7. **THE** importation of things absolutely necessary, cannot be thought an evil; but the nation is not less impoverished by it.

8. **THE** importation of foreign goods, to be afterwards re-exported, leaves a real profit behind.

9. To hire out one's ships for freight to other nations is a beneficial commerce.

THE general operation of commerce ought to be directed by this plan.

WE have defined that operation to be the home circulation of the produce of a country, or its colonies, the exportation of its superfluities, and the importation of foreign commodities, either to be consumed at home, or re-exported.

THIS definition naturally divides trade into two parts, home and foreign. Their principles are widely different, and if not distin-

guished from each other, must occasion great confusion.

THE home trade of a nation is that which the several members of a society carry on among themselves. It holds the first rank in trade in general, because what is necessary is more esteemed than what is superfluous, which is not for that reason less in request.

THIS home circulation consists in the consumption of the produce of the country, and of the industry of the inhabitants, of which that consumption is the soul and support. We have already observed, that the real riches of a nation are at their highest period when that nation has recourse to no other to supply its wants. The rules established in consequence in different states, vary according to the greater or less abundance of their natural riches; and the well-judged industry of many has compensated for what nature has refused them.

THE value of a home trade is exactly the sum to which the private expence of every inhabitant amounts, for lodging, food, cloathing, and the conveniencies and superfluities of life. But whatever is consumed of foreign commodities must be deducted from that value, as a real loss to the nation, so far as it is not compensated by a foreign trade.

THE populousness of a state is the soul of this home consumption, the perfection of which consists in a plenty of commodities of the

the national growth, adequate to the want and demand for them: its preservation depends on the profit which those commodities yield to the proprietor of them, and on the encouragement given them by the state.

So long as the lands receive their greatest and best culture that can possibly be given them, the use of articles of convenience and luxury cannot be too general, provided those articles are of the growth of the country, or its colonies.

THEIR value increases the amount of private expences, and is divided among the several inhabitants employed therein.

It is good for a state not to want any of the sweets and conveniencies of life, because that people is more happy by possessing them than it would be otherwise. It would cease to be so, if those conveniencies exhausted its riches: nay, it would soon be quite deprived of happiness, because real wants are impatient and tormenting creditors. But when those articles of convenience and luxury are the produce of the country, the pleasure they procure is attended with several advantages. They are an allurement to other nations, who are taken with them, and procure the state that possesses them wherewithal to increase its exports. Let me be allowed to extend this maxim to the liberal arts and sciences: they cannot be degraded by being considered in a new light of commercial utility. Men require instruction and amusement:

ment: every nation that is obliged to have recourse to another for those instructions or amusements, is so far impoverished thereby, as the expence on that occasion amounts to, which is so much clear gain to the nation by which they are furnished.

WHAT to the eye of reason might seem a most frivolous art, or a most trifling commodity, is a very essential object in *political commerce*. Philip II. though possessed of the mines of Potosi, issued two edicts during his reign, only to forbid the importation of all foreign dolls, glass-ware, combs, and pins, especially French.

ALLOWING fashions, and the continual changes of them, to be the effect of the levity and fickleness of a people; yet it is certain that people could not act more wisely for the benefit of its trade and circulation. Those only are to blame who follow them when not able to afford it: the real ridicule consists in complaining of fashions or finery, and not in abstaining from them.

IT is, however, far from being impossible, or even difficult, to carry luxury to too great a height; the consequence of which would be, that the lands and most necessary arts would be much neglected, and other less useful arts and less necessary cultures applied to.

IT is always in the legislature's power to check that excess, by striking at its cause: they will always be able to maintain a just equilibrium

equilibrium between the several occupations of the subject, to ease the part that suffers by granting privileges and immunities, and to make the taxes fall on the home consumption of articles of luxury.

THAT part of trade falls properly under the cognizance of the particular laws of the body politic, in whose power it is to encourage, restrain, or absolutely prohibit the use of commodities, either national or foreign, according as the welfare of the state requires. For that reason it is that all colonies are under a state of perpetual prohibition.

LASTLY, it must always be remembered, that the home-trade of a country, is what particularly keeps up the real riches of the state.

FOREIGN trade is that which a political society carries on with others: it tends to the same end that the home-trade does, but is more particularly calculated to procure relative riches. For, if we suppose a trading people abounding with commodities of which foreigners make but little use, the home-trade of that people will keep up the spirit of culture and industry by what is consumed among themselves; but the foreign trade will go no farther than barely to favour it, without sacrificing to it any opportunity of encreasing the relative riches of the state, by the sale of any other commodity more suitable to a foreign market. This part of trade is so closely

connected with the political interests of a state, that it partakes of their nature.

PRINCES are always in a forced state when considered relatively to other princes; and those who would procure their subjects any considerable export of their commodities, are obliged to consider the circumstances, maxims and interests of other trading nations, as well as the taste and caprice of the consumer.

THE operation of foreign trade consists in supplying the wants of other nations, and drawing thence wherewith to answer one's own. The perfection of that trade consists in supplying others with as much as is possible, and in the most advantageous manner that can be: it's preservation depends on the manner in which it is carried on.

THE produce of the land and of industry is, as we have before said, the basis of all trade. Fruitful countries have consequently an advantage for exportation over barren ones: and the more a commodity is necessary and perfect, the more other nations must depend on it.

To be very populous is one of the advantages, by which a nation is enabled to supply to the utmost the wants of other nations: whilst on the other hand it's foreign trade employs all the hands which it's home-trade could not have maintained.

A NATION will be more or less populous according as it's inhabitants are more or less able

able to subsist by their labour, and as their property is more or less secure. If their labour does not afford them the means of subsistence, experience shews they will seek it in other countries. Accordingly, when by extraordinary circumstances that is like to be the case, the legislature takes care to prevent the evil by finding employment for the subject. From the necessity of a country's being well peopled, it follows that idleness ought not to be suffered.

ONE country can not supply another with any commodity, which it does not sell as cheap as it can be bought elsewhere: if cheaper, it will always be preferred at home. Four things are sure to constitute that cheapness: rivalry in trade, oeconomy of men's labour, small charges of exportation, and low interest of money.

DOMESTIC rivalry in trade produces plenty; and plenty cheapness of provisions, of the first materials, of labour and of money. Rivalship is one of the most important principles of trade, and a considerable part of it's liberty. Whatever cramps or hurts it in these four points is ruinous to the state, and diametrically contrary to it's intent, which is the happiness and comfortable subsistence of the greatest number possible of men.

THE oeconomy of men's labour consists in substituting in it's stead that of animals and machines, when it can be done either with less expence, or more safety to the men.

Far

Far from preventing, it is a means of encreasing the populoufness of a state. The mistaken notion of it's being a hindrance to the propagation of the human species prevailed longest in those countries whose trade was confined within themselves. And, indeed, it must be allowed that where there is but little foreign trade, the general intent would not be answered, if the home-trade did not employ as many men as possible. But, if foreign trade, that is to say, navigation, the colonies, and wants of other countries, is able to employ still more men than are to be found, it is necessary to oeconomise their labour that it may answer all those ends as far as it possibly can. Experience shews, that a nation loses it's trade when it does not carry on so great a one as it is able to do. It is evident that the strength of a body politic depends on employing in the best and most extensive manner whatever men are invited thither by it's political riches. A consideration it is necessary never to lose sight of. To oeconomise the labour of men cannot, therefore, hurt the encrease of the species, when the legislature only directs with prudence their labour from one object to another, which is properly the business of particular laws and regulations.

THE smallness of the expences of exportation is the third source of cheapness, and, consequently of the vent of the productions of a country.

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THOSE expences are the charges of carriage and duties outwards. The carriage is either by land, or water. Land-carriage is known to be by much the dearest. For which reason, canals to supply the want of navigable rivers, the keeping up and rendering convenient rivers that are navigable, and an absolute freedom of inland navigation, are an essential part of the administration in a trading state.

DUTIES, either inland, or on exportation, laid on the produce of a country, are of all charges those which foreigners are most unwilling to pay. The merchant looks upon them as an enhancement of the real value of a commodity, and policy considers them as an encrease of relative riches.

WISE nations either suppress those duties when commodities or manufactures of their own produce are exported, or proportion them to the foreign demand for those commodities. Above all they take care to compare the price of their goods delivered at the market where they are to be disposed of, with the price of the same kind of goods sent thither by their rivals in trade. Such a comparison is of great importance. Though the quality and prime cost of a commodity be the same in each of two manufacturing nations, yet the duties outwards ought not to be equal, if the charges of carriage be not the same too. The smallest difference influences the market.

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SOMETIMES the legislature instead of laying a duty on the exportation of some goods encourages it by granting a bounty. The intent of that bounty is to add to the profit of the labourer, or workman, when that profit is not otherwise sufficient to support a useful industry, in opposition to other nations. If the bounty be such as lessens the price of the commodity, the preference foreigners will give it in a few years will be sufficient to establish that new branch of trade, which will afterwards be able to support itself. The effect is certain; and the practical part cannot but be beneficial to a body politic. It is like the warmth which, in a human body, one member communicates to another when in need of it.

A NATION could not be said to supply another with as much as possible, if it was to trade in nothing but commodities of it's own growth. Every one knows by experience that it is natural to go for what one wants to the shop that is best stocked, and that choice of goods often makes customers want what they did not think of before. The case is the same in trade in general. Trading nations go to other nations for what they want, in order to sell them again to the consumers. This kind of trade, generally called the carrying trade, may be very properly called *economical*. A prudent nation will foregoe no branch of trade; and though it's articles of luxury do run high, yet, if it has plenty of
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inhabitants, and store of money at a low interest, it is evident that nation will be able to carry them all on successfully. I will go farther; the moment when it's merchants find their account, will be the most certain epocha of it's riches.

IN order not to deprive a nation of the profit to be made by foreign goods, but on the contrary to encrease it's relative riches, some states have opened ports in which the importation of whatever it is advantageous to re-export, is allowed free of duty: they are called *free ports*.

IN other states goods are only deposited; and, in order to facilitate the general exportation of even permitted foreign commodities, either the whole or part of the duties of entry are repaid on exportation.

THE foreign trade of a nation cannot have attained it's greatest perfection, if it's superfluities are not exported, and what it wants imported in the most advantageous manner possible.

SUCH exportations and importations are performed either by national ships, or foreign, and by traders either denizens, or aliens.

THERE is, therefore, an active, and a passive commerce. It is plain that a passive commerce lessens the advantages of exportation and enhances the price of importation.

IT is contrary to the intent of commerce in a state, by depriving the subject of his labour and means of subsistence; and prevents

it's effect by lessening the relative riches of that state.

A PASSIVE trade is productive of another disadvantage: the nation that engrosses the active trade of another, keeps that other in a state of dependance: whenever their union ceases, that which has only a passive trade, loses all it's vigour. It's Agriculture, industry, and colonies, are in a state of inaction; the number of it's inhabitants decreases, until it recovers an active trade; which it is never sure of doing, and must at all events be a work of time.

THE difference that results from the exports and imports during a certain time, compared, is called the *balance of trade*. That is always paid or received in money, because the exchange of commodities, or metals, by which they are represented, is indispensable when one has no other equivalent to give for them. States balance with each other just as private men do.

ACCORDINGLY, when the balance of trade is in favour of a nation, it's capital stock of conventional riches is encreased by so much as that balance amounts to: when that balance is against a nation, it's amount is a diminution of the capital stock.

THIS balance ought to be considered as particular, and general.

THE particular balance is that of the trade between two states; it is the object of the treaties they make with each other, in order

to establish, as nearly, as possible, an equality of commerce. Those treaties stipulate the kinds of commodities they are allowed to supply each other with; the mutual convenience and advantage of importing them; and the duties such goods are to pay.

IF two nations had only the same kinds of productions to communicate to each other, there would be no other treaty between them than what humanity dictates, to use each other well; because that of the two which had the advantage over the other, would, at last, engross it's trade both home and foreign. The trade between two such nations would then be reduced to that, which a third would give them room to carry on by the re-exportation, before mentioned.

PERFECT equality of trade between two nations, implies equality of value, and of the number of men necessarily employed by each. It is hardly possible for such a thing to be in reality; for which reason, equality of value is what is usually calculated.

THOUGH the numbers of men employed be not reckoned, one would incline to think it ought to be considered, according to the reciprocal necessity of the exchange. If the balance is not equal, the difference of the number of men mutually employed is not to be considered by the gainer; because it is certain that the sum received in money will increase the nation's home circulation, and
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consequently procure a greater number of men the means of subsisting comfortably.

If a foreign country is in absolute want of a commodity, the success of the means by which it is intended to bring it near to an equality in trade, depends on the degree of competition in that article; for if other nations having an equal quantity of the same commodity, offer better terms, that which is less advantageous will be excluded the market. If that foreign country has nothing to offer in exchange but goods of the same kind and species with those we are in actual possession of, it is proper first to compare the product and advantages that may be made by the sale of our own commodity, with the loss that may result from the importation of foreign commodities; and in the next place, by what means to prevent their interfering at home. Circumstances, which now no longer subsist in Europe, might formerly require a different policy in the case we are speaking of: when one or two nations, exclusive of others, carried on the general trade, it was not always proper for them to refuse the commodities of a third, because that would have been laying that third under the necessity of encreasing its own correspondence and navigation.

THE finishing of such a treaty of commerce requires also a thorough knowledge of the trade of the two contracting nations,
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of their mutual resources, their populousness, the price and quality of the first materials, the price of provisions and labour, their kinds of industry, reciprocal wants, particular and general balances, their finances, and the proportion of the interest of money, which being too low with one, and high with another, makes the latter lose where the former gains.

It may happen that the balance of trade with a country is disadvantageous, and yet that trade may be useful; that is to say, it may be the cause and necessary means of another trade, which more than compensates for that loss.

THE general balance of the trade of a nation is the profit or loss resulting from the particular balances compensated with each other.

THOUGH the amount of the general exportations should be lessened, if that of the importations be likewise lessened in proportion, the state cannot be said to have lost any part of its useful trade; because it is, generally speaking, a proof that a greater number of hands are employed in its home trade.

By the same reason, though the general exportations be less, if the importations have lessened more than in proportion, it proves an increase of useful trade.

It is plain that of several nations, that whose general balance is always most in its

favour, must become the most powerful. It will have most conventional riches; and those riches, by circulating at home, will maintain comfortably a greater number of inhabitants. Such is the effect of trade, when carried to perfection in a body politic: to procure those advantages is the aim and object of the government: and to succeed therein requires very superior views, and the utmost vigilance in watching over the steps, regulations and motives of rival nations; together with a thorough knowledge and exact calculation of real and relative riches compared. Circumstances vary continually, but the principles are ever the same. He who considers them in all their lights, will know how to apply them.

THE restrictions under which trade is laid for political reasons, cannot be said to cramp it. Freedom of trade, so much talked of, and so little understood, consists only in carrying on with ease that trade which is consistent with the real general interest of society.

WHATEVER extends beyond that is a licentiousness destructive of trade itself. I say, the real general interest, because what seems an advantage does not always prove so.

DECEIT and fraud cannot be too severely proscribed: formalities are requisite to enquire into them. All excess of them is destructive of liberty, and to neglect them entirely, introduces licentiousness. Those formalities

lities ought, therefore, not to be quite laid aside; but care should be taken to keep them within due bounds, and to provide for their being properly observed.

THERE is a necessity of domestic rivalry in commerce: it is the soul of freedom properly understood.

THAT is one of the nicest points in government: its principles will ever be a part of the plan by which a state obtains a general balance more advantageous than its neighbours.

WE have purposed examining trade as the occupation of a citizen. We will consider it in that light in relation to the body politic.

TRADE being the soul of that body, the profession of a trader is commendable, as is every profession useful to society. Every member of society ought to be distinguished in proportion to the services he renders; and trade cannot be encouraged in a country where such distinctions are not made.

A MAN may be personally concerned in trade three ways.

FIRST, by purchasing the productions of the land, and of the industry of its inhabitants, to sell them again in small quantities to his fellow-citizens. Dealers that way are called *retailers*.

THIS business, more convenient than necessary to society, promotes circulation at home.

SECONDLY, the industry of the citizen may be exerted in guiding and directing the labour of a number of other citizens, to prepare and form the first materials. Those who apply to that branch are called *manufacturers*.

THIS kind of industry is very necessary, because it increases the real and relative riches of a state.

THE third kind of trade, in which a citizen may be engaged, is, the exportation of the productions of his country, to be exchanged abroad for other necessary productions, or for money. That trade, whether it be carried on by sea or land, in Europe or to the extremities of the world, is distinguished by the name of *wholesale trade*, and the person that carries it on is called a *merchant*.

THIS profession is very necessary, for it is the soul of navigation, and increases the relative riches of the state.

THE strictest probity is a duty incumbent on, and gives life to these three ways of trading: their object is the same, gain: their effect different, as it contributes more or less to the general effect of trade in a body politic.

THIS effect is what the state ought to distinguish them by, and esteem each individual in proportion as he co-operates more or less.

Not

NOT that the immediate design of the legislator is to have merchants immensely rich: he values them because they have contributed greatly to the success of his views; but it would be still more useful, in case where trade is limited, to have many rich, rather than a few very rich. Twenty merchants with ten thousand pounds each, do more business, and have among them greater amount of credit, than five with forty thousand pounds a-piece. Besides, fortunes divided among many are a much greater help to the circulation and real riches of a country. A great disproportion of fortunes in trade is not, however, a burden to the state, because they generally circulate wholly to the advantage of useful arts; it were even to be wished they were to remain in trade, because they settle numbers of factors or agents abroad; those factors increase the branches of trade of their nation, and likewise procure it the advantages they make in the trade of which the country where they reside is susceptible. Such fortunes would not be taken out of trade, if the condition of a merchant was as much respected as it ought to be. As to the great undertakings in trade for a government, its own credit is sufficient; if the security be good, and a profit can be made, a sufficient number of solid undertakers will soon be found.

To know how to trade, or how to direct trade, are two very different things. To direct it properly, requires a knowledge of how it ought to be done; a man may gain by trade, without knowing how it ought to be directed. The merchant's science is in the detail of his particular business: the political science consists in the use that may be made of all those details. It is therefore necessary to know them; but that knowledge cannot be gathered but from merchants. One cannot converse with them too much in order to learn; but in deliberating, their advices are to be received with caution. We have already distinguished between the merchant's gains and the gains of the state;—and it is plain that the merchant, taken up with his own detail, seldom has an eye to what is general, unless he happens to have acquired that turn by travel, or an extensive experience on which he has meditated and reflected: such as are so qualified in that case may decide safely. The more there are of them, the more the profession of a merchant will be respected by the state, and deserves to be so. I may likewise add, that the several branches of general trade will increase thereby.

To send from one foreign country to another the goods that are wanted there, although those goods be prohibited by the society of which one is a member, cannot be deemed an act contrary to the love we ought
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to have for our country. It is plain that since those goods were necessary to gain what would have been gained by the country that produced them, had that country sold them herself, is adding to the relative riches of one's own country.

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OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE TRADES OF THE EAST AND WEST INDIES



DISSERTATION XXXIII.

Of arts, and manufactories.

MANUFACTURE, or ingenious labour, is the art of working up the productions of nature. Desire of convenience and of a more comfortable being, gave birth to this art, and preserves, and promotes it: the productions of nature are the matter on which it is exercised: the elements, the animal creation, and, in short, all that exists, are the means by which it is exercised. We will, at present, consider ingenious labour only in regard to the effects it has in the body politic: we will afterwards endeavour to shew what are the principles, which most certainly conduce towards a society's enjoying the benefits of those effects.

Our physical wants are so few that, strictly speaking, corn, (or even roots) fruit, water, milk, and the flesh and skins of beasts, are sufficient for the calls of nature. If, therefore, men could be content with what is absolutely necessary, they would desire no other productions from the earth, except it be what
little

little iron is necessary to enable them to till it. Nor do I say, they would be less happy if their desires extended no farther.

If we suppose for a moment all the inhabitants of the earth in that first state of simplicity; and that some one nation should set about to work up and fabricate the productions of the earth; the consequence would be, 1st, that that nation would raise a greater quantity of productions on it's lands.

2dly, That the culture of those productions would required a greater number of hands.

3dly, That the art of forming or fabricating those natural productions, would be to the inhabitants of that nation, an encrease of occupations, or of means of subsisting comfortably.

4thly, That when ever other nations should become acquainted with the productions of that new art, the natural desire of living comfortably would give birth to new desires.

5thly, Those desires could not be satisfied, but by an exchange of commodities. Now, as art gives an additional value to the productions of nature, it follows, that the industrious nation would receive in exchange more than it would give. Such exchanges of commodities becoming troublesome, and scarce metals being substituted as their common measure and equivalent, the same proportion would still take place in favour of the industrious.

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6thly, The nation, in which that industry, or ingenious labour, is promoted, abounding most in natural commodities, or money, the measure and representation of them, several members of other societies would flock thither to have a share in the conveniencies resulting from such labour.

7thly, The number of inhabitants encreasing continually in that industrious society, it would become stronger and more powerful than others.

THOUGH no civilized nation is now a stranger to ingenuity : it is not the less evident, that the real and relative effects of the foregoing hypothesis must take place, in proportion to the greater or less progress of that ingenuity.

Of two nations the superior progress of the one in ingenious labour, depends on it's superior degree of consumption, either home, or foreign.

THE principles of both are in some respects the same ; in other respects each has it's distinct, but never contradictory principles. We will begin with the latter.

Two things evidently concur to constitute a superiority of home-consumption between two societies. To attain that superiority it is necessary, 1st, that a society should have in proportion to it's populousness and the extent of it's lands, a greater number of men able to consume the productions of art, than another has : 2dly, that it consume less than the

the other does of the produce of foreign ingenuity.

THE first condition demonstrates, that if in a nation a multitude of men should require nothing beyond the absolute wants of nature, ingenious labour would fall short of it's perfection, in proportion to the number of those men. Now since, as we have seen, productions of the earth are the basis of ingenious labour, and as the use of those productions is multiplied by that labour, we may justly infer, that in such a nation agriculture would likewise fall equally short of perfection.

FROM the second condition it follows, that those manufactures, which serve for what is most generally wanted, are the most useful, and the first that ought to be established. The use of a thing is more common in proportion to the greater necessity for it, either real, customary, or imaginary, for the latter is looked upon as indispensably necessary by the generality of mankind. Even though the value of commodities should be but small the repeated consumption would make the aggregate value very great; and in the mean time a great number of hands will have been employed, and a great quantity of the natural productions of the country used; both which objects are the most essential a state can have in view. We may likewise add, that if a nation was to abandon it's more common arts, and apply to others of less general use, the riches of its trade would dwindle
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away imperceptibly ; just as that man would soon want, who should turn into parterres, or groves, part of that field on the produce of which he subsists. To prevent that evil, the legislator restores a just equilibrium by various means. The most usual is to raise the price of those superfluities, but, at the same time without hurting the nation's foreign trade ; which it must be owned is a very nice and delicate point. The surest way of all is to attack the source of the evil : for no remedy can be efficacious, which does not reach the cause.

IN order to consume as little as possible at home of the produce of foreign labour, every state has enhanced the price of such articles by duties of entry, or has absolutely prohibited them.

A RIGHT of so doing cannot be disputed in any free society, unless the treaties of commerce, by which that society has entered into engagements with other nations, stipulate the contrary.

BUT such duties and prohibitions, though, lawful and often necessary, are not always what most suits the real interest of a state. For, if it be natural for a nation to make as little use as possible of foreign manufactures, it is certain, that foreigners have a reciprocal right to lay the manufactures of that nation, under equal restrictions. Before such a thing be put in practice, it is, therefore, proper to examine carefully, whether the amount of the importations intended to be forbid, exceeds

ceeds that of the exportations a nation should, in consequence thereof, be deprived of. National enmities have sometimes carried those duties and prohibitions to too great a height, when all either party has got by it has been to cramp it's trade, or make room for a third to share it's profit.

It is undoubtedly fit to settle duties on both sides, in order to encourage the subject's labour; but it might, perhaps, be very possible, in general, to fix reasonable bounds to those duties. A manufacture, even in it's infancy, seems not to have any reason to fear foreign competition, when the duties of entry are at 15 per cent; for the charges of carriage, commission, and others, will come to four or five per cent. more. If 18 or 20 per cent, besides the foreign manufacturer's profit, do not content the home manufacturer; one may readily conclude, either that such home manufacturer wants to gain too much, or, that his undertaking is badly managed; or, in short, that there are some obstacles in the way at home, which must be removed before success can be expected.

In all states very profitable branches of trade have been lost, or missed being established, for the sake of things, which never were compassed, or which might have equally well been brought about by more gentle methods. Such problems are always very intricate; but, with the help of good principles, and a competent knowledge of the particular details

details relative to the object proposed, the solution of them is far from being impossible.

It is, however, a generally received maxim, that each nation ought to endeavour as much as possible to do without the produce of the labour or ingenuity of others. The principle is very just, if this essential clause be added to it, *without forcing those other nations to do without one's own.* In that the skill consists; there are proper ways of doing it, of which we shall speak hereafter.

One only thing can secure to a nation a superiority over another in the foreign consumption of its manufactures: that is, *the art of seducing, or pleasing to a higher degree the consumer of every kind.*

This principle is the same with that between one workman and another in matters relating to home-consumption; it becomes that of the state, with regard to foreign consumption. For, in this case the legislator is divested of his character, and becomes merchant. He may govern and direct his manufacturers as he pleases, and dictate to them what law he thinks proper: but, if he intends to sell his goods abroad, his counsels, directions, and laws must be agreeable to the taste and caprice of the independent consumer.

That taste changes with the climate, customs, and richness of the countries, where the goods are sold: each must, therefore, be

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consulted. From these truths, so clear in themselves, several important consequences ensue.

1st, The same stuff ought to contain more or less matter, according to the climate of the country to which it is sent, the oeconomy of the inhabitants of that country, and the particular use it is designed for. An intelligent buyer generally explains those points in the orders he gives; and a judicious seller will not execute those orders, till he knows perfectly well how to do it, for fear the goods should remain for his account, or that his correspondent should apply to him no more.

2dly, It is not always adding to the perfection of a manufacture to sell it's productions dearer, even though they be finer, or more lasting; because it is not certain that those who took them at one price, are either able, or willing to purchase them at a higher price.

3dly, There are in every country people as well of different abilities as of classes: to tempt and please them all, it is proper to offer them assortments of every kind proportioned to their different abilities in point of purchase. Besides that general advantage, assortments of each particular kind of goods have likewise another in the operation of trade. The merchants, in the country where the goods are consumed, chuse always to buy what best suits the taste of that country, and yields them the most profit. Assortments of
different

different prices of the same stuff, are a very proper means of helping them to a reasonable gain; and that motive is alone sufficient to determine them to promote the consumption of it.

4thly. A STUFF of the most inferior quality may be called perfect in its kind, as well as that of the most superior quality, if both are equally worth their prices.

5thly. A wide difference ought to be made between the perfection of workmanship or labour, and the general perfection of the manufactures of a state. The latter, without doubt, consists in obtaining the preference of every class of consumers.

A STATE attains a general perfection of its manufactures by two means. The greatest variety possible in its kinds of works; and a great number of factories in foreign countries.

It plainly results from the principles before laid down, that choice of various kinds of goods multiplies the desires of other nations. Of the new inventions, which the active genius of workmen will produce, some will be of short duration; that is, their business. Materials will still have been used, men employed, and wages paid. The legislator is the guardian of society in general; and if he sometimes enters into particular concerns, it never can be attended with benefit, but so far as he protects or favours in

particular such establishments as to him seem most conducive to the general interest.

FACTORIES in foreign countries are the surest way of increasing our own sales by a natural chain of consequences, and a more exact knowledge of the several tastes of the consumers. Settlements of this kind are of such important service to the trade of a nation, that they cannot be too much encouraged, nor too numerous.

BESIDES the particular riches arising from the taste of consumers in each foreign country, there are likewise several rules, calculated equally to facilitate the consumption of goods in all countries; those rules are likewise applicable to home consumption.

WHAT strikes the buyer's eye being always most apt to tempt him, it is necessary to study particularly how to make goods look well.

THE faith of a nation is most certainly concerned, in not suffering the buyers to be deceived by what his eye cannot discover; security and honour, in that respect, is a great help to consumption. For which reason too great care cannot be taken to see that the stamps, or other marks affixed to goods, indicate no more than what is in reality to be found. As to visible defects, they can never be called deceit: the buyer ought to be a judge, and the legislator would have too much to do, if obliged to lead every man by the hand from shop to shop. These Platonic

ideas, in the general police of nations kept the arts a long time in a state of thralldom.

CHEAPNESS is always a temptation to the buyer, and is consequently one of the great advantages manufactures ought to have.

THE words *cheap* or *dear*, when applied to a commodity, relate to its kind, quality, and goodness of fabric; they likewise often signify the great or less value of a thing, abstracted from all comparison. To remove all doubt, we understand in general, in this work, by those words, the higher or lower price of a commodity, compared with another of the same kind, quality, and perfection of workmanship. We must, however, add, that if it be impossible to afford a commodity equally well wrought, as substantial, or as fine as that of others, at a lower price than they do, the surest way is to let the quality be rather inferior, in order to bring it to a lower price: the reason is plain. 1st. The generality of buyers are influenced and determined by the look of a thing, and its cheapness. 2^{dly}. The purchase of a fine, solid, and well-finished thing is, as I may say, a piece of oeconomy in rich people: consequently few (in comparison to the multitude of consumers) are able to afford it. The interest of a society is plainly to sell to the greatest number possible: a greater quantity of materials is used; more men are employed in working them up, in their carriage, and in their navigation.

tion. 3dly. The luxury of buyers in general is excited by lowness of price. The mechanic's wife will not buy a damask of fifteen shillings a yard; but will have one of eight or nine: she does not trouble herself much about the quality of the silk; but is satisfied with making as fine a shew as a person of higher rank or fortune.

MANY things contribute to the cheapness of goods; plenty of the first materials, rivalry of workmen, cheapness of provisions and labour, and easy charges of carriage.

ALL that we observed to be conducive to the progress of agriculture, is productive of plenty of first materials. From their plenty ensues their cheapness; from their cheapness the progress of manufactures; and by that means the greatest consumption of the productions of the land.

THE mutual dependance of all the branches of occupation among men on each other, and the active spirit and motion given them all by the same principles, is well worthy being attended to. It is a demonstrable proof of the excellence of those principles, and of the closeness of the ties and connections by which the welfare of each class of people is cemented with that of every other class.

FROM this observation it may be inferred, that it is not in reality a way to favour manufactures to prohibit the exportation of first materials, unless those materials be the only ones of the kind, and the culture of them

elsewhere is not attended with those conditions which render the consumption of them necessary.

FROM what has been said in the preceding part, it is plain that agriculture cannot flourish, when not considered as an object of trade. If that maxim be true with regard to corn, it must consequently be so in other productions of nature: and if first materials are the food of manufactures, as corn is that of men, it must be proper to employ the same methods to proportion the means of subsistence of the grower of those materials, with the subsistence of the manufacturer.

IF, from a calculation of the prices of those first materials on an average for several years, a certain price was fixed, under which the exportation should be permitted, our manufacturers would always be supplied at a cheap rate; cheaper at least than strangers would, who are obliged to pay carriage, freight, commission, and other charges. Some small duty might, if thought proper, be laid on the exportation; provided always that the price of those materials be such, as that foreigners will find their account in preferring ours, and thereby enrich our husbandmen. All that need be done in such a case, would be to calculate the average price of the same materials in such other countries as are rivals in those branches, together with the charges there, and other considerations of trade, in order to compare them with
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the same circumstances at home. The product of that comparison will be the true medium by which it will be proper to regulate the duty on exportation, or suppress it. Profit is what animates culture, and every class of occupations among men; if any one of those occupations be deprived of that hope, it must perish. The loss of it would be sooner or later felt by every other; for the effect is sure: and when agriculture is the part that suffers, or that gains the least, it almost instantly affects all the rest at once. Accordingly, if the medium prices, I am speaking of, were fixed with regard to the exportation of first materials, it would be indispensably necessary to raise them in proportion to the increase of the expences of cultivation, or as the gains of other professions grow greater by the increase of conventional riches. If the prohibitions we are speaking of have sometimes succeeded, yet no consequence ought to be drawn from thence against the principle here laid down, unless the kinds and circumstances be particularly distinguished; and, on a due examination of them, they will be found to coincide with what is advanced.

ALL countries do not produce all things; consequently there are materials which some manufactures require being supplied with from abroad.

If the entry of them is attended with higher duties in one country than in another,

it is plain that, supposing all other things equal, what is made of those materials must be so much dearer in the former country, as the duties amount to more than in the latter : for which reason, wise trading states allow the importation of first materials, free of duty.

It is, however, proper to lay duties on the importation of foreign first materials in two cases. 1st. When we have reason to expect a sufficient quantity of them of one's own growth, and that nothing is wanting but to help the price a little to promote the cultivation of them ; the duty ought then to be proportioned to the degree of want the manufactures are in, and to the encouragement wanting to assist the cultivation of those materials.

2dly. When a first material of any kind is imported, after having undergone some kind of dressing or preparation abroad, which might as well have been done by the nation that buys it, it is not just for it to be imported subject to no greater duty than if not wrought at all.

THESE remarks are a necessary consequence of the foregoing principles : manufactures ought to give the lands of a state to the highest value possible, and its men the greatest plenty of work possible.

SOME nations have laid pretty high duties on the re-exportation of such foreign first materials ; but that seems in reality to be

be depriving manufactures of a more useful rivalship in favour of one less useful, which is thereby avoided. It is offering up an apparent sacrifice to them, at the expence of navigation, and of which they in reality bear the loss.

WHEN a nation is so happy as to procure foreign materials so much cheaper than others can, that rival nations find their account in purchasing them from her, it is evident that not only her national manufactories will be well supplied, but likewise that the greater plenty of the commodity must make it bear a less price. For in that case, the rivalship of the buyers is seldom so great as that of the sellers, who are always animated more and more by the profits they make. We have already observed, that what a nation fabricates with foreign first materials, must, supposing all other things equal, be dearer than if fabricated by that nation from whom those materials were purchased. If that nation who procures such first materials cheap enough to sell them back to others, chances to meet with difficulties in that trade, it is clear that her ships will no longer bring any more than just what is necessary for consumption. The rivalship in those materials decreasing, the price of them must increase; fewer ships will be employed, freight will consequently be dearer, and the commodity must pay it. Nor is that the only disadvantage: it may happen that the measure of ex-

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changes

changes being no longer the same, the owners of the first materials will consume less wrought goods than they did before, when their own sales were more considerable.

TRADERS of other nations will likewise be forced to send their own ships to purchase those materials at the first hand, and endeavour to introduce their own manufactures in exchange. The freight being then divided between what is imported and what is exported, they will be able both to buy and sell cheaper.

THUS one single step would be the ruin of a useful branch of trade and navigation; manufactures would feel the disadvantages of an increase of price in the first materials, and of a new rivalship in the sale of their productions. Domestic rivalship among workmen is absolutely necessary to make manufactures cheap and elegant. That rivalship will be established first by the progress of the home consumption of a commodity; next, by the rivalship or plenty of the first materials of that commodity; and lastly, by the quantity of foreign consumptions. So, on the other hand, it may be said, that all these things will afterwards increase by the competition or rivalship of workmen.

BUT that rivalship of workmen will not take place, if their condition be not comfortable and happy, in proportion to the pains they take. To that end industry must be
safe,

safe, the whole of what it produces must belong to him that is possessed of it; that part excepted, which he shall of his own accord lay out for his necessary subsistence and convenience. Just as a fortune possessed by a man without the privity of others, ceases to be a fortune in their eye, so, the superfluous expences of artisans, and workmen, will always be in proportion to the ease and safety they enjoy. On the other hand, the price of the necessaries of life, is less considered by workmen, as a diminution of the progress of their industry, than as an indispensable reason, why they should exert that industry. And, accordingly, in those two respects, a well judged regulation of the finances makes a country ample amends, by the smallness of what is demanded, and the care that is taken not to overburden the subject.

A MAN cannot be said to enjoy a certain, nor a happy state, if the profession he embraces be cramped, or the profits attending it limited, when there is nothing in them contrary to strict justice. As a farmer would be discouraged, if he was forced to sow a field with hemp, which would produce him more if planted with hops.

RIVALSHIP of workmen, or mechanics, would be badly established, if it cost much money for liberty to apply to any kind of ingenious labour; because most of those, who do apply to working trades are poor. Consequently,

frequently, the easier workmen are introduced into a comfortable business of livelihood, the more they will encrease.

From the same consideration of poverty we may conclude, that few men would betake themselves to laborious trades, if they could not be bound apprentices, till past their youth. Parents who are poor, would be afraid of having children to bring up and keep so long: if any came, those children, oppressed by want, would chuse easier ways of subsisting. Every useless way of living is unfortunately of that kind, and the number of them is terrible. Perhaps too, the children so abandoned might take to begging. I do not mention the resource of husbandry, because though that be often left for other kinds of occupations, yet those occupations are never left by any to turn plowman: a fatal experience, and well worthy the most serious attention!

In short, if the hands we are speaking of were not lost to useful labour, they must at least have lost a most valuable time: for it must be in their tender years, that men imbibe a real inclination to work, which afterwards stands them in lieu of pleasure the rest of their lives.

To tolerate those private regulations, by which the number of apprentices each master of a trade may take is limited, is another bar to the emulation, or rivalry of workmen.

men. It would, on the contrary, be of great service, to oblige every master to have a certain fixed number of apprentices, within a limited number of years; and on failure to forfeit a sum to be distributed among such as should have exceeded the number appointed by law. But to suppress apprenticeships, as burdensome, would be the greatest fault to the principle of rivalry: they are still farther useful for two reasons,

First, the business of the mechanics is, in general, less laborious than that of the husbandman; it is, therefore, proper, in order to put them on a level, that it should be most easy to subsist by tilling the earth.

Secondly, It is of moment to the state to have it's mechanics excel. Not that the legislator is obliged to enter into the particular details of each family, but, because the reputation of a nation's artists and mechanics is necessary towards extending her trade; for, if her workmen are not ingenious and skilful, they will not be able to hit the taste of foreign purchasers; to tempt them with new inventions, or imitate those of other nations; nor, in short, to satisfy the various humours and caprices of consumers. The workman, who does not fall in with this taste, will not be able to sell his goods; without doubt that is a punishment to him: but, if he be not intelligent enough to alter his method, and follow the advice that is given him, a whole family is deprived of work: the state
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shares that punishment with him. If the workman be master of his business, every neglect of labour in him will be punished, either by loss of trade, or diminution of his profits; but the community will be no great sufferer thereby, because he will amend his faults.

APPRENTICESHIPS are, therefore, not so burdensome as they are useful and necessary: the fault would be in making them too long, and in the manner of serving them. Though a seven years apprenticeship, as is customary with us in England, may be thought hard, yet it is, perhaps, not too long to learn a trade, or business in the least complicated. If it be to the woollen branch, for example, that a man would apply; he ought, in the first place, to make himself a thorough judge of the qualities, properties, and effects of wool: to that end, a great deal must pass through his hands, and he must likewise be assisted by his masters instructions. He must begin with cleansing and beating the wool; after which he must learn how to comb or card it. Those instructions will require some time; and he will thereby gain a more perfect knowledge of the qualities and properties of that material. From thence he must proceed to a knowledge of spinning, the various kinds of which will require fresh application. The knowledge of that is the true principle of fabricating well, and of the profit attending it. During this time the apprentice will have become acquainted with the several tools and
instru-

instruments used in preparing the materials employed, the looms, and various parts of which they are composed; he will understand the working of them, their perfection, or defects. Without these preliminary requisites, which are more or less rapid, in proportion to their difficulty and the learner's parts, a workman can never know how to mount his loom to the best advantage, make the most of his materials, or direct how to prepare them; much less will he be able to invent, or strike out new roads for the improvement of his workmanship.

THE quantity of what is consumed is so much greater in Holland, than the quantity of what the land produces, that agriculture is one of the most lucrative professions there. For which reason the equilibrium naturally subsisting in that republic between the cultivators of land, and the manufacturers, required no precautions to be taken on that head. The Dutch had no reason to invite men to embrace one profession more than another.

MANUFACTURES were not invited into Holland nor did they spring up there, but fled there for shelter from every country, where workmen have been molested in their liberties, fortunes, or religion. Those workmen could not be subjected to serve an apprenticeship to a trade, or art, which they brought with them, no more than the French could require it from an English workman, who

who carried over to them the art of calendring, or watering silks.

THE manufacturers, who were received in Holland, naturally instructed, as apprentices, their children, relations, friends, and fugitive countrymen; as their trade encreased, they were probably obliged to instruct and bring up others, who have all continued to work as they were taught, or have improved their art. It was of less importance to the state to have the most famous and most excellent workmen, than to acquire new men, who brought into it's trade values, which before were in the trade of other nations: such is still and ever will be the policy and interest of Holland.

THE Dutch have, indeed, given a great proof of their wisdom in not suffering any monopolies to be established among them; I mean, in not allowing those regulations of workmen, whereby the number of hands to be employed in a profession, and even the quantity of work, is limited. But a mastership, which cannot be refused any man capable of working, is attended with none of the inconveniencies of monopolies: and it may be of some moment to the public welfare, to know those who have embraced each kind of profession.

IT is plain that the so essential emulation amongst workmen is incompatible with the exclusive privileges of which we shall speak presently. It is not less so with the immu-
nities

nities granted to some towns and cities preferable to others. If it be once admitted that it is of advantage to a state to have manufactories: it follows, that it must be so to multiply them in as many places as possible, in order to establish a natural and indispensable equality between all the children of the same father. The state is always a gainer by multiplying emulation and rivalships, amongst it's artificers of every rank, because it's foreign sales are thereby encreased, as well as the subject's abilities to subsist comfortably.

THE emulation of capitals in trade, the natural effect of public credit, and the lowness of the interest of money, are two of the surest ways to procure emulation amongst workmen; but both those objects deserve to be considered separately.

CHEAPNESS of workmanship is as much the effect of the emulation amongst workmen, as of the lowness of the price of commodities of the first or most absolute necessity towards subsistence: for such emulation lessens the profits, or improves the work, in order to preserve the profit it does yield. It is, however, evident that such lowness of price contributes greatly to it. In regard to the laying of taxes upon native commodities, if this policy should be always judged requisite, there are two general rules that seem necessary to be observed. The first is, to continue raising the duty in proportion as the commodity becomes less absolutely necessary: the

the second, to proportion, in every place the value of the duty on commodities of the first or most absolute necessity, with the lowest price of hire, or wages ; for, by that means by only reckoning the number of day's work, the workman's clear profit is seen at once.

IN order to enjoy the benefits of cheap living, manufactures still stand farther in need of the rivalship of cultivators of land, and of cultivated lands : whilst, on the other hand, both those rivalships will be promoted by that of workmen grown rich. But a wide difference must be made between a commodity's being cheap, and its bearing no price at all ; for, in the last case, the cultivation of it would be neglected, and manufactures consequently hurt.

FROM the necessity of keeping the price of subsistence at a moderate rate, it may be inferred, that manufactories are never established to advantage in capital cities, or great towns, unless they are inhabited by manufacturers only. Besides its being impossible for things not to be dear in places where extraordinary quantities of them are consumed, it is farther to be observed, that example never fails to introduce superfluous wants, which soon become necessities in the opinion of men ; example too introduces dissipation, and neglect of work, much more dangerous than expensive living. If the manufactories thrive, notwithstanding these inconveniencies,

niencies, yet a real disadvantage still results to the state: higher wages tempt workmen from places where they earned less: industry is absorbed by a few towns, instead of promoting a circulation in every part of the state: in short wages of all kinds, even in the country, rise; and if the natural equilibrium be properly maintained, the value of all commodities must rise too.

ANOTHER way to procure cheapness of labour is to encourage and reward all inventions tending to abridge or ease the labour of men. The skill and rivalry of artists naturally lead to it; and that is the utmost period of perfection of the manufactories of a state.

SUCH discoveries are not, as may be thought at first sight, contrary to the object and first intent of manufactories, which is to employ the greatest number of men possible. They will, on the contrary, be found, with very little reflection, to tend to that end, by multiplying works, and increasing the produce of the balance, which never ceases to increase home consumptions.

BEFORE principles are applied, it is proper to distinguish circumstances. A nation destitute of all foreign trade would be secured by a perpetual state of prohibition, and would find it advantageous to multiply all opportunities, even of superfluous labour, in order to preserve the greatest number of men possible. Accordingly it has been observed, that the prejudice against the means of abridg-

ing labour subsisted longest in those countries, where trade is most recent, and in the minds of those whose knowledge of that subject is least clear.

BUT in a nation where men are wanting for several kinds of labour (and that must always happen where there is great variety of labour); where it appears plainly by the sales rival nations make, that somewhat may still be added to one's own, either by ruining their manufactures of the same kind by *underselling them*, or by substituting the productions of our own labour in the room of other kinds possessed by them, but which we have not ourselves: such a nation need never fear having too many hands, if her police be good.

IT is true, that changes of this kind, if considerable, require being managed with due circumspection and prudence. The workman will certainly be alarmed, if told of them, because it is not his business to calculate: it will even be impossible not to excuse his fears proceeding from his ignorance and personal feeling. The blame and punishment ought, in such a case, to fall on those who foment those fears out of sordid views of interest: for it is proper always to remember, that rivalry, so favourable to the trade of a state, lessens the trader's profits.

BUT it is indifferent to the state, whether a manufactory be in one town, or fifty miles
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off in a village, which will become a town in its turn. Experiments are there made quietly, by a small number of chosen workmen, and their example by degrees invites others thither. It is proper to observe, that these kinds of changes are always supposed to facilitate the art; otherwise there would not be such clamour against them as there generally is. What is practised there may become general, without the least prejudice to the order of things. A prudent police, likewise, takes care to have work ready, or at least to have in the mean time a subsistence to offer such as may chance to want it. We say such as may chance to want it, because that want can never proceed from any thing but a false terror or obstinacy, when matters are properly prepared before hand for such a change, and it is brought about by degrees.

WE do not see any objection that can be made to the oeconomising of time, or facilitating the work of manufactories, which may not be equally well made to all inventions of new fashions, or of new stuffs, by which the old are forgot. And yet such changes do happen every day without the least prejudice to society; and I believe no man will say it is the interest of a nation to prohibit new manufactories, in order to favour the workmen employed in the old.

IN short, the prejudice we are speaking of is incompatible with the preservation of the

foreign trade of a state; for the steps a state takes must be guided by those *which foreigners take*. Even supposing the exportation of manufactured goods not to be increased thereby, the home consumption will at least be more considerable.

If we could object against any of the machines made use of in fabricating, it would be those that are used in the making of rich stuffs. I might ask whether it be possible for them to equal with their hard motion (for if not hard it would not long be even) the suppleness, softness, and pleasing gloss given by the hand of a skilful and careful workman? Would not those machines be fitter for thread and woollen than for silk?

WE must add one word more to clear this subject of all doubt. Care must be taken not to judge of the machines made use of in manufacturing, as one would of such as might be invented to abridge the tillage of the earth.

MANUFACTORIES are at most but a precarious and accidental income to a state: *the utmost industry, vigilance and care, are requisite to keep them from foreigners*. When so rich a treasure once passes into their hands, the men therein employed, and thereby maintained, soon follow. The legislator cannot, therefore, act more wisely than to increase the number of home wants, or the quantity consumed by the subject, in order to preserve, at all events, the greatest number possible of manufacturers. The home circulation

tion can never be better secured than by the increase of that class of men, who are the fund of the populousness of a state; I mean *the cultivators of its lands*. Every machine tending to diminish their employment would really be destructive of the strength of society, the mass of men, and home consumption.

WE have before observed concerning the quantity of men, which the effectual culture of the earth furnishes every other kind of occupation with; it will be easily perceived, that the use of mechanics in manufactories tends to preserve populousness; and that there are, between these two objects, differences essential to their nature.

BUT to come to the fourth cause of cheapness of workmanship.

THE charges attending the carriage of a commodity are so much added to its intrinsic nature: consequently the lowness of those charges is of very great importance, with regard to the cheapness of manufactures, relatively to other nations, rivals in the same branches. The state may provide for that, partly by laying no duties at all on the exportation of them; by the greatest possible competition or rivalry of navigators; by keeping up properly or improving the roads and navigable rivers; and, in short, *by all the encouragements that can be given to agriculture*, because plenty of forage will keep that forage cheap, and plenty of carriages will increase the consumption of it.

IN judging of the superiority of manufactures between two nations, it would be dangerous to lose sight of this maxim, that the seller is in a state of dependance on the buyer : whence it follows, that the steps taken by a trading nation ought to be regulated by what is practised, not only in the country where the commodity is to be consumed, as before observed, but likewise what is practised by its rivals. It is necessary to know what are with the latter the cost of first materials, the expence of delivering them at the manufactory, the price or wages paid for the fabricating each branch, the price of commodities of absolute necessity, as well as of superfluous commodities, how much of either kind is generally consumed, in what manner the materials are employed ; and lastly, the charges of carriage of the goods, when fabricated to the place where they are to be consumed.

NOR is this the whole requisite to be comprehended within our consideration : the superior degree of cheapness of work between different nations depends in a great measure on the better or worse terms each of them may have been able to make by their *treaties of commerce* with other nations. The conclusion of such treaties requires a deep combination, not only of the general and reciprocal interests of the two contracting parties, but likewise of those of other rival nations. Nor is it enough to know those general

ral interests: it is likewise necessary to be acquainted with the detail of the particular operations of the merchants concerned in each branch, in order to foresee what use those merchants may make of such or such a clause; wherein such or such conditions may be disadvantageous to them; and in short, the various revolutions which the circumstances of things seem to promise in their commercial negotiations. A good *treaty of commerce*, independent of the art of negociation, may be said to be a masterpiece of skill. That which England made with Portugal in 1703, and with Spain in 1667, are most excellent models.

WHAT we have hitherto said of the means by which a nation may acquire a superiority over another in point of perfection in workmanship, proves that manufactures cannot support themselves in a flourishing state without some assistance. They are indebted for that state, partly to the concurrence of several various causes, always collected in one point of view by the legislator, whose wisdom and vigilance direct them equally towards the same end.

WHATEVER care the preservation of so rich a mine requires, the greatest difficulty of all lies in the first finding out and opening of it: the strongest efforts are never too great then. Rude and ignorant men are to be instructed, and their hands taught to have more intelligence than their heads are suscep-

tible of; and those novices are to be made not only to equal foreign rivals consummate in their art, but even to influence and seduce those who are to judge between them.

IN times of ignorance, exclusive privileges were granted under pretence of rewarding undertakers of new manufactures, for the risk of what they advanced, and to secure them a profit in return for their zeal. That was renouncing in favour of a few, all rivalry of first materials, workmen, capitals, and, in short, the perfection of the art and cheapness of it's productions; which can be the fruit of those rivalships only. The undertakers themselves often felt the weight of those chains, with which they intended to fetter commerce: misunderstanding, the usual concomitant of bad success, or bad management, stopt the progress of those undertakings. The privilege, however, remained; and private workmen, blameable enough for having stolen or imitated our art, become useless, and were subject to fines and forfeitures. The misfortune was much greater, when those manufactories were brought from other countries: for, in that case, if new workmen, often more skilful than the old, invited by their hopes of making more speedy fortunes, offered; they were forced to carry elsewhere their labour, industry, consumption, and good will. The loss of one single family often occasioned that of many more, deterred from leaving their country by so fatal an example.

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WHETHER matters turned out well, or ill, the interest of the undertakers being to gain time, the art was but little improved at the expiration of the patent, or privilege. Sometimes too, if matters did not succeed well for want of good management, those to whom the miscarriage was owing, blasted the art so as never to be retrieved in that country.

THERE is, however, perhaps, a kind of mitigated patent, or exclusive privilege, with regard to manufactories, which would not deprive a state of the advantages of rivalry. That is, when the patent is limited to a small number of years, and to one, or at most two counties, or provinces, in order not to raise the price of either first materials or workmanship too much at once. And even then it is proper, that such a favour should be purchased by an encrease of population and industry; that is to say, the undertaker ought to be obliged to bring from abroad, and maintain, a certain number of foreign workmen, and likewise take a certain number of national apprentices.

THE means generally made use of in France to encourage the establishment of manufactories, are to purchase at the *public expence* the particular secrets, either for preparing or dying materials, or the engines, whether new, or not known there before; and to grant rewards proportioned to the importance of such new undertakings. Those rewards, always judged necessary, are personal distinctions

tions and prerogatives granted to the directors of the undertaking ; funds advanced ; proper places allotted to save expence at first, till the profits became certain ; the purchasing of what is manufactured, or wrought, at a fixed price during a certain time ; a thing by no means to be slighted, and of which great advantage has been and may be made ; or lastly, a bounty on the exportation of those productions, until they are able to compete with foreign productions of the same kind at their proper market.

THE expence of maintaining skilful foreign workmen in all branches, is not less necessary towards the preserving of manufactories, than towards the establishing of them. Small causes will always be productive of great effects in that respect : for example, it is probable that the maintaining of a few women, good spinsters, in different parts of the country, which might be done at a small expence, would contribute infinitely to promote manufactories, by inculcating in the wives and daughters of husbandmen and other labourers, a spirit of industry, which would not interfere with any thing else they may have to do.

No part of the state, but the stockholders, can find fault with those expences ; because they are the only men, who would not be repaid their disbursements with usurious interest. That remark alone sufficiently shews that

that states have not any more certain way to encrease their riches.

A LAST way to encourage manufactories, is to annex an idea of merit and distinction to the profession of manufacturers, or of those who by their extensive correspondences procure a vent for their productions abroad. That is but just ; since those men, the merchants, are the dispensers of employment and food to the industrious workman, and of the cultivator's reward. The state is in a manner partner in the merchant's profits, without sharing the hazard he runs, or the fatigues he undergoes ; and, therefore, ought never to slight him, but cherish, caress, and honour him. The productions of labour and ingenuity may, in general, be compared to a-piece of clockwork ; the springs of which relax and spoil, when not taken care of, and which at length stop if not wound up in time. The men who keep those springs in order, who compose, connect, and put them in motion, ought to be distinguished by their country and by every citizen who is a friend to it.

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DISSERTATION XXXIV.

An enquiry into the reasons for Holland changing her system of late years towards the court of England; being an abstract of a certain remarkable speech said to be made at a conference by the g——d P——r of Holland, in the year, 1742, before certain British lords, who were sent on an embassy to engage them in British measures: with remarks, shewing that Holland expects Great Britain should change her system towards that republic, before she can alter hers.

MY LORDS!

“**A**FTER so many solid reasons, (says the Dutch politician) heretofore assigned by the ministers of Holland, for not entering into any *offensive alliance*, it should seem unnecessary to add any thing on the subject: but since the uncommon eagerness with which such an alliance is still pressed, requires a clear and definite answer, it becomes incumbent on those in the direction of public affairs in this republic, not only to give such a final answer,

answer, but their reasons at large for their disinclination to their contracting any new engagements that might throw the States into measures of violence and expence, without any views of advancing either the immediate interest of their country, or that of those who would provoke the same, from motives that are no way interesting to Holland.

THE deference due to the august princes from whom the overture comes, requires that our refusal of the alliance in question should be so justified, as that not only the nations immediately concerned, but all Europe may perceive the rectitude of our conduct, from the force of our reasons in support of it.

BUT though the nature of my subject requires that I should explain myself with freedom, I shall carefully avoid all personal reflection; a caution, which, I am sorry to say, has not been observed with regard to the chief ministers of Holland.

THOUGH, we Dutchmen, whether from discretion, or phlegm, hold or seem to hold a deaf ear to all tale-bearers; yet are not the less acquainted with the secret calumnies of them who make us openly the warmest profession.—But, I hope to make it evident to the world, that no French gold, the dread of a stadholder, nor that of being stripped of power, have had any the least influence on our conduct by not chiming in with the views of a neighbouring ministry.

IF from what I shall say on the subject of the proposed alliance, it shall appear to be destructive of the tranquillity, trade, and interest of the Republic, I hope disapprobation will not be imputed to either the influence, or the gold of France. I will not take upon me to charge either the late or the present ministers of L——n with being pensioners to that crown; but, I say, that they could not have served her more efficaciously, had they tasted liberally of her bounties *, &c.

BUT the being pensioners to France is not the only charge industriously whispered against the ministers of the Republic. The dread of a stadholder is imputed to them as the most heinous crime. How great has been the pains, how refined the address, to insure the people, on this head, with sentiments injurious to the honour and probity of those in the administration of our affairs †?

THE dread of being stripped of power, or rather the lust of power, is the third charge privately suggested against the ministers of the Republic. They little know how greatly the toil of office in this country exceeds the emoluments that accrue from it, who arraign Dutch ministers of unfaithfulness to their

* I have here omitted more severe reflections on the British ministers at the time, as tending not to answer my purpose of unanimity and concord in this nation so desirable at present.

† I shall not repeat what was urged on this occasion, it not being consistent with my view.

country in order to continue their power. It is not here as with those who artfully seek to discredit us with our fellow subjects. We have no immense public revenue to count over a gridiron; every town in each province having it's own distinct receivers; and the revenue of each applied under their own particular inspection.

FROM this short but faithful pourtraiture of the ministerial function here, you may perceive the justice of the odium secretly endeavoured to be fixed upon those in the administration of our affairs, for supporting the interest of the Republic.—It is an ungrateful task to rake into the misconduct of others, particularly, of those whom one is inclined, for interest, as well as choice, to think well of; but, since speaking without disguise is become of absolute necessity, in order to justify the conduct on this side the water, I hope I shall stand excusable for what the nature of my subject requires I should consider with plainness and freedom. Here, was I inclined to lay open old sores, might I prove, from the several gradations of misconduct in the cabinet of L——n since queen Anne's death, that the present power of France, the inability of this Republic, and that of B——n itself, the misfortunes of the heirs of Austria, and the distractions of Europe, are not so much the effects of chance and French politics, as of B——h blunders, and corruption. Of the latter I am satisfied the ministers

sters of this Republic may be acquitted: but I am sorry I cannot so justly acquit them of error in embracing too implicitly many of the false maxims of their neighbours.

THE late ministers of the Republic, who alone are accountable for a mistaken deference to the cabinet of L——n in the late reign, might be excusable for supposing that a new family would take no step to irritate or weaken the *only powers* they could depend upon, much less court and aggrandize those whom they had most reason to dread and guard against.—Our late statesmen might be deceived in concurring with a court where their interest was now become *the same with the republic's*. This was the foundation they built upon in acceding to the *quadruple alliance*, and the treaty of Hanover.—Here arise many other rancorous reflections upon the conduct of the court of England; which, as I conceive they will answer no end to either nation at present, I have expunged only reason for hinting what has been urged in favour of the conduct of Holland is to shew, that the cabinet of Holland think that we have not acted upon a right footing of policy with them: and does not this seem to point out the necessity for the court of England *to change her system towards the Dutch*? It certainly does: but how that system may be happily changed, so to content the Dutch as to draw them absolutely into the British scale of power, seems to be

be the great political problem necessary to be investigated, for the mutual security of both *. —*That Holland has changed her system towards Great Britain is certain; and that if Great Britain would effectually induce Holland to fall in with her measures; there is a something wanting, that neither court seems yet to have fallen upon. But, if Holland had hit upon the one thing needful; unless the court of England were ripe for it, Holland would never suggest it; the proposition would never come first from the cabinet of Holland to that of Great Britain: no; the latter must take the lead; England must herself hit upon the grand arcanum of union between the two states, and Holland will cheerfully embrace it; if it is conducted with the address requisite on an occasion so importantly interesting to both potentates.*

BUT to continue the Dutchman's reasons for change of conduct in the States General towards this nation, leaving out every thing acrimonious, that may irritate rather than conciliate.—‘The English ministry, continues this statesman, do not, or, perhaps, will not see that the unequal load [meaning their public debts and taxes] is, and always must be a drawback upon the credit, or influence of that country while she continues to

* Here again arising further reflections contrary to my intentions, I pass them over.

be burthened with them: *What nation, says the Dutch minister, in Europe can reckon on Britain's supporting a war against France with the necessary vigor, while she groans under the weight of fifty millions sterling of debt?* Here let Englishmen seriously, reflect upon the Dutch ministers reasons.— As our public debts and taxes are in the road to be doubled the above sum before the war is ended, should not this rouse and animate us to change our *domestic* as well as our *foreign system*? From these motives, I laboured the last year, to show the indispensable necessity of raising the supplies within the year, in order to put a stop for ever to the encrease of the public debts, and taxes ||; than which nothing will give greater weight, with Holland, and other powers, and induce them to listen to what may be urged in favour of a new foreign system.

“ HOWEVER drained and impoverished, continues the Dutch minister, France has been painted of late in *memorials* and *speeches*, we, in these provinces are too well acquainted with her natural and political strength, not to dread that she will, as in her late wars, when she had all Europe for enemies, be able to wage a ten or twelve years war, if ever she should be forced into one, by either one or both the maritime powers. In such case, what must become of Britain, that power which is expected

|| See my *Great Britain's true system*,

will always bear the greater part of the expences of such a war : what, I say, must be her condition then, if even now all Europe see her drop under the weight of her present debts, taxes, and the decay of her trade, and industry? In such a situation, how feeble her efforts in the general cause of liberty; how mistaken would they be, who should reckon upon her being able to defray her proportion of the expence of a war, which the misconduct of her cabinet had brought upon all Europe? Is it not more natural to suppose, that once mighty and powerful state would become bankrupt in the course of so long and expensive a war as that with France would necessarily be? Would not this be more likely, than that she should be able to maintain so vigorous a war with that crown as might induce her to sue for peace with humility, as in the days of Anne? Should not these severe reflections excite us to form such a system of power as will enable England and her allies to cope effectually with this great leviathan?

“Upon recollection, says he, I don’t know but I might have been guilty of a breach of charity in imputing to one man all the misconduct of the cabinet, which he was supposed to direct. For, though it be criminal to concur in destructive measures, yet, as there are degrees of guilt, he who only concurs, cannot be deemed as highly criminal as he who lays the plan and directs. If, there-

fore, the great delinquent was under any controul, he may be looked upon as an accessory rather than a principal; and, though by the civil law there are no accessories, in cases of homicide all are principals; it is not so in treason, either against a single magistrate, or the state. In these cases, the first mover is the most obnoxious.

IF then the favourite was obliged to steer by the lights set up by his immediate predecessors in the administration; if he was compelled to walk in the paths chalked out for him, he was guilty, but not superlatively so. He was criminal for stooping to *addresses*, or shrinking at *frowns*; he was guilty for having soothed the *passions* of any man or men in violation of his allegiance to his country, or regard to the freedom of mankind, but still is less guilty than——

THE successors to that great man's power may possibly, on the strength of his strain of reasoning, plead the same excuse in bar of any exceptions which may be taken to their conduct, since he has laid down. But their own *opposition* to the late ministers administration, *cuts away all ground of excuse for their shaping their conduct by his, &c.* [Here the Dutch statesman speaks out; he declares the necessity of a change of measures in the British court; that a change of men only can answer no end: but here seems to arise a difficulty; raw, fresh men, unexperienced in public business do not seem capable of changing

ing the British system as they should do: however good their hearts may be; and, however great weight and influence they may have in parliamentary debate; yet, when they attempt a new plan of government, and come to carry it into execution; they often find themselves in a labyrinth, and incapable of forming such new plan of power, that shall remedy the defects in the conduct of their predecessors; and, therefore, however public spirited and glorious their intentions may prove; yet, if they are found unequal to the forming of the proper plan or plans themselves, requisite to extricate the nation from those difficulties under which it may labour, they are bound in duty as chearfully to give up the helm, as they were ready to embrace it: or, to endeavour at a hearty *union* with the more experienced statesmen, and with an amiable and true patriot-condescension communicate to them their oversights, and join their hearts as well as their heads with the more experienced, to save their sinking country: let these true friends of their country lay aside all private resentment, and let them call into their aid all who may prove any ways assisting, in the divers branches of the ministerial function. And, if they know the integrity of their own hearts; if they are sensible that their intentions are to rectify past mistakes in the government, or to eradicate all malversation; it is no less their duty to call into their assis-

tance all persons of any talents to be useful to the state, than to aim at taking the lead? A minister may act with great abilities and dignity in a particular department, because he may be more than equal to the same in all respects: but, when he grasps at being premier, and undertakes the whole ministerial duty upon himself, and to direct and controul all subordinate to him, it is impolitic to reject and contemn services that are tendered him, where they promise any thing consistent with the public felicity: because such who are able to serve a wise and a faithful minister, may be provoked to do otherwise from motives of resentment. Men of capacity, and of malignant spirit may, from revenge, lay schemes to clog the best and wisest administration; and, although this is a detestable principle; yet it being too prevalent, the profound statesman will guard against evils of this kind, and cherish, instead of despise merit, because it must at length, bring scorn and contempt upon themselves, and indicate that they are no thorough paced politicians.

BUT, if there is a necessity of alteration of measures, in regard either to our foreign or domestic concerns, why cannot the ministers experienced in public business as well undertake the requisite reforms, as those who have never been tried? Do not all men acquire knowledge by experience? If the statesman has once experienced that he has committed mistakes, is there not more discredit to per-
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sist in them, than rectify them? And how can they better be convinced of this, with respect to Holland, than to find it's cabinet so refractory to British influence?

To return again to the Dutch minister, waving all particulars consistent with the then state of public affairs.—“As for this Republic, urges he, though the late minister paid her not so open court, nor was so lavish of his professions to her, as the successors; yet I must say in his behalf, that if he did not behave towards her with so great politeness, and ceremony, he was not less candid and sincere. If she found him no courtier, she could not prove him a hypocrite.

BUT it is needless to descant more minutely on the situation of foreign affairs at the time when the minister laid down; there is none here can be ignorant of it! It is more to our purpose to take a view of affairs as they stand at present.

THE new ministry were no less esteemed abroad than at home. Their ability was not doubted, and their virtue not so much as suspected. They had the hearts of their countrymen with them, and the wishes of all Europe, except the partisans of France. So pleased were we in Holland with the change in London, that public rejoicing had been made on the occasion by some, if our more moderate magistrates had not thought them indecent, as being obliquely reflecting on the judgment of one whose character they were tender of. Great men seldom make a

wrong choice; but, if they do, they soon rectify their error. Resolution in some often degenerates to obstinacy, and then ceases to be a virtue.

THE eyes of Europe were upon the successors of the removed minister. France trembled that so powerful a neighbouring nation should be wisely *conducted* and become *united*, as there was scarce a doubt that they would by their new leaders. Spain began to repent that she had formed any schemes on Italy; in short, every prince, every state that had been inveigled into the schemes of France was in dread that new salutary measures in the cabinet of L——n would be the certain consequence of the late ministers removal.

THE independant friends of universal freedom, on the other hand, expected *a change of measures in E——d*; but far from dreading any evil consequence that could attend such change, they doubted not that it would *tend to the cementing such an alliance as must have a view to stopping the career of France, and securing the liberties of Europe.*—But we of these provinces out-went all others, in hopes that we might now safely rely on the wisdom, steadiness, and integrity of a cabinet, which we could not reckon upon for upwards of twenty years before.—We saw France extending her power, and we saw the necessity of checking her ambition, *but could not with any hopes of success enter into any measures for the purpose, whilst the late minister*

minister presided over the councils of the only nation in Europe most capable of aiding in the glorious design.

BUT now the scene was changed : we saw a sett of men rise to power that had for many years professed to have *opposed* the late minister, solely on account of his misconduct at home, his subserviency to France, and his neglect of *all the natural allies of his country*. As from such men all that was great and glorious might have been expected, no wonder that we were as sanguine in our hopes of their conduct as all their own fellow subjects were. They might have influenced us here in Holland as easily as their own countrymen ; and might have as readily brought us into alliance, as they commanded the treasure of their own nation : such was the high opinion conceived here, as well as at home, of their virtues and abilities.

BUT how delusive are hopes built upon probity of men ! Scarce had we the pleasing news of the advancement of the late *opponents*, but we had advice that they *capitulated* before they were advanced ; that they were not only to secure the retreat of the late minister, but embrace his maxims, and steer as he should direct from behind the curtain. Though this piece of intelligence came confirmed to us from those whose fidelity we had no reason to suspect ; yet were we slow, and I the slowest of all my colleagues, in believing any thing so injurious to the characters of

of the rising statesmen, &c.—I was, however, mistaken. I too fondly supposed that sensible men would act as it became them to do.—Mistaken notion, particularly with regard to a *neighbouring nation!* To judge of them with any certainty, in their political capacity, the safest way is to suppose they will always act in direct opposition to the true interest of their country.

—If the cabinet of Holland has judged of the British ministry according to the undisguised sentiments of the Dutch statesmen, it is no wonder that they do not draw with us; and that all harmony between us is destroyed: and that they do judge so in reality, their constant conduct has too long significantly declared;—and this effectually accounts for their measures.—It seems then that the ministry of England has not yet happily struck upon the right system to gain over the Dutch; and the latter, as we find, represent it as if they had been under the same French influence, with which many in England have suspected the Dutch ministry to have been.—For my own part, who have no reason to be partial towards either, I cannot help declaring, that I am rather inclined to think this general charge on either side to be groundless and defamatory: I rather attribute suspicions of this kind to the difficulties that the men in power in both councils have found in falling upon those measures that can produce and cement the desired good understanding, union and

and friendship between Great Britain and Holland; and the lucky policy of France in projecting such as have tended to divide them.

THE ambition of France, continues our Dutch orator, and the distractions on the continent, required *domestic unanimity*, without seeing which confirmed, the states of Europe could not safely rely on the alliance of B—n, &c. [This gives us the natural idea of the sentiments which the Dutch entertain of our eternal ministerial distractions; what high dishonour do they not reflect upon the king's councils, and the glory of the nation. While things are so, is it to be wondered that we can neither influence the Dutch, or any other cabinet of Europe to good purpose? If the axe was once laid to the root of these evils, we might expect things to go better with us; and ministers get more wealth (if that was their idol) as well as more lasting glory to themselves and families.]

AFTER leaving out much of Mynheer's matter that was agreeable to the then circumstances of affairs, and that bears extremely hard against our English ministers, the gentleman proceeds thus:—"The late minister having been universally condemned for stooping to French influence, it was thought necessary that his successors should shew that they were men of high mettle, and more exalted virtue. But as nothing could more effectually remove all suspicion of being held in

in the late minister's leading-strings, as taking, or at least affecting to be inclined to take, young Lewis by the whiskers, it was resolved they should assume a *strutting* air, stamp the foot at the old cardinal; call him hard names; and tell him he must be civil, or — what? Why that the simple Dutch would be forced, if they proved wise enough not to see the fallacy, to join against France in spite of their teeth: that the best troops of B—n would be transported to Flanders; with some reflections that I choose to omit, as thinking them unseasonable, as well as indecent, upon — Here was the scheme, says the ministerial Dutchman; and it must be owned it was specious and artful.

Who could imagine that there was no intention of a rupture with France, when so many engines should appear at work for tearing her to pieces? Who could suspect a *court* of having absolutely determined to break with France, unless she should attempt an invasion in favour of the p—r, who should send one of the principal nobles to press and bully the States General into an offensive alliance against that crown? With much more to the like purpose, turning our whole conduct into a frenchified farce.—

THEN he goes on again:—"The scheme was well concerted, and executed so speciously, that all Europe began to think that a rupture would necessarily ensue; but, my l—ds, *we of the state had quite another idea of*
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the warlike preparations of your country. We saw, as has been observed, a new ministry under an absolute necessity of appearing to swerve from the measures of the former minister, become universally bated, more from his cringing subserviency to the house of Bourbon, than even to his corruption, and profusion of public money.—We soon discovered the drift of those hostile preparations, which so much employed the thoughts of the politicians of Europe, and diverted those of the subject at home from observing that the cabinet was still influenced by the late minister, and that the new leaders had servilely adopted all his maxims. We could perceive the new ministers implicitly bowing to every desire of the court for requiring power; but still covering themselves under the shelter of succouring the queen of Hungary, and distressing France. [Heavy charge, and betrays great disgust against England.]

WE saw, my l—ds, your court, as most courts are, enamoured more with the power of doing harm than good. We saw her all along grasping at all that could make her dreaded at home, and slighting all that might acquire her the good confidence and affection of the people. This was the light we viewed your court in, when we heard of your embarkations for Flanders; nor did we alter our opinion when you urged us so eagerly to act jointly with you against France. Even now we see no reason for altering our sentiments.—[He then proceeds to support his charge

charge against our British ministers, by an induction of particulars, and endeavouring to make them act in disguise, and from quite other motives than appeared to the people; and goes on as]—I have made a cursory mention of the motives, which, I think, induced the court of L—n to press us so earnestly into an *offensive alliance against France*; I shall now endeavour to point out our motives for declining to contract any engagements that seem to threaten the tranquillity of the republic.

“ I HAVE taken some pains to trace out the conduct of the late minister, in order to shew that the republic could, with no safety imaginable, contract with, or rely on, the court of L—n, whilst he was at the helm: and I have observed succinctly on the conduct of the *new ministry*, and compared it with the late, that it might be seen whether or no the reasons still subsist, which induced the states to harbour a diffidence of the virtue and wisdom of their ancient allies. If the conduct be the same, as it seems to me evident that it is, the same reasons still subsist for our distrusting the court of L—n at present, as much as during the public influence of the late minister; and that the conduct of the late and present ministry is the same, appears, I think, manifestly from the consequences.—[Here the Dutchman is again excessively severe against our ministers, and then proceeds.] My lords, at the time

that we engaged with B—n against France there were no divisions, no discontent that could possibly obstruct a vigorous prosecution of that just and necessary war, &c. In those days your debts were not great, and your taxes were moderate; your trade was beneficial, your industry was quick, your luxury was a pigmy, if compared with what it is at present. Sure I need not shew how greatly the same is altered of late: I need not be at the pains of pointing out what every one knows; what all Europe knows.

WE cannot but see what all the world sees, that B—n has neither s—n to direct her councils, nor generals to fight her battles, except your l—ps. We cannot avoid seeing the decrease of her trade, the weight of her taxes, her luxury, and her debts, which might have been paid off before now; and we must be infatuated not to perceive, that she is infinitely in a worse plight at this time than when we entered into an offensive alliance with queen Anne.

IN those days we could rely on the wisdom of B—n, her steadiness and regard for the liberty of Europe, and the Protestant interest; but can we do so now, after so many repeated tests of her bad conduct? Can we shut our eyes to her conduct towards her natural allies, since the death of that excellent princess, who was the soul of the late general alliance? Have we not seen the late emperor, the princes of the empire, the king of Sardinia, and

and this republic, slighted always, often irritated, whilst servile court was paid to France, &c.

“ THE fatal consequences of so mistaken a conduct are too visible to be overlooked. We see them with that sincere concern which friendship dictates. We see a divided, discontented people, overburdened with taxes, groaning under the pressure of debts, decay of trade, luxury, and penal laws.—We see this people not long ago the terror of tyranny, and the delight of the virtuous, now become the object of general scorn and derision, and

You may perceive, my l—ds, from what I have said of the conduct of your cabinet, and the situation of your country, that I don't hold it prudent or safe for this republic to embrace the overtures you are pleased to make us. I observed that it may be necessary for the ministry *to seem to be inclined to a war with France; but that in reality they never intended it.* But supposing that the tongue had spoke the sentiments of the heart, how unfaithful should we be to our mother-country, should we involve her in an unjust quarrel, to sooth the present peevish humour of *those* whose misconduct has precipitated a daring, powerful, faithful nation into irresolution, poverty, and perfidy? *Can we venture on your councils, or your efforts in the prosecution of a French war, when we see how you have misapplied your force and your time in carrying on your present war with Spain? To*
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embark the republic in an expensive dangerous war, in conjunction with a divided, discontented, debilitated, burdened, ill-conducted nation, would be a weakness, removed but by a very slender partition from madness. Forbid it heaven! that the servants of the state should be enemies and betrayers of the republic. [May we not reasonably believe, from the conduct of the Dutch, that these sentiments, however false they may be in the opinion of some, still prevail in the cabinet of Holland? And, if they are false, should we not thoroughly convince the Dutch of their mistake, by our manifest contrary conduct? for that only will have weight with them.—Then he proceeds again:]

IF Britain, who prides herself in being empress of the ocean, makes so miserable a band of a war on her favourite element, what a scurvy figure must she make in a foreign land war, against the powerfullest nation in the world?—[Are not these powerful motives for the Dutch to act as they have long done, and still continue to do?]

But, my l—ds, are you in earnest when you tell us that France is reduced? What are her debts? I'll answer they do not amount to a fourth of what Britain owes. What are her taxes? Not half what is paid in England. The trade of France is visibly increased; that of Britain is absolutely decreased. The gasconade of pulling down France, this eagerness to press the republic

into an offensive alliance against that crown, may serve the purpose of the B—sh ministry; their measures may require such props. But, my l—ds, the servants of this republic want no such aids. They have no views, no interest separate from the good of their dear country. They serve her to the best of their skill, and the utmost of their power. They have not, nor ever will, put their country to an immense or any expence, in order to share of the spoil, or delude their countrymen. Had the servants of B—n observed this wise and patriot maxim, their country would be at this time as powerful as she is otherwise, and France as impotent as she is falsely painted to be.

TO put an end to the conference, which we hope will be the last on the present subject, I must freely declare, that the conduct of B—n all along has been such as would deter us from entering into new contracts with her, supposing they thought her in earnest. But as there is room for believing that all her late bustle and outcry are calculated to some certain domestic purposes, we desire to be excused from having any hand in countenancing ministerial collusion. —The neutrality of the Netherlands is so much our interest, 'tis much the interest of Europe, that we are resolved to preserve it at all hazards. Therefore, my l—ds, to convince you of our candour, we plainly tell you, that we shall look upon those who commit hostilities in the Netherlands as enemies to the republic,

lic, and treat them as such to the utmost of our power.—Your l—ps will be pleased to look upon this as the *final answer* to the proposals you have made us from your court. I am now to beg your l—ps pardon for having taken up so much of your time, and particularly for my harshness of expression, to which the nature of the subject obliged me.”—The end of the abstract of the Dutch minister’s speech.

Other REMARKS.

WE find that the Dutch minister roundly charges the British ministry with being quite frenchified ever since the treaty of Utrecht.—That they have *pretended* only to go to war with France, but were never since in earnest.—That they have increased the public debts and taxes, not to humble *France*, or right ourselves with *SPAIN*, but to answer other domestic purposes, which the Dutch refused to countenance.—That it is the interest of the republic to adhere to their *neutrality*.—That it would prove ruinous to them, if they were to be influenced to follow the *offensive measures* that may be necessary to the views of the British ministry.—That our wars by land and sea have been so illy conducted, that they cannot safely ally with us against any enemy.—That though ministers have been changed, there has been no change in our measures.—That our measures have been such, that they have brought an indignity

and contempt upon the British nation at all the courts in Europe. That our commerce has decayed, while that of France has increased.—That we grow poorer and poorer, and France richer and richer ; and that while Britain pursues measures so destructive to her interest and her honour, the Dutchman bluntly tells our noble lords, that the cabinet of Holland will never be swayed by this nation to come vigorously into any war with us against France ; and therefore, that if we are brought into any broils, we must get out of them ourselves as well as we can, and not depend upon their assistance ; for that they cannot depend upon our fidelity or ability.—That they think themselves able to take care of themselves, with what other allies they can obtain, whereon they can better depend than on Britain. This seems to be the substance of Mynheer's speech ; from which I have expunged such matter, as I thought might tend, at present, rather to widen than heal our domestic breaches.—This I have done to shew my moderation at so critical a conjuncture ; and yet have gone so far as may be requisite to remind us of what may be necessary to be done, to wipe off those reflections of the Dutch ; and that not only from a motive to the re-establishment of old friendships between Great Britain and her ancient and natural allies the Hollanders, but to dissipate every evil impression that may be made on other courts to the dishonour of our own ;

own; for if we lose all our weight and dignity with the States General, we cannot expect to maintain them in any other courts; because the political contagion will inevitably spread itself throughout Europe; and what must prove the consequence? Why truly we must exhaust our vital treasure, while we have a shilling left, to purchase the friendship of every court, that may have it in their power to do us the least mischief; because, according to the Dutch minister's sentiments, they look upon us with contempt, and as an ignominious milch-cow. Whereas, a nation that sustains its honour and dignity with foreign states, and is famed for the wisdom of its councils, will do more with a nod, than the other can with her millions.—Let these reflections of the Dutch be true or false, they have done unspeakable injury and dishonour to these kingdoms, because we know they have been industriously propagated by our enemies at all the courts in Europe. If the Dutch have been imposed upon, why have they not been unanswerably refuted? Why has not the whole republic been convinced of the falshood of those accusations, and those prejudices conceived in Holland against this nation eradicated? For they have done infinite mischief to this kingdom in point of trade, as might be easily shewn.—But, on the contrary, if these charges are true, and will hold good against former ministers only,

why is not our mistaken conduct rectified? Why do we not instantly convince the Dutch, and all the world, that our ministers are not a frenchified crew, as to pretend only to declare war against that nation, but with no intent to fight or hurt them, our views being solely, as the Dutch minister barefacedly asserts, to raise immense sums of money for the sake of domestic plunder, and to participate of French gold too! For a charge of this nature to be made against British ministers, by our most ancient, our most natural, and our most important ally, must greatly concern, if not shock, every true friend to these kingdoms. And what can dissipate these notions, at home or abroad, but a thorough change in the whole British system? If those who shall take the helm are not able to effect this, they should not attempt it; for nothing else will retrieve the interest and the glory of the nation. But I hope the nation has those who are not less able than willing to retrieve the honour and glory of these kingdoms, and every honest man will lend them their aid.—Such, and such only, I shall be ambitious to serve as a private man.

To lay a foundation for the desirable change that seems absolutely necessary, has been the end of all my poor political labours; but the superstructure can never be erected by scribbling alone; that must be accomplished by other measures, designed to be communicated

cated to such only who are no less capable than willing to set about the great work in earnest: and it is to be hoped that heaven will soon raise up in this kingdom ministers of state that will cordially and cheerfully embrace the tender of my service upon this and some other occasions, that I humbly apprehend will be attended with consequences importantly interesting to the kingdom, and no less honourable to themselves.—

LET me not be misunderstood here, that I mean only measures, whereby Holland alone must be convinced of the rectitude of our intentions, and her patriots in power influenced to acquiesce therein. No; we mean much more than that: for the whole power of Holland alone, as it stands at present, being united with that of Britain, would not answer the end of reducing France as should be done, to procure a lasting and an honourable peace: we propose likewise such an increase to the power of Holland, as will soon give that republic much greater weight both by sea and land than those out of the secret can conceive.—Nor is this all; we aim at nothing less than the bringing such other allies into the British scale, as will answer the end aimed at: and, what will not easily be credited, I am sensible all that we humbly pretend to may be accomplished at one third part of those continental expences that have only brought about rope-of-sand confederacies,

deracies, and been productive of nought but temporary amusements; nought but a peace liable to be broke, as it were, the succeeding year.

BUT if the Dutch, upon the system intended, be deaf to their interest, it may be executed without them: so that the court of England would not depend upon the Dutch; she would then have many strings to her political bow, and Holland would be glad to make one amongst the rest, when that republic shall be convinced that she could not act with security, but in concert with Great Britain, who then would fully have it in her power to discover infallibly which was the real frenchified court, either that of London or the Hague. But if the States General, in such case, should still prefer a neutrality, that would no less determine her to be under French influence, than her throwing her whole weight into the French scale against Britain and her allies: and if she did do so, she would run the hazard of absolute ruin, and that none but faithless ministers would suffer, and they would certainly suffer for it, from the just resentment and indignation of the people, who would be no less sensible than the wisest patriot of the interest and glory of their state, when the court of England should undertake to render it more than ever the High and Mighty States of Holland; and this appears, to my humble judgment, to be

in the power of Great Britain to accomplish, and that with as much interest and honour to herself, as to the States General of the United Provinces.—And I will presume farther to declare, that all this may be done without any objection from the most sanguine ante-stadtholderian.

I AM too well acquainted with the present strength and power of France, to imagine she is to be so easily reduced within the bounds needful for the security of Great Britain and Holland, and the liberties of all Christendom; and I have too sufficiently proved, in these discourses, the commercial broad-bottom, that crown has established, for the future augmentation of her trade and her maritime power, to think that we shall be ever able to reduce her within the requisite preservative bounds, unless we do it by the present war; apprehending that any peace we can expect to make with them now, must prove far more disadvantageous and dishonourable than the continuance of a war; especially if it be not conducted upon other principles than it has ever yet been: and for not carrying on a war upon the principles hereby hinted at, I am certain that no ministers in this kingdom have ever been blameable, because I am too sensible that such is the nature of the design, that it never so much as entered into their imagination; and, therefore, there could be no guilt where
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there was no knowledge ; for we cannot put certain undiscovered maxims of policy upon the footing of discovered and promulgated laws ; for although *ignorantia juris non excusat* ; yet it is quite otherwise with regard to the measures we allude too ; nor have they, I am confident, been less thought of by the Dutch ministry, than the British ; if they had, we may presume they might and would have found ways to have suggested them to our own ; unless indeed they have had indubitable reasons, in a long course of negotiations with the king's ministers, to know that they really are as hearty friends to the French as the Dutchman would have us believe they have been enemies to his country : but this cannot easily be known to others. However, if the states of Holland have heretofore had reason to know, or even to imagine, that the court of England has used them ill, and been more in the interest of France than in that of their natural ally, we cannot blame the Dutch for acting the part they have done, and which they at present do : but it is to be hoped that we shall soon have a ministry at the head of the king's affairs, who will dissipate all those evil impressions in Holland, by convincing them that they are not of the frenchified stamp.—The nation expects to see a truly patriot ministry ; such a ministry as shall have well studied, not only the essential political lines of public

public business, as well with regard to foreign as domestic concerns: a ministry also thoroughly instructed in all the various departments, and all the practical subordinate dependencies and connections: a ministry that will court and not despise useful information from all quarters, and who are so happily turned for the administration of national affairs, as to be capable of superintending every department, and directing the rudder of the whole: a ministry who will scorn to screen themselves by urging that this was not done within my department, this is out of my province, I am not answerable for it, &c.—We say, it is to be hoped, that the king will make choice of such able ministers for the chief domestic officers of state who have wise heads, as well as honest hearts, to conduct public business with ease to themselves, general satisfaction to the people, and joy to our aged sovereign, and dignity to the heir apparent to the crown. And as the state and management of our home and foreign affairs is closely connected, it is likewise to be desired, that we may have a ministry no less skilled in foreign than domestic concerns; a ministry as well acquainted with the finances of other countries as of their own, and no less informed of the trade and the arts of other states and empire than of those of Great Britain.—A ministry thus informed in the state of foreign nations, will always be able to treat with them to the advantage and honour

nour of their country, and to make such treaties of commerce, friendship, and alliance, as will prove the mutual steady support and prosperity of these kingdoms, and all with whom they shall ally.—This being the case, Great Britain will have no occasion to expend *millions* in the purchase of alliances: on the contrary, every state will court our friendship, and be lead by the wisdom of British councils; because such councils will consult the prosperity and happiness of our natural allies, in conjunction with our own: for upon the basis of reciprocal interest only can solid and permanent treaties subsist.

STRANGE it is that there should be no observation more common amongst our neighbours abroad than this, That the people of England, of all others, are the worst reasoners on foreign affairs; and this I fear is as just as it is general: for our situation, which deprives us of easy intercourse, and happily saves us from any *immediate* connection with the people of the continent, renders the study of their interests and policies at once more difficult and less interesting; while the few who have had the opportunities of being well informed in these things, instead of making the proper use thereof, have turned their thoughts to other kind of reflections: and, indeed, if the ground-work is not well laid before travel,
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it is rare that any solid knowledge is gained by tour after tour; for the substantial of treaty-making are not to be acquired, we apprehend, by the mere converse of the world, that scarce ever entering into its fundamentals, whereon it essentially depends.

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DISSERTATION XXXV.

Of the conduct of the court of Spain towards that of Great Britain since the peace of Utrecht ; with considerations on the extraordinary friendship that we may reasonably expect from that nation at present.

IT has been no uncommon thing for us to have from three to four, and even sometimes five hundred vessels, great and small, of these nations in several ports of Spain at once ; and seldom, throughout the whole year, less than two hundred at a time. It has been common to see a hundred, and often two hundred sail of British and Irish ships in the Bay of Cadiz at a time. Two thirds of our Newfoundland and New England trade for *fish* depended on *Spain* ; nor were we less obliged to that kingdom for the great advantage that accrued from our being their carriers of Europe, during times of peace with that nation.—We traded with the Spaniards, and for them, from Hamburgh, Holland, and from all the East and North seas ;
and

and to and from the extended coasts of Italy; Turkey, Barbary, as well as from Great Britain and Ireland.—We shared in the Spanish West-India trade as largely as any nation in Europe;—and the balance of trade between Great Britain and her other dominions, and the kingdom of Spain, was considerably in our favour, and it was well worth the while of this kingdom to maintain a strict friendship with this nation, for the sake of our commercial connections; when the old Spanish proverb we know was, *Paz con Anglaterra con todos otos la guerra.* Peace with England and war with all the rest of the world.

BUT so it is, the case is greatly altered of late years. Spain has greatly decreased in her imports of British manufactures, as well to *old* Spain as to *new*; and yet our imports from thence have been far from declining in the like proportion; the French have not only greatly supplanted us in the Spanish European trade, but have obtained by far the greatest share in the supply of the galleons and flota, they being of late years by far more highly favoured than Britain in their commerce to old Spain as well as new; their woollen manufactures are become now far more in vogue there than the English; and their linens, silks, and gold and silver manufactures are no less acceptable to the Spanish dons. The French also have cut us out in a considerable part of the supply of the

the Spaniards with fish.—And that our whole trade with Spain must daily decline no one can doubt, when he considers that the Spaniards, though long reproached for their commercial indolence and inactivity, having now struck into an active commerce, are determined to become their own maritime carriers, are striking into fisheries, and are taking every wise measure to establish nurseries for seamen, in order to raise a formidable royal navy.

THEY have likewise settled manufactories of almost every kind ; they have allured away our woollen and filken manufacturers, and even our ship-carpenters, who, it seems, have already instructed the Spaniards in those our most inestimable arts, and they appear resolved to raise themselves into a great manufactural and commercial state ; the foundation of which was laid by the Dutchman the duke de Ripperda, who succeeded Alberoni as chief minister in Spain ; and his scheme has ever since been gradually carrying into execution, as is manifest from the testimony of that patriot-Spaniard, Don Geronymo de Uztariz, whom I have frequently cited upon this occasion.

IN Madrid, says he, has been set up a manufacture of tissues, lutestrings, and other silks, no less curious in the workmanship, than in the colours and mixtures, in imitation of the fabrics of Lyons in France ; and
this

this manufacture has produced such as the king himself was not ashamed to wear.

THIS successful establishment in Spain has been owing to workmen, and a famous dyer from the city of Lyons, procured by his majesty, at the charge of his own royal revenue; and for the encouragement of a house and supplies of money, which he ordered to be advanced in the infancy of the undertaking, giving also a monthly pension of 15 doubloons to the master-dyer, and 12 doubloons to the head manufacturer.

WITHOUT the gates of Madrid has been raised also a fabric of prime tapestry, in imitation of those of Flanders, by a master and workmen, whom his majesty procured from that country, at the charge of the treasury; and they continue in this important manufactory, working for his royal palaces, having the encouragement of houses, workshops, and indulgences, which his majesty has granted them.

AND notwithstanding there is not yet in either of the fabrics a competent number of masters and workmen, for the considerable consumption of this kingdom: yet the main difficulty has been surmounted, which is settling and bringing the manufactures to the perfection already mentioned; *for it is an easy thing to enlarge, or add to what we have begun, and already established upon a good footing.*

‘ By this plain fact, says a celebrated Spanish author, **IN THE VERY FACE OF THE COURT**, many persons might be undeceived, who believe and propagate a notion (upon what grounds I know not) that in this kingdom we cannot arrive at the perfection we have seen in these and other manufactures, either on account of the delicacy of the work, *as if there was neither genius to invent, nor hands to execute in Spain*; or for colours, as if his majesty’s provinces did not really supply the principal and best materials for them; or from our water, which they suppose not proper for them, even when both the declaration of foreign artificers, and experience, shews it to be very fit for dying all sorts of colours; and it is also certain, that, notwithstanding foreigners introduced these curious fabrics, *many SPANIARDS now join in them, and already make them in equal perfection* *.

THE grand fabric of fine cloths at Gadalaxara is wholly owing to the vigilance and protection of his majesty, though there has

* By these very measures the great Colbert laid the foundation for the present flourishing trade of France. And, by these and the like maxims of policy, Spain is likely to raise her trade and navigation to what pitch they desire. Do we not see that Spain is daily drawing away ingenious artificers from various parts of Europe, as well as Great Britain? Wherefore, is it not the interest of these kingdoms to give all fitting encouragement to ingenious artificers and mechanics, to keep them at home, to prevent their loss from impoverishing our own nation, and enriching our rivals, by their commerce and navigation?

not

not been yet, in the management of it, the good oeconomy, which is requisite, and has been directed by his majesty's orders. *But one great point has been obtained; that many of the good workmen employed in these manufactures are SPANIARDS, and some, who have been bred up in them, have dispersed into other parts of the kingdom, which is the principal advantage resulting from the arrival and introduction of foreign masters and workmen; therefore no scruple ought to be made of bearing the expence of their journey, and their first settlement.*" [BRITONS! permit me to do myself the honour earnestly to recommend to you to cherish and care for your ingenious ARTIFICERS, your MECHANICS, your MANUFACTURERS, that no inducements may prevail with these most useful subjects of the three kingdoms to abandon their native country, to enrich others, and ruin their own!]

"AND it well deserves our notice (continues this wise Spaniard) that it has been found by experience in Guadalaxara, and other parts of Spain, that the Spanish women, and even the very young girls, spin wool better and quicker than the mistresses of foreign families that instructed them, and were brought over for that purpose.

By means of due supplies and encouragement from his majesty to Don Joseph de Aguada, knight of the order of Calatrava, for the fabric of cloths in Valdemero, the Spaniards have also gained the point of manu-

facturing them in that town, as fine as those of ENGLAND, and of good colours and mixtures; as is manifest from the approbation they have received from his majesty, who has worn them himself upon several occasions *

This is but a slight sketch of what is doing in Spain, in regard to their trading interests. Hear what this noble Spaniard further urges, and which is now duly attended to at the court of Spain.—“ It is out of dispute, says he, upon another occasion, that the commerce, we have many years carried on with other nations, has been very injurious to the Spanish monarchy; and the cause, whence our damage has arisen in the same commerce, has been pointed out. So that it will be easy to conceive, that, in order to promote our own interest, and possess the great and happy consequences, which we aim at, and we are invited to, and enabled to obtain from the great plenty, and superior quality, of our materials and fruits, we ought to labour, with zeal and address, in all these measures, that can avail towards selling more commo-

* This again is following the example of Lewis the 14th of France, who, by the very same means enabled his subjects, first, to supply his own kingdom with the woollen manufacture, and afterwards encouraged them to supplant us at foreign markets. It is certain, from this policy of the court of Spain, that we must lose the greatest part of the trade of both *Old and New Spain*. Does not this merit the consideration of the wisdom of the nation?

dities and fruits to foreigners, than we buy of them, *for here lies all the secret, good conduct, and advantage of trade*, or, at least, that we be upon a par in the barter of commodities; which might be even sufficient for the constitution of this kingdom. For, by virtue of it, there would be detained, in Spain, the greatest part of the wealth that comes from the Indies, and these kingdoms be constantly rich and powerful. Nor ought we ever to lose sight of this maxim, that the vast treasures, which arrive at Cadiz from these parts, contribute nothing to our relief, or advantage, but will rather be turned against this monarchy, so long as they pass, directly from the same port, to the rivals of the crown, &c.”

I AM satisfied, says he again, that there are now in the kingdom of Valencia above 2000 looms of silk and wool; in the principality of Catalonia, above 500; and, in the kingdom of Granada, 1000, including both sorts; and there are also in other provinces manufactures of silk, though not very considerable; and, in almost all of them, no contemptible number of looms for the several fabrics of wool, such as the middling and coarse cloths, bays, serges, camblets, drugnets, &c. One may, I think, without rashness, suppose the silken and woollen looms, that are now in Spain, to be 10,000. Now these, with the 60,000 new ones that have been imagined to be set up, would amount to 70,000; and one may

reckon 14,000, or about one fifth part of them to be silk looms: and the remaining 56,000 of fine, middling, and coarse wool, of which last there is no less consumption.

I HAVE already remarked, that in every silk and woollen loom, taken together, there might be yearly manufactured to the value of 700 dollars, including the expence of materials, and dying goods. In this estimate I am moderate, as well to stand clear of every thing that might seem forced, either in the facts, or the reasoning. But, as preciseness is necessary in calculations, I shall here produce that made, a few years ago, by the president and inspectors of the silk manufacture in the city of Seville, which is as follows:

THAT, in every loom of entire tissue, there is yearly wrought up 100 weight of silk, and 220 ounces of leaf silver, or gold, more or less. These manufactures yield 150 yards, which, at the moderate price of 3 doubloons, amount to 450 doubloons.

In each loom for middling tissue, 150 pounds of silk, and 150 ounces of metal yearly, and these wrought up yearly 190 yards, which, at the rate of 2 doubloons a yard, amount to 380 doubloons.

In every loom for brocades, 200 pounds of silk, and between 70 and 80 ounces of metal, which are manufactured annually into 300 yards, and, at a doubloon and a half per yard, make 450 doubloons.

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In a loom of double taffeta, there is used 280 pounds of silk annually, which wrought up produce 1800 yards, and, at the rate of 10 reals de vellon, will amount to 300 doubloons.

In every loom of single taffeta, is expended 200 pounds of silk yearly, with small difference, and they yield above 3000 yards, which, at the rate of 6 reals de vellon, are worth 300 doubloons.

In every loom of plain or striped sattins, there is used yearly 200 pounds of silk; which woven yield 1200 yards, and at the rate of 16 reals a yard, one with another, the whole amount will be 300 doubloons.

In every loom of damask, there is yearly expended 280 pounds, which wrought up produce 1200 yards, and at the rate of 29 reals, one with another, are worth 400 doubloons.

THOUGH some persons, continues our writer, may be a little jealous of these calculations; and willing to reduce them even one sixth, or one fifth, it must be acknowledged, that after this reduction, there will be manufactured annually in every loom, one with another, to the value of 1000 dollars, including the price of the materials. So that in the 14,000 looms appropriated to silk, out of the 70,300 for this commodity and wool, there would be manufactured to the amount of 14 millions of dollars; not forgetting that there is a fluctuation in the prices from year

to year, according to the quantity of silk and fruits, and from other accidents, that usually raise and fall the markets.

FROM the information of people of experience, and to be relied upon, we find that in every woollen loom, one with another, allowing for the difference between fine, middling, and coarse cloths, there can be yearly manufactured to the value of above 700 dollars, including the materials. Hence there would be annually wrought up in the above 56,000 woollen looms, to the amount of 39 millions, which, added to the 14 millions produced by the silk manufactures, would make 53 millions of dollars.

IT may be observed, indeed, that all positions, founded on principles that are not quite determinate, are liable to some uncertainty: however, they do not fail of affording light, by their approaches to truth; especially, when some of the principles whereon they are founded are certain.

FROM what I shall offer elsewhere upon the number of inhabitants in Spain, it will be found that it contains near 7,500,000 souls; and though there be many of these that yearly expend in manufactures of silk and wool, or of both sorts, above 100 crowns, without any regard to linen, it is also known, that the greatest part of the inhabitants of both sexes are found to be dressed in middling and coarse cloths, and that every suit lasts them about two years: and when we consider

sider that the country people, and mechanics, take up for a suit six yards of ordinary cloth (which is narrower than the fine) this, at 15 reals a yard, will amount to six dollars, and that two dollars more will be necessary for linings, the whole commodity will cost eight dollars yearly; and, upon supposition a suit of cloath shall wear two years, there will be expended by every individual four dollars a year. But, as it is also certain that many of these wear a cloak, and a cap, the annual expence of every one of this class may be stated, in these commodities, at five dollars.

NOR should it be unobserved, that younger boys, and girls, of the lower class, will not expend, in cloaths, four dollars yearly; the same, also, will happen to a great number of women, exclusive also of linen; but, in consideration there are many of both sexes that yearly expend in commodities of silk and wool from 20 to 100 dollars, and more, I am persuaded that, for every one of the 7,500,000, one with another, we may fairly calculate their annual expence, in both commodities, at four dollars and a half, which, for the whole, will amount to something above 33,000,000 of dollars: and, if we deduct this sum from the 53,000,000, the supposed value of the fabrics manufactured in the above 70,000 looms, there would remain to us, of both commodities, the value of 20,000,000. And, by means of this over-

overplus, one may, I think, furnish his majesty's Indies both with the silks they are in want of, and also the fine cloths that go thither from Europe, since they have no occasion for ordinary cloths, by having them in plenty from their own fabrics. Nay, I am apt to believe, that, after the necessary supplies from Spain and the Indies, there will still remain considerable quantities of the above silks and fine cloths, for exportation to several kingdoms and countries in Europe, especially those of the North, that yield no silk, and but very little of fine wool.

*By this, and other wise provisions, we should accomplish the grand point of selling others more commodities and fruits than we buy. For, even by the single provision of setting up the 60,000 looms abovementioned, there would be, after supplying the kingdom of Spain, and the Indies, so many goods left, as would suffice, and even be more than a balance for the spices, linens, bacalao, and other cured fish, we are obliged to have from foreign parts, for our fast-days; though the last article from abroad might be considerably reduced, by taking such steps as shall be proposed in another place *.*

AFTER the supposed exportation of our silks and woollen cloths, we should still have the benefit of our wines, brandies, oils, rai-

* These we shall occasionally shew, with humble expedients proposed, to guard against any injury that this nation may sustain thereby.

fins, and other fruits, that are more than we consume ourselves, and go abroad in considerable quantities, besides a great many small wares, that might be made of the excellent iron of Biscay, and other provinces, both for home and foreign consumption; and great quantities of crystal and soap, that might be manufactured in these kingdoms, by means of the fosa and barilla, which they abound with, and are acknowledged to be of such superior quality, that these two ingredients are eagerly desired by all nations in Europe, and in preference to all other sought after, and exported from Spain.

“ MOREOVER, the quicksilver, copper, tin, and other profitable metals, which his majesty's dominions yield in great plenty, merit our consideration; as also, that in many parts the soil is peculiarly adapted to the growth of flax and hemp, materials very advantageous, and will furnish us with rigging and sail-cloth, both for *our own, and the supply of other countries.*

By these natural means, and which the constitution of these kingdoms renders very practicable, there would not only be prevented the extraction of many millions of gold and silver, but there might come in from foreign countries a considerable quantity of money.

BUT, should we succeed no farther than to detain all, or a moiety of the treasures that
come

come from the Indies, and have hitherto gone directly to other kingdoms, Spain serving them only for a passport, we should then have that plenty, increase of people, strength, and other advantages we are now destitute of, by the desertion and decay of the manufactures above-mentioned, and which it is in our power to revive, enlarge, and improve, by granting some indulgences, and making a *judicious reform of the duties upon exports and imports*. For though the commodities now exported from Spain are few, there would then go abroad large quantities; and, were they to pay no higher duty than $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. *of their value, the customs would yield more than at present*. Nay, as the country would be rendered more populous by means of the manufactures, there would ensue an increase of the revenue, arising out of the more frequent sales and purchases, and a large consumption of commodities and fruits: and, what is a natural consequence, a better cultivation and produce from our lands, and an improvement in all *mechanic arts*. To all which ought to be added, as a sure and settled principle, that, though the treasury should not be so visibly augmented, and go hand in hand with the wealth of the subjects, it would not be possible, under the obligation and tender regard we have for the king, to leave him poor, while we ourselves are rich.

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MOREOVER, let us always recollect, when we think of this essential point, of re-establishing and enlarging our manufactories, that we ought not to be discouraged by the language of certain low-spirited persons, that believe there is not a sufficient number of people in Spain to execute this *grand project*; for it shall be demonstrated, that, by means of those that now are here, and such as commerce will always bring along with it, there will be a sufficient number for this, and other provisions for the relief of the kingdom."

THIS is a sketch only of what is about to be done in Spain; and ought it not to rouse and alarm us?

WE shall now consider what mighty advantages we have obtained by the commerce of Spanish America, and particularly by that intended to have been carried on in the South Seas, which gave birth to our present company of that name.

THIS company was established by act of parliament, in the ninth year of the late queen Anne, entitled, An act for making good deficiencies, and satisfying the public debts, and for erecting a corporation to carry on a trade to the South-Sea, and for the encouragement of the fishery, &c.

MANY of the most judicious in commercial affairs looked on this company, considered as a joint-stock corporation for carrying on trade, as a chimerical project; and so it proved at length; but not from the nature and design
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of the institution as a trading society, if the same had been wisely projected, and its trade carried into execution as it ought to have been. For such a powerful company would have paved the way for an immense scene of trade to have been cut out into the South-Seas, which might have been carried on by separate traders, to no less benefit to themselves than the nation, when it might have been necessary to have dissolved this company, as a trading one, exclusive of all other his majesty's subjects. For this, and this only, is the motive for our ever favouring any joint-stock monopolies for foreign trade; and this idea I intreat the reader he would always take with him, when he observes me to say any thing favourably of such like trading corporations.

THE preamble to the establishment of this company, in relation to its trading capacity, runs thus: "Whereas it is of the greatest consequence to the honour and welfare of this kingdom, and for the increase of the strength and riches thereof, and for the vending the product and manufactures, goods and merchandizes of or brought into this kingdom, and employment of the poor, that a trade should be carried on to the SOUTH-SEAS, and other parts in America, within the limits herein after mentioned; which cannot be so well carried on as by a corporation with a joint stock EXCLUSIVE OF ALL OTHERS: now, for the better encouragement

ment of all and every the person or persons, &c."

Is it not plain from hence, that the company, by its first institution, was to have an exclusive trade within the certain limits particularized in the said act? and that our people of Jamaica, by the very act, were to be deprived of the trade to the South-Seas, which was, before this, carried on greatly to the advantage of themselves and the nation? But so wisely did the Spaniards manage this matter, that they got this company in England converted from a trading corporation (which they apprehended might too much benefit England, and too greatly detriment them in the Spanish West India commerce) into a mere *Affiento* for negroes, and a 500 ton annual ship. Was not this giving up the certain profits of our Jamaica trade to those imaginary ones, with which the nation were only amused?

It is true, the Jamaica traders were not excluded, but only from Buenos Ayres, southwards, and from the South-Sea; they had still left the places in the Atlantic ocean for themselves: but the profit they and the nation before annually derived from the South-Seas was considerable; and Spain found means, by tampering with the ministers of those days, to have all these advantages given up to the company, as an expedient, that the company, as such, might be the more easily brought to give them up to Spain; which

which the nation would never have done, had it not been for this chimerical amusement of mighty things to arise from this company. Hereby we lost the substance for the shadow, and what did Spain give us as an equivalent? Why truly that court very liberally bestowed upon us a scandalous and ruinous Affiento contract; a contract to sell the Spaniards 4,800 negroes per annum, together with a permission to send 500 tons of goods to Porto Bello! Thus all our solid advantages, that we might have reaped from a South-Sea trading corporation, vanished into this poultry Affiento! an Affiento abounding with stipulation contrived purposely by the court of Spain to quarrel with us whenever they thought proper; for so greatly did the Spaniards over-reach us herein, that they were sure always to have the company's merchandises in their possession; which were often kept three years in the king of Spain's warehouses, and under his own lock and key. Hereby did one half of the company's goods often perish in so hot a climate, and how could they ever be expected, under such restrictions, to be brought in the general to a good market? Or how could the Affientists ever hope for profit from their negroes, that were to pay a heavy load of duties to the king of Spain? A treaty could scarce have been contrived of so little benefit to the nation.

WOULD not one have thought, that after those pompous declarations, which we have
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seen in the preamble to the South-Sea act, that some attempt at least should have been made, by way of experiment: but so amazingly were we duped by the court of Spain, in concert with their fellow-treaty-makers, the court of France, that we wickedly gave up all our pretensions of trading to the South-Seas, as well from Jamaica as by the company, for an *Affiento chimera*! Is not this the more remarkable, since neither the Dutch, nor the French, nor any other nation, has restrained their subjects from trading to those parts; nor did they neglect to carry on a trade thither with a great profit to themselves; whilst the subjects of Great Britain, by means of the South-Sea company, were denied this!

HAD the South-Sea company put their original plan in execution with vigour and honour, it would certainly have proved a benefit to the kingdom, by the increase of our exports and navigation; but the sending an annual ship under such limitations as was done, though a new method of trade, could not possibly prove of national benefit, it lessening our exports, at the same time, by the way of old Spain. Cadiz, Seville, Port St. Mary's, before the South-Sea company was erected, were the places where our Spanish merchants, trading to the Spanish Indies, informed themselves what species and quantities of goods were shipped off from time to time; but on sending of the annual ships by the South-Sea company, they were under

such uncertainties, that they very greatly declined dealing in our manufactures by those channels. This gradually and insensibly gave our rivals in this trade an open opportunity to establish houses of trade or factories at these ports; and by exercising the commerce to the Spanish Indies, in a way the most agreeable to the court of Spain, laid the foundation to supplant us so greatly as they have done, not only in the Spanish West-India trade, but in the whole trade of old Spain.—This was not the essential fault of an *Affiento*, but the fault of being over-reached in the stipulations thereof, that we have become such sufferers thereby.

BUT even this *Affiento*, however beneficial it might have been rendered, both to the nation and the company, if the court of England had duly supported her dignity with that of Spain, was, by mismanagement, rendered quite otherwise; it was for many years like the dog in the manger, it neither traded itself, nor suffered those who would have done so in the like branch of commerce. The act for erecting this company deprived Jamaica of trading to the South-Seas; but the *Affiento* contract shut them out of the commerce of the Spanish Indies. Thus Spain got their ends by excluding us out of the trade of the South-Seas, and at length has deprived us also of the *Affiento* contract, which we weakly supposed was to make us more than an ample compensation for giving up the whole South-

South-Sea trade, which we intended to establish, *risum teneatis!* Whoever considers the coasts, countries, and islands, the product, trade, and the then state of all the places within the limits of the act of parliament, which constitutes the South-Sea company, must allow the aim was great, and the benefits might have proved no less so: but what a ridiculous exchange did we make for such an *Affiento*? In a word, it is apparent, from this plain and impartial state of the case, that our misunderstanding with the court of Spain may be justly attributed to those who made the *Affiento*, and the treaty of Utrecht; all which might have been avoided, if the nature of the Spanish West-India and South-Sea trades had been then better understood by our ministers of those days. But it is no easy matter for subsequent ministers to rectify such capital mistakes, committed by their predecessors. And these things being candidly and dispassionately recommended to consideration, may help to guard us against being thus imposed on in future.

THOUGH I do not at present intend to enter into the causes of the late war with Spain, yet there is one particular that may be necessary just to mention: that at the making of the late peace, and before we had absolutely settled the business of the *Affiento* with the court of Spain, it was a little unhappy that the *logwood affair* also had not been finally settled, that being one cause of the late

war, and may be productive of ill blood hereafter. If we have no right to carry on that trade in any shape, it would have been better to have explicitly renounced such a claim by treaty, than to leave the matter doubtful, that our traders therein might know upon what footing they stood in that respect: if we have a right to cut logwood, it is to be lamented that such right has not been expressly ascertained by treaty.

WE have never heard that the French or the Dutch pretend to any such claim to this trade as the English have; and yet, while I am writing these papers, we have an account, it seems, of a French ship being taken in coming from the Mississippi, that has a large quantity of logwood on board. So that this logwood trade, as carried on by the French, we find is winked at by the Spaniards, while we have had frequent accounts that they threaten to destroy all our people who are any way concerned in this commerce.

WE have for some time been amused with the Spaniards entering into a strict neutrality during the present war. I am afraid that we shall not be greater gainers by their neutrality than we are by those of the Dutch, the Hamburgers, Danes, &c. For hereby will not the ports of Spain be free and open to export all Spanish commodities to Great Britain, and a great part in their own bottoms too, since they have commenced an active com-

commerce; while the Spaniards shall carry, and cover under Spanish names, all French commodities? For there is no end of the deceits practised by neutral carriers in times of war. In a word, as our commerce is circumstanced, in regard to that of France, (with relation, I mean, to the difference in price between their commodities and ours) the neutrality of maritime carriers must prove very destructive to the trade of England, because those neutral powers will not traffic in British goods, as I have elsewhere observed, while they can in French to much greater advantage. Besides, ought it not to be considered whether the neutrality of Spain may not prove far more beneficial to France than even Spain declaring war against us likewise may be? For may they not, under colour of such neutrality, supply them with the treasures of the Spanish Indies to ruin us? I am much afraid that a Spanish neutrality, and a French war will prove more destructive to Great Britain than a war both with France and Spain.—But I shall not enter into a discussion of this important point: I cannot, however, avoid expressing my fears, and leaving the matter to the animadversion of those, whose duty it is more than mine to enter deeply into those delicate concerns.

WE have shewn, on another occasion, how large a fleet Spain has now ready for action; and if they sign a neutrality, will this preclude them from selling their ships of war to France?

Or, will it be reckoned an infraction of such neutrality for Spain some how to dispose of this fleet for the assistance of France? Can we suppose the Spaniards so weak as to put themselves to such great expence for nothing? Let us only suppose (for I would not presume to go farther than bare supposition) that France proposed to Spain, after they have signed a neutrality, to give them up Minorca, if they will give them an equivalent in men of war, and the naval stores they have now ready for action. Could such an agreement be construed a violation of the Spanish neutrality? Minorca is, by conquest, at present the absolute property of France, and they can dispose of it as they please; they may give it, or sell it, to whatever power they shall think proper; and why not to Spain, for what they may think a valuable consideration? If the neutrality of Spain takes place, I wish this may prove imaginary. But the short question is, whether this policy is not far more for the mutual interest of France and Spain, than Spain to join with France against England? If they find it so on deliberation, I make no doubt but we shall soon hear of a Spanish neutrality. But from whose instigation is this neutrality to take place? We can hardly believe it can proceed from the court of England.—Would not this betray our weakness as well as our dread, no less than the distraction of our system? Is the Antigallican prize to be made the tub to decoy us into these snares? Or, is advantage to be taken of
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the present unhappy situation of our domestic affairs? Or, have we not reason enough to believe that France has made secret overtures to Spain to come into a neutrality? Let it proceed from whatever cause it may, if Spain makes choice of such a part, we must certainly be stone-blind not to discern that this is brought about by the councils of France and Spain acting in secret concert. But what is the cover? Where lies the deception upon poor old England? Here it lies, I am much afraid--the Antigallican affair, and some other pretences, are to be made the motives to England for suing to Spain for her own destruction!

It will be asked, perhaps, why should we dream of Spain's exchanging her royal navy to France, or signing a neutrality? From some motive or other, we will not say what. —If not from those we have suggested, are there no others to induce Spain to assist France in her trade, and even with her marine, under the pretext we have mentioned? And may it not be secretly agreed between those two courts, on consideration of such artful assistance on the part of Spain, that France shall exert such Spanish naval strength, in conjunction with their own, to wrest Gibraltar out of our hands, as they have done Minorca? And, after the affair was over, would it not be very easy for those two powers to make an exchange again; the French to give up Gibraltar to Spain, and Spain return Minorca to France? And may not all this be done under cover of a neutrality! But while France

and Spain were playing this game, could not Spain underhandedly assist them also by land in the acquisition of Gibraltar, while France were acting by sea with the combined fleets? And if England complained of this, as a violation of the Spanish neutrality, what satisfaction would she have by it? The business might be over before our remonstrances might be listened to at the court of Madrid; or so delayed as not to prevent the execution of the scheme projected. And Spain then would declare war against England also, and bid us defiance. In this manner may Great Britain be duped out of her most invaluable rights and possessions, and out of the whole commerce of the Mediterranean, the Turkey, and Levant trades: and after this, what might not the combined powers effect, by such artful machinations? Are not these powerful motives for France and Spain thus to unite sword and purse, if not sword and sword, to obtain these great points? Can we still be weak enough to amuse ourselves that we have the least favour or friendship to expect from Spain, either from her neutrality or otherwise? But why are we to expect such tenderness from Spain as some people flatter themselves with? Have we had the least experience of it since the peace of Utrecht to the present tense? Ah, but she is a great gainer by the trade with us, and not with France, and she will not quarrel with us. Nothing more true; she is a much greater than she deserves to be, by a nation
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she has so much insulted, and on whose traders she committed such scandalous depredations, without provocation any way adequate to the resentment shewn. Well! but say others again, though in contradiction to the former, we are so great gainers by the trade of Spain, that it is not our interest to quarrel with her at any rate. This appears to be a great falshood, and an egregious imposition upon those who think so; and let any impartial man consider connectedly what I have said upon this topic, and he will find his mistake; but I will say no more here at present: in short, the balance of trade between England and Spain turns daily more and more to our disadvantage; and it will soon appear more conspicuously so to the eyes of those who will not see at present. The great point, however, submitted to consideration is, whether it may not be more for our interest to have a war both with France and Spain, than with France alone, and Spain to remain neuter?

Is it time to speak out, or shall we refrain till the nation is undone? However unpaid, or unthanked, I will throw in my mite to save the sinking nation; for sinking we certainly are, in the opinion of all candid and impartial men; in the opinion of all who will be honest enough to speak what they think. But certainly some people must not think at all, or think only like superlative traitors to their country, who insinuate, that, for peace sake, we should not scruple even to
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give up Gibraltar itself to Spain! How can we expect things to go well with us, while principles of this kind shall be adopted? If complaisance would effectually attach that court to our interest, have we not already sufficiently shewn it? Have we not given up the trade of the South-Seas, and also that of the Affiento contract, to oblige Spain? And have we not been the chief instruments of settling two Spanish monarchs in Italy? And after all, did they not insult us, and obstruct our commerce and navigation to and from our colonies to such a degree, as at length forced us into a war with them? Can we suppose, therefore, that if we were so further complaisant to them, as to make them a present of Gibraltar, and Jamaica too, that they would use us the better, by reason of our greater impotence to resent their wrongs and indignities? No man can seriously think so. That the mistakes of such who are really indifferent in regard to Gibraltar, the following reasons are humbly submitted to their candid consideration, for our preservation of that important place.

(1) BECAUSE Gibraltar preserves to us the conveniency, protection, and security of our commerce to the streights, above that of all other nations, more especially in regard to the Algerines and Salleemen, who are influenced by it to keep their treaties made with us; which they never do longer with any other

other nation than till they find it their interest to break them.

(2.) BECAUSE in respect to the great advantage which the possession of that place hath already given us, when in war with France and Spain; and, consequently, will always give us again upon the like occasion, whilst we continue to keep it.

(3.) WITH regard to our trade in general up the Mediterranean: for, as it commands the passage or entrance of all our navigation into that sea, both in time of peace and war, so it is equally necessary, and as much our interest, to keep it ourselves, as for any gentleman to keep possession of the gate which leads to his own house; it being in the power of those who possess this port, at all times, to interrupt, annoy, or hinder whom they shall think fit in their trade, by keeping a few ships of war constantly on that station; in the same manner almost as the Danes, by the possession of Elsinour command the passage into and out of the Baltic: so that, if this port and fortification were in the hands of any other nation, it would be in their power likewise either to permit us to navigate our trade within those streights, or not, as they should think fit, unless a very strong squadron was constantly kept at the entrance of the streight's mouth, to secure the passage, and to be relieved, from time to time, by fresh ships, which would put us to a much greater

greater expence than we are now at in keeping this place.

(4.) BECAUSE, before England was in possession of Tangier, on the opposite side of the streight, we were never able to deal with the Algerines, and other Turkish rovers; who, for near a century, had carried on a successful piratic war against the commerce of this nation, and never could be reduced till, by the situation and our possession of the abovementioned place, we distressed them so much, not only by taking their ships going in and coming out of the streights, but also by retaking such of their prizes as they had taken in the Ocean, that at last they were forced to be content with such a peace as we would give them; the continuance of which is owing to nothing so much as to our having been, for many years passed, and, at present, in the same condition to chastize those rovers, by the possession of Gibraltar, as we were before by the possession of Tangier.

(5.) BECAUSE the security of our Italian, Turkey, and fish-trades entirely depends on our possession of this place; and, should we ever lose it, or part with it, it is very reasonable to believe that both the Algerines and Salleemen would soon break with us again: so that, in such a case, the abovesaid branches of trade would almost wholly fall into the hands of our rivals, the French from Marseilles, who, by their situation, are always

ways ready at hand to furnish those markets, as soon as they are in want, while we, on our part, shall be obliged to carry on that trade by the tedious methods of fleets, and convoys, and at last, perhaps, come long after the market is supplied by our rivals. Besides all this, the article of insurance, which would certainly run much higher than usual under these circumstances, would prove a heavy charge on our goods, more than those of foreign traders, which would thereby very much affect those branches of our trade and navigation.

(6.) BECAUSE the mischief would not stop here: for, as the Algerines, of late years, often cruize at the mouth of our channel, and as some of them have also heretofore come into our very ports two or three years successively; so it is possible that, if we should lose Gibraltar, they may become, being so well acquainted with our channel, a much more dangerous enemy to us than ever they were formerly, and may attack all our trade in general, as the St. Malo privateers did in the wars of queen Anne, whenever they shall find that they can carry home their prizes without any interruption; which is not to be done, unless we should be dispossessed of Gibraltar, and thereby take the bridle, which has hitherto restrained them, out of their mouths.

(7.) BECAUSE, in respect to our neighbours, Gibraltar is situated in such a manner, that

that it is in the power of the present possessors to cut off any naval communication between one port and another, of each of those very powerful kingdoms: with which we have had such frequent occasions to be at war for almost these fifty years past; who would soon turn the tables upon us, if they should recover this place out of our hands, especially in time of any rupture between us; nothing being more self-evident than that it gives, to those who are masters of it, especially in conjunction with Minorca, the sovereignty and command of the commerce and navigation of the Mediterranean sea, and makes it almost impracticable for any other nation to trade there with safety, without their leave. And farther, by our possession of this place, all nations within the Mediterranean will be obliged to court our friendship, or fear our power, particularly, the piratical states, who, beholding vengeance so near at hand, will be thereby deterred from attempting to interrupt our trade, while they are destroying that of all others.

(8.) BECAUSE this advantage is not all that we reap from the possession of Gibraltar; for it hath put into our hands occasionally a great proportion of freight-trade into the Mediterranean, especially, that of the Hamburgers, and Hollanders, who have made use of British bottoms to carry on their commerce in those seas, till the Dutch obtained a peace with the Algerines; whereby we lost one great advantage that belonged to the navigation

tion of Great Britain, which we before enjoyed, whilst those merchants made use of English ships, finding it dangerous to venture their estates in any other.

(9.) BECAUSE, laying aside all other considerations, there cannot be a stronger proof of the importance which the possession of this place hath proved to us, than that it hath been a formidable check to the naval power of France, from the hour of our taking it, to the conclusion of the last French war: nor, indeed, could they ever send any naval stores round about into those seas, without an apparent danger of their falling into our hands in going through the streights. And, had not such unhappy misunderstandings fell out as did between two admirals in the late war, we should have more feelingly experienced the invaluable benefit of this possession, which would have prevented a war for many years to come.

(10.) BECAUSE it's proximity to Cadiz, the great mart and center of almost all the riches of Spanish America, gives us the greatest opportunity of commanding that port, and the trade frequenting it from the West-Indies; which, in time of war with Spain, may be reckoned of no small consideration, or importance.

(11.) BECAUSE, as the advantages of Gibraltar which result to this kingdom from the foregoing particulars, are fully confirmed and demonstrated by the experience of many years past, so the preservation of it, at all times, is
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of much greater concernment than it was ever before, as will appear by considering the present state of public affairs: particularly, that many capital manufactures are springing up in most parts of Europe, and are grown to a great height as well in Spain as France, and that several other powerful states are endeavouring to vie with us in commerce and a maritime force; which ought to put us on the strictest guard, and determine us not to part with a place which is manifestly of so much advantage, by securing and improving our own trade and navigation, as well as by defeating the attempts of our enemies and rivals therein.

(12.) BECAUSE Spain and France in conjunction, if not others, will ever have their eye upon this possession, in order to wrest the same out of our hands, to ruin the whole maritime power of Great Britain.

(13.) BECAUSE Gibraltar lies at hand to intercept their East-and West-India fleets, with the spoil and riches of both worlds: it separates and divides Spain from itself, and hinders all communication by sea from the different parts of their dominions, and, consequently, must keep them in a perpetual dependence, and put them under a necessity to court our friendship, as well as fear our enmity, if our naval strength is once duly exerted: it gives us an opportunity to pry into all their measures, observe all their motions, and, without the most stupid remissness on our part, renders it impracticable to them to form any

any projects, or carry on any expeditions against us or our allies, without our having due notice.

(14.) BECAUSE it may be made highly useful to check the rise of the naval power of France, which can never be above our match at sea, if uncorruptly exerted, whilst Gibraltar remains in our hands. It hinders the communication between their ports and squadrons in the Ocean and the Mediterranean: it makes it impossible for them to supply their southern harbours with naval stores either for building or repairing of fleets; of which they were so sensible in queen Anne's war, that, as soon as Sir George Rook had possessed himself of it, they saw themselves under a necessity to lay aside their usual caution, and dare him in open battle; and, not meeting the success they hoped for, the very same year, to the unspeakable prejudice of their other affairs, besieged it in form, and lost a French and Spanish army before it, and never afterwards appeared with a fleet upon the seas again during the whole war, but suffered their great ships to moulder and rot in their harbours, for want of the means to fit them out again.

(15.) BECAUSE long experience has evinced, that we can never, with security, depend on the faith of France: and, therefore, if Britons are determined never to become vassals to the dominion of that crown, they can never part with any thing that is so substantial a preservation of their maritime power,

and, consequently, of their liberties and properties, as that inestimable fortress of Gibraltar.

(16.) BECAUSE it appears throughout this work, from a series of facts incontestable, that the commerce and navigation of France have been encreasing ever since the time of that great and able minister Monsr. Colbert: and that they have now settled the same upon so broad a bottom, and with such peculiar and extraordinary advantage for their daily rise and encouragement, that, if Great Britain gives up Gibraltar, she may be so eternally embroiled in wars with that nation, as to encrease her national debts and incumbrances to a degree so enormous, that her whole trade must inevitably sink under them.

(17.) BECAUSE a right use made of the possession of Gibraltar will always give us reputation and figure in those seas, which are always rewarded with power and riches. It will oblige all nations who trade in the Mediterranean, or have empire there, to court our friendship, and keep measures with us. It will awe even the courts of Rome and Constantinople, and make them afraid to disturb or provoke us.

(18.) BECAUSE the charge and expence of keeping Gibraltar bears no proportion to the advantages we reap by it, and the detriment and injury our trade and navigation must sustain, if ever we part with it.

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(19.) BECAUSE if Minorca should be restored to us, PORT-MAHON cannot possibly answer all the purposes of Gibraltar : which must be evident to any one, who but looks into the map ; for the island of Minorca lies many hundred miles further up towards the gulph of Lyons, and, in truth, out of the road of all ships trading to Sicily, the Adriatic, the Levant, or Africa. It is situated at such a distance from France, and Spain, that the greatest fleets can escape unobserved, unless we keep perpetually before their ports to watch and pursue them ; which is exceeding dangerous, if not impracticable in those seas. We shall be out of a way of all intelligence. But as we have lost Minorca, there is still a greater necessity for our keeping Gibraltar.

(20.) BECAUSE nothing is plainer, than that it will be exceeding difficult, if not impossible, to keep the island of Minorca, if restored, without the possession of Gibraltar ; at least it will be more expensive to us than both would be, especially, if France and Spain should join again ; which event, I think, we ought to keep always in view, for then Gibraltar will be the only resource we have to carry on any trade in the Mediterranean, and to prevent the union of the French and Spanish fleets with themselves, or each other.

(21.) BECAUSE all the objections, made against the facility of a communication of the different ports of France and Spain with one

another, will be stronger against us; for they have others near to Gibraltar, where fleets may lie safe, and have a chance to escape us, by catching at favourable opportunities, and the advantage of winds; whereas we must run all hazards, and trust to our strength alone, without any harbour to retreat to, in case of storms or other accidents.

(22.) BECAUSE we have no means of sending naval stores and recruits to our garrisons, and often provisions for them, without a port to protect us during a thousand leagues sailing. Portugal will not be suffered to receive, or relieve us, and then we must run the gauntlet by single ships, with scarce a chance to escape, or send convoys upon the smallest occasions, capable of fighting the united French and Spanish power.

(23.) BECAUSE we ought not to be surprized, if the nations of Europe and Africa should wish it in hands less potent at sea, and who could consequently enjoy it more harmlessly to it's neighbours: it must be undoubtedly an awe to any people who would be our rivals in trade or naval power, or, indeed to any state that aspires to empire, which can never be accomplished without fleets as well as armies.

(24.) BECAUSE, if we part with Gibraltar, to what purpose have we made war? To what purpose bestowed great sums, and gained great victories? Did we beat the enemy, and force them to beg peace, and yet must
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bribe them to accept of it? Have we conquered, and shall they give terms, and get towns by losing battles? Or, if we do not part with Gibraltar for the sake of peace, pray what consideration are we to receive for the sake of Gibraltar? What can be given as an equivalent?

(25.) BECAUSE there can be no substantial reasons to take such a thorn out of the foot of Spain and France, and to remove such an obstacle to their greatness: the enterprising genius of the latter is as well known, as it is formidable to all it's neighbours, but, in particular to us. And Spain, we have seen, are taking large strides to raise manufactures and maritime power. And do we not know by experience, what help we are to expect from our allies, when we have no more millions to give. We are not able to keep great standing armies at home, nor is it consistent with our liberty to do so; and, therefore, we ought to take every measure to encrease our naval strength, and to put new bridles upon those who are, or may soon be, our rivals therein.

(26.) BECAUSE the nation in the world whose power we have most reason to guard against, is that of France; and yet I don't know by what fatality it has often so happened, that we have been the unhappy instruments of promoting it. Oliver Cromwell gave the first rise to it's greatness at land, and king Charles II.

at sea: the late queen, by an ignominious peace, restored it, when it was reduced to the lowest extremity, and must have submitted to any conditions she had thought fit to impose. But sure it will never be said that any British ministry, who profess to be the patrons of liberty, the constant and declared enemies of those proceedings, should act so far in defiance of all their known principles, as, voluntarily and unconstrainedly, to throw away any part of that national security, which are the only rewards and recompence of a tedious, successful, and glorious war, carried on at an immense expence of blood and treasure, of which we and our posterity shall long feel the severe effects.

(27.) BECAUSE there seems to be more reason for our being tenacious in preserving this possession, at this time, than there ever was since we had it; for, it is to be feared, that we are the only maritime power that must alone stand against those of France and Spain, and such allies as they shall be able to influence; since our old and natural allies, the states-generals of the United Provinces, do not appear to be at all inclined, as heretofore, to unite with Great Britain, and act with vigour, when occasion may require, but on the contrary are, by their neutrality, greatly aiding to the encrease of the commerce of France, and thereby enabling her the better to continue the war.

(28.) BE-

(28.) BECAUSE the Spaniards give more encouragement to the French in their trade, by the way of Old Spain to New Spain, than they do to the English ; and, in consequence thereof, our commerce in that channel declines, while that of France advances. And the Spaniards to favour the French in the S——h W——t-I——a trade, which they carry on from their colonies, to the Spanish main, both from the Mississippi, and St. Domingo, while they are always pecking at the English about a little paultry logwood, which affair they ought long to have finally settled, but have always declined the same.

(29.) BECAUSE the too frequent unkindly treatment of the English in particular, by the Spaniards at present in America, is said by some to be with a view to compel us, at length, to give up Gibraltar ; which, for that very reason, we ought to be the more sanguine to preserve.

(30.) BECAUSE Great Britain has already done enough in favour of the court of Spain without sacrificing Gibraltar, to induce them to desist from their obstruction to our trade and navigation to and from our own colonies, even, if we had no right whatever to cut logwood.

THE conduct of Great Britain towards Spain, in order to influence them to preserve a good understanding with them, is notorious to the whole world, and may be chiefly comprehended under the following articles.

(1) Our giving up the trade of the South-seas in exchange for the Affiento contract. (2) Our giving up the Affiento contract itself for a song for peace sake. (3) Our being the chief instrument of making two Spanish sovereigns in Italy.—To which may be added (4) Our being the best customers for Spanish wines, fruits, &c. that Spain has to her back. And, if Great Britain should even acquiesce to the creating of a third sovereign to gratify, and to give up Gibraltar also, what security should this nation have, for the friendship of Spain?

ONE part of the grand system of the court of Spain, in the time of Alberoni, was to preserve the rights of Spain and of the house of Parma to Spanish princes; and to make a settlement for Don Charlos and Don Philip worthy of their birth, out of the states which the emperor possessed in Italy: and has not this part of the system been steadily and successfully pursued? But how could these sovereignties be effectually secured, says a certain prince, without the possession of Gibraltar? This, therefore, was a point to be gained, in order the better to secure the other. The system, at present in Spain, is bottomed on the same principles; it is not only to provide for a third prince in Italy, or elsewhere, but to fall upon the establishment of manufactories, with a view to supply their extended American colonies themselves with their own merchandizes, and those of France, instead of taking them from the other nations of Europe.

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Will not this affect Great Britain, in proportion to what she now supplies Spain with? Some accounts from Spain about two years since tell us, that it appeared, by an authentic list of the ships which entered the Spanish ports that year, their number amounted to 1142: of which 643 were English, 277 French, 148 Dutch, and 74 of different nations.

SUPPOSING this to be true, some people may infer from hence, perhaps, that the trade of England must be far superior to any of the rest: so it is, indeed! But what sort of trade are we carrying on with that nation? We are sending 6 or 700 ships or more annually to purchase their wines and their fruits, while France sends between 2 or 300 to carry their own manufactures. If this be the case, does not France, therefore, gain far more by their smaller quantity of shipping, than we do by double the number? The fact is, that we decline in our exports to Spain, and encrease in our imports; while France encrease in their exports to Spain, and decrease in their imports from thence. Have they not allured away our manufacturers and shipwrights out of the kingdom, with a view to turn the hands of our own artists against us?

WHAT is urged in divers other parts of this work, will enable us to judge, whether it can ever be adviseable to acquiesce in the giving up Gibraltar; and, especially so, if we add to these considerations what we have said also in regard to the commercial dominion of

FRANCE;

FRANCE ; because we shall find, that SPAIN is now following the example of France, in order to ruin the commerce and navigation of these kingdoms : for the system of the two courts seems really to be what is said in a tract lately printed, called the Political Testament of cardinal Alberoni. “ While the navy of the two crowns [meaning those of France and Spain] says the writer, is not superior to that of the English and Dutch together ; while MINORCA and GIBRALTAR are not in possession of their proper masters ; while DUNKIRK is not raised from the state to which it was reduced by the treaty of Utrecht, a descent on the coast of ENGLAND and IRELAND, will be always ineffectual, &c.”

D I S-



DISSERTATION XXXVI.

Of the necessity of Great Britain being more closely connected and allied with the continent than she ever has been, though upon quite different principles, and not at such an expence, in times of war, as has been the case heretofore,

IT has, doubtless, cost this nation an immense profusion of blood, as well as treasure, to preserve the liberties of Europe, by forming such alliances and confederacies as have been occasionally necessary to withstand the torrent of arbitrary power of those nations, who have brooded schemes of ruin and destruction to their neighbouring states.

OUR allies also have been at as great a proportion of the expence as they could well afford in the same good cause, notwithstanding the large subsidies wherewith we have been obliged to supply some.

THE great public debt, and the burdensome taxes with which our commerce is hereby become incumbered, to our unspeakable detri-

detriment, in consequence of those measures, make it necessary for the court of England to change this *old system*, and adopt such other as may exempt her and her allies from those prodigious expences which have hitherto proved necessary. Those potentates who have disturbed the tranquillity of Europe, have been chiefly such who are interested in the cause of arbitrary and tyrannical rule, the enemies of liberty, and the enemies of mankind; and they have been withstood chiefly by the Protestant potentates, the friends of liberty, and the friends of mankind. And the glorious stand made by those states having hitherto preserved the liberties of Christendom, and maintained the balance of power; the expence, be it what it will, is no way disproportionate to the important and invaluable blessings it has hitherto procured. For what avail all the treasures of the earth, if we are deprived of the only solid felicity that life affords; the freedom of thought, the toleration to worship our maker according to the dictates of our reason and conscience, and the full enjoyment of property, and every right and privilege that human nature can wish or desire. Certain then it is, that the expence of this nation, however great it has been, bears no comparison to the inestimable purchase that we have obtained as an equivalent. This no free Briton will gainsay.

THE argument, therefore, with respect to our connections with the continent, is reduced

duced to this single question : whether Great Britain could have proved the happy instrument that she has been in preserving the liberties of Europe, at less expence than she has been put to ? If she could, this is to be laid at the door of those ministers of state, who have been too profuse of the public treasure. Whatever proportion of the expence we have been at, might have been saved to the nation, must be attributed to the bad measures of those who have had the conduct of our public affairs from the revolution to the present time : the fault lies not in the cause for which we have contended, but in the exorbitant expence to which we have been put ; which cause might have been as effectually supported, in my humble opinion, at a far less expence than it has been : no man will undertake to ascertain exactly how many millions might have been saved to this nation, and yet the liberties of this kingdom, and the balance of power in Europe, have been no less secure than they are at present. For my own part, the work * I drew up the last year for the public service, signifies, explicitly enough how many millions, I apprehend, might have been saved to the nation by raising the supplies for carrying on wars within the year, and purchasing all naval and military stores for short credit, or at

* Great Britain's True System.

a ready money price, as it were. In the same tract I have shewed my disapprobation of the measures of sending British troops to the continent, when we could hire auxiliaries at a much cheaper rate. But the contrary measures have certainly proved wrong, as having excessively accumulated the expence, and incumbered the nation with an enormous debt, and clogged our commerce with taxes ruinous to it.

As I have shewed myself an advocate for the contrary measures to what have hitherto been pursued in this respect from the revolution to the present time; so the course of my studies has led me to consider every way whereby we can support the liberties of Europe and our own, at the least expence possible: and, in my writings, I have entered into a detail of the particular steps that I have judged necessary for that purpose, which need not be here repeated.

BUT this is not near the full length that I have humbly attempted to go. No: I have endeavoured to form a new foreign system; or rather to engraft an entire new system upon the old one, whereby one million of money properly raised, and properly applied, may go near as far as two millions have been made to do upon the old system. And I suppose, if the court of England could, by the most parsimonious measures, obtain such alliances upon the continent for one half the
expence

expence that she has been at heretofore, as shall prove sufficient to withstand the power of the enemies of the Protestant interest ; I presume no body could, or would, think much of such an expence. As we are the chief Protestant potentate in Europe, and it is reckoned that no other can afford to be at so great an expence as we can, we must expect to bear a greater share of the burden than any other ; and especially so in the present war, since we are the principals therein. Indeed, when the religion and liberties of other Protestant states become endangered, these states then become no less principals than we, in regard to these points, and as such, it is to be hoped will be excited to act in concert with us for our mutual defence and security.

WHEN people talk of our not being under the necessity of having any connection with the continent, they certainly talk very irrationally and wildly ; when they are pleased to consider that our whole commercial interest absolutely depends on those continental connections, because they are our trading customers, and our reciprocal trafficable dealings require us to cement those connections, Upon what principles of policy else are all our treaties of commerce founded ? When the court of England is not capable of obtaining allies to contribute to fight their battles for them without subsidies, then we have a great lamentation for want of allies ; and yet,

yet, in the same breath, these very complainants will roundly assert, that we have no need of any connections with the continent ! Can any thing be more inconsistent ? From whence but from the continent are we to have any allies ? Well then, the matter lies here ; we are always glad to have good allies in times of danger ; and he is the ablest minister who can obtain such at the least expence to the nation. If this is the right state of the matter, then we will hope that the British ministry will act upon this system.

WE have seen, from a series of the plainest and most indisputable *facts*, how formidable the power of France is, and what capacious schemes of commercial sway and dominion she has projected.—We have seen likewise that the system of Spain is perfectly compatible with that of France ; that Spain follows as closely the Steps of France, as if the ministers of France were in the cabinet of Spain.—We hear too, and I wish it may not prove true, that the Spanish minister Don Ensenada is recalled to court, and that our dear friend the queen dowager of Spain has again crept into his Catholic Majesty's councils, which forebodes no good, perhaps, to Great Britain.—Do we not know likewise that Spain has got a pretty formidable fleet ? And can we imagine that this court has been at such an expence to parade it only ? We have seen too the detrimental effects to our
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commerce of a Spanish neutrality. So that, let Spain take which part she will, have we not all reason to connect ourselves more closely with some good continental allies than ever we had? With allies who will not only act so far in concert with us by land, as may prove preservative of the Protestant interest there, but shall be induced to unite their maritime power with ours; for I wish that we may not have occasion enough for it. Allies then are certainly necessary for us to obtain, and such too as are able and willing to do us, and the Protestant cause, the most effectual services. But what allies can we expect to obtain, according to the old system of foreign affairs? The Dutch, we have too long experienced, are immoveable, and we have seen their reasons why. Whether the reasons assigned be real or pretended, it matters little, as to their good offices towards us now in time of need. If the reasons assigned are real, we have it in our power to obviate them; if they mean otherwise than they say, it is our business to penetrate that meaning, and remove their most secret articles to a perfect union between us. But if we prevail with them no farther than to fulfil their treaties with us, what dependence can we make on their assistance? Has not experience sufficiently taught us? It is manifest, therefore, that Great Britain cannot reckon at all on the services of the United Provinces upon the old system, especially

cially as affairs are at present circumstanced between the French and the Dutch. What then becomes the wisdom of Great Britain to do, in regard to the Dutch? For their neutrality, at present, is little less detrimental to our commerce than if they threw the weight of their whole power against us into the French scale. But some are inclined to think that the Dutch are quite impotent as a state, and that their power is not worth courting by Great Britain. This is a great mistake. Were they determined to exert their whole strength, and act in concert with their old and natural ally, as one and the same nation: were the Dutch in earnest to act in conjunction with us to reduce the power of France within the requisite bounds, and was England resolved to move in conjunction with Holland upon the same principle, and in earnest also to humble France once for all, we should soon see that the Dutch could figure it as highly and mightily as they ever have done; for their plea of inability is pretence only: those who know their commercial resources, the true state of that republic, and the millions they have in foreign funds, know that these are only specious coverings, and to save appearance with the court of London. But if Great Britain becomes once happy enough to have a ministry that the Dutch think they can absolutely depend upon; if they become once convinced that the affairs of the nation will be so conducted,

ducted, that if we draw them into an expensive war against France as principals, we shall not be able to extricate them from it with honour and advantage : if we shall convince them that we are determined at last to take Lewis by the whiskers, we should soon see the Dutch move with us, and for us, as heretofore.

BUT what must be done on our part to convince the Dutch they may securely depend upon us to do all this? Certainly our old system, with relation both to our domestic as well as foreign affairs, will never make the due impression for this purpose upon the United Provinces : we have tried that long enough, and often enough, and it is superlative weakness to rely any longer upon it. Is it not then in the power of Britain to form no other system that will at once convince the Dutch that they may safely depend no less upon her ability than her wisdom, to bring her securely, honourably, and beneficially out of a war, if they came vigorously into one with her against the enemy? If there is such a system of policy to be projected, that seems to promise fair to answer those desirable purposes, has it not a title to be candidly examined into, although it should come from the most obscure and unknown person in the kingdom? though it should come from so insignificant a person as the writer of these papers?

WITH respect to the domestic system he has endeavoured to recommend and establish, that is openly enough declared in his last work. If the Dutch are once convinced that the court of England is determined to raise the supplies necessary to carry on the war within the year; if our ancient and natural ally shall once be made sensible that we are able to carry on a war without farther increasing our public debts and taxes, this measure alone we have seen from the declaration of their cabinet will remove some of the essential objections against their joining with us heartily against France.—If they shall find also, that such is the wisdom of his majesty's councils, that all parsimonious ways and means are fallen upon, both in the expending as well as raising of the public money; if the Dutch once experience that our public credit shall be established upon a rock, and that instead of augmenting their public debts and taxes, that we shall infallibly get into the certain road of reducing both; what weight will not this domestic step have with the states of Holland to induce them to listen to our remonstrances?

THOUGH these may be the proper preliminary steps requisite to be taken to convince the Dutch that our measures, and not only our ministers are changed; yet these alone will not have all the due influence with that state to bring them sanguinely into an offensive war against France. No: the court of
England,

England, I humbly apprehend, must still go greater lengths : they must also change their foreign system, in order to induce the Dutch to throw up so lucrative a neutrality as they at present enjoy.—But how to accomplish this is the great point!

Does it become the wisdom of any statesman to affirm roundly, that he does not think it possible for the system of foreign affairs to be so changed, as to induce the Dutch to give up their neutrality, and join the whole weight of their power with Britain against France? If men had been dismayed from their researches into things from a prepossession of the impossibility of the discoveries which they have attempted, what advance in science could we have expected? When people in authority shall declare the most important attempts to be impossibilities in their eye, can any thing prove a greater obstruction and discouragement to the increase of knowledge of any kind? Who can undertake to assert with infallibility that it is impossible for the human understanding to discover this or that? Is there less presumption in such an infallible declaration, that an attempt to discover the supposed impossibility? Men of science, I believe, will be of opinion, that the presumption on the part of the one, is far more injurious to society than any modest attempts on the side of the other to discover useful and important truths of any kind. But does not the progress of arts and

sciences shew, that the great seeming impossibilities have proved the most easy and palpable truths? If such like authoritative caveats had been pronounced against all the discoveries that have been made, would there not long since have been a stop put to all the mathematical and philosophical sciences, which abound with numberless truths that appear at present greater impossibilities to those who do not understand them, than the discovery of the political problem affirmed to be an impossibility by a late certain great man?—I am concerned for the gentleman's honour that he should be so rash in making such an hasty declaration; but the goodness of his heart, with me, will atone for all the mistakes of the head; for I greatly honour him, notwithstanding his hasty determination in regard to a matter which has not fell under his consideration.

LET it be supposed, however, that it is even impossible for the court of England to bring the Dutch into any new system to act vigorously against France; is the court of England to set still, and not endeavour to make any other alliances, in order to stem the torrent of popish dominion? No true Briton will say, that England should attempt to act alone against France and Spain, as may soon prove the case. But lest such an event should happen, does it not become the wisdom of England to guard against so great an evil, if possible; because, if England was capable of supporting a war to her advantage against both

both those great potentates for a time, the number of neutral powers who would commence maritime carrier for Spain as well as France would ruin the commerce of England, and protect that of her enemies.

To what a degree the trade of France is, at present, promoted by the neutrality of the Dutch, the Danes, the Swedes, and the Hanse towns, I have already repeatedly shewn; and who knows but some of those neutral powers may endeavour to screen Spanish, in case of a war with Spain, as they do, at present, French property. I am afraid this will prove the case, unless England can form a system that will draw off those powers from their neutrality. I will not show how this may be done, lest I should put mischief into the enemy's head, which they may not so readily fall upon. It follows then, if we consider this point in whatever light we can, that England must make good alliances with the next best natural friend, she can obtain, if she cannot draw the Dutch into her circle of policy. And who are our natural allies next to the Dutch? Is it not happy for England that she can have Prussia and Hanover to supply their place? If we cannot obtain these to act effectually against France and her allies, at so easy an expence as we could wish, is there not the greater necessity to raise the supplies within the year, and to pursue a steady system of domestic oeconomy, the better to enable us to support our
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allies,

allies, that they may give all the diversion possible to the French power in Germany, which has proved the devouring grave of those our enemies?

BUT these allies cannot give us any maritime assistance against the enemy. Why, therefore, should we not endeavour to gain what maritime assistance we can from others? But these alliances will be very expensive to us, if we are to purchase them at the rate we have heretofore done. I do not say, That should be the case; but, if we cannot, or will not attempt to change our foreign as well as our domestic system, that must be the case, let it cost what it will; and, if we keep only from encreasing our public debts and taxes, it will be happy for us if we can make no greater change in our general system than *That*, it will prove of extraordinary help, and enable us the better to carry on the war, and procure an honourable peace. However, as I have said, there is still a much greater change needful than this alone, I mean a change in our whole foreign system; such a change as I humbly apprehend promises fair to bring in the Dutch, as well as our other next natural maritime allies into the war against France; and, which I conceive to be practicable upon far less expensive measures than have been pursued from the revolution to the present time.

INSTEAD of being unconnected with the continent, as some would have, we stand in
need

need of being more closely connected therewith than ever we yet were; but those connections should be founded rather upon interesting than expensive principles; and, as a trading nation we have more reason to be connected with the continent than the continent has to be with us. In regard likewise to our security both by land and sea, though an island, we may, in times of danger, stand in no less need of the aid of continental allies than they may occasionally do of ours; for, can any thing be more weak and ridiculous than to think ourselves omnipotent, because we are islanders, when we have experienced that neither our fleets by sea can infallibly protect our commerce, or our possessions abroad, nor our fleets and armies jointly preserve us from panicks at home? How absurd is it to imagine that an island, which depends upon commerce for its wealth, should be emancipated from the continent, by which it subsists, and should establish it as a part of their political creed, that they will neither give to, nor receive from their continental friends any succour when their very Being depends upon their reciprocal support, and defence? However omnipotent by sea as well as land we might be formerly, the scene is now changed; our enemies have as greatly improved in the arts of war by sea and land as they have in the arts of commerce. This is one cause of our ill success. The marine as well as military system of France is greatly improved to what
ours

ours is in many essential respects, and it is no wonder that they prove more successful than formerly.

VARIOUS are the arts of the French to divide this nation from all preservative connections with the continent, they well knowing that if they can but once work us up to such a state of pride and self-sufficiency, as to think ourselves independent of all the world beside ; and, in consequence of such vanity to influence our councils to break off all connections with the continent, they cannot fail to conquer us, or so distract our affairs as to obtain the end aimed at. Upon this principle it is, that they have left no artifice untried to divide our continental ally, the Dutch, from our interest, which they seem to have done pretty effectually—Another point they have laboured not less arduously, though not successfully, is to divide Great Britain from her continental ally, the Elector of Hanover, by employing her emissaries to propagate the greatest falsehoods relating to His Majesty's German dominions, and in making the people believe, that there are no commercial connections between this kingdom and those dominions to induce us to support them ; when I have shown *, that those connections are not less interesting than those with most other states in Europe? —

* See my Great Britain's true system.

They have likewise drawn off our continental allies the queen of Hungary, and the empress of Russia, and would, if possible, detach the king of Prussia from our alliance. In short, those anticontinental principles that have been so industriously propagated of late years seem to have been coined in the mint of France, and circulated here to answer the most destractive as well as destructive views to this nation, and her natural allies. But I hope there is one good end that such gallican politics will answer; which is, *that they will promote a stricter union between Great Britain and the continent than she ever yet had, though at a far less expence than they ever yet did.—* This is the NEW SYSTEM that will give us and our allies the victory, nor do I believe that any other can do it so effectually; and, therefore, I humbly hope, that the court of England will soon take the same into serious consideration, although it comes from no greater a person than the humble writer of these papers. Reason will prevail without authority, but authority will not prevail without reason. “Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt, quam necesse est: non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quaerenda sunt. Quin etiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, quid se docere profitentur: desinunt enim suum iudicium adhibere; id habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, iudicatum vident. Nec vero probare

bare soleo id, quod de Pythagoreis accepimus; quos ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quaereretur, quare ita esset, respondere solitos, ipse dixit: ipse autem erat Pythagoras. Tantum opinio praejudicata poterat, ut etiam sine ratione valeret auctoritas. *Tul. de nat. deor.*

D I S



DISSERTATION XXXVII.

Some general principles whereon the balance of trade is founded; with the application thereof to the present work, in a recapitulation of it's contents; the consideration of which is earnestly recommended to public regard; in order to throw the balance of trade so effectually into the hands of Great Britain as to put the constant balance of power of Europe into her hands also.

THE general balance of a nation's trade is the difference between the amount of what it buys and what it sells abroad. That difference must necessarily be paid in money which is the sole equivalent for what is deficient in the exchange of commodities for commodities.

To receive that balance is the point which every trading nation aims at; and in fact it is the only thing capable of augmenting the positive and relative mass of their metals, of encreasing their populousness, and of giving
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circu-

circulation that activity which distributes ease, the useful principle of luxury, through every class of the people.

THE general balance is the result of the particular balances, which are not all immediately advantageous, though the general balance be lucrative. But they are not burdensome to the state when they are the means of procuring other more useful branches of trade, or lessen the loss on those without which a nation cannot carry on trade.

Two things deserve to be taken particular notice of in the balance of trade: the way to know one's advantage, or disadvantage; and the means of obtaining advantage.

If no fraudulent exports or imports were made, it would be easy to ascertain the nature and amount of the particular balances, by the customhouse books and registers. But care must be taken in such valuations not to rate the goods exported by foreign ships, higher than their first value and the expence of carriage on board; to which must be added the value of the freight, if they are shipped in national vessels. It is on the other hand equally proper to value the imports made by foreign ships, on the footing of the value of the commodities at the place where they are landed; and on the footing of their first value only, when imported by national vessels.

ANOTHER way to judge in general of the advantage or disadvantage of the general balance

lance of trade during a year, is to combine the courses all the exchanges have been at. This method is evidently not susceptible of any positive degree of knowledge : nor is it in general of that of the particular balances, because it often happens, that one place, by the trade with which a nation loses, is employed to make the remittances of another with which it gains, without having any open course of exchange with it. But this method is more certain than the other to know whether money comes into a country, or goes out of it, because it embraces every object.

BESIDES, the active and passive debts of foreign trade, states have sometimes others between themselves.

THESE second debts are the mutual expences of subjects who travel to each other's country ; the interest of sums put out either with private men, or in the public funds, or government securities ; and lastly, their political engagements.

A BODY-POLITIC is not strengthened by a new substance till all those kinds of debts are mutually balanced. The result of those operations cannot be known with any degree of certainty, but by a combination of the exchanges.

BOTH methods may in general be of great help to each other, and afford a reciprocal elucidation ; for which reason they ought not to be separated.

AN advantageous balance is chiefly the fruit of the several mechanic branches of commerce, which have made a part of the subject of this treatise: all particular operations ought to tend to four fundamental points, as Sir Josiah Child very justly observes. They consist,

1st. IN considering trade as the chief interest of a nation.

2dly, IN increasing the number of workmen.

3dly. IN increasing the nation's capital in commodities.

4thly. IN making foreigners find their account in trading with her.

EVERY occupation contrary to any one of these four means is dangerous: the commerce of a state will fall short of perfection, in proportion as these four means shall be less extensively made use of.

It is plain that the two first naturally lead to the two others, which are the absolute and necessary consequences of them.

It seems equally superfluous to insist on the necessity of considering trade as a nation's chief interest; that maxim we hope having been established to content.

WE have had fewer opportunities of insisting on the necessity of increasing the number of workmen, than on the means of occupying the people. One still remains for us to touch upon, after which we will proceed to this important object.

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WE have observed that foreigners may contract a second kind of debts with a nation, by the expences they are at in travelling there.

IT is to the liberal arts and sciences that curiosity generally pays that tribute. A double motive for acknowledgment towards such as cultivate them with success; towards those great and uncommon genius's, to whom nature has intrusted the art of instructing other men, or of leading them on to pleasure by sensations purer and more analagous to that part of us which thinks and knows. They do not only answer the intent of their glorious motive with regard to those whose intellectual faculties are less sluggish and obstructed; but useful and assisting to all that bears the stamp of humanity, they procure a more comfortable subsistence to a rude and ignorant multitude, too much inclined to disown the favours they receive.

REAL talents, ever modest, and unambitious of whatever does not conduce to perfection, would alone have but a very small share in the ease and convenience that flows from them, if unassisted by the justice and liberality of government and princes. A prince cannot build his glory on a surer foundation, and that part of the public revenues which he employs therein is an advantageous commerce which he procures his subjects. For the same reason it is right to multiply

public buildings and monuments, and repositories of scarce and valuable things, when the public ease admits of it. There it is that artists ought chiefly to pique themselves on shewing the extent of their invention, and rivalling nature in all they do, emulate those beauties, whose charms, felt by all, command respect from the most capricious, and the ignorance of less happy ages.

To raise the curiosity of strangers is, however, not alone sufficient; it is likewise necessary to seduce them, and prolong their stay. Public diversions cannot be too much varied in a capital, nor too magnificent; and if the national beauties are not sufficient of themselves to please the taste of every nation that resorts thither, it is proper to add others to them, but better still to make them one's own by a happy imitation.

Of all allurements the most seducing certainly are the engaging manners of a people and their cordiality. The French are allowed by all to excel in the first; but I cannot help saying, that the second, by much the most essential, is less common in their capital. It is quite the reverse in their provinces, with which foreigners are most delighted, when they know them.

The buildings and monuments of a city are soon seen, the walks and gardens are soon run over, as well as the country seats about town, and the public diversions. What can

tempt a foreigner to stay after that, if he has formed no intimacies with the inhabitants? Can he form any, if he be in a manner excluded from society? I am sensible that the entrance into that society ought to be difficult wherever a great multitude is collected together, because a greater facility would be an inlet to numberless abuses; besides that, the continual hurry and agitation in which men are forced to live, does not suffer them to attend minutely to objects indifferent in themselves. Accordingly, foreigners are not so unjust as to require being sought after and courted; but it is with reason they complain of being shunned; of not being excused their different air, dress, language, and ignorance of particular customs: nay, even of the jargon, frivolousness and ridiculous affectations of a people, which are, however, the perpetual object of their jokes and laughter.

It would, perhaps, not be beneath the majesty of a great king to appoint a proper person or two, whose function should be to do as it were the honours, of a country to foreigners of distinction, or such as should be recommended by their ministers.

It would not require much money to keep two good tables. Those to whom that care should be entrusted should study to invite men capable of giving foreigners a just idea of our manners and politeness: of the

better bred to all strangers, notwithstanding the rudeness of the vulgar herd; they would thereby be enabled to form acquaintance and connections more easily. Such an example would influence the great, who would think it their duty to promote such noble views; they could not themselves but be gainers by the instruction they would learn relating to foreign affairs; and the political interests of the state would in all probability likewise reap advantage thereby.

IT will next be necessary to observe the means of procuring a state an advantageous balance of commerce, by the increase of the number of workmen.

IT is plain, that if the strength of commerce be known, if it becomes a nation's chief interest, the various kinds of work will multiply of themselves. But that is not the only means that ought to be made use of to increase the number of workmen. Sound policy will effect it likewise, by drawing over workmen from abroad, and seeing in general that men are employed in the best manner possible.

IF the inhabitants of one country enjoy more happiness than those of others, the latter will resort to the former of their own accord. The division of Europe into several sovereignties, has left policy no other resource whereby to obtain superiority. The legislator would therefore deprive himself of
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part of the fruit of his labours, if he opposed difficulties or indifference to the willingness of useful men desirous to become his subjects. It is highly proper that all who come capable of increasing the number of commodities, or who bring their fortunes with them, should, on conforming to the laws of that country, enjoy all the prerogatives of subjects. If they marry there, it would be unjust, and perhaps more imprudent, either to refuse to naturalize them, or to make that naturalization expensive.

To obtain men is a great advantage; but it is indispensably necessary to employ those we have in the best manner possible. That best employment consists in receiving from them all the assistance that can be gathered from their faculties, both mechanic and intellectual: it is by so much the more important, as every inequality affects population.

It is not enough for the public welfare that every poor inhabitant gets a livelihood; but the manner in which he gets it ought likewise to be useful to society in general.

A GREAT number of beggars may live comfortably, though the body-politic receives no part of its strength from them. It is even weakened by them: for, not to speak of the contagious example of idleness, the substance which compassion and charity allot for the maintenance of those useless members, is partly withheld from other members, who

are no longer able to exert all the activity of which they are susceptible.

COMMERCE considered as the chief interest of the nation, and the safety of industry, are the easiest ways of keeping men from a way of life so hurtful to the community. But force alone can break that habit, when once contracted.

WORKHOUSES are as old as industry in nations wise enough to conceive betimes, that the occupation of the subjects was the pledge of their fidelity, the source of population, of national riches and public revenues: in short, the only solid foundation of a well judged foreign power. Those houses have answered two intents of police: at the same time that they root out sloth and idleness, they are a means of punishment to such as disturb the public order, without going such lengths as to deserve to be quite cut off from society; which, by that means, inflicts a proper chastisement on vice, without losing it's right to the labour of vicious men.

It must not be imagined that such establishments are expensive, or difficult, or fit for some particular countries only. Every county has it's hospitals, it's laborious works, such as hewing stones, felling wood, sawing planks, making ropes, and tow, the first dressing of wool, hemp, and an infinity of other things sufficient to maintain a man

man against whom the laws are justly incensed.

HANDS may likewise be transmitted from one workhouse to another, where the country affords more work. Such an establishment requires little expence, but great order, and an exact and uniform police.

BESIDES begging, men have other ways of subsisting pernicious to society: and I will again venture to assert, that population always decreases in proportion to the encrease of such kinds of occupation.

THAT amazing multitude of livery servants chosen from among the most robust and best made men in the country, can never make amends by their consumptions for the want of that better degree of culture, which the lands had a right to expect from them. The state loses on the capital of it's commodities and the balance of it's trade; and the public revenues will be weakened thereby, so long as that object of luxury, pernicious fruit of a bad principle, shall not be subjected to such an impost, as shall keep it within proper bounds.

Two or three thousand, or perhaps more, water-carriers are employed in Paris to do what four hundred carts might perform equally well. The quays, bridges, and streets, of that city are more and more crouded every day with pedlars, old clothes-men, and other such like people, whose station in life cannot

well be defined; and who live by doing needless things; by hawking about lottery tickets, an invention, perhaps, fully as hurtful to the ease and honesty of the people, as all the other effects of unpunished idleness. All these men, deserters from tillage, navigation, and manufactories, did not want for employment and wages; but they have found out a way of getting more by doing no one useful thing: void of care and without families, they lead a more debauched life, too often supported by larceny.

THOUGH the legislator cannot, nor ought to enter into the particular details of every subject; can it be doubted how much it concerns him to forbid in general by his laws, all public acts that tend to depopulation, and the ruin of society? I do not pretend that a particular plan of life or industry should be laid down for every man, but only that such things as are incompatible with public order, should be suppressed and prevented.

THAT indeed can never be so well effected as when foreign trade shall incessantly procure the totality of the people new riches together with new branches of useful industry.

If the proper employment of industrious men, is what constitutes essentially the strength of the body politic; it follows, that to multiply the days of that employment is to multiply the resources of the state. It were to be wished as Don Geronimo de Ustariz, the Spaniard,

Spaniard, observes, that it were possible, without interfering with the public worship of God, to provide for the wants of the poor: every holiday is a diminution of at least eight millions of piastres out of their wages. It must be owned that in those dioceses where festivals are less strictly observed, all the working people do not profit by it: but that is less owing to their zeal and piety, than to their habitual depravity of life. Many, however, make a good use of it; it gains ground imperceptibly, and to encourage it still more, it would, perhaps, not be amiss to oblige all shopkeepers to keep their shops open when permitted by the superior clergy.

THOUGH all men are born to labour, the the inequality of conditions has introduced among them very reasonable distinctions with regard to the object of that labour. We will here call employment of the intellectual faculty whatever is not the work of the mechanic labour of the body.

THE more the principles of a frivolous education have introduced variety among a people, the more those distinctions are become shameful and humiliating.

THAT, however, is not the only abuse: as all endeavour to rise, men born in a middling station would think they demeaned themselves, if they stooped to the class in which their grandfathers were born. If those

those middling classes were more numerous than their proportion with the others could well bear, the multitude of men, whom pride would keep poor and idle, would be as infinite as their pretensions: very few of them would marry, and the celibacy forced upon part of the children would be thought a necessary cruelty on account of the rest.

PUBLIC prejudice would thus encrease daily, together with the causes of depopulation, whilst no body would think of explaining what in the public order is understood by reputable profession and honourable family.

FARMING, navigation, arts, and commerce, not being included in these vague indefinite terms, because none would apply to them for resources, all such as should have grown rich in these four classes would leave them as quick as possible.

If the admission into the class distinguished by public order could be bought on terms ruinous to the prince's domain, all the rich would have a double inducement to abandon their former state to purchase lands, and live in a manner suitable to the prejudices of their new condition. If their descendants chanced to impoverish themselves, they would hold all kind of work in still greater contempt. The army would be their resource, but the causes of depopulation would not be the less multiplied.

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To suppress the venality of nobility in France might be now a more brilliant than useful operation; both on account of the public wants, and, because it is of consequence not to retrench such objects of emulation as men have been accustomed to; and likewise because it would be depriving one's self of those extraordinary talents, which chance does not confine to any one class, as the national prejudices would have it be; but above all for fear the rich should carry their fortunes over to some other country, where they could enjoy what their own refused them.

THE privileged nobility in France, always separated from the other by a boundless space, or, at least, by such a one as great men only can stride over, will be forced, as they multiply to confine themselves pretty nearly to the occupations of the order from which they sprung: France begins already to find that effect from her multiplying of privileges. If the legislator did but add to the first expedient, some few signal favours in behalf of such kinds of occupation as should be judged most proper to be preferred, one might hope to see prejudices soon subside in every proportional class of the subjects; labour would insensibly resume her rights, and the causes of depopulation would diminish.

VANITY does not confine to any one class of men her opposition to the better employment of their mental faculties. She it is that,
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backed by too great a number of colleges and academies merely literary, produces and keeps up, to the prejudice of all ranks of people, wretched poets, insipid novelists, and all the numerous tribe of scriblers and pretended wits and *beaux esprits*. Agreeing among themselves in one point only, their superstitious worship of fancy, they resemble each other in petulance, and in being equally, in the highest degree, useless to society.

THE loss of those men is already inestimable in itself; but, by becoming an object of luxury with the great and rich, they have infected both sexes with their contagious flights. A too fatal imitation has carried the spirit of levity and giddiness even to the mechanic, the whole inheritance of whose widow and children will, perhaps, be to know how to beg their bread in more elegant words.

NOTHING but ridicule and the sharpest criticism can avenge society of such wrongs: for sound criticism is as formidable to a little wit, as it is advantageous to a genius truly great.

LET not a vain indulgence be claimed here: the imperfection of humanity, I grant, is such that it's good things are never without some mixture. Did not the wisest of men deserve the hemlock draught? Humiliating, but useful reflection! Athens justly preferred the preservation of public order, to the life of her best philosophers.

I DO

I do not after all desire a law should be passed to forbid people from losing their time in scribbling, but only that a proper degree of ridicule be tacked to it. It is not the multitude of bad writers that makes them better: in the career of imagination every man born with but a small genius, will make but a bad author as long as he lives; they are synonymous terms. The names of such as are animated by a genius truly great, will live as long as the annals of the nation that has them. But the sole consideration of the lustre it enjoys, will make no ordinary men take up the pen. The works of those great masters will be the study of well organised heads, and of the small number of such as are worthy to imitate them.

No man can be more ready than I am, to pay to all pleasing arts that tribute of praise which cannot be refused them without injustice, nor without hurting the real good of society. Several passages in this work must screen me from any contrary invitation. But many, to whose sentiments I owe the greatest deference, tax me with having seen the abuse that is made of our intellectual faculties, with too severe an eye. I had rather own it, than seem to persist in a dangerous opinion. But yet I do not know whether the abuse of the academies *merely and purely literary*, with which our provinces abound, deserves so little attention as is pretended. It is not the loss
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of five or six hundred men known to polite literature, that I regret; some of them do honour to their country; and others, as manufacturers will always deserve some regard. But with what eye shall we look upon the inestimable loss of time of thousands of young people in every province, whom the frivolous advantage of being thought witty, induces to neglect those studies to which they were destined by their birth and family? Can it be thought sufficient to renounce all wildness and levity of mind at the very instant when a man enters on a profession? That it is quite easy to check an imagination, the flights and starts of which have been long applauded? In short, is not the time when a man enters into life, that wherein he ought rather to act than study? It is not only in that light that I consider the abuse of the mind: let us penetrate into the private transactions of families; we shall see women give up all domestic cares, to indulge themselves in the reading of books, which, far from forming, corrupt their minds; we shall see them despise the company and counsels of a husband, who is only a man of plain good sense, and study to deserve a ridiculous character; a mother will consult the man that amuses her most, about the plan of education, or the choice of a tutor for her son. I do not pretend to enumerate all the follies, the affectation of *bel esprit*, has been productive of in our days: I am
content

content to observe that it is hurtful, even to the progress of learning. The pretended good company, of which the *bel esprit* is the charm and idol, is fit only to enervate a young author, to fill him with that inconsiderate and rash confidence, which is a certain symptom of neglect of study, and of very indifferent performances. Let us, in fine, apply to this luxury of mind, the principles that have guided us in our own examination of that which appertains to commerce. It is not to be feared, if it proceeds from a useful principle, that is to say, from public instruction and a general taste for that well seasoned reason in which all true wit consists. I do not speak of the academies where they ought to be, because it is proper there should be distinctions there for eminent men, and that every kind of luxury should center there.

If perfection in the sciences is reserved to a certain degree of intelligence, seldom given by nature, it is at least certain that every degree of knowledge that is acquired, has it's usefulness. Mediocrity in an astronomer, a mathematician, naturalist, chymist, lawyer, and, in short, in any of the sciences, is sufficient to qualify a man for numbers of employments in society; for, even that mediocrity always supposes some degree of judgment and application. *Neque enim ita gene-*

rati

rati a natura sumus, ut ad ludum & jocum facti esse videamur, sed ad severitatem potius & ad quaedam studia graviora atque majora. Ludo autem & joco, uti illis quidem licet, sed sicut somno, & quietibus caeteris, tum cum gravibus seriisque rebus satisfecerimus. Cic. de offic. lib. I.

FOR many other particulars relating to a knowledge in the balance of trade, the reader may please to consult my dictionary of commerce.—Every one will discern how far these sentiments of Mons. Melon, a judicious Frenchman, are applicable to these kingdoms. But by what peculiar means the particular balances of trade, and in consequence thereof, the general balance may be augmented for the benefit of Great Britain, is the intent of the present treatise.

WISHING, that it might be well understood in this nation, from what general as well as particular system of police the commercial grandeur of France has proceeded, I thought it my duty, before I laid down my pen, to display the same in a connected view: and judging one essential cause thereof has been owing to the general cheapness of their commodities; I have laid the foundation of these papers, by endeavouring to show, by what measures, I humbly apprehend, we may be enabled the sooner to compete with this rival kingdom, in that respect, which is, by urging the necessity of taking more and
more

more land into cultivation, till we should be capable of gradually diminishing our taxes, by the gradual lessening of our public debts. Hereby likewise, we conceive, that all future scarcity of grain, and other provisions, in the kingdom, may be effectually prevented; in order to render the necessaries of life and labour cheaper, that our arts and manufactures may become so, in consequence thereof.

WE have next taken under consideration the produce and trade of England, and compared them with those of Scotland, and Ireland, and the British plantations; and also with each other, from a view further to enforce the reasonableness and necessity of England's falling into the measures before recommended; shewing otherwise that her lands and her trade are not less likely to be ruined by her own dominions than by foreign rivals. This is the tenor of the two first dissertations.

BUILDING much on the greater cultivation of land, it has been judged eligible to give a summary of various general principles of agriculture, as founded on experience, for the better improvement of our lands; in order the better to promote that general plenty and prosperity in England aimed at by these writings. As connected herewith, we have entered upon the point of establishing public and private granaries. These make the subject of the three succeeding discourses.

FROM hence I have examined into the essential connections of trade between

Great Britain and Ireland, and the British plantations, and pointed out such productions, manufactures, and trades, as England, Scotland, Ireland, and the British plantations should chiefly cultivate; in order to rival and compete with foreign nations, and not with each other; representing measures necessary to be taken for the joint prosperity of the commerce and navigation of them all. These topics carry on our animadversions to the Xth dissertation.

WE begin next with our considerations on the necessity and advantages that will arise to Great Britain in general, from a proper union between her and Ireland. This subject is continued in divers lights to the XIVth discourse; the next beginning, as having affinity with the preceding, on the point of annexing the Isle of Man to Great Britain, and thereby to lay the axe to the root of the infamous practice of smuggling carried on from thence.

FROM considering the commercial state of our concerns in Europe, we next take a succinct view of the constitution of the British plantations in America, and of the condition wherein they have many years been; pointing out the chief and disregarded causes of their becoming the present seat of war; with reflections how they may recover their strength and stability, and become a match for our enemies. This is the tenor of our endeavours

endeavours from the XVIth to the XIXth discourse.

To corroborate our humble sentiments on those concerns, we have subsequently taken a review of the conduct of France, in relation to the North-American colonies. On this capital point we have endeavoured to give a comparison between her management of her American affairs, and that of Great Britain. This subject carries us to dissertation XXI.; when the next enters upon a matter no less interesting at this juncture—and I call it the system of the French with regard to their African trade; wherein will appear by what police they have become so successful therein, and obtained the advantage so greatly over us. This is continued to the XXIIId discourse; beginning next, as the reader will discern the reason, with a summary review of the commerce of France in the East-Indies; shewing by what gradations they have advanced the same, and how Great Britain stands in contrast with them in that respect. Dissertation XXIV. treats of the policy of England with regard to her management of the African trade; with considerations how the same might have been better conducted, and far more extended for the general interest of the nation; with a farther comparison between our management and that of France, respecting the same: and by what means our East-

India company may be rendered instrumental to the security and advancement of this commerce. The XXVth discourse continues the preceding subject. I next consider, in the XXVI. the increase of the naval power of France and Spain, by the means of their FISHERIES, and show the necessity of England balancing that degree of naval power, by the carrying of her fisheries to the full extent they will admit of. And to the end that the reader may have before him in full view the present state of the commercial connections of France, we have taken a survey of her trade with all the European nations, which finishes the XXVIIth discourse.

AFTER this, we enter more minutely, in the XXVIIIth dissertation, into the essential principles of navigation in general, and fisheries in particular, and shew how they contribute to give the balance of commerce, and consequently of power.—And in order to apply those maxims to the state of affairs in the times of war, we have next taken into our consideration the best methods of stationing our convoys and cruizers for the security and protection of our trade and navigation, and for the annoying those of the enemy. This is the purport of discourse XXIX. And that our naval force may not be obstructed in its full exertion to the utmost public benefit and advantage, I have shewed the
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ill policy of our insuring the ships and merchandizes of the enemy in times of war: with considerations on the detrimental consequences to our trade, and the advantages to that of France, arising from so many neutral maritime carriers. This point finishes the XXXth dissertation; and the subsequent topic is an enquiry how long France may be presumed to carry on the war from the present state of affairs, according to the old system of conduct.

IN our next discourse, we have given a summary of general maxims regarding the prosperity of our national commerce, as founded on experience, and the sentiments of the most knowing and judicious.

THAT what has been urged throughout these discourses may be the better relished by the reader, and make the desired impression upon his understanding, we have next given a recapitulation of fundamental principles, whereon the national trade may be promoted in every branch. This concludes dissertation XXXII; and is introductory to what is urged in the subsequent discourse, of arts and manufactories.

IN order to render this work the more seasonable at this critical conjuncture of public affairs, we afterwards make an enquiry into the reasons why Holland has changed her system of late years towards the court of England; giving an abstract of a genuine remarkable
speech

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speech said to be made at a conference by the
—d P—r of Holland, in the year
1742, before certain British lords, who were
sent on an embassy to engage the Dutch in
British measures: with remarks shewing that
Holland expects Great Britain should change
her system towards that republic, before she
can alter hers; with some intimation how
Great Britain may change her system to gain
the Dutch, and several other her natural allies,
as principals in the present war against France;
and that at little expence to this nation in
comparison to what it has cost heretofore:
This subject finishes the XXXIVth discourse.

AFTER that I have animadverted on the
conduct of the court of Spain towards that
of Great Britain, since the peace of Utrecht;
with remarks on the extraordinary friendship
that we may reasonably expect from that na-
tion at present: with this subject ends the
XXXVth dissertation.

IN the subsequent discourse, we enter
upon the necessity of Great Britain being at
present more closely connected and allied
with the continent than she ever has been,
though upon quite different principles; and
not at such an expence in time of war, as has
been the case heretofore. Here ends the
XXXVIth discourse.

I NEXT enter upon the general principles,
whereon the balance of trade is founded;
with the application thereof to the present
work

work, in a recapitulation of it's contents
 the consideration of which is earnestly recom-
 mended to the public regard, in order to
throw the balance of trade so effectually into the
hands of Great Britain, as to put the constant
balance of power in Europe into her hands.
Discourse XXXVII.

F I N I S.

work, in a recognition of its contribution
the consideration of which is a necessary
in order to the public regard, in order to
thrive the balance of the year, and in order
hands of Great Britain, in order to put the country
balance of power in Europe, and in order
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F I N I S